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Anarchism and religion have historically had an uneasy relationship. 
Indeed, representatives of both sides have regularly insisted on the 
fundamental incompatibility of anarchist and religious ideas and practices. 
Yet, ever since the emergence of anarchism as an intellectual and political 
movement, a considerable number of religious anarchists have insisted 
that their religious tradition necessarily implies an anarchist political 
stance. 
Reflecting both a rise of interest in anarchist ideas and activism on the 
one hand, and the revival of religious ideas and movements in the political 
sphere on the other, this multi-volume collection examines congruities 
and contestations between the two from a diverse range of academic 
perspectives.
The third volume of Essays in Anarchism & Religion includes five essays 
focusing on particular individuals (Abraham Heyn, Leo Tolstoy, Herbert 
Read, Daniel Guérin and Martin Buber), one essay on the affinities 
between mysticism and anarchism, and one surveying the vast territory 
of ‘spiritual anarchism’. 
In a world where political ideas increasingly matter once more, and religion 
is an increasingly visible aspect of global political life, these essays offer 
scholarly analysis of overlooked activists, ideas and movements, and as 
such reveal the possibility of a powerful critique of contemporary global 
society.
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International 
Relations at Loughbourough University
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Anarchism, Religion, and the 
Religiousness of Political Ideologies 
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos & Matthew S. Adams
Loughborough University, UK 
Borders are often messy, contested spaces. This is true not just 
of physical borders, but intellectual ones too: the spaces between 
traditions, ideas, and concepts are often disputed  territories. The 
border between ‘religion’ and ‘political ideology’ is no  different. 
At first sight, the central focus of each seems  different: religions 
appear to deal with the divine, whereas political ideologies are 
ostensibly concerned with the all-too-human world of political 
and economic reality. But on closer inspection this confident dis-
tinction appears more vulnerable: both terms signify systems of 
thought and associated  practices; religions do not always refer to 
God or gods (and the assumption that  religions deal with the divine 
is narrow, rather monotheistic, and quite Eurocentric);  nearly all 
religions take positions on political and economic  questions; and 
political ideologies can be preached with religious fervour, can ele-
vate particular people to the status of ‘prophets’, and often come 
with their own revered symbols and memorabilia. At a minimum, 
therefore, we might say that ‘religion’ and  ‘political ideology’ 
are locked in a territorial dispute, their shared boundary vulnera-
ble to marauding bands from either side. 
Definitions do not help tidy up the distinction. We noted how 
 diverse the definitions of ‘religion’ are in our introduction to 
Volume II.1 But there is no single definition of ‘ideology’ either, with 
We are very grateful to the two anonymous reviewers’ suggestions to im-
prove this introduction, many of which we have taken on board.
 1 Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Matthew S. Adams, “Anarchism and 
Religion: Exploring Definitions,” in Essays in Anarchism and Religion: 
How to cite this book chapter:
Christoyannopoulos, A. and Adams, M. S. 2020. Anarchism, Religion, and 
the Religiousness of Political Ideologies. In: Christoyannopoulos, A. and 
Adams, M. S. (eds.) Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III. Pp. 1–20. 
Stockholm: Stockholm University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16993/
bbb.a. License: CC-BY.
2 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
millions of politics students being offered at least four  different 
standard stories from which to choose: for many Marxists, ide-
ology refers to a distortion of reality, a false narrative which is 
controlled by the ruling classes and which distracts the exploited 
from recognising the fact of their exploitation; for many liberals, 
ideology denotes a closed (even totalitarian) system of thought 
which provides a means of ensuring compliance; for conservati-
ves, ideologies are dangerous simplifications of an unavoidably 
complex reality, which lead to ill-conceived policies; and for many 
social scientists, the term describes something more analytical 
than polemical, a framework of thought which  explains current 
conditions, envisions a set of alternatives, and proposes a particu-
lar route to get there.2 Where ideology was once the  provenance 
of the narrowly political – that is, it was the subject of critique 
from expressly political (we might say, ideological) positions and 
interpreted essentially as a means to advance special interests – 
this diverse field now focuses more squarely on the internal logic 
of ideological systems of thought, how ideologies emerge in parti-
cular historical contexts as reflections of intellectual and practical 
developments, and how they adapt with time to remain useful in 
changing historical circumstances.3 
Yet religion provides examples of every one of these meanings 
of ‘ideology’: deluded and distracting distortions of reality; clo-
sed systems of thought that facilitate compliance; simplifications 
of reality which lead to ill-advised choices; or indeed narratives of 
the current order, visions of alternative futures, and preferred 
paths to their realisation. Religions can, therefore, sometimes be 
Volume II, ed. Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Matthew S. Adams, 
Stockholm Studies in Comparative Religion (Stockholm: Stockholm 
University Press, 2018).
 2 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 6th ed. 
(London: Palgrave, 2017); Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
 3 The literature here is vast, but the most famous and important represent-
ative is Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual 
Approach (Oxford: Clarendon, 2008). For an application of Freeden’s 
technique to anarchism, consider: Benjamin Franks, Nathan Jun, and 
Leonard Williams, eds., Anarchism: A Conceptual Approach (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2018).
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labelled ‘ideological’. But it also works the other way round too: 
political ideologies such as socialism or feminism or fascism can 
be ‘religious’ in the sociological sense of the word, providing com-
munities with unified systems of beliefs and practices, for example, 
or, in the anthropological sense, providing a system of symbols 
that help make sense of the world and motivate action within it. 
In short: the terms ‘religion’ and ‘ideology’ are difficult to de-
cisively separate and then keep apart. In the collection of essays 
of which this is the third volume, we are interested in one specific 
political ideology: anarchism. The limited ambition of this intro-
duction, therefore, building on the discussions of anarchism and 
religion in the introductions to the previous two volumes, is to 
ponder the extent to which anarchism can be considered ‘religio-
us’ or be said to display ‘religious’ characteristics.4 
Anarchism as ‘religion’?
The definition of ‘religion’ is contested. To repeat our comments 
in Volume II: 
some employ the term broadly to include all the spiritualities and 
practices which can be considered ‘religious’, whereas others in-
sist on the label applying more narrowly to more institutionalised 
and often Western-centric practices and beliefs, and do so precise-
ly in order to differentiate such examples of religiosity from non- 
Western and less institutionalised spiritualities and rituals.5 Some 
definitions hinge on the object of worship (God or gods), others on 
ritual practices, others still on the state of mind which opens itself 
to it.6 Some insist on religion being a private matter, sometimes 
 4 Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Matthew S. Adams, “Anarchism 
and Religion: Mapping an Increasingly Fruitful Landscape,” in Essays in 
Anarchism and Religion: Volume I, ed. Alexandre Christoyannopoulos 
and Matthew S. Adams, Stockholm Studies in Comparative Religion 
(Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2017); “Anarchism and Religion.”
 5 Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead, The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion 
Is Giving Way to Spirituality (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); Philip Sheldrake, 
Spirituality: A Brief History (Oxford: John Wiley and Sons, 2013).
 6 John Bowker, “Religion,” in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World 
Religions ed. John Bowker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
pp. xviii-xiv; John Hinnells, ed. The Penguin Dictionary of Religions, 
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with an explicit determination to keep it independent from poli-
tics.7 Others argue that religion cannot but inevitably be political, 
and that its confinement to the ‘private’ sphere is actually the result 
of a political project.8 Then there is the category of ‘civil religion’ to 
describe politics than looks like ‘religion’.9 
In the discussion that followed, we also acknowledged some of 
the cultural biases which predispose people towards  different 
kinds of definition of ‘religion’, emphasising, for example, be-
liefs, or ritual practices, or moral guidelines. And we noted that 
2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 1995), pp. 414–16; Moojan Momen, The 
Phenomenon of Religion: A Thematic Approach (Oxford: Oneworld, 
1999), pp. 26–28, and chap. 3.
 7 Jean Baubérot and Micheline Milo, Laïcités Sans Frontières (Paris: Seuil, 
2011); Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The 
United States, France, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Erica Michelle Lagalisse, “‘Marginalizing Magdalena’: 
Intersections of Gender and the Secular in Anarchoindigenist Solidarity 
Activism,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 36, no. 3 
(2011); Tariq Modood, “Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity, and 
Respect for Religion,” The Political Quarterly 81, no. 1 (2010); Graeme 
Smith, A Short History of Secularism (London: I.B.Tauris, 2008). 
 8 Steve Bruce, Politics and Religion (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); José 
Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994); William T. Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough 
to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State,” 
Modern Theology 11, no. 4 (1995); Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and 
Anthony T. Fiscella, “‘Religious’ Radicalism,” in Routledge Handbook 
of Radical Politics, ed. Uri Gordon and Ruth Kinna (London: Routledge, 
2019); Jonathan Fox, An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory 
and Practice (Oxon: Routledge, 2013); Jeffrey Haynes, ed. Routledge 
Handbook of Religion and Politics (London: Routledge, 2009); Nikki 
R. Keddie, “Secularism and Its Discontents,” Dædalus 132, no. 3 (2003); 
Steven Kettell, “Do We Need a ‘Political Science of Religion’?,” Political 
Studies Review 14, no. 2 (2016); Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, 
Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
 9 Robert N. Bellah and Phillip E. Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1980); John A. Coleman, “Civil Religion,” 
Sociology of Religion 31, no. 2 (1970); Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion, 
trans. George Staunton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); 
John Markoff and Daniel Regan, “The Rise and Fall of Civil Religion: 
Comparative Perspectives,” Sociological Analysis 42, no. 4 (1981).
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 scholarly  definitions also tend to reflect the academic  discipline, 
and therefore common disciplinary assumptions, of their authors. 
‘Anarchism’ is not, of course, an ideological practice managed 
by an organisation that resembles mainstream Christian churches. 
The object of worship is not a god, nor is anarchism, for most 
anarchists, a state of mind open to the divine. Indeed many anar-
chists have been firm critics of religion (especially Christianity), 
just as there are many determined religious critics of anarchism.10 
Anarchism is also not a private matter. Nor does it gel a whole 
polity’s civil society (at least not yet). Besides, the term itself is 
contested, and there are many varieties of  ‘anarchism’ that make 
it, superficially at least, resistant to easy assimilation. It would 
be misleading therefore to claim that ‘anarchism’ can be straight-
forwardly classified as a ‘religion’. 
Nonetheless, ‘anarchism’ does display the characteristics of ‘re-
ligion’, especially once we appreciate that Christianity, even with 
its many variants, is only one particular kind of religion. As we 
noted in Volume II, Ninian Smart identifies the following 
characteristics […] found in all ‘religion’: practical and ritual (the 
religious performances and celebrations that punctuate days, 
 10 A sample of anarchist criticisms of religion (mainly Christianity) is pre-
sented in Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Lara Apps, “Anarchism 
and Religion,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism, ed. Carl Levy 
and Matthew S. Adams (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); 
“Anarchism and Religion,” in Brill’s Companion to Anarchism and 
Philosophy, ed. Nathan Jun (Leiden: Brill, 2018). Another example is 
Aaron S. Tamaret, Ha-Emuna Ha-Tehora Ve-Ha-Dat Ha-Hamonit 
(Odessa: Halperin, 1912). Examples of religious (Christian and Jewish) 
criticisms of anarchism include: Thomas Campbell, “Anarchy,” The 
Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton, 1907), http://
www.newadvent.org/cathen/01452a.htm; Abraham I. Kook, Igrot Ha-
Raya, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1962), 174–75, 229–30; 
Reinhold Niebuhr, “Catholicism and Anarchism in Spain,” Radical 
Religion 2, no. 2 (1937). If one however broadens the search to religious 
scholars and theologians who criticise ‘lawlessness’, political ‘anarchy’ 
and the like, and who advocate political order, hierarchies and state-like 
formations – in other words if one looks beyond religious criticisms fo-
cused specifically on anarchist theories and practices – then the religious 
literature critical of ‘anarchism’ is vast.
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months and years); experiential and emotional (Paul’s or Buddha’s 
conversions, religious music and art, etc.); narrative or mythic (the 
story of our origins); doctrinal and philosophical (theology, dogma, 
metaphysics, etc.); ethical and legal (how we are to live our lives); 
social and institutional (the community of adherents and its social 
function); and material (the physical buildings and sacred places).11
Again, however, looking at anarchism with such characteristics 
in mind illustrates the permeability of any border wall between 
anarchism and religion.
The doctrinal and philosophical dimension of anarchism, for 
example, encompasses a variety of trends, but anarchists do uni-
te in denouncing structures of oppression and injustice, especi-
ally the state. Most of them are just as united and passionate in 
their denunciation of capitalism, racism, sexism and other coer-
cive inequalities too. Most are atheists or at least anticlerical. 
Although there is of course lively debate on a number of topics 
(violence, diet, religion, etc.), there is therefore a ‘doctrinal and 
philosophical’ core to anarchism, subscription to which is 
treated as a  prerequisite for the legitimate application of the la-
bel. Moreover, internal debates often involve references to core, 
‘doctrinal’ or defining anarchist values. As for the underlying 
‘philosophical’ and metaphysical grounding of these values, 
even though anarchism has a tendency to heterodoxy that ac-
commodates a diversity of angles (‘classical’ and rationalistic, 
post-structuralist, or indeed even religious), and even though 
there can be vehement debate between proponents of each, there 
is a broad understanding about which trends are authorised un-
der the label (classical and post-structuralist, for example) and 
which are not, with religious ones often treated with considera-
ble suspicion, and ‘anarcho- capitalists’ with firm  disdain. Either 
way, even allowing for some diversity, there is a ‘doctrinal and 
philosophical’ core to anarchism.
This anarchist ‘doctrine’ also includes a narrative or mythic di-
mension, with a particular origin story. At one level, for most, this 
involves a materialistic and scientific understanding of the  origins 
 11 Ninan Smart, The World’s Religions, Second ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 12–22.
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of life, though here again religious anarchists  provide notable 
exceptions – which is not to say they all reject science altogether. 
Anarchists also tend to offer a shared historical narrative: that 
is, all offer some variant of the spread of  capitalist exploita-
tion working in parallel or tandem with the rise of the nation 
state. The contours of this story are often  shaped by an indi-
viduals’ stance regarding other important themes, say the role 
of colonialism, gender inequalities, or  racism. That  narrative 
then helps explain the current human predicament, identifies 
historic transformations and heroic moments, and provides a 
collective memory for the movement. The writing of anarchist 
 intellectual histories is a component of this identity-building. 
For a thinker like Kropotkin, historical example was a use-
ful tool in  demonstrating the practicability of anarchist ideas 
in the face of scepticism, but a particular history of anarchism 
– tracing its emergence as an intellectual force that reflected the 
broader development of social scientific thinking – also under-
pinned his own political identity. As with all narratives this was 
a constructed one (that is not to say it is necessarily false), but 
it was  integral in  burnishing a distinctively anarchist identity 
weighted with intellectual pedigree.12 
Anarchism might not generate institutions in the typical sense 
of top-down hierarchies like the state or the private corporation, 
but there is an important social and institutional dimension no-
netheless. For one, the list of ‘institutions’ founded and run by 
anarchists is considerable, and includes, among others, syndi-
calist organisations, housing communes, producer cooperatives, 
solidarity networks, and publishing collectives. These ‘institu-
tions’ all  provide essential social functions for anarchist commu-
nities: to meet, assist, debate, learn and of course organise and 
resist. What does tend to mark out these anarchist organisations 
from  typical  ‘institutions’ is their anarchist organisational ethos: 
radically  participative, inclusive, bottom-up and renegotiable. 
Yet they are, nonetheless, ‘institutions’. 
 12 Matthew S. Adams, Kropotkin, Read, and the Intellectual History of 
British Anarchism: Between Reason and Romanticism (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 77–88.
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If legal is a problematic term to apply to anarchists, ethical 
is not. All variants of anarchism preach particular ways of li-
ving our lives, or rather at least recommend some over others. 
Indeed, prefiguration – i.e. trying to embody in one’s conduct the 
 principles that one preaches – is an important consideration for 
most  anarchists. Moreover, certain kinds of behaviour are consi-
dered unacceptable in anarchist settings, as evidenced for instance 
in the articulation of safe space policies. Besides, even if ‘legal’ is 
a term which problematically evokes the state, many anarchist or-
ganisations do write down collectively-agreed rules, adherence to 
which is expected for continued participation, and constitutiona-
lising has always been, despite the usual assumptions about anar-
chism, a key anarchist practice.13 There is therefore an ‘ethical and 
legal’ dimension to anarchism.
One cannot point, of course, to ‘religious’ performances and 
celebrations among anarchists in the (narrow and Eurocentric) 
sense of regular worship of the divine. Yet a practical and ritu-
al element can still be identified. The prefigurative performance 
of one’s principles acts as a confirmation of one’s commitment, 
not least during formal meetings. Particular historical moments 
are also often celebrated: the International Workers’ Day is an 
important date on the calendar; and anarchists have actively 
commemorated specific events, such as the Paris Commune, or 
the anarchist revolution in Catalonia during the Spanish Civil 
War. The holiday – May Day in particular – is sacred and must 
be protected from encroaching neoliberal demons. Rallies and 
demonstrations – both generally and those marking particular 
historical events – are sites of anarchist performance. In a similar 
manner, the anarchist clandestine cell and secret society that were 
ubiquitous in nineteenth-century sensational fiction reflected the 
value of ritual in the context of official oppression. We might say, 
therefore, drawing on Benedict Anderson’s phrase, that anarchism 
was something of an ‘imagined community’, its symbols and 
practices offering the comforting rituals of fellow- feeling 
 13 April Carter, The Political Theory of Anarchism (London: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1971), 56–59; Ruth Kinna and Alex Prichard, “Anarchism 
and Non-Domination,” Journal of Political Ideologies 24, no. 3 (2019).
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and recognition in times of political stress.14 In short, various 
 performances and celebrations punctuate anarchist timelines and 
thus provide anarchism with a practical and ritual dimension. 
The material facet is there too: social centres, squats, bookshops, 
soup-kitchens and suchlike happen in specific locations, someti-
mes in the face of de facto and de jure persecution. Sometimes, 
such as, for example, with the immigrant anarchist communi-
ties in New York at the end of the nineteenth century, the  ritual 
 gathering in the beer hall or meeting room became practical-
ly and emotionally foundational for the local anarchist scene.15 
Over time, some of these anarchist spaces become revered and 
can even become sites of pilgrimage. Anarchists might not gather 
in churches and treat sites like the Temple Mount as holy there-
fore, but an anarchist geography does nonetheless map buildings 
and places, ascribe higher status to some sites over others, and 
inform anarchist commemorations. Also notable are the material 
sites of ‘evil’ such as the prison, the border, the royal or presiden-
tial palace, the shopping mall and so on. 
There is also an experiential and emotional dimension to anar-
chism. Not unlike Paul or Buddha, some famous anarchists did 
‘convert’ after particular tribulations. Experiences of injustice are 
keenly felt, as are experience of empowerment. Indeed, demon-
strations can conjure up powerful emotions. And many examples 
could be listed of anarchist art and music, including revolutionary 
anthems, protest banners, street art, punk music and aesthetics,16 
or even the instantly-recognisable A-in-an-O symbol that can illi-
cit emotional responses and inform the group-feeling. 
In short: anarchism displays many of the same characteristics 
as religion that Smart identifies. There may not be gods in the 
 14 Adams, Kropotkin, Read, and the Intellectual History of British 
Anarchism, 182–87.
 15 Consider the chapters by Tom Goyens, Kenyon Zimmer, Marcella 
Bencivenni and Christopher J. Castañeda in Tom Goyens, ed. Radical 
Gotham: Anarchism in New York City from Schwab’s Saloon to Occupy 
Wall Street (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017).
 16 Jim Donaghey, “Punk and Anarchism: Uk, Poland, Indonesia” 
(Loughborough University, 2016); Francis Stewart, Punk Rock Is 
My Religion: Straight Edge Punk and ‘Religious’ Identity (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2017).
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 traditional sense (except of course for religious anarchists), and 
anarchists may be more iconoclastic than other political tradi-
tions, yet particular heroic comrades are celebrated, nonetheless. 
And even though they are rarely anthropomorphised, principles 
such as freedom, equality or non-domination can be, in a sense, 
‘worshipped’. Just as religions do, anarchism presents its  adherents 
with a historical narrative, a doctrinal core, various institutionali-
sed settings, a set of ethical expectations, concrete material spaces, 
particular rituals, and strong emotions. 
There are other ways of making a similar argument. For ex-
ample, the literature on ‘civil’ or ‘political’ religion precisely argues 
that certain political ideologies and practices resemble ‘religious’ 
equivalents and indeed perform functions historically performed 
by religion (especially mainstream Christianity).17 Fairly obvious 
examples (because of their totalising tendencies) include some types 
of nationalism, fascism, and state communism, but other ideologies 
also arguably display at least some characteristics of ‘civil religion’. 
In the case of anarchism, to echo some of what has already been 
evoked above, these characteristics of ‘civil religion’ might include: 
an awareness of the sacrifices required for the cause, and a willing-
ness to make them (almost as a public duty);  respectful commemo-
ration of courageous martyrs; collective  rituals and performances 
punctuating anarchist calendars; the cultivation of particular spa-
ces for important gatherings and other activities; use of symbols 
to signal belonging as well as to  proselytise; and a strong sense of 
community, comradeship and belonging. At the same time, no vari-
ant of anarchism has yet held together, as the dominant ideology, a 
coherent and sovereign body politic resembling a state (Republican 
Spain was ideologically diverse and unstable, Makhnovist Ukraine 
did not survive its founding guerrilla war, and Rojava’s ideology 
blends what anarchism informs it with obvious ethno-nationalist 
undercurrents). Nor does anarchism impose itself and punish devi-
ance in the way more classic ‘civil religions’ have, although it can 
certainly imply expectations, and perhaps even assume that civical-
 17 Bellah and Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion; Coleman, “Civil 
Religion.”; Gentile, Politics as Religion; Markoff and Regan, “The Rise 
and Fall of Civil Religion: Comparative Perspectives.”
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ly-minded anarchists would perform particular duties.18 There is 
also no  biblical imagery, nor any evocation of theological vocabu-
lary (except in religious anarchism). The extent to which the label 
of ‘civil religion’ applies to anarchism is therefore disputable, even 
if some characteristics are nevertheless present.
Yet another alternative framework from the sociology of religion 
that could be used to illustrate the ways in which anarchism is akin 
to religion comes from the literature on ‘implicit religion’, accor-
ding to which religion consists in ‘commitment(s)’, ‘integrating foci’, 
and ‘intensive concerns with extensive effects’.19 It is not difficult to 
contemplate ways in which anarchism meets such defining criteria: 
anarchism grows from sincere commitment (both conscious and 
subconscious); it provides a content around which adherents find 
common purpose and integrate into groups (small to large scale); 
and it articulates intensive concerns which its adherents feel and ex-
press across the various sites of their existence. Anarchism, or some 
instances of it anyway, could possibly therefore be considered an 
‘implicit religion’. Similar explorations could be articulated using 
Tillich’s description of religion as ‘ultimate concern’ or Luckmann’s 
notion of ‘invisible religion’. Either way, the argument remains that 
in more ways than one, anarchism (just like many other political 
ideologies) displays characteristics of ‘religion’. 
It might also be helpful here to briefly recall the expanding scho-
larship that has questioned the very assumption that the ‘secular’ 
can be distinguished from the ‘religious’. Talal Asad’s  genealogical 
critique of these categories for example  justifies  caution when af-
firming rigid distinctions between the two,  especially  given how 
these categories are rooted in violent  imperialist projects.20 The 
 18 Matthew S. Adams, “Utopian Civic Virtue: Bakunin, Kropotkin, and 
Anarchism’s Republican Inheritance”, Political Research Exchange 
(2019), 1–27.
 19 Edward Bailey, Implicit Religion: An Introduction (London: Middlesex 
University Press, 1998); “Implicit Religion,” ed. Peter B. Clarke, The 
Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion (Oxford University 
Press, 2011), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/ox-
fordhb/9780199588961.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199588961-e-045; 
Stewart, Punk Rock Is My Religion.
 20 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Genealogies of Religion: 
12 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
process of ‘secularisation’ has in part been a vehicle with which 
the modern Westphalian state established its sovereign power by 
subjugating ‘religious’ competitors.21 It is also interesting that 
political ideologies as a phenomenon only emerge as this mo-
dern Westphalian state affirms itself, in a sense filling a vacuum 
or performing various functions previously covered by ‘religion’. 
Perhaps, then, common to both ‘religion’ and ‘political ideolo-
gies’ (including anarchism) are a range of existential and social 
concerns, social functions, and moral, ritual and emotional  drives 
that can be observed in all human societies (ostensibly ‘religio-
us’ or not). And perhaps all observers need to remain alert to 
the political interests that can be served by the labelling of social 
 phenomena as ‘religion’, ‘anarchism’ or ‘ideology’. 
What, then, does a depiction of anarchism as akin to religion 
achieve? Our intention is not to flatten out all differences: even 
if anarchism displays characteristics one finds in ‘religion’, ‘politi-
cal ideology’ probably remains a more apposite term to label this 
system of thought and its associated practices, at least in the sense 
that it is less likely to generate sometimes unhelpful confusion. 
What we do hope to have shown, though, is that what is distinct 
about ‘religion’ is not easily defined and captured; that the charac-
teristics of religion (especially when looking beyond conventional 
Christianity) are similar to those of the beliefs and practices of 
an ideology such as anarchism; and that caution and nuance are 
therefore desirable when categorising phenomena as ‘ideological’ 
or ‘religious’. 
Either way, dismissing beliefs and practices simply because they 
are classed as either ‘religious’ or ‘ideological’ is both lazy and 
simplistic. Far more interesting and rewarding is engaging with 
their content. And indeed, such effort usually leads to inevitable 
nuancing and deeper reflection. With this collection of essays on 
anarchism and religion (including Volumes I and II), we hope to 
have demonstrated the merits of closer engagement with the very 
Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). See also Christoyannopoulos and 
Fiscella, “‘Religious’ Radicalism.”
 21 Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House.”; 
Christoyannopoulos and Fiscella, “‘Religious’ Radicalism.”
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diverse lines of argument and analyses that can be articulated 
about anarchism, religion, and their interaction. A closer reading 
of the various authors and themes covered in these volumes de-
monstrates that ‘anarchism’ and ‘religion’ are not as inevitably 
mutually exclusive as can at first seem. That anarchism (just as 
other political ideologies) can be interpreted as in some ways akin 
to religion further justifies the nuancing of intellectual boundaries.
The essays in this volume
Taken together, the three volumes of our project include most 
of the original contributions to the 2012 Anarchist Studies 
Network conference at Loughborough University, where this 
project first emerged, as well as several further essays that have 
been added to the project. We hope that this will not be the last 
volume of the sort, the first three having illustrated the vibran-
cy and multi-faceted nature the discussions around anarchism 
and religion. 
The above conceptual and theoretical discussion does not 
 concern exclusively the essays in this volume, nor are they 
essential to approach the content of these essays – they rather 
speak to the broader topic of ‘anarchism and religion’ which eng-
lobes all  three volumes. Moreover, the selection of essays in this 
particular volume, just as in the previous two, is the  accidental 
product of circumstance: the essays that have been part of the 
project since 2012 came to be ready for publication roughly 
in the order in which they appear across the three volumes. 
Nevertheless, there is in this third volume some degree of infor-
mal narrative continuity, with most chapters introducing a theme 
that is in some way taken up by the next. The last two chapters 
also do happen to speak more directly to the conceptual discus-
sion above.22 
In this present volume, five essays focus on a particular 
 individual (Heyn, Tolstoy, Read, Guérin and Buber) and thus of-
fer case  studies of authors standing with one foot in  anarchism 
 22 We are particularly grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging 
us to clarify these points.
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and the other (to some degree at least) in religion. One essay 
 focuses on the affinities between mysticism and anarchism, 
and a final one on the vast territory covered by the label ‘spi-
ritual  anarchism’. As has been the case with the broader pro-
ject emanating from the 2012 conference, Christianity is heavily 
 represented here, as are Western white males. We hope to redress 
these  imbalances in a potential fourth volume focused exclusively 
on interrogating these issues. Rectifying centuries-old biases is a 
challenging task for a small team working on already heavily- 
biased material, but we remain open to considering projects that 
aim to redress this. Meanwhile, this third volume is once again 
dominated by white Christianity. 
Non-Christian perspectives nevertheless feature in two essays 
in this volume. In the first chapter, Hayyim Rothman inscribes 
Abraham Heyn’s anti-authoritarian, anti-militarist and universal 
ethos into the Jewish tradition. He does this by outlining three 
themes in Heyn’s Jewish anarcho-pacifism: the notion that the es-
sence of Judaism consists in a conviction of the absolute sanctity 
of human life; the implication for an anarcho-pacifist vision of 
society; and the prefigurative revolutionary method that follows, 
with its emphasis on moral transformation. This therefore pro-
vides a second essay on Jewish voices within the three volumes 
to date.
Pacifism figures too in the second chapter, as Alexandre 
Christoyannopoulos presents a condensed version of his recently 
published monograph on Leo Tolstoy’s political thought.23 The 
chapter examines Tolstoy’s pacifism, anarchism, anticlericalism 
and activism, each time considering Tolstoy’s main claims first, 
then some of the criticisms of his views, and then assessing the 
ongoing relevance of these arguments. 
Where Tolstoy is unproblematically described as a religio-
us anarchist, Matthew S. Adams’ chapter explores a thinker 
who would have rejected this label: the art critic and anarchist 
 intellectual Herbert Read. Nevertheless, Adams argues that consi-
 23 Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s Political Thought: Christian 
Anarcho-Pacifist Iconoclasm Then and Now, Routledge Series on Russian 
and East European Studies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).
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dering Read’s theoretical edifice in relation to the spiritual can be 
illuminating. Developed through a comparison with the work of 
H.G. Wells, Adams shows how Read saw some sort of spiritual 
union as a crucial part of a successful society, and that this spiritu-
al dimension would inform an artistic flourishing, Read’s measure 
of the successful diffusion of freedom.
The relevance of thinking about anarchism’s relation to 
 conceptions of spiritual union is explored further in the fourth 
chapter. Daniel Guérin’s contribution to anarchism is well esta-
blished, but less well-known is the extent to which his political 
commitments might have been sometimes motivated by religious 
or spiritual  ideas. In the fourth chapter, David Berry examines 
precisely these influences, and in particular considers Guérin’s dis-
covery of Tolstoy, his friendship with novelist François Mauriac, 
and his struggle with the reactionary stance of the Catholic chur-
ch. Berry also reflects on the role, for Guérin, of redemption 
through a Gandhian form of love or fraternity, seeing this as a 
kind of secular religion. 
Where Read and Guérin are both thinkers not typically viewed 
in terms of the religious and spiritual, Martin Buber, like Tolstoy, 
wore these influences proudly. In chapter five, Sarah Scott re-
constructs Buber’s conception of grace to show its importance 
for unifying his religious orientation and anarchist tendencies. 
She explains that previous accounts of Buber’s notion of grace 
were incomplete, because he reinterprets Augustinian grace as 
not just from God but also from our relations with other creatu-
res. This paves the way for an anarchist politics by side-stepping 
Augustine’s dependence on hierarchy and submission. 
Departing from the study of individual thinkers, in the sixth 
chapter, Stefan Rossbach considers affinities between mysti-
cism (in theology) and anarchism (in political theory). Drawing 
from Plato, Rousseau and Landauer, he argues that both mysti-
cism and anarchism involve a ‘stepping out’ from the mainstream 
and a rejection of what he calls ‘externalising practices’. 
The final chapter opens the discussion to a far wider range of 
‘religious’ and ‘spiritual’ perspectives. More specifically, Anthony 
Fiscella critically examines how and when ‘spiritual anarchism’ 
has been applied as a label, and how it could be applied. In 
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the  process, he provides an extensive overview of both existing 
 literature and forgotten stories, and comments on the colonial le-
gacies than tend to afflict scholarly work on the topic. 
As with Volumes I and II, we believe that this volume presents a 
striking variety of angles on anarchism and religion that points to 
both the health of the emerging field, and the deep complexities 
that characterise considerations of both the religious and anar-
chist political thought. We hope that readers will agree, and find 
these essays stimulating and challenging. 
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and 
Matthew S. Adams, January 2020
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Abraham Heyn’s Jewish Anarcho-Pacifism
Hayyim Rothman
Bar Ilan University, Israel
Abraham Judah Heyn (1880–1957) was an orthodox rabbi of pre-
stigious hasidic (habad) lineage, who served several communities 
throughout Europe and Palestine/Israel. Responding to the intensi-
fication of antisemitic brutality in Eastern Europe around the turn 
of the twentieth century, he promoted a hermeneutic of resistance, 
interpreting Jewish tradition as the foil of the state and of state- 
sanctioned violence — indeed, all violence. In this essay, three central 
themes developed in his writings — hitherto almost entirely neglec-
ted — are examined in detail. One, the notion that the essence of 
Judaism consists in a conviction as to the absolute sanctity of human 
life. Two, the implications this has for an anarcho-pacifist vision for 
human society reminiscent of Tolstoy’s but articulated in a distincti-
vely Jewish manner. Three, the nature of a true and morally sound 
revolution as determined by the essence of Judaism and the sort of 
community that, according to Heyn, it is designed to promote. More 
broadly, this essay aims to intervene in contemporary theo-politics 
by recovering for (orthodox) Jewish tradition an anti-authoritari-
an, anti-militarist, and universalist  ethos, and by inserting Judaism 
and Jewish thought — in distinction from Jewish people — into the 
 revolutionary tradition that has largely ignored them. 
I. Introduction
The Babylonian Talmud that R. Meir once accompanied his way-
ward master, Elisha b. Avuya, on the Sabbath in  order to learn 
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from him and that upon reaching the Sabbath-limit,1 Elisha b. 
Avuya went on while R. Meir turned back.2 Commenting on this 
episode, Isaac Deutscher once celebrated the former as an example 
of those radical and brave ‘non-Jewish Jews’ like Karl Marx, 
Rosa Luxemburg, and Gustav Landauer,3 who passed beyond 
Judaism because it has become too small for them. Deutscher li-
kewise despised men like R. Meir who may have been inclined to 
leave but, he says, behaved like the debased Uriel da Costa: 
 unable to bear the consequences, they returned.4 
Though perhaps articulated in less abusive terms, Deutscher’s 
governing assumption — that left-radicalism goes hand in hand 
with secularism — prevails both in the popular imagination 
and in the scholarly literature. Though this prejudice has been 
recently challenged by publications like Religious Anarchism: 
New Perspectives and Essays in Anarchism and Religion, the vast 
 1 I.e. two thousand cubits in all directions from the place where a person 
makes his abode for the day of rest, beyond which it is forbidden to go.
 2 Babylonian Talmud, Hagigah 15a. Elisha b. Avuya is a notorious and 
fascinating figure in rabbinic tradition. A student of the great R. Akiva 
and the teacher of the equally great R. Meir, he experienced some sort of 
spiritual crisis that drove him to apostasy. In spite of this, R. Meir contin-
ued to study Torah with his teacher, contending that one ought “look not 
at the container, but at its contents (Avot 4:27).” See Goshen-Gottstein, 
A. The Sinner and the Amnesiac: The Rabbinic Invention of Elisha Ben 
Abuya Eleazar Ben Arach. (Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 2000).
 3 There is a fair amount of research on Landauer and his links with the 
Jewish tradition, but among the most significant recent publications 
is Mendes-Flohr, P., Mali, A, and Delf Von Wolzogen, H., eds. Gustav 
Landauer: Anarchist and Jew. (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2014).
 4 Deutscher, I. “The Non-Jewish Jew.” In The Non-Jewish Jew and Other 
Essays. (New York: Verso, 2017). Uriel da Costa was an elder contem-
porary of (and influence on) Spinoza. A member of the Portuguese ex- 
marrano community in Amsterdam, he was put under ban several times 
for publicly rejecting post-biblical rabbinic tradition. As he reports in the 
autobiographical portions of Exemplar humanae vitae, his reconciliation 
with the community was made contingent upon his public humiliation — 
which included lashes and being trampled upon by members of the con-
gregation. These experiences left da Costa a broken man who ultimate-
ly took his own life. See Goldish, M. “Perspectives on Uriel Da Costa’s 
“Example of a Human Life”.” Studia Rosenthaliana 42/43 (2010): 1–23. 
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.bc.edu/stable/24388990.
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 majority of contributors to the effort have drawn on the various tra-
ditions of Christian anarchism. To a lesser degree, anarchist trends 
in Buddhist, Taoist, and Islamic thought have, in these publica-
tions and elsewhere, also been addressed. Where Judaism and 
Jewish thought are concerned, however, the scholarship is surpri-
singly sparse.
While there is ample research dedicated to the involvement 
of ethnic Jews in the international anarchist movement,5 a dis-
tinction is to be made between anarchists who happen to be 
 (non-Jewish) Jews and Jews who understand their anarchism 
through the lens of their Judaism. Along these lines, the field is 
largely limited to the writings of two figures: Martin Buber6 and 
 5 Avrich, P. The Russian Anarchists. (Stirling: AK Press, 2006): 204; Avrich, 
P. Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in America. (West 
Virginia: AK Press, 2005); Fishman, W.J. East End Jewish Radicals: 
1875–1914. (Nottingham: Five Leaves, 2004); Gidley, B. P. Citizenship 
and Belonging: East London Jewish Radicals 1903–1918. (Ph.d., U. of 
London, 2003); Knepper, Paul. “The Other Invisible Hand: Jews and 
Anarchists in London before the First World War.” Jewish History 22, 
no. 3 (2008): 295–315; Moya, J.C. “The Positive Side of Stereotypes: 
Jewish Anarchists in Early-Twentieth-Century Buenos Aires.” Jewish 
History 18, no. 1 (2004): 19–48; Schapiro, Leonard. “The Role of the 
Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement.” The Slavonic and East 
European Review 40, no. 94 (1961): 148–67; Shone, S.J. American 
Anarchism. (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014); Shor, Francis. “Cultural 
Identity and Americanization: The Life History of a Jewish Anarchist.” 
Biography 9, no. 4 (1986): 324–46; Shpayer-Makov, Haia. “Anarchism in 
British Public Opinion 1880–1914.” Victorian Studies 31, no. 4 (1988): 
487–516; Shpayer-Makov, Haia. “The Reception of Peter Kropotkin 
in Britain, 1886–1917.” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with 
British Studies 19, no. 3 (1987): 373–90; Zimmer, K. Immigrants Against 
the State: Yiddish and Italian Anarchism in America. (Champaign: U. of 
Illinois Press, 2015). One might also point to studies of prominent figures 
like Bernard Lazare, Emma Goldman, and Alexander Berkman. 
 6  Cannon, Patrick. “Martin Buber & Leo Tolstoy: Two Examples of 
Spiritual Anarchism.” Philosophy Now 116 (2016): 16–18; Di Cesare, 
D.E. “Martin Buber and the Anarchic Utopia of Community.” Naharaim-
Zeitschrift für deutsch-jüdische Literatur und Kulturgeschichte 4, no. 
2 (2011): 183–203; Doubrawa, E. “The Politics of the I-Thou: Martin 
Buber, the Anarchist.”Gestalt Journal 23, no. 1 (2001): 19–38; Kohanski, 
A.S. “Martin Buber’s Restructuring of Society into a State of Anocracy.” 
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Gershom Scholem.7 Some work has also been done on the nex-
us of anarchism and Jewish nationalism, a line of research that 
includes also some examination of the early kibbutz movement.8 
Jewish Social Studies (1972): 42–57; Mendes-Flohr, P. “Prophetic Politics 
and Meta-Sociology: Martin Buber and German Social Thought.” 
Archives De Sciences Sociales Des Religions 30, no. 60.1 (1985): 67–82; 
Schaefer, Y. Between Political Theology and Theopolitics: Martin 
Buber’s Kingship of God. Modern Judaism 37, no.2, (2017): 231–255; 
Schwarzschild, S.S. “A Critique of Martin Buber’s Political Philosophy: 
An Affectionate Reappraisal.” The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 31, 
no. 1 (1986): 355–388; Vogt, S. “The Postcolonial Buber: Orientalism, 
Subalternity, and Identity Politics in Martin Buber’s Political Thought.” 
Jewish Social Studies 22, no. 1 (2016): 161–186; Wolf, S. “Le vrai lieu de 
sa realisation est la communaute: L’amitie intellectuelle entre Landauer et 
Buber.” In Juifs et Anarchistes: Histoire d’une recontre, Edited by Bertolo, 
A. (Paris: Editions de l’Eclat, 2001). See also Brody, S.H. Martin Buber’s 
Theopolitics. (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 2018). This text places 
Buber more squarely into the context of religio-political anarchism.
 7 Biale, D. “Gershom Scholem and Anarchism as a Jewish Philosophy.” 
Judaism 32, no. 1 (1983): 70; Bonanni, M.C. “Gershom Scholem: 
Uno Spirito Anarchico Religioso?” La Rassegna Mensile Di Israel 77, 
no. 1/2 (2011): 97–116; Jacobson, E. “Gershom Scholem’s Theological 
Politics.” In Metaphysics of the Profane: The Political Theology of Walter 
Benjamin and Gershom Scholem. (New York: Columbia U. Press, 2003), 
52–84; Löwy, M., Scholem, G., and Richardson, M. “Messianism in the 
Early Work of Gershom Scholem.” New German Critique, no. 83 (2001): 
177–91; Silberstein, L.J. “Modes of Discourse in Modern Judaism: The 
Buber-Scholem Debate Reconsidered.” Soundings (1988): 657–681. 
 8 Berman, M. “Statism and Anti-Statism: Reflections on Israel’s Legitimacy 
Crisis.” Tikkun 27, No. 3 (2012): 31–68; Bowes, A.M. “The Experiment 
That Did Not Fail: Image and Reality in the Israeli Kibbutz.” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 22, no. 1 (1990): 85–103; Boulouque, S. 
2004. “The Anarchists, Zionism, and the Birth of the State of Israel.” 
Social Anarchism 36: 15; Butler, J. “Palestine, State Politics and the 
Anarchist Impasse.” In The Anarchist Turn, edited by Blumenfeld J., 
Bottici C., and Critchley S., 203–23. (London: Pluto Press, 2013); Eiglad, 
E. “Anti-Zionism and the Anarchist Tradition.” In Deciphering the New 
Antisemitism, edited by Rosenfeld, A.H., 206–41.(Bloomington: Indiana 
U. Press, 2015); Gordon, U. “HomeLand: Anarchy and Joint Struggle 
in Palestine/Israel.” In Anarchy Alive! Anti-Authoritarian Politics From 
Practice to Theory, 139–62. (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2008); Grauer, M. 
“Anarcho-Nationalism: Anarchist Attitudes towards Jewish Nationalism 
and Zionism.” Modern Judaism 14, no. 1 (1994): 1–19; Horrox, J. A. 
Living Revolution: Anarchism in the Kibbutz Movement. (Edinburgh, 
Oakland, Baltimore: AK Press, 2009); Maor, Z. “Moderation from Right 
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That being said, with the exception of but a handful of studies, the 
religious dimensions of Jewish anarchism have been largely neg-
lected9 — especially where, as Moshe Goncharok has pointed 
out, the anarchism or anarchist tendencies of the religiously 
 observant are concerned.10
Thus, we return to the figure of R. Meir, whom I regard in a far 
different light than Deutscher. In R. Meir, I see someone who car-
ries the periphery back to the center, destabilizing and enriching 
it. I see an example of one who insists that the teachings of an 
Elisha b. Avuya have a legitimate place in the beyt midrash, the 
traditional study-hall — indeed, one who forces God himself to 
accept these teachings!11 There have been many such figures in 
the history of modern Jewish thought — obscure as they may 
to Left: The Hidden Roots of Brit Shalom.” Jewish Social Studies 19, no. 2 
(2013): 79–108; Oved, Y. “L’Anarchisme dans le mouvement des kib-
boutz.” In Juifs et Anarchistes: Histoire d’une recontre. Edited by Bertolo, 
A. (Paris: Editions de l’Eclat, 2001); Tamas, G.M. “Ethnarchy and Ethno-
Anarchism.” Social Research 63, no. 1 (1996): 147–90; Zipperstein, S.J. 
Elusive Prophet: Ahad Ha’am and the Origins of Zionism. (Berkeley: 
UCLA Press, 1993). See also Lowy, M. Redemption and Utopia: Jewish 
Libertarian Thought in Central Europe, a Study of Elective Affinity, 
translated by Heany, H. (New York: Verso, 2017).
 9 See Agursky, M. 1984. “Universalist Trends in Jewish Religious Thought: 
Some Russian Perspectives.” Immanuel 18 (1984); Berti, F. Torah e 
libertà. A/Rivista Anarchica 40, no. 352 (2010); Biagini, Furio. Torah 
and Freedom: A Study of the Correspondence Between Judaism and 
Anarchism. (Lecce: Icaro, 2008); Chaterjee, M. “The Redemptive Role 
of Labor. In Studies in Modern Jewish and Hindu Thought. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 1997): 23–48; Löwy, M., and Larrier, R.B. “Jewish Messianism 
and Libertarian Utopia in Central Europe (1900–1933).” New German 
Critique, no. 20 (1980): 105–15; Luz, Ehud. “Utopia and Return: On 
the Structure of Utopian Thinking and Its Relation to Jewish-Christian 
Tradition.” The Journal of Religion 73, no. 3 (1993): 357–77; Shapira, A. 
Anarkhism Yehudi-Dati. (Ariel: Hotsayt Universitat Ariel, 2015). See also 
Magid, S. Hasidism on the Margin: Reconciliation, Antinomianism and 
Messianism in Izbica and Radzin Hasidism. (Madison: U. of Wisconsin 
Press, 2003); this text, however, focuses on antinomianism, which is to be 
distinguished from anarchism.
 10 Goncharok, M. “On the Question of the Relationship Between 
Certain Aspects of Judaism and Anarchism.” Journal for the Study of 
Jewish History, Demography and Economy, Literature, Language and 
Ethnography 6, no. 1 (2011): 8–22. 
 11 Babylonian Talmud, Hagigah 15b.
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have become — and it is one of them, R. Abraham Judah Heyn 
(1888–1957), whose work I intend to examine here. 
Owing to Heyn’s extreme obscurity, a brief word as to his bio-
graphy is in order. He was born to the chief rabbi of the Ukrainian 
city of Chernihiv, R. David Tsvi Heyn, a great-grandson of 
the celebrated Tsemah Tsedek, the third Grand Rabbi of the Habad 
hasidic sect who also traced his lineage to the distinguished Hen-
Gracian family, which traces its roots to 11th century Barcelona.12 
Thus was Abraham Judah immersed in hasidic life from his youth 
onward. After obtaining private ordination, Heyn went on to assu-
me several rabbinic posts throughout Eastern and Western Europe 
before ultimately emigrating to Palestine by 1935.13 
He entered the public sphere in reaction to the infamous Beilis 
trial of 1913 during which the defendant faced fictitious murder 
charges based on the blood libel (an antisemitic canard which 
asserts that Jews consume Christian blood for ritual purposes). 
He composed an essay explaining in detail not only the absurdi-
ty of such accusations from the standpoint of Jewish law, which 
 proscribes even the consumption of animal blood, but more 
 importantly, uses this prohibition to articulate a theology of non- 
violence that framed his thinking for the remainder of his life.
After immigrating to Palestine, Heyn served in a rabbinical 
capacity in several Jewish communities throughout the coun-
try, but finally settled in Jerusalem. There, he headed the Beyt 
Midrash ha-Rambam (an institution dedicated to Maimonides’ 
legacy of free Jewish thought),14 served as director of the Center 
for Religious Culture15 and, after 1948, within the Department of 
 12 Laine, E. “Kontres Teshuot Heyn: Helek Rishon.” Sefer She’elot u-Te-
shuvot Avney Heyn. (New York: Kehot, 2013): 259–319; Heyn, A. 1931. 
Lenahameyni. (Tel Aviv: Self published): 70–71.
 13 Belzer, S., and Zislensky, A.Y. eds. Shaarey Tsiyon. Nisan-Sivan 5695: 35.
 14 “Be-Mosdot Yerushalayim u-be-Argonia.” Ha-Hed. Vol. 12(8). April 
1937. Pp. 19–20; Soker, Y. “Be-Beyt Midrash ha-Rambam.” Ha-Hed. Vol. 
12(9). May 1937. Pp. 16–17.
 15 (Zohar, H. “Mosad ha-Rav Kook: Reyshito u-Meyasdav, Terumato 
le-Heker Erets Yisrael ve-ha-Tsiyonut ha-Datit.” Sinai: Ma’amarim 
u-Mehakrim be-Torah u-be-Mada’ey ha-Yahadut. Tammuz-Elul 132 
(5763): 132.
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Cultural Education.16 Heyn’s main teachings appear in a posthu-
mously published three-volume collection of essays entitled Be-
Malkhut ha-Yahadut: Pirke Hagut u-Mahshava (In the Kingdom 
of Judaism: Meditations and Thoughts), echoing Tolstoy’s In the 
Kingdom of God.17 In it, his unique anarcho-pacifist interpreta-
tion of Jewish tradition is articulated through thematic essays as 
well as Sabbath and holiday sermons.
Here is not the place to elaborate at length on the context in 
which a hasidic rabbi came to appeal to Tolstoy’s late Christian wri-
tings. In brief however, Tolstoyan ideas were very much part of the 
atmosphere in Heyn’s generation of Eastern European Jewish intel-
lectuals. Zionists like A.D. Gordon adopted his back- to-the-earth 
ethos, and his effort to supply a timely account of theological ideas 
was regarded by many Jewish traditionalists as external confirma-
tion of their own efforts to demonstrate the continuing relevance 
of religion. This is to say nothing of the fact that his philosophy of 
non-violence served as a resource for Jews striving to respond to the 
increasingly intense pogroms that frequently broke out as the 19th 
century came to a close and the 20th began.
In this essay, I shall examine in depth three central themes develo-
ped in Heyn’s writings, which have been almost entirely neglected: 
one, the notion that the essence of Judaism consists in a conviction 
as to the absolute sanctity of human life, two, the implications this 
has for an anarcho-pacifist vision for human society reminiscent 
of Tolstoy’s but articulated in a distinctively Jewish manner,18 and 
 16 “Ha-Memshala Kibla le-Yadeha et Mahleket ha-Tarbut me-Yesodo shel 
ha-Va’ad ha-Leumi.” Ha-Tsofe 01/17/1949: 4.
 17 Heyn, A. Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut: Pirke Hagut u-Mahshava. Vol. 
1 (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1958); Heyn, A. Be-Malkhut 
ha- Yahadut: Pirke Hagut u-Mahshava. Vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-
Rav Kook, 1963); Heyn, A. Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut: Pirke Hagut 
u- Mahshava. Vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1970). 
 18 There is something to be said here on Tolstoy’s relationship to Jews and 
Judaism. Though it is indeed the case that he denounced Russian perse-
cution of Jewish people, his anti-Judaism is palpable in much (though not 
all) of his later writing. See Eigland, E. “Anti-Zionism and the Anarchist 
Tradition.” In Deciphering the New Antisemitism, edited by Rosenfeld, 
A.H. (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 2015), 206–41. In this respect, 
thought it would be false to accuse him of anti-semitism, it would be 
equally false to represent his relationship to Jews and Judaism as 
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three, the nature of a true and morally sound  revolution as deter-
mined by the essence of Judaism and the sort of community that, 
according to Heyn, it is designed to promote.
First, I will discuss Rabbi Heyn’s view as to the essential charac-
ter of Judaism — namely, the absolute sanctity of human life — and 
two related principles that Heyn derives from it: the inadmissibility 
of justifying means by their ends on the one hand, and of regar-
ding the individual as the subordinate of the collective on the other. 
I shall then show how the essence of Judaism and its derivative 
principles — so far as Heyn understands them — leads him to a 
Jewish formulation of religious anarchism. This, I explain, is pri-
marily based on Heyn’s claim to the effect that the idea of the abso-
lute sanctity of human life meaningfully intersects with traditional 
theological notions of human freedom. Earlier Jewish philosophers 
and theologians tended to restrict discussion of human freedom to 
the problem of providence — i.e. to the negation of freedom and 
moral responsibility that providence may entail. In contrast, Heyn 
uses the traditional terminology but extends its scope to include 
political and social questions falling within the scope of the rela-
tionship between the individual and the group of which he or she 
is a part. Finally, I address the question of revolution, finding that 
Heyn  recommends revolution of the heart as a means of revolutio-
nizing society at large. This does not mean that he adopts a passive 
or quietistic view. Rather, it is his conviction that a revolution con-
ducted in a manner consistent with its goals, a Jewish revolution 
grounded in opposition to force and violence as such constitutes a 
position of strength because it undermines the moral foundation of 
the enemy.
In conclusion I find, in Abraham Judah Heyn’s thought, a ro-
bust example of religiously-inspired radicalism. In this manner, I 
highlight the sort of exception that Deutsch failed to recognize 
and show that for the modern Jewish radical, Elisha b. Avuya is 
not the hero of the story; rather, it is R. Meir who brings home the 
 uncomplicated and without blemish. As with most European thought, the 
Jewish intellectual must proceed with generosity, attending to the mes-
sage while bracketing the occasional jab at his person and his tradition. 
See Krauskopf, J. My Visit to Tolstoy: Five Discourses. (Philadelphia: 
Temple Kenesset Yisrael, 1911). 
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teachings of Elisha b. Avuya, radicalizes the beyt midrash and, in 
doing so, enriches it rather than destroying it.
II. The absolute sanctity of human life as the 
essence of Judaism
Let us begin by considering an essay entitled, like one of Tolstoy’s 
lesser-read works, “Thou Shalt Not Kill,” in which Heyn presents 
the basic features of his thought. While this prohibition, he says, is 
universally acknowledged in principle, it has at least three senses. 
These are the “thou shalt not kill” of: (a) the “Romans,” i.e “the 
doctrine of the majority, the state, the society (hevra), and the public 
(tsibur),” (b) the “[anarcho-]individualists (ba’aley ha-anokhiyut),19 
 19 Here, I translate ba’aley ha-anokhiyut as “anarcho-individualism” as op-
posed simply to “individualism” for several reasons. First of all — as my 
memory recalls — he refers to Stirner a handful of times throughout the 
three volumes of his major work. Although Stirner is not mentioned here, 
this would suggest that Heyn was at least aware of the general substance 
of Stirner’s thought. More importantly (as we shall see below), Heyn’s ac-
count of the ba’aley anokhiyut implies that any and all moral constraints 
to individual liberty are — according to this worldview — absurd. This 
does not at all resemble political individualism, which insists on the right 
of each individual to act as he or she wishes, just as long he or she does not 
infringe on the same liberty of another. Even a more radical individualist 
like Thoreau, who opposed civil government, will still say “if I have unjust-
ly wrested a plank from a drowning man, I must restore it to him though 
I drown myself;” see Cafaro, P. Thoreau’s Living Ethics: Walden and the 
Pursuit of Virtue. (Athens: U. of Georgia Press, 2004), 65–70. In contrast, 
an anarcho-individualist like Stirner, will assert that “morality is incom-
patible with egoism, because the former does not allow validity to me, but 
only to the Man in me (Stirner, M. The Ego and His Own: The Case of 
the Individual Against Authority. Translated by Byington, S.T. Edited by 
Martin, J.J. (Mineola: Dover, 2005), 179).” and that “I recognize only the 
right that I impart (ibid. 297).” Though such claims are not  necessarily tanta-
mount to nihilism (Leopold, D. “Max Stirner”, The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/max-stirner/>),” 
the value distinctions they allow are focused solely on the person making 
them and imply no duties at all vis-a-vis the other. For instance, Stirner 
asserts that he loves men and that he has, for them a “fellow feeling” by 
dint of which he suffers when they suffer. It is for this reason and this 
reason alone that he can “kill them, not torture them (Stirner, M. 2005, 
291).” From this, we see that if Stirner felt no such “fellow feeling,” he 
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and (c) of “man as such.”20 Let us first discern how Heyn conceives 
the three elements of this typology of prohibition, and then consi-
der what he adds to it.
For Heyn, the foundation of the statist, or Roman, approach to 
the prohibition is the doctrine of “sacrificing the particular for the 
sake of the general.” All supporters of this view, he says, regard 
“the universal” as “the end of creation” and “the particular as the 
instrument thereof.” They disagree only “as to what constitutes 
the universal;” for some, it may be a religious community, for 
others the state or even humanity at large. In essence, however, 
“all have the same idol and it is called the whole; all worship at 
the same altar and it is called the good of the whole.” According 
to this doctrine, Heyn continues, murder is not sinful in itself; 
rather, it is condemned only insofar as threatens the whole.21 
Therefore, when the whole itself demands bloodshed, the prohi-
bition is lifted; “slaughter is sanctified” because “the being of the 
one is nothing more than a footstool for the life and prosperity of 
the many,”22 because man is regarded as nothing “but a tool of the 
community… a small nail in the structure of the great universal… 
the sacrifice of which logic dictates the necessity of” when that 
serves the general interest.23 
In contrast to Roman statism, anarcho-individualism mainta-
ins that “there is no whole, no mass, no gathering, no collective, 
no community constituting a higher purpose” more sacred than 
the individual, who is “a world unto himself.” As such, the latter 
cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the former; “if the individu-
al is everything (ha-kol) and his destruction is the destruction of 
everything, for the sake of what could he be sacrificed?” In this 
sense, the prohibition of murder becomes something of an abso-
lute.24 Yet, Heyn contends, if there is indeed nothing other than 
would recognize no obligation to avoid killing or torturing others. As such, 
Heyn’s account of the ba’aley anokhiyut more closely resembles Stirner’s 
anarcho-individualism than “individualism” more broadly construed.
 20 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 73.
 21 Ibid. 74–76.
 22 Ibid. 77.
 23 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 335.
 24 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 77. 
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the individual (efes zulato),25 there is nothing to keep him or her 
in check and the very notion of prohibition is rendered absurd.26 
If anarcho-individualism can explain the inadmissibility of self- 
sacrifice, it is at pains to establish moral grounds barring the 
 perpetration of violence. 
Appealing to Kropotkin — whom he calls “the righteous man 
(tsadik) of the new world” and “a pure and crystalline soul”27 — 
Heyn entertains the prospect of replacing prohibitions on violence 
with “wise counsel” to the effect that the perpetration of violence 
invites its suffering.28 He does not so much object to this counsel as 
identify its boundary. In the case of one who must choose to slay 
or be slain,29 he avers, it supplies no barrier; “when two existences 
collide, yours takes precedence.”30 This is the limit: anarcho-indi-
vidualism regards the individual as an absolute, but cannot supply 
the ground for unqualified prohibition of his destruction.
The sense of ‘thou shalt not kill’ of man as such is a “variety of 
[anarcho-]individualism,” but a “holier” one which escapes this 
difficulty. To the aforementioned existential collision, it responds 
with a challenge: “perhaps his blood is redder!”31 In other words, 
it is based on conviction as to the “absolute holiness of human 
life and the absolute sinfulness of uprooting it.”32 This convic-
tion as to the irreducible holiness of human life, Heyn mainta-
ins, constitutes “the essence of Jewish religion.”33 It is not simply 
that Judaism prohibits killing. Rather, “Judaism is the teaching 
of the negation of blood[shed];”34 this is not “a thing inscribed on 
the tablets [of the law], but the tablets themselves.”35 
 25 Here, Heyn draws on the traditional language of the Aleynu prayer “Our 
King is true and there is nothing other than him (efes zulato),” thus indi-
cating that the individual treats himself like a god.
 26 Ibid. 78.
 27 Ibid. 78–79.
 28 Ibid. 78.
 29 Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 74a.
 30 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 80.
 31 Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 74a. 
 32 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 81.
 33 Heyn, 1970. Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 187.
 34 Ibid. 201.
 35 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 81.
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As Heyn develops it, the theoretical foundation of this  position 
lies in a distinction between “the one (ehad)” and “the unique 
(yahid)”36 — between, that is, quantitative and qualitative de-
terminations of value. Quantitative value, he explains, is “the 
 expression of a relation external to the object that bears it;” it 
pertains to “things which are means and not ends in themselves,” 
to objects of utility. In this sense, it is recognized in “the relation 
of an owner to his property” or to things that may enter his pos-
session. Appealing to the ancient ius abutendi, Heyn holds that we 
have the right to destroy that which we own; an ox, for example, 
is slaughterable because oxen can be viewed as human property. 
This ox can be killed because any ox can be killed; oxen are not 
treated as subjects but as utile objects.
“No man,” Heyn states, “was created for the sake of another, nor 
for the service of some necessity external to his own requirements 
for life.” Man, he continues, “is not a means, but an end; the whole 
of his being is his alone and he exists only for himself.”37 As such, 
human life “is in no respect the acquisition of another” it cannot be 
treated as property. If so, it “is not one, but… unique,” its value is 
strictly qualitative. In making this claim, Heyn appeals to a biblical 
census-taboo expressed in a rabbinic prohibition against directly 
counting people.38 His gloss on the prohibition is that it has a moral 
message, that it expresses the singularity of each individual. As he 
 36 It may be noted that Heyn borrows this distinction from Maimonides’ 
account of God’s unity as it appears in the Guide for the Perplexed, I.57. 
This appropriation is made all the more interesting by the fact that Heyn 
reverses Maimonides’ intent. For Maimonides God alone is unique be-
cause God alone is not the product of intelligent design — i.e. something 
existing for some rational end. However, as he goes on to explain, this 
does not mean that man (or anything else for that matter) has an ulti-
mate purpose; “it was not a final cause,” Maimonides contends, “that 
determined the existence of all things, but only His will (Guide for the 
Perplexed 3.13).”
 37 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 7
 38 Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 62b; Yoma 22b. See Liver, J. “The 
Half-shekel offering in biblical and post-biblical literature.” Harvard 
Theological Review 56, no. 3 (1963): 173–198; Milgrom, J. “A 
Prolegomenon to Leviticus 17: 11.” Journal of Biblical Literature 90, no. 2 
(1971): 149–156; Neufeld, E. “The sins of the census.” Judaism 43, no. 2 
(1994): 196.
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goes on to articulate it, “from the standpoint of the self, it is all the 
same whether it dies alone or the whole world dies with it… He 
says ‘my death means [for me] an end to everything’” or, to express 
the same idea in the language of the rabbis: “when a single life is 
destroyed, it is as if a whole world is destroyed.”39 Human life is an 
 39 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 9, 39–42; cf. ibid. 213–14. See 
also Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 37a. So as to discern how strik-
ing is Heyn’s use of this concept, cf. Ascherman, A. “Does Judaism 
Teach Universal Human Rights?” In Abraham’s Children: Liberty and 
Tolerance in an Age of Religious Conflict, edited by James, K.J., 81–101. 
(New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2012); Regev, U. “Justice 
and Power: A Jewish Perspective.” European Judaism: A Journal for the 
New Europe 40, no. 1 (2007): 148–64; Dorfman, A., and Messinger, 
R. “Toward a Jewish Argument for the Responsibility to protect.” In 
Responsibility to Protect, 61–75. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
In these articles, the principle is largely incorporated into a classically 
liberal doctrine of human rights; it is not expanded into a general critique 
of the state. 
It may also be noted here that by formulating this proposition in uni-
versal terms, Heyn takes an implicit position in a longstanding textu-
al dispute with significant theological implications. According to some 
versions, the source text reads “whoever destroys a soul is considered 
as if he destroyed an entire world. And whoever saves a life of Israel, 
it is considered as if he saved an entire world (Mishna, Sanhedrin 4:5; 
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 37a; Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 4:9).” 
Here, the universal “a single soul” appears. However, a parallel text 
appears in Avot de Rabi Natan, in which the passage reads “a single 
Jewish” soul. Most printed versions of the Talmud follow the latter read-
ing, though the scholarly consensus is that the former is correct (Urbach, 
E.E. “‘Whoever Preserves a Single Life...’: The Evolution of a Textual 
Variant, the Vagaries of Censorship and the Printing Business.” Tarbiz 
40. (1971): 268–284; cf. Jaffee, M.S. “Rabbinic Oral Tradition in Late 
Byzantine Galilee: Christian Empire and Late Rabbinic Resistance.” In 
Orality, Literacy, and Colonialism in Antiquity. Edited by Draper, J.A., 
176–79. (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004). 
Due to this interpolation — in addition to other rabbinic and mysti-
cal sources — major trends of modern kabbalistic and hasidic thought 
have adopted a profoundly ethnocentric view of human life. This is es-
pecially pronounced in the Habad tradition from which Heyn emerged. 
Shneur Zalman of Liadi, the movement’s founder, writes (basing himself 
on Hayyim Vital’s Ets Hayim) that “the souls of the nations of the world, 
however, emanate from” those aspects of the which contain no good 
whatever (Likutey Amarim Tanya, ch. 1). Later Habad  theologians, Yoel 
Kahn for instance, interpreted this in a most radical sense,  positing that the 
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“absolute essence”40 — this is what Heyn intends by the irreducible 
holiness of human life as the core principle of Judaism: an indivi-
dual is not one among many, but one and only or non-numerable. 
Now, from his conviction as to the uniqueness of human life, 
Heyn derives two intersecting principles, both based on the sup-
position that uniqueness, or non-numerability of the individual 
implies that his or her value is non-relative. The first of these prin-
ciples is that each person constitutes an end unto himself that that 
under no circumstances do ends justify means.41 Heyn reasons 
here that to treat people as means to other ends is to regard them 
as objects of relative quantitative value as opposed to subjects 
with the absolute value due a subject. Thus he writes that:
The justification of the means considered in themselves is a 
 fundamental principle of Judaism, its primary substance. This 
is one of its most revolutionary contributions to world culture. 
Jewish people are literally a distinct and superior species of human (Kahn, 
Y. Mahutam shel Yisrael be-Mishnat ha-Hasidut. New York: Hekhal 
Menahem, 2002; cf. Balk, H. “The Soul of a Jew and the Soul of a Non-
Jew: An Inconvenient Truth and the Search for an Alternative.” Hakira, Vol. 
16 (2013): 47–76). While Habad theology is not without other profoundly 
redeeming qualities, this particular train of thought is  clearly problemat-
ic, especially when it is politicized by men like R. Yitzchak Ginsburgh, 
whose Jewish-supremacism translates into a justification for anti-Arab vi-
olence and Israeli imperialism (Satherley, T. “‘The Simple Jew’: The ‘Price 
Tag’ Phenomenon, Vigilantism, and Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh’s Political 
Kabbalah.” Melilah, Vol. 10 (2013): 57–91). Thus, Heyn’s departure from 
this element of his tradition is radical in the extreme. That being said, he 
did not directly indicate this divergence.
 40  Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 5.
 41 The Kantian background of this claim is palpable. For more on the link 
between Kantianism and Anarchism, see May, T.G. “Kant the liberal, 
Kant the anarchist: Rawls and Lyotard on Kantian Justice.” The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 28, no. 4 (1990): 525–538; May, T.G. “Kant 
via Rancière: From Ethics to Anarchism.” How Not to Be Governed: 
Readings and Interpretations from the Critical Left, edited by. Klausen, 
J.C. and Martel, J. (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011): 65–82. See also 
Wolff, R.P. In Defense of Anarchism. (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 
1970); Pritchard, M.S. “Wolff’s Anarchism.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 
7, no. 4 (1973): 296–302; Sterba, J.P. “The Decline of Wolff’s Anarchism.” 
The Journal of Value Inquiry 11, no. 3 (1977): 213–217; Riley, P. “On 
the Kantian Foundations of Robert Paul Wolff’s Anarchism.” Nomos 19 
(1978): 294–319. 
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The tool which the hands operate, must itself be perfect… any 
blemish, no matter how small, invalidates it… the whole idea of 
absolutely despising a transgression performed by way of a good 
deed,42 that whole system, is the novel contribution of Judaism… 
[which] represents the opposite extreme of the idea that the ends 
justify the means.43
One must, he indicates, always use “kosher tools.” Drawing an 
analogy to the hand-lathing ritual, he says that the vessel must 
be whole and unblemished; if not “the hands remain impure; in-
deed, they create, via the water and the blemished cup, more im-
purity, thus nourishing the external [evil] forces.”44 If, that is, the 
means are bad, their result will be bad; means must accord with 
their end and in this sense constitute ends in themselves.45 
 42 Here, Heyn appeals to the notion of a “precept fulfilled through a trans-
gression (mitsva ha-ba’a ba-avera),” which normative Jewish law in-
validates. See Babylonian Talmud, Sukkot 30a, 31b, 32b. Unlike other 
Jewish anarchists, most notably, Gershom Scholem, Heyn’s anarchism 
is by no means antinomian in character. For more on the link between 
Jewish anti-nomianism and Jewish anarchism, see especially Scholem, 
G. “Redemption Through Sin.” In The Messianic Idea in Judaism: And 
Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality, translated by Halkin, H. 78–141. 
(New York: Schocken, 1971); Jacobson, E. “Gershom Sholem entre an-
archisme et tradition juive.” In Juifs et Anarchistes: Histoire d’une re-
contre, edited by Bertolo, A., 53–73. (Paris: Editions de l’eclat, 2001); 
Jacobson, E. “Gershom Scholem’s Theological Politics.” In Metaphysics 
of the Profane: The Political Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom 
Scholem, 52–84. (New York: Columbia U. Press, 2003). See also Elior, 
R. “Jacob Frank and His Book The Sayings of the Lord: Religious 
Anarchism as a Restoration of Myth and Metaphor.” The Sabbatian 
Movement and Its Aftermath: Messianism, Sabbatianism and Frankism, 
Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 16, no. 1 (2001). In this respect, 
Heyn’s anarchism is the cousin of Landauer’s and Buber’s (see notes 3 
and 6 above), both of whom also placed extreme emphasis on the conso-
nance of ends and means. 
 43 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 318.
 44 Ibid.193. See also Mishna, tractate Yadayim. Cf. Maimonides’ introduc-
tion to and commentary on the first two chapters of this tractate. 
 45 As Uri Gordon has generously pointed out, means-ends unity is a central 
anarchist principle, and one that appears prominently in recent discus-
sions of prefigurative politics. See Leach, D.K. “Prefigurative Politics.” 
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. Edited by 
D.A. Snow, D. Della Porta, B. Klandermans, & D. McAdam. (Hoboken: 
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The second is that if people are not one, but unique, and so 
unaccountable, it follows that they cannot be treated as one 
among many. The whole, Heyn contends, “is nothing more than a 
collection of individuals” regarded from an external standpoint”46 
whereas, in reality, there is no “majority, no congregation, no col-
lective, no society,”47 no “nation, country, congregation, party, 
[or] institution,”48 no “higher purpose”49 than the individual.50 
People, he says, “are not like drops of water that can be stirred 
together so that, in the end, they become a single entity.”51 Each 
person is a world unto himself. Here, Heyn simply draws a natu-
ral conclusion from his rejection of the ends-means dichotomy. If 
each  individual is an absolute, then he really is a world unto him-
self; his vital interests and those of a social or political collective 
cannot be weighed against one another — the individual stands 
always apart from and above the collective.
In sum, we find that that “the absolute and unconditional 
prohibition of killing”52 implies the holiness of human life. 
Namely — in classical Kantian terms — that a person is a sub-
ject with  irreducible qualitative value and not an object of re-
lative quantitative value. In Maimonidean terms: a person is 
not just one, but unique. From this, Heyn infers, first, the non- 
admissibility of an ends-means dichotomy where people are con-
cerned — it would imply that the end is more valuable than the 
human material  sacrificed to achieve it. Since the individual can-
Blackwell 2013); Franks, B. “Prefiguration.” Anarchism: A Conceptual 
Approach, 28–43. (New York: Routledge, 2018). See also Gordon, U. 
“Prefigurative Politics between Ethical Practice and Absent Promise.” 
Political Studies, vol. 66, no. 2 (2017): 521–537; Swain, D. “Not Not but 
Not yet: Present and Future in Prefigurative Politics.” Political Studies, 
(2017): .003232171774123.
 46 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 69.
 47 Ibid. p. 77.
 48 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 96–97.
 49 Ibid. p. 77.
 50 Cf. “Have you ever seen an independent creature called the general? It is 
nothing more than a collection of particulars, each of which lives unto 
itself, and two instances of life in a single body I have never seen (Ibid. 8).”
 51 Ibid. 143; Vol. 1, 78, 159.
 52 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 201.
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not serve as a means or a tool for others, he is not subordinate 
to them but stands apart. As Heyn understands it, the alternative 
is a dangerous fiction that “plows the whole world with salt.”53 
This complex of convictions, according to Heyn, constitute the 
 essence of Judaism.
III. Heyn’s conviction as to the sanctity of life as the moral 
foundation of an anarchist vision for human community 
Let us now proceed to consider how Heyn’s conception of the 
prohibition of murder implies anarchism broadly construed. Traces 
of his view can already be discerned in his approach to the ques-
tion of numerability. So he understood it, that is  numerable which 
lends itself to being owned. A proprietor counts his property and 
assesses its value in relation to other sorts and quantities of pro-
perty. As property, the numerable can be treated as a relative use 
value, it can be reduced to and deployed according to the desire 
of the proprietor. 
The term which Heyn uses is ba’alut. Though it implies ow-
nership, it is better translated as mastership. That is numerable, 
quantifiable, usable, which is under the dominion of something 
else, which is subordinate to it. In this sense, the economic relation 
of property transforms into a political relation of sovereignty. As 
instances of absolute sanctity, human individuals cannot be trea-
ted in this way. If they are not subject to numeration, valuation, 
possession, and so on, they are also not subject to dominion; the 
human being cannot be the subordinate of another man or other 
men. “It is clear to me,” Heyn says, that the idea of “sacrificing 
the individual for the sake of the collective originates from a prior 
doctrine: that of dividing the inhabitants of the world into  masters 
and slaves.”54 For the master, his “men were nothing more than 
objects. The master could kill them at will in the same way that 
he might shatter his tools or slaughter his animal… The real utili-
ty or the capricious enjoyment of the master determined the being 
 53 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 295.
 54 Ibid. 69–70.
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of the slaves. They were his men, not humans but carriers of de-
terminate value.”55 
Interestingly, in several places Heyn appeals to an incident re-
corded in Kropotkin’s Memoirs of a Revolutionist56 to exempli-
fy this relationship between ownership, dominion, and sacrifice 
on the one hand and, on the other, their rejection as the moral foun-
dation of “the great city of ideal anarchism.”57 So Heyn reports it, 
enamored with his father’s reputation for valor, Kropotkin inqui-
red as to the details of an especially impressive exploit for which 
the elder had earned a medal of honor; he was said to have saved 
a family from a fire. Were you “singed by the fire?” Kropotkin 
the younger asked. “Little lamb,” his father answered, do 
“you think I myself went into the fire? I sent Frohl, my servant!” 
Then, responding to his son’s incredulity, he explained that the 
servant was “my soul, the acquisition of my money.” On the basis 
of this anecdote, Heyn articulates a “general principle” to the ef-
fect that it is because a master-slave relation obtained between the 
elder Kropotkin and Frohl that the latter could treat the former 
like merchandise, applying to him the distinction between one 
and many.58 Though, he adds furthermore, “the forms of slavery 
have changed” over time and abject servitude has perhaps come 
to an end, “the foundation remains.” Namely, “external authority 
[that] hovers above” in the form of our “subordination to kings, 
to flags, parties, states” and even democratically elected parliame-
nts, which dupe men into believing they have sent themselves to 
slaughter. In all such cases, there is a master who does the sending 
and slaves who “are sent because they are under his authority and 
not their own.”59 This fundamental insight, Heyn contends, was 
 55 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 209.
 56 The incident is mentioned in Chapter 1, section 3 of this text. 
 57 Ibid. 209. 
 58 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 69–70. Cf. Heyn, Be-Malkhut 
ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 209. The story is repeated there, but in a slightly 
altered form.
 59 Ibid. 210. Cf. “Between generation and generation, group and group, man 
and man, there is no difference but the form of the master. Sometimes, it 
is in the form of a Roman crown, sometimes it is in the form of a Spartan 
helmet, sometimes [it is in the form of] a nihilistic clown who negates 
himself and others alike, a noble individual isolated in a closed room or 
a disorderly mob, a party or a society at large. What all of them have in 
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“the first reed plunged into” Kropotkin’s “upright heart” on which 
“the great city of ideal anarchism”60 — which entails “a  total ne-
gation of servitude and authority of one man over another” that 
in turn negates “the idea of sacrificing the one for the many at 
its very source”61 — was eventually built. Let us now see how 
he arrives at a similar result by appeal to traditional Jewish 
sources and ideas.
As Heyn understands it, man is a fundamentally social creature. 
“The life of the individual,” he says, “cannot be complete, healt-
hy, and full without the life of the community.” This is true not 
only in respect of his basic survival needs, but also his spiritual 
needs. Appealing to language once used to describe the nature of 
God, Heyn writes that it is “the nature of the good to do good;”62 
that is, it is constituted in its expression. Likewise, he explains, 
“life is expressed only through activity… [it] is nothing more than 
the expression of life, the ‘revelation of the concealed,’ the ‘making 
actual what was potential.” Therefore, it “is not felt without other 
people,” without “brotherhood and connection” such that the 
“soul lives only insofar as it is gathered together [with others], in a 
community.” In this respect, “communal life is the glory of the in-
dividual”63 — it is the necessary condition for the expression of his 
being and, to that extent, constitutes means of his liberty. 
Still, it is precisely that: a means. The community in and 
by which man lives does not exist for its own sake. “Like the air 
which men breath” it may be, but they do not do so for the sake of 
common is that all function as masters. One master replaces another, 
but the slave remains in his position (Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. 
Vol. 2, 246).”
 60 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 209. Cf. Babylonian Talmud, 
Shabbat 56b — Heyn appeals to teaching of R. Judah, who said in 
Samuel’s name that “when Solomon married Pharaoh’s daughter, Gabriel 
descended and planted a reed in the sea, and it gathered a bank around it, 
on which the great city of Rome was built.” Based on Heyn’s reading of 
Rome, we might say that the doctrine of sacrificing the one for the sake of 
the many began its development. In the same way, but in the opposite di-
rection, Kropotkin’s father planted the seed which grew into the  negation 
of this doctrine.
 61 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 69–70.
 62 See Hakham Tsvi, Responsum 18. Cf. Shomer Emunim, ch. 2.
 63 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 86–87.
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the air. On the contrary, “once breathing stops, it is all the same” 
whether there is air or not; in the same way, the “whole world was 
created for no other reason than to serve the needs of the 
 individual.”64 Heyn arrives at this conclusion by radicalizing 
the notion that “whoever destroys a single life is as if he destroyed 
an entire world.”65 As he understands it, this teaching is based 
on a commitment to the “negation of servitude.” Neither slave 
nor master, every man, he says: “is the sole master of himself. 
Therefore, there are no two lives which belong to one of them. 
Each one is unique and it is therefore everything… there is only 
the individual.” However sacred the community, he continues, it 
derives its value from the individual; therefore, it “has no claim 
over the sovereign authority of the individual.”66 
If so, then while it may be that the life and being of the in-
dividual — and to that extent, his liberty — is realized only 
in community, the latter is not entitled to maintain itself by 
compelling the former. Rather, the individual must be free to 
actualize the potentiality of his being in a thoroughly unfette-
red manner. “Independence and selfhood,” says Heyn, “are the 
inner being of freedom, its depth and innermost chamber.” It is 
achieved through “the absolute negation of slavery, liberation 
from the foreign yoke, from dominion of another, from any sort 
of foreignness and otherness.” In speaking of foreignness and 
otherness, he does not intend national or ethnic others; rather, he 
intends everything that that “blemishes,” “harms,” or “diminis-
hes” one’s “inner freedom and independence.” Thus, he writes:
 64 Ibid. 86.
 65 Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 37a. As I indicated earlier, Heyn adopts 
the universalist — and, according to scholarly consensus, the correct 
— reading of this maxim. Standard editions of the Babylonian Talmud, 
however, follow the text of Avot de-Rabi Natan, which reads “a single 
life Jewish life.” It is, however, unclear whether Heyn has universalized 
a maxim which he undestands, in the source text, to be ethnocentric in 
character or whether he appeals to older (and more universal) versions 
of the text that appear in quotation in many theological and legal texts 
(e.g. Maimonides’ Mishne Torah; see Hilkhot Sanhedrin ve-ha-Onashim 
ha-Mesurim la-HemI 12:3, which reads “a single soul” and not “a single 
Jewish soul.”
 66 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 42–43.
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When inner, spiritual, freedom is cuffed… the lighter, the more 
kind, soft, and pleasant the authority resting upon you, the more it 
shackles your liberty, your sole lordship over yourself, the more 
it entangles you in its pleasant visitations, the more it entraps you. It 
pounces on you and penetrates your innermost being, your hidden 
depths. Silk threads more tightly confine the body than Egyptian 
rope and stalks of linen. The heart is more tightly squeezed by 
clouds than by iron traps and walls of bronze.67
Any external compulsion, hard or soft (especially soft), any im-
position from without constitutes a violation, for Heyn, of the 
absolute uniqueness and alterity of the self which must be released 
from every shackle if it is to express or manifest itself thoroughly. 
Thus, commenting on Jeremiah 31:33 — which reads “no long-
er will a man teach his neighbor, or a man his brother, to say know 
the Lord, for they will all know me” — does he remark that any 
form of social hierarchy violates the liberating moral doctrine of 
Israel. It is not, he says:
Just that one man will no longer enjoy a material advantage over 
another, that advantage which is essentially the result of violen-
ce. Even the spiritual advantage of one man over another will be 
negated… Every difference, every human inequality be it spiritu-
al or material, necessarily divides men into classes. But the Jewish 
ideal is absolute equality — not just equality before the law, but 
moral, intellectual, and spiritual equality, an absolute equalization 
of value… Man is not one [among many], but unique. Everything 
depends on this. Each individual is the absolute and sole master of 
his ‘I.’ No ‘I’ bends to the authority of another ‘I’... every individual 
is his own master.68
What is striking about this passage is that Heyn is utterly 
 insensitive to the historical register of the verse. Jeremiah was cle-
arly speaking of the messianic era; for Heyn, however, that each 
man will become his own master becomes a demand that each 
man must now be his own master and that none shall have his will 
 67 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 76–77.
 68 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 38–39.
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bent before that of another.69 Thus does he explain elsewhere 
that this constitutes the basic message of the Exodus from Egypt. 
Judaism, he says, “is fundamentally hostile to all the ropes and 
chains of the state. The Holy One, Blessed be He said to Israel: My 
children, this is what I thought [when I liberation you from Egypt], 
that you should be free from government; like a beast free in the 
wilderness without any fear of men, so I thought that you should 
be beset with no fear of governments.”70 This is the very seed of 
that vine which God “transplanted from Egypt” and which “took 
deep root (Psalms 80:9–10)” in the heart of the Jewish life in 
this world.71
Thus, the relation between the sanctity and uniqueness of hu-
man life on the one hand and, on the other, the imperative of 
unmitigated freedom comes to constitute the very core of Jewish 
religion. The force of this conclusion, Heyn emphasizes by propo-
sing a novel and extremely radical re-interpretation of the prin-
ciples of behirah hofshit, freedom of choice. To explicate it, it is 
first necessary to turn to a talmudic homily involving the Sinatic 
revelation. Commenting on the verse “and they stood at the foot 
of (lit. “under”) the mount (Exodus 19:17).” it is taught that R. 
Avdimi b. Hama b. Hasa said “this teaches that the Holy One, 
blessed be He, overturned the mountain upon them like an [inver-
ted] basin, and said to them, ‘If you accept the Torah, it is well; if 
 69 This is not to say that even from this standpoint there are no moral 
boundaries. Elsewhere, Heyn denounces “the pathological arrogance of 
a certain people] which extends even to the point of denying the very 
existence of others. It is not just that she is the wheat and others are the 
chaff… [according to her] even ascribing to others the value of chaff is 
too much, while for her even the status of first fruits is too meagre. She 
is everything and the rest are nothing. Evidently, a group like this recog-
nizes not the naked being of another, of anything external to itself. This 
opened eye sees not the other; it really doesn’t see anything other than 
itself as more than an irritating buzz, as worthless chaos… This is the 
central point whence extend lines of blood and iron, the aggressive ten-
dency to oppress, to seize, to dispossess whatever impedes the expression 
and emphasis of its being (Vol .3, 239–40).” 
 70 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 87.
 71 Interestingly, the verse cited by Heyn concludes “You drove out the na-
tions [of Cana’an}, and planted it.” Heyn excludes this phrase and fails to 
address the exclusion.
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not, there shall be your grave,’” to which R. Aha b. Jacob replied 
that “this furnishes a substantial caveat (mude’a raba) to [the obli-
gation to fulfill] the Torah.”72 
Without digressing into the long history of interpretation bea-
ring on this strange passage, let us simply comment as follows. R. 
Avdimi suggests that the law was accepted under compulsion, whi-
le R. Aha b. Jacob points out that were this the case, the legitimacy 
of the law would, in some respect, be undermined. Heyn elabora-
tes on R. Aha b. Jacob’s challenge.73 For Judaism, he maintains:
Freedom of choice is a necessary and not merely a contingent ex-
istence… Judaism is literally inconceivable without the principle 
of free choice. This principle is nothing other than the immedia-
te consequence of absolute justice. This attribute constitutes the 
whole hidden depth of Judaism… [Its meaning is] the sole and 
unlimited right of every essence with no stipulation, no limit, no 
boundary imposed on it from without. For this right is not a gift or 
kindness from without, it comes only from itself. Since it does not 
come from any other domain, no other authority has attachment 
to or control over it. This… attribute of freedom, of absolute justi-
ce, is an outgrowth of the right of existence… [and] its singularity. 
The negation of all lordship, mastery, authority, and claims over 
the I — in this way, nothing external to it has the ability to rule 
over the freedom of this I if its right to itself is exclusive. The ne-
gation of external authority is a consequence of the right of being 
itself which cannot be challenged. 
The foundation of free choice according to Judaism is the ab-
solute justice which is the sole right that man has regarding his 
essential being... The negation of external authority over your I 
leads to the negation of lordship, mastery, compulsion, and ble-
mish on your exclusive right. It is the foundation of freedom of 
 72 Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 88a.
 73 Actually, Heyn responds to this difficulty from two angles. In addition 
to the tack discussed above, he suggests that the image of the hovering 
mountain does not so much describe a case external compulsion as much 
as it conveys an inward sense of responsibility to ancestral tradition 
(This is based on the claim that the forefathers observed the Torah before 
it was bestowed at Sinai. See Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 28b). Here, we 
observe another example of the sort of beholdenness which the individ-
ual bears toward the community; it has its own force, but operates from 
within as a personal sense of loyalty. 
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choice according to Judaism. Consequently, the measure of free-
dom in Judaism and in the Torah of Israel is truly unlimited… No 
authority external to the individual can compel him and rule over 
his freedom. Only he himself is able to compel himself. This ability 
comes only from the unlimited freedom of man. Likewise, the indi-
vidual is unable to compel anyone other than himself. He can com-
pel only himself. The right to compel an essence arises from the 
unlimited freedom which man has with respect to himself; he is al-
lowed to do with himself what he wishes. If you erase this point, the 
point of being, its holiness and its right, from our faith… then you 
render its substance a forgery… our special substance is the idea 
of ‘beating’ swords [into plowshares], the pulverization of the 
gods of power, compulsion, and the altars of man.74
Here, I have quoted at length because the passage in question 
is incredibly powerful. Whereas earlier interpreters of the Jewish 
tradition — Maimonides, for example — understood the concept 
of behira hofshit to be the foundation of Jewish religion in the 
sense that it implies the negation of metaphysical determinism 
and makes possible (or at least sensible) the notions of command-
ment, and justifies the doctrine of reward and punishment, Heyn 
gives it an altogether new sense.75 While he concurs that Judaism 
 74 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 261–72.
 75 See, for example, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance 5: 3–4. Here, 
Maimonides identifies freedom as a necessary presupposition of the 
idea of commandment. See also Guide for the Perplexed, book three, 
chapter seventeen, where the doctrine of reward and punishment is in-
cluded as well. The striking departure from traditional theological pos-
tures here can be discerned by reviewing what came before. As for the 
general crux of the problem, see Samuelson, N. “The Problem of Future 
Contingents in Medieval Jewish Philosophy.” Studies in Medieval Culture 
6 (1976): 71–82. For a selection of particular responses on the part of 
some major representatives of medieval Jewish philosophy, see Altmann, 
A. “The Religion of the Thinkers: Free Will and Predestination in Saadia, 
Bahya, and Maimonides.” In Religion in a Religious Age: Proceedings of 
Regional Conferences Held at The University of California, Los Angeles 
and Brandeis University in April 1973. Edited by Goitein, S.D. (New 
York: Ktav, 1974); Weiss, S. Joseph Albo on Free Choice: Exegetical 
Innovation in Medieval Jewish Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 
2017); Ventura, M. “Belief in Providence According to Gersonides.” In 
Minha l’Avraham: Hommage a Abraham, recueil litteraire en l’honneur 
de Abraham Elmaleh. (Jerusalem: Comite du Jubile, 1959): 12–21.
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is literally inconceivable without this doctrine, he deploys the tra-
ditional terminology to make a radically untraditional claim; the 
principle of behira hofshit is uprooted from its largely metaphy-
sical context and transplanted into the field of politics. If it once 
described the sort of creature that one must be if he or she is to be 
held responsible for his or her obedience to or neglect of the law, 
it now comes to describe not how things are, but how they ought 
to be, the sort of relation that must obtain between a person and 
his or her socio-political environment. Namely, that compulsion 
of any sort is incompatible with the absolute sanctity of human 
existence.
Thus, just as the sanctity of human life implies, for Heyn, an 
absolute refusal to distinguish between lawful and unlawful kil-
ling, reducing both to one and the same prohibition, at a deeper 
level he likewise refuses the distinction between just and unjust 
governments. Sovereignty, “dominion, considered in itself, the 
expression of rule over others, the authority of one man over 
another,” he says, “are equivalent to the sin of the fall of man.”76 
They represent a violation of the very core of the ethical and po-
litical message of Judaism, for “the kingdom of Judaism within 
us”77 — sovereignty lies within or not at all.78 
 76 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 319.
 77 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 241.
 78 Here, it is worth noting Heyn’s explicit appeal to Samuel’s condemnation 
of the people (1 Samuel, chapter eight) for having demanded a king (that 
is, a centralized system of governance). Some things, he writes, “were said 
lovingly and gracefully, supernal beauty and truth desire them. Other 
things, even commandments, were said in anger to begin with so that it is 
the will of heaven that they never come to pass. The chapter dealing with 
the monarchy constitutes a whole chapter in the Torah containing explic-
it and detailed laws and rules. Yet, the first prophet, of whom it is said 
that he is to be measured against Moses and Aaron together, announced 
aloud “you have done evil in the eyes of God in seeking a king (1 Samuel 
8:6).” Thus did R. Nehorai, who is always the author of unattributed 
Mishnaic rulings (i.e. R. Meir) said that all the laws pertaining to kings 
were commandments given in anger. The sages of homiletic teachings 
further elaborated as to the suffering, as it were, of the God of freedom 
and the destruction of slavery, where the chapter concerning kings is con-
cerned. I said that you should be free of kings in the city and likewise in 
the wilderness, yet you seek a king?! (Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. 
Vol. 3, 200–01). Cf. “‘You have done evil in the eyes of God in seeking 
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IV. A revolution of the heart: Heyn’s approach  
to radical change 
We have observed that Heyn’s belief as to the absolute sanctity of 
human life leads him to reject violence in all its forms, and that 
this rejection carries with it a refusal to admit the legitimacy of: 
(a) distinctions between the one and the many, (b) the sacrifice of 
the one for the many together, (c) the justification of means by 
ends, and (d) relations of mastery which give rise to all three. This 
leads us, in turn, to the following question: by what means is this 
a king’ — the whole chapter on the laws of kings is called a command 
issued in fury. Thus do we find in the aggadic teachings that ‘I said that 
you should be free of dominion like a wild ox in the wilderness, but you 
[sought out a king]’ (ibid. 319).” See also Abarbanel, introduction to 1 
Samuel, chapter 8. 
I have previously written on the subject of Abarbanel’s anarchist ten-
dencies. Others, however, read him as a republican. See, for instance, Cohen 
Skalli, C. “Abravanel’s Commentary on the Former Prophets: Portraits, 
Self-Portraits, and Models of Leadership.” Jewish History. Vol. 23, no. 3 
(2009): 255–280; Baer, Y. A History of the Jews in Christian Spain. Vol. 1. 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1966): 256–57; Melamed, A. 
“Isaac Abravanel and Aristotle’s Politics: A Drama of Errors.” Jewish 
Political Studies Review. Vol. 5, no. 3–4 (1993): 55–75; Mittleman, A. 
“‘Mishpat ha-Melukha’ and the Jewish Political Tradition in the Thought 
of R. Shimon Federbush.” Jewish Political Studies Review. Vol. 10, 
no. 3–4 (1998): 67–86; Korn, M. “Court Tales, Kingship and Commentary: 
Joseph and Daniel in the Eyes of Isaac Abarbanel.” MA Thesis. Baltimore 
Hebrew University, 2003; Novak, D. “Kingship and Secularity.” In The 
Jewish Social Contract. (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 2005): 124–156; 
Rader-Marcus, J. and Saperstein, M. “Don Isaac Abravanel on Monarchy 
and Republics 1483–1508.” In The Jews in Christian Europe: A Source 
Book. (Pittsburgh: U. of Pittsburgh Press, 2015). Cf. alternate readings 
which regard Abarbanel as an advocate of the aristocracy: 
Strauss L. “On Abravanel’s Philosophical Tendency and Political 
Teaching.” In Philosophie und Gesetz: Frühe Schriften, edited by Meier H., 
195–231. (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1997); Baer, Y. “Don Isaac Abravanel 
and His Relationship to Problems of History and State.” Tarbiz 8 (1937): 
241–259; Borowitz, E.B. “Judaism and the Secular State.” The Journal 
of Religion. Vol. 48 no. 1 (1968): 22–34; Ravitzky, A. “Kings and Laws 
in Late Medieval Jewish Thought: Nissim Gerona vs. Isaac Abravanel.” In 
Scholars and Scholarship: The Interaction Between Judaism and Other 
Cultures, edited by Landman, L., 67–90. New York: Yeshiva U. Press, 
1990; Melamed, A. Philosopher-King in Medieval and Renaissance 
Jewish Political Thought. (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003).
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vision to be realized? If indeed the rule of one man over another 
is, together with all the violence that entails, to be regarded as 
an affront to the divine image of man, it would seem that revolu-
tion is called for. Yet, revolution in its conventional form, as type 
of military uprising, evidently runs counter to Heyn’s moral phi-
losophy. What then is to be done? Heyn invites revolution as a ne-
cessary response to violence and injustice but holds, like Tolstoy,79 
that it must be conducted in a manner consistent with its goals. 
A legitimate Jewish revolution must be carried out in a manner 
consistent with the nonviolent essence of Judaism.
In the first place, Heyn believes that the ability and impetus to 
bring about radical change depends on existential freedom; one 
must be in touch with oneself. This is accomplished above all by 
cultivating a youthful state of mind, a sort of innocence. Because 
“hands have not yet touched his mind or his heart,” because “his 
inner eye has not yet been erased or crushed by constant oppres-
sion and by serving others,” because “his soul has not yet been 
seduced” by “society and its false doctrines,” it is “only the child 
[who] sees with his own eyes, hears with his own ears, thinks 
his own thoughts.” Thus are youth — and, indeed, the young 
at heart who are also fit to “break every barrier, breach every veil 
of concealment, every covering and hard shell that has clung to 
his soul from without”80 — “able to question and be astonished 
 79 Medzhibovskaya, I. Tolstoi’s Response to Terror and Revolutionary 
Violence. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9, no. 3 
(2008): 505–531; see also Brock, P. “Russian Sectarian Pacifism: The 
Tolstoyans.” In Pacifism in Europe to 1914, 442–70. (Princeton University 
Press, 1972); Stanoyevich, M.S. “Tolstoy’s Theory of Social Reform. I.” 
American Journal of Sociology 31, no. 5 (1926): 577–600. 
 80 Here, Heyn adopts the idiom of Lurianic kabbalah. This tradition ex-
plained the origin of evil by appeal to a primordial crisis known as the 
“shattering of vessels (shevirat ha-kelim).” By a combination of self-re-
striction (tsimtsum) passage by way of intermediary entities known as 
“vessels (kelim),” God’s being, or light, is said ultimately to reach our 
world. Initially, however, the proportions were poorly calibrated: too 
much light, too little vessel. In consequence, the vessels “shattered.” In 
their shattered form, they become known as “husks (kelipot)” that con-
ceal “sparks (nitsotsot),” or traces, of divine being. This concealment of 
divine being accounts for the possibility of evil. The human task is, by 
obeying God’s will, to liberate the divine sparks from their concealment 
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at the” proverbial “nakedness of the King,” the violence and in-
justice of the rule of one man over another.81 Unsullied by those 
heteronomous forces that impose upon it some artificial shape, 
or which direct its development from without, the youthful soul 
sees clearly.
Having achieved clarity of vision, the youthful soul is called 
upon to be transformed by what it sees. This process of inner 
transformation, is what Heyn calls a “revolution of the heart.” 
Such an upheaval, he says, was fomented by Abraham our fore-
father, who “left [it] to us as an inheritance for the generations.” 
It is to be carried out “not with swords and spears, with bom-
bs and mines, nor with any secret weapon,” not by force. These, 
he avers, “are not our tools; they are the tools of Esau and not 
of Jacob.”82 Moreover, they are “already rusty,” for “swords have 
in the husks, thus restoring God to himself. On this subject, the litera-
ture is vast. Tishby’s study, however, is an excellent example (Tishby, I. 
The Doctrine of Evil in Lurianic Kabbalah. (London: Kegan Paul, 1942). 
See also Jacobs, L. “The Uplifting of Sparks in Later Jewish Mysticism.” 
Jewish Spirituality from the Sixteenth-Century Revival to the Present, 
edited by Green, A., 99–126. (New York: Crossroad, 1987). 
While the Lurianic doctrine itself is more universal in character, it 
was, as Scholem points out, personalized. What, he says, is novel about 
hasidism is not its mystical doctrine, but its mystical ethics (Scholem, 
G. “Hasidism: The Latest Phase.” Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, 
325–50. (New York: Schocken, 1995). For instance, Shneur Zalman of 
Liadi, the founder of Habad hasidism, speaks of the inwardness of the 
heart — which is, according to his understanding, synonymous with the 
divine presence (shekhina) — as something that can accumulate “husks” 
that are peeled away by self-sacrifice by acts of kindness and charity, thus 
restoring the individual to his or her true self and, at the same time the 
being of God to itself (Likutey Amarim Tanya. Iggeret ha-Kodesh, 4). It is 
this personalized form to which Heyn appeals. 
 81 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 2, 246–47.
 82 Building from Isaac’s “blessing” for Esau, “you shall live by your sword 
(Genesis 27:40),” Jewish texts from the Talmud to late hasidic writings 
have developed an image of Jacob’s brother as the antithesis of the Jewish 
ideal: a violent, coarse man unconcerned with matters of the spirit. 
According to rabbinic tradition, Esau is also the progenitor of Rome — 
and ultimately to Christendom — thus extending his personal reputation 
to the state apparatus as such: it is violent and oppressive, it ignores or 
destroys what is most holy. See Cohen, G.D. “Esau as symbol in ear-
ly medieval thought.” Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, edited 
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never brought salvation, nor have they altered the character of 
the living.” On the contrary, “the sword is a thing that naturally 
swings around,” cutting down the servant today and the master 
tomorrow such that none are safe so long as “the blood of any 
man is made cheap” and the world’s supply of corpses and cripp-
les, paupers and madmen, is continually replenished. 
According to Heyn, it is upon us to bring forth “new lights” 
rather than depending on “old vessels.”83 What is this new light, 
and how is it to be shed? A preliminary answer can be gleaned 
from the following proposal. In place of the old “me or you,” 
Heyn suggests, we must introduce “a new and revolutionary ‘me 
and you.” Appealing to the Tolstoyan faith84 in the brotherhood 
of humanity as “the secret of redemption,” individual and collec-
tive alike, he maintains that “we need only to make this idea into 
a fashion, to hand it over to the trend-setters of the world, the 
designers of spirit, to make this wonder penetrate.” Like Tolstoy, 
Heyn appeals to the court of public opinion; it is his hopeful con-
viction that “the world is tired of the ‘blessing’ of the sword” and 
by Altmann, A., 19–48 Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1967; Elazar, D.J. 
“Jacob and Esau and the Emergence of the Jewish People.” Judaism 43 
no. 3 (1994): 294–301; Wolfson, E. Venturing Beyond: Law and Morality 
in Kabbalistic Mysticism. (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 2006): Ch. 1–2.
 83 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 202–03. As for the distinction 
between lights and vessels, see note 76 above. As for the notion of a 
“new” light, this is an important theme in Habad hasidism especially. 
Broadly speaking, it relates to the manner in which divine light, or being 
is, in response to specific events or actions (the blowing of the shofar on 
Rosh ha-Shana, for instance), conveyed unto the created worlds. See, for 
example, Shneur Zalman of Liadi’s commentary on the verse “Forever 
are the eyes of the L-rd your G-d upon it, from the beginning of the year 
to the end of the year (Deuteronomy 11:12)” in Likutey Amarim Tanya. 
Iggeret ha-Kodesh, 14. Heyn, of course, translates the new revelation of 
divine being into a new mode of social and political being among men.
 84 See Donskov, A. and Woodsworth, J. eds. Lev Tolstoy and the Concept 
of Brotherhood: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the University 
of Ottawa, 22–24 February 1996. (Ottawa: Legas, 1996); Berman, A. 
Siblings in Tolstoy and Dostoevsky: The Path to Universal Brotherhood. 
(Chicago: Northwestern U. Press, 2015).
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its fruits,85 and that awakened to the “me and you,”86 the fact 
that we have “all one Father” who “created us,” we will naturally 
ask “why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother 
(Malachi 2:10)?” Building on this conviction, Heyn represents the 
Abrahamic revolution — indeed, the “essential being of Judaism” 
— as an endeavor to realize brotherhood among nations by way 
of a “culture of the heart and, what is more, the enheartening of 
the mind.” To support this, he points out that: 
Abraham, our forefather… is the one who… is called “father of the 
multitude of nations (Genesis 48:19)” and… ‘the one who made all 
the inhabitants of the world into brothers.’87 On Rosh HaShanah 
and Yom Kippur, the days of days, we likewise pray “make all of 
them [the nations] a single bundle (agudah ahat).” Likewise it is 
written “I will pour a pure language upon the nations (Zephania 
3:9)” — that is our mission and the teaching of our mission. Real 
Judaism announces the revolution of the heart; that is, the notion 
that the world is built up with kindness and not with brutality. 
Judaism sees the secret of redemption in absolute equality.”88
 85 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 271.
 86 It may be that Heyn has Buber’s I-Thou relation in mind. However, at no 
point does he refer directly to his contemporary.
 87 Midrash Tanhuma, Lekh Lekha.
 88 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 274. The degree to which Heyn’s 
use of this biblical reference departs from that of his contemporaries 
in the orthodox rabbinical camp can be discerned by reference to the 
following sources. To begin with, consider Midrash Tanhuma, parashat 
Nitsavim; here, the “multitude” is interpreted as the collective body of the 
Jewish people alone. Cf. Mittleman, A.L. The Politics of the Torah: The 
Jewish Political Tradition and the Founding of Agudat Yisrael. (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1996) 19, 77, 171; Mittleman, A.L. “Fundamentalism 
and Political Development: The Case of Agudat Yisrael.” In Jewish 
Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, Ideology, and the 
Crisis of Modernity, edited by Silberstein, L.J. (New York: NYU Press, 
1993) 231; Morgenstern, M. From Frankfurt to Jerusalem: Isaac Breuer 
and the History of the Succession Dispute in Modern Jewish Orthodoxy. 
(Boston: Brill, 2002) 52. In these sources, we see that this exclusivist in-
terpretation of the reference served an ideological role for a fundamental-
ist political action movement. That being said, there is also a long history 
of more universalist deployments of the same reference; see, for instance, 
Idel, M. “Particularism and universalism in Kabbalah, 1480–1650.” In 
Essential Papers on Jewish Culture in Renaissance and Baroque Italy, 
edited by Ruderman, D.B, 324–344. (New York: NYU Press, 1992).
Abraham Heyn’s Jewish Anarcho-Pacifism 51
For Heyn, the revolution of the heart, nt involves the Abrahamic 
vision of a multitude of nations united under the kingdom of God 
that negates all human sovereignty. This, he indicates, is the special 
mission of the Jewish people: spreading the new light of true reli-
gion by dint of which old hearts become youthful, “dry bones hear 
the word of the Lord” and live, and the redemptive flame is ignited.
Building on this idea, Heyn focuses on the figuration of 
Abraham as the exemplar of the divine revolutionary in order 
to elaborate as to the manner in which this light is to be spread. 
Abraham, he says, reached out to others in a “fatherly” manner. 
By “fatherly,” I believe that Heyn understood not patronizing or 
paternalistic, but intimate and loving engagement — engagement 
aiming less to direct than to cultivate moral insight. Abraham’s 
revolution, Heyn writes, was:
Not conducted with blood and fire. The revolutionaries were led 
neither via punishments nor signs, neither by tyrant nor prince. 
‘The world is not without its king,’ he said to the children of Ham, 
who said to him [after the battle of Siddim in Genesis, chapter 14] 
“you are our king.89
In the first place, we see that the Abrahamic revolution entailed 
proclamation of the kingdom of heaven, of the sovereignty of 
God. However, what is, for Heyn, crucial is not only the substance 
of Abraham’s teaching, but the manner in which it was delivered. 
Thus, he goes on to explain that Abraham’s:
Method of planting [seeds of change] and its modes was not 
through proofs; though logical demonstrations existed, he changed 
neither people nor the condition of the world through them. These 
were just his ‘ands’ and ‘thes’ (gamin ve-etin) [i.e. afterthoughts]. 
Moreover, even these flowed from the essential hidden spring [of 
his teaching]; they were not strictly rational and scientific.90 ‘It is the 
nature of the good to do good’ — this is the fundamental and exis-
tential character of the absolute individual, the absolutely unique. 
 89 See Bereishit Rabba 42:5.
 90 Concerning Heyn’s implication that the force of reason can also be re-
garded as a form of violence, or unwarranted authority over another, it is 
perhaps worth referring to Feyerabend, P. Science in a Free Society. (New 
York: Verso, 1982).
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There is, in that nature, the unique key to the hidden wonder of the 
first inclination to create the worlds and to form man. The desire to 
do good that is in the nature of the good is what encouraged that 
One who is alone to create others, that which is other than himself. 
The desire to do good is, in essence, a desire for others. This is what 
penetrates others from the very beginning. The same goes for man. 
The more something has the supernal attribute of uniqueness… 
from the absolutely unique, the more it has the attribute of being 
good and doing good, the more it feels a thirst for others, a capacity 
to ‘make souls’91 
Here, so far as Heyn understood them, we observe two featu-
res of Abraham’s method. One, that he was not so much con-
cerned with convincing people, with serving as a teacher and 
— so we have already seen — to that extent a master. Rather, 
he appealed to the intuition of the heart and endeavored to ig-
nite the  fellow-feeling already there by demonstrating its origin 
in the source of all good.92 Two, he did so by drawing the link 
 91 Here, Heyn refers to Genesis 12:5, which speaks of “the souls that they 
[Abraham and Sarah] made in Haran].” See Rashi’s commentary on this 
verse, where it is explained that one who teaches another is considered as 
if he had made them. 
 92 As Uri Gordon has correctly pointed out, Heyn’s account of Abraham’s 
modus operandi is distinctly reminiscent of the hasidic ethos as repre-
sented by its founder, Israel Baal Shem Tov. Take, for instance, the fol-
lowing teaching: “‘you shall love your neighbor as yourself (Leviticus 
19:18)’ — this is a reflection of the mitzvah, “You shall love the Lord, 
your God.” When one loves another Jew, he loves the Holy One, blessed 
be He. For the soul of a Jew is a “portion of God Above,” and when 
one loves a fellow Jew, he loves his innermost essence. Thus, he loves 
the Holy One, blessed be He, as well (Schneerson, M.M. HaYom Yom, 
translated by Kagan, Y.M. (New York: Kehot, 2005) 78). This love, is, as 
reported elsewhere, to be “without any differentiation of who or what he 
is (Schneerson, J.I. Likkutei Dibburim, translated by Kaploun, U. Vol. 3. 
New York: Kehot, 1982) 770). As for the strategic function this approach 
played in efforts to transform Jewish life, see for instance Schwartz, B.L. 
“The Vilna Gaon and the Baal Shem Tov: Head or Heart? The Debate 
over Spirituality.” Judaism’s Great Debates: Timeless Controversies from 
Abraham to Herzl. 57–63. (Lincoln: U. of Nebraska Press, 2012). See also 
Gellman, U., Rosman, M., and Sagiv, G. “Beginnings.” Hasidism: A New 
History, edited by Biale, D, Assaf, D. Brown, B., Gellman, U., Heilman, 
S., Rosman, M., Sagiv, G., Wodzinsky, M., 43–53. (Princeton: Princeton 
U. Press, 2017).
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between his uniqueness, the absolute sacredness and inviolability 
of his own being which, we now see is not amoral, but quite the 
 contrary. Since the soul derives its absolute character from the 
absoluteness of God, it shares in the divine nature, which is the 
desire to create or, in other words, an inward desire for the other. 
Here, a sense of mutual responsibility, of care, emerges not in 
spite of the soul’s uniqueness, as the limit thereof, but because 
of it — for it is the nature of the good to do good (teva ha-tov 
le-heytiv). Actualizing this feature of his own being, Abraham in-
spired it in others. Moreover, so Heyn continues, he was able to 
reach this place precisely by cultivating the sort of independence 
and self-sufficiency discussed earlier:
The one who needs nobody is the one who everyone needs and who 
refines them. The perfect giver is the one who receives nothing by 
dint of his nature. The true benefactor is the one who needs good 
from nobody else in the world. This is the principle and substan-
ce of love which is not dependent on something.93 Specifically this 
love, where one receives nothing from the beloved, is true love. The 
unique one who is never negated, which is not created on  condition, 
has no condition of cessation. In other words… he who benefits 
not from that which is of others enjoys the others  themselves; 
Again, the it is clear that Heyn is universalizing the more ethnocentric 
doctrine of “love of a fellow Jew (ahavat Yisrael).” However, this is not 
without parallel. See, for instance, some of the the comments of M.M. 
Schneerson, the last Lubavitcher Rebbe, on the personality of Abraham 
on the holiday of Lag ba-Omer, where he speaks of love and “unity in 
diversity” as pertaining not only to Jews, but also to humankind as a 
whole (Schneerson, M.M. “Lag BaOmer, 18th Day of Iyar, 5750.” Sichos 
in English. Vol. 44. (New York: Committee for Sichos in English, 1979).
 93 See Mishnah, Avot 5:16: “any love that is dependent on something, when 
the thing ceases, the love also ceases. But a love that is not dependent 
on anything never ceases.” See Danzig, G. “Greek Philosophy and the 
Mishnah: On the History of Love that Does Not Depend on a Thing.” In 
When West Met East. The Encounter of Greece and Rome with the Jews, 
Egyptians, and Others. Studies Presented to Ranon Katzoff in Honor 
of his 75th Birthday, edited by D. M. Schaps, U. Yiftach, D. Dueck, 
23–50. (Trieste: Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2016); Kochin, M.S. 
“Friendship Beyond Reason.” Presented to the Annual Meeting of the 
Western Political Science Association, Denver, March 27, 2003. http://
www.georgetown.edu/departments/government/gradpages/avramenr/
friendship%20 beyond%20reason.pdf.
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he is pleased by their pleasure — or, what is more, from their 
essential existence.94
Here, we see that, in Heyn’s view, the link between the absolute 
character of God’s nature and that of man insofar as it relates to 
the revolution of the heart has mainly to do with the attribute of 
unconditionality. It is not simply that God is inclined to do good 
because he is good; it is that, being unconditioned, both his own 
cause and an end unto himself, God behaves altruistically in his 
beneficence. He is self-sufficient; thus, the love he bestows is not 
“dependent on something,” it is expressed without expectation or 
need of reciprocity. To the extent that the human soul is also ab-
solute and sufficient unto itself, needing naught but its own free-
dom, it is likewise able to act altruistically. Thus, the Abrahamic 
revolution, so far as Heyn conceives it, entails a process of “ma-
king souls,” of putting people in touch with the absoluteness and 
uniqueness that characterizes them as men, by virtue of which 
they are intrinsically good and naturally inclined toward altruistic 
behavior. This is the revolution of the heart Heyn envisions: a mo-
ral transformation on the part of each individual which renders 
superfluous the organized violence of the state.
This, so he maintains, constitutes a revolutionary program 
consistent with a prohibition against killing that is without con-
ditions.95 It is one in which ends cohere with their means and the 
individual is in no manner submerged in the collective or subor-
dinated to its utility. It is a non-violent program of revolution but 
by no means a passive one. On the contrary, if it involves solida-
rity with the weak, it is by no means an “ethic of weaklings and 
 slaves.” Judaism, Heyn explains, is:
 94 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 46–48. Here, one might reflect on 
the relation between Heyn’s view on sovereign generosity as articulated 
here and Nietzsche’s opinion on the same. See Schoeman, M. “Generosity 
as a central virtue in Nietzsche’s ethics.” South African Journal of 
Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2007): 41–5; White, R. “Nietzsche on generosity 
and the gift-giving virtue.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 
24, no. 2 (2016): 348–36.
 95 Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 3, 201.
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A moral doctrine that consists entirely in a screed against the right 
of force (zekhut shel ha-koah). It finds its consistency in a total 
war against force and its right. It raises the weak, the pursued, and 
the oppressed on a standard. Whereas they are typically last, ext-
raneous, it ensures them a place at the top of the gate… Those 
who established this relationship between the weak and the strong 
neither fashioned an ideology of weakness, nor a cult of degrada-
tion, submission, and bodily destruction. 
The opposite is true. It is because freedom is priceless (tesula 
be-faz),96 it is because the right of the individual is absolutely holy, 
it is because the sole right which the individual has over himself 
cannot be taken away (eyna nitenet le-hilakah), it is because the 
suffering of he who lacks all of these things is immeasurable, it is 
because the lot of the oppressed, the persecuted, and the despised 
is equivalent to death… that the Torah strives against force and its 
right. Force and its right are what has brought great troubles into 
the world. It is out of an ambition is to make everyone strong, to 
uproot weakness, that Judaism wrestles against the strong arm — 
this is the sole cause for the weakness of the weak… 
Here, hostility to power does not constitute an eternal foun-
dation in itself; there is no raising of weakness and the weak to 
the status of a cult. The opposite is true: power is highly valued. 
However, because of that it is impossible not to declare a holy 
war against the prime cause of weakness and the weak: the force 
of war and aggression. Because the whole Torah is based on the 
principle that ‘what is hateful to you, do not to another,’ weakness 
is utterly foreign to Judaism… When we are dealing with the lot 
of truth, with the trampling of justice and the disgrace of fairness 
(mishpat), then there is no limit to true greatness and power, the 
elevated spiritual power that Judaism discloses.”97
Here, we see that if, according to Heyn, Judaism opposes force 
and violence categorically, expressing special care for the weak, 
the oppressed, and the persecuted because they suffer from it 
most, this is not because Judaism celebrates weakness. It is not, 
as Nietzsche sometimes indicated, a cult of weakness.98 On the 
 96 This is a reference to Lamentations 4:2.
 97  Heyn, Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut. Vol. 1, 46.
 98 Consider, for example, Nietzsche’s remarks on Jewish ethics in the 
Genealogy of Morals. On this subject, see Yovel, Y. “Nietzsche and 
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 contrary, it aims at empowerment through true strength, which 
lies in the just doctrine of “what is hateful to you, do not to 
another,” the meaning of which is “love thy neighbor as thyself”99 
— love him, that is, as an instance of the divine absolute and treat 
him accordingly. This demand is its own sort of battle cry: it calls 
upon the truly strong to draw on that strength and to conduct a 
holy war against the violence of the strong arm.
V. Conclusion
Let us now summarize this extended analysis of a fascinating 
and deeply underappreciated Jewish thinker. We found that 
Heyn distinguishes three forms of the prohibition of killing. 
One, the “Roman” or statist mode which, on his account  entails 
the subordination of the particular to the universal and justifies 
killing on that account. Two, the individualist, which he consi-
ders upright except insofar as it is unable to account for the 
 moral necessity of refraining from spilling blood when one’s 
own life is at stake. Three, the Jewish (or that of man as such), 
which evades this difficulty by maintaining the absolute sanctity 
of human life. 
As I demonstrated, the idea that human life is sacred involves 
three intersecting convictions. One, that each instance of life is not 
merely one among many, but unique. Two, that instances of human 
life are, therefore, not numerable. Three, that in consequence none 
can be sacrificed for any collective good, any good of the many. In 
this manner, we found that human life is altogether irreducible.
the Jews.” In Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals: Critical Essays, 
edited by Acampora, C.D., 277–290. (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2006); Santaniello, W. Nietzsche, God, and the Jews: his critique of Judeo-
Christianity in relation to the Nazi myth. SUNY Press, 2012; Golomb, J. 
“Nietzsche on Jews and Judaism.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 
67, no. 2 (1985): 139–161; Eisen, A.M. “Nietzsche and the Jews recon-
sidered.” Jewish social studies 48, no. 1 (1986): 1–14.
 99 See Sifra 2:12 and Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a. Cf. 
Christoyannopoulos, A. “The Golden Rule on the Green Stick: Leo 
Tolstoy’s International Thought for a “Postsecular” Age.” In Towards 
a Postsecular International Politics, edited by Petito, F. and Mavelli, L, 
81–102. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
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We then saw that, according to Heyn, belief as to the sacredness 
involves three intersecting convictions. One, that each instance 
of life is not merely one among many, but unique. Two, that in-
stances of human life are, therefore, not numerable. Three, that in 
consequence none can be sacrificed for any collective good, any 
good of the many. In this manner, we found that human life is 
altogether irreducible.
Our analysis of Heyn’s position as to the moral illegitimacy of 
the state then arose from the problem of numerability. Appealing, 
in part, to the personal reflections of Peter Kropotkin, whom 
he held in high regard, Heyn explained that that is numerable 
which can become an object with respect to, can enter into the 
ownership of, something else. That is, those things which can be 
mastered by others. Insofar as humans are non-objectifiable, they 
also stand outside relations of mastery. The individual, so he ar-
gued, is necessarily and absolutely free. Jewish moral doctrine, 
he claimed, rejects inequality of any sort, including inequality of 
power; that is, inequality of sovereignty. Thus, Heyn finds that 
one of the very foundations of Judaism is the doctrine of free 
choice radically construed; each man constitutes his own master 
and coercion of any sort is prohibited. In this way, the state is 
precluded as a moral option.
Having accounted for Heyn’s religious rejection of the state, we 
concluded by examining his views on revolution. So we discove-
red, Heyn holds that the means of revolution must be consistent 
with its ends. If the goal of revolution is a social condition free of 
violence and coercion of any kind, the same must be the case for 
the revolution that brings this about. Heyn calls for a revolution 
of the heart which involves putting others in touch with the abso-
lute character of their being which, unconditioned, becomes the 
foundation for unconditioned — that is, essentially altruistic — 
behavior. Like Tolstoy, he believes that revolution is the product 
of moral transformation.
Where does this leave us? This study of Abraham Judah 
Heyn’s thought ought to be regarded as a preliminary. There are 
 further implications as to Heyn’s understanding of the essence of 
Judaism. These include his analysis of punishment generally and 
capital punishment in particular, of economic inequality as a form 
58 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
of  violence (which enables him to articulate a Jewish doctrine of 
“from each according to his ability and to each according to his 
need”), of war as a moral problem, of the interpretation of Jewish 
law and, finally, of the Zionist movement and the State of Israel.100 
More generally, the work of Abraham Judah Heyn is but one 
example of efforts on the part of observant Jewish philosophers 
and theologians to achieve the sort of synthesis between political 
radicalism and the traditional beyt midrash that R. Meir achieved 
and the Elisha b. Avuyas of the world fail to discern. Studies of 
Heyn and others like him constitute a twofold intervention. On 
the one hand, they challenge a longstanding consensus that sup-
poses an opposition between radical and traditional identities — 
especially where anarchism is concerned.101 Contemporary scho-
larship has only begun to uncover the ideological and religious 
fluidity that actually prevailed within Jewish communities well 
into the twentieth century.102 
 100 These, I have addressed in a much longer study that will appear in 
my (forthcoming) No Kings but the Lord: Varieties of Religious 
Jewish Anarchism. In brief, as I indicated earlier, Heyn worked for the 
Department of Cultural Education after the foundation of the state of 
Israel in 1948. While he does not directly address the apparent incon-
sistency of his personal engagement with the state apparatus and his 
own anarchism, he does — on several occasions in the third volume of 
Be-Malkhut ha-Yahadut — address the question more generally. That is, 
how his ideas might square with the existence of a Jewish state. In my 
view, he is ultimately unsuccessful. However, in many respects his effort 
parallels Buber’s (see Buber, M. A Land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on 
Jews and Arabs, edited by Mendes-Flohr, P. Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 
2005) — his anarchism becomes an anarchist ethos within the frame-
work of a moral critique of the policies and practices of the State of Israel 
(or a foundation for one) that falls short of rejecting its legitimacy.
 101  Margolis, Rebecca E. “A Tempest in Three Teapots: Yom Kippur Balls 
in London, New York and Montreal. In The Canadian Jewish Studies 
Reader, edited by Richard Menkis and Norman Ravvin, 141–63.” (2004).
 102 See my (forthcoming) “Dancing at Every Wedding: The Biography of 
Rabbi Yaakov Meir Zalkind, a Religious-Zionist, Pacifist, Anarcho-
Communist.” See also Polland, Annie. ““May a Freethinker Help a Pious 
Man?”: The Shared World of the “Religious” and the “Secular” Among 
Eastern European Jewish Immigrants to America.” American Jewish 
History 93, no. 4 (2007): 375–407; Türk, Lilian, and Jesse Cohn. “Yiddish 
Radicalism, Jewish Religion: Controversies in the Fraye Arbeter Shtime.” 
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Highlighting this fluidity means more than simply setting the 
historical record straight. It also part of what it would mean to re-
verse the post-WWWI narrowing of socio-political imagination.103 
As much as this is a matter of reviving the utopian mindset pre-
pared to envision a qualitatively better society, it is —  especially 
in an increasingly polarized public arena — equally a matter of 
challenging preconceived notions about who participates in the 
articulation of that vision.
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In the last thirty years of his life, Leo Tolstoy wrote many books, 
essays and pamphlets expounding his maturing views on violence, 
the state, the church, and how to improve the human condition. 
Since then, these ‘Christian anarchist’ and pacifist views have  often 
been dismissed as utopian or naive, and despite inspiring numerous 
activists, often forgotten or ignored. This chapter seeks to exami-
ne them in greater detail. Tolstoy’s political thought is divided into 
four main themes: pacifism, anarchism, anticlericalism, and activist 
methods. For each theme, Tolstoy’s main contentions are first sum-
med up, then some of their criticisms are discussed, and then some 
reflections are offered on their ongoing relevance today. The chapter 
concludes that despite being an odd Christian, an odd pacifist, an 
odd anarchist and an odd activist, Tolstoy put forward: a compel-
ling denunciation of violence which influenced numerous thinkers 
and activists; a condemnation of state violence and deception which 
can be extended to today’s globalised political economy; a bitter cri-
tique of the church which can be extended to religious institutions 
of our time; and a method of activism through withdrawal which 
continues to generate debate and is increasingly adopted by a varie-
ty of activists today. In short: Tolstoy’s Christian anarcho-pacifist 
 political thought continues to deserve to be taken seriously.
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very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter, and 
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How to cite this book chapter:
Christoyannopoulos, A. 2020. Tolstoy’s Christian Anarcho-Pacifism: 
An Exposition. In: Christoyannopoulos, A. and Adams, M. S. (eds.) Essays 
in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III. Pp. 71–118. Stockholm: Stockholm 
University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16993/bbb.c. License: CC-BY
72 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) produced two of the world’s most acclai-
med works of fiction in War and Peace and Anna Karenina, but at 
the time of his death was at least as famous for the radical religious 
and political views he propounded in the last thirty years of his life. 
These ‘Christian anarchist’ reflections are sometimes remembered 
today within pacifist and anarchist circles and in religious studies, 
but barely known by the general public outside these. This limited 
knowledge about Tolstoy’s Christian anarchist writings might have 
as much to do with their eccentric radicalism as with their drow-
ning in the downpour of mass violence that submerged the world 
in the years that followed his death. However, Tolstoy’s thoughts, 
eccentric perhaps but also perceptive and stirring, continue to merit 
attention in a world in which the violence he abhorred, far from 
being eradicated, remains both present and threatening. 
The aims of this chapter, after a brief contextualisation of Tolstoy’s 
vocabulary, are to both present and muse on the relevance of four 
central themes emerging from a study of Tolstoy’s thought. These 
are: his pacifism, his anarchism, his anticlericalism and his views 
on activist methods. Each core section is in three parts: first Tolstoy’s 
main claims on the matter, then a discussion of the criticisms made 
of these, and then some reflections on how relevant those arguments 
remain today. What the chapter offers, therefore, is both a herme-
neutical reconstruction and a normative evaluation of some thematic 
consistencies in Tolstoy’s thought. My intention is to provide a tas-
ter as to why, even if eccentric in his Christianity, in his anarchism, 
indeed in his pacifism and in his anticlericalism, Tolstoy remains an 
engaging thinker when considering twenty-first century challenges.1 
 1 The chapter thus presents a much shorter version of the discussion ar-
ticulated in Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s Political Thought: 
Christian Anarcho-Pacifist Iconoclasm Then and Now (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2020). In the book, the more exhaustive presentations of what 
Tolstoy said are illustrated with numerous quotations from his writings; 
the discussions of criticisms and contemporary relevance are developed 
in greater detail and with extensive references to relevant scholarship; 
and a fifth central theme, asceticism (including his views on sex and mar-
riage, intoxicating luxuries and meat-eating, and art), is presented and 
discussed. The book also sets Tolstoy’s arguments in their historical and 
intellectual contexts. This chapter here summarises and presents in open 
access format several of the main arguments developed in the book. 
Tolstoy’s Christian Anarcho-Pacifism: An Exposition 73
Tolstoy’s ‘Christian’ vocabulary
Before embarking on the main body of this chapter, however, 
a few words about Tolstoy’s vocabulary and what led him to 
it are in order.2 There is no space here to narrate in detail the 
biographical and intellectual trajectory that led Tolstoy to his 
Christian anarcho-pacifist conclusions, but in short: although 
several core arguments had been slowly germinating for decades, 
Tolstoy  cemented his political views in the late 1870s, after an 
increasingly intense existential crisis which he eventually resol-
ved through a renewed engagement with Christianity.3 
However, the ‘Christianity’ to which Tolstoy thereby ‘converted’, 
and upon which his anarcho-pacifism would be based, was un-
conventional. Tolstoy was not interested in supernatural claims or 
even in Jesus’ resurrection, but only in what he considered rational 
 2 To reiterate what I said in Tolstoy’s Political Thought (xiii) about lan-
guage: “I ought to confess that my command of Russian is very limited. 
I have, however, sought help from Russian speakers and consulted the 
best sources I could when particular translated words needed closer in-
vestigation. This also explains why my references to Tolstoy’s writings are 
not to the ‘PSS’ (Полное собрание сочинений) or Jubilee Edition version, 
but to the translations I read and studied. As a polyglot, I am aware that 
to translate is also partly already to interpret. But good translations can 
convey an author’s original intention faithfully. The English translations 
I have used have in most cases been widely praised by specialists, indeed 
sometimes by Tolstoy himself. It might be that sometimes the original 
Russian reveals a slightly different nuance to what I have presented, but 
I have tried my best to avoid misrepresenting Tolstoy’s views.”
 3 Tolstoy recounts his intensifying crisis in “A Confession,” in A Confession 
and Other Religious Writings, trans. Jane Kentish (London: Penguin, 
1987). Good critical introductions to various aspects of Tolstoy’s bio-
graphical and intellectual trajectory include: Rosamund Bartlett, Tolstoy: 
A Russian Life (London: Profile, 2010); E. B. Greenwood, Tolstoy: 
The Comprehensive Vision (London: Methuen, 1975); Richard F. 
Gustafson, Leo Tolstoy: Resident and Stranger: A Study in Fiction and 
Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Aylmer Maude, 
The Life of Tolstóy (London: Oxford University Press, 1930); Inessa 
Medzhibovskaya, Tolstoy and the Religious Culture of His Time: A 
Biography of a Long Conversion, 1845–1887 (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 
2008); Donna Tussing Orwin, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Henri Troyat, Léon 
Tolstoï (Paris: Fayard, 1965); A. N. Wilson, Tolstoy: A Biography (New 
York: Norton, 1988).
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and helpful in the Bible, which essentially consisted in Jesus’ ethical 
teaching and not much else. Anything that appeared irrational in the 
Bible and in the church’s teaching, he discounted or explained away 
on rational terms. I have argued elsewhere that one could therefore 
classify Tolstoy as a ‘deist’: he reduced religion to morality, and from 
its cosmology could only keep what he deemed made rational sense. 4 
Tolstoy thus came to view a meaningful life as one which seeks 
to embody the kind of exemplary moral conduct preached and 
illustrated by Jesus. He would henceforth spend the remainder 
of his life expounding the political implications he derived from 
this ethical position. The political arguments he would elaborate 
would therefore frequently invoke Jesus and Christianity, but it 
is important to remember that what Tolstoy meant when he used 
such religious vocabulary was always filtered by his zealously ra-
tionalistic, moralising and deistic reading of those terms. Hence 
even if he did not mean what is conventionally understood by 
terms like ‘God’, ‘resurrection’, ‘revelation’, ‘kingdom of God’ and 
so on, he still used those words as if to deliberately appropriate 
and restore them to what he saw as their proper meaning. His 
embrace of traditional Christian vocabulary might also be partly 
tactical, donning the mantle of the prophet to entice his predomi-
nantly Christian readers to his political views. 
The irony is that if his adoption of Christian vocabulary was an at-
tempt to broaden his appeal and align a widespread worldview with 
his political agenda, precisely this religious content has since become 
a barrier to many readers. He meant to address all human beings, 
but his inclination to invoke Christian language can put off many 
potential converts to his political thought. Bearing in mind this ca-
veat about Tolstoy’s religious vocabulary helps unshackle Tolstoy’s 
political thought from its apparent confinement to Christianity.5 
 4 Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, “Leo Tolstoy’s Anticlericalism and 
Its Contemporary Extensions: A Case against Churches and Clerics, 
Religious and Secular,” Religions 7/5 (2016); Christoyannopoulos, 
Tolstoy’s Political Thought, introduction.
 5 A more thorough discussion of Tolstoy’s treatment of traditional 
Christian terms can be found in Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s Political 
Thought, introduction and chap. 3.
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I – Pacifism
The pivotal theme in Tolstoy’s Christian anarchist writings is 
his rejection of violence.6 Upon it rest his anarchism, his activist 
 preferences and (indirectly) his anticlericalism. 
Tolstoy’s claims
The teaching of Jesus that influenced Tolstoy the most was his 
call, in the Sermon on the Mount, to “turn the other cheek” to 
whomever strikes you on the right cheek. Reflecting on this pas-
sage, on the many other sayings of Jesus on love and forgiveness, 
and on the violence that is plaguing human relations, Tolstoy 
came to the view that violence is always wrong, always a mistake, 
always counter-productive.7 Violence, for Tolstoy, always genera-
tes more violence, because those to whom violence is done will 
feel anger and resentment, will not see the justice of the violence 
 6 On Tolstoy’s pacifism, see for instance: Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, 
“Turning the Other Cheek to Terrorism: Reflections on the Contemporary 
Significance of Leo Tolstoy’s Exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount,” 
Politics and Religion 1/1 (2008); Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, 
Christian Anarchism: A Political Commentary on the Gospel (Exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 2010), chap. 1; Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s 
Political Thought; George Kennan, “A Visit to Count Tolstoi,” The 
Century Magazine 34/2 (1887); Colm McKeogh, Tolstoy’s Pacifism 
(Amherst, New York: Cambria, 2009). In his own writings, Tolstoy re-
turns to his pacifist arguments repeatedly, but perhaps the more helpful 
introductions are the following: Leo Tolstoy, “The Beginning of the End,” 
in Tolstoy’s Writings on Civil Disobedience and Non-Violence, trans. 
Aylmer Maude (New York: Bergman, 1967); Leo Tolstoy, “The End of 
the Age: An Essay on the Approaching Revolution,” in Government Is 
Violence: Essays on Anarchism and Pacifism, ed. David Stephens, trans. 
Vladimir Tchertkoff (London: Phoenix, 1990); Leo Tolstoy, “I Cannot 
Be Silent,” in Recollections and Essays, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1937); Leo Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God 
Is within You: Christianity Not as a Mystical Doctrine but as New 
Understanding of Life,” in The Kingdom of God and Peace Essays (New 
Delhi: Rupa, 2001); Tolstoy, “The Law of Love and the Law of Violence.”
 7 For Tolstoy’s exegesis, see in particular: Leo Tolstoy, What I Believe 
<”My Religion”>, trans. Fyvie Mayo (London: C. W. Daniel, 1902); Leo 
Tolstoy, “The Gospel in Brief,” in A Confession and the Gospel in Brief, 
trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1933). 
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they suffered, and will therefore seek violent retaliation further 
down the line. Violence for Tolstoy only ever feeds a vicious cycle.
For Tolstoy, Jesus proposes a radically different, indeed revolutio-
nary method to overcome this vicious cycle. That is, when  violence 
or injustice is done against you, do not strike back, but  respond 
with love, forgiveness and generosity. Only that way, Tolstoy inter-
prets Jesus to have said, can the cycle of violence be broken. 
Implicit in this response is the attempt to see, respect and address 
the human being in the person committing evil and  violence – in 
other words a refusal to dehumanise that enemy. A loving and 
forgiving response is not what the violent enemy expects. Instead 
of treating that enemy with anger and disdain, a forgiving respon-
se treats them with unexpected magnanimity and respect, which 
in turn opens the possibility for reconciliation.
Tolstoy relates that teaching of Jesus with another theme which 
he returns to a number of times in the gospels: the counsel not 
to judge one another lest we be judged by that same measure, 
not to criticise our neighbour for a mote in their eye when there 
is a beam in ours, the related story of the adulteress about to 
be stoned, and so on. For Tolstoy, what Jesus means is that we are 
all imperfect and sinful ourselves, so we should refrain from jud-
ging others too quickly. This in turn makes it all the more impor-
tant not to use violence in acting upon that potentially mistaken 
and hypocritical judgement. 
Tolstoy’s implicit hope is that a virtuous cycle of love and forgi-
veness can be superimposed on to the vicious cycle of violence and 
revenge. Both cycles are contagious and inspire responses in kind. 
With enough courageous forgivers, perhaps the cycle of violence 
can one day be overpowered and overcome. 
What is also implicit in this Tolstoyan reading is that we should 
forego any attempt to teach morality top-down through the use 
(or threat) of coercion, but instead that we should seek to teach 
by example. Just as we learn to use coercive means to try to reach 
our ends in a world in which others do the same, the hope is 
that enough exemplars of patient love and forgiveness can just 
as mimetically inspire that same behaviour too. 
Of course, that is not easy, and Tolstoy recognises that. Indeed 
it takes courage to respond lovingly to someone who commits 
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an injustice against you. The kneejerk reaction is to be angry and 
violent in return. More courageous is the attempt to rise above 
these feelings and respond with patience and hope, leaving 
yourself vulnerable yet resolute in the refusal to be driven by the 
understandable drive towards anger and retaliation. Responding 
to evil with love is an act of courage, not cowardice.
Criticisms
Is this teaching impossibly utopian? Certainly mainstream theo-
logy has laboured to argue that Jesus could not have meant this 
teaching literally, and that it is too difficult and unrealistic to fol-
low in this life – as if there would be any need for it in paradise (or 
hell, for that matter).8 For Tolstoy, such replies are copouts which 
betray Jesus’ teaching. He writes: 
It may be affirmed that the constant fulfilment of this rule is diffi-
cult, and that not every man will find his happiness in obeying it. 
It may be said that it is foolish; that, as unbelievers pretend, Jesus 
was a visionary, an idealist, whose impracticable rules were only 
followed because of the stupidity of his disciples. But it is impos-
sible not to admit that Jesus did say very clearly and definitely that 
which he intended to say: namely, that men should not resist evil; 
and that therefore he who accepts his teaching cannot resist.9
It might be foolish and difficult, but Jesus clearly calls his 
 followers to respond to evil with love. Indeed, Jesus exemplified 
that teaching himself, right unto his very death. The essence of 
Jesus’ teaching is about love and forgiveness, even if many of his 
official followers – despite otherwise venerating him as the Son of 
 8 Eric Mader, Tolstoy’s Gospel, available from http://www.necessaryprose.
com/tolstoysgospel.htm (accessed 16 September 2010); David Matual, 
Tolstoy’s Translation of the Gospels: A Critical Study (Lewiston: Edwin 
Mellen, 1992), 166–167; Aylmer Maude, The Life of Tolstoy: Later Years, 
Second ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1911), 352–367; 
McKeogh, Tolstoy’s Pacifism, chap. 4; Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, Tolstoy’s 
Quest for God (London: Transaction, 2007), 120–123; Alexander Root, 
God and Man According to Tolstoy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009); Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is within You,” chap. 2.
 9 Tolstoy, What I Believe, 18–19. 
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God, as the Christ, as God incarnate – have decided that he could 
not have really meant that. 
Still, Jesus may have preached this, but that does not mean the 
teaching is sensible – especially to non-Christians. Here, though, 
Tolstoy’s argument is that surely, we have seen enough tit-for-tat 
violence in history, surely violence has been shown to have been 
such a catastrophic failure in teaching morality or approxima-
ting justice, that perhaps it is worth reminding ourselves of this 
(admittedly high) ideal which Jesus advocated. It might be near 
impossible, but does that mean that no attempts at all should be 
made in trying to approach it? It might be utopian, but at least, 
the Tolstoyan argument goes, it sets an ideal to try to genuinely 
work towards. Besides, perhaps Tolstoy’s pacifism can also be 
considered ‘utopian’ in the less dismissive sense articulated by 
Ruth Levitas: as an invitation to think differently and reconsider 
prevalent automatic assumptions about violence.10 Just because 
the maximalist programme might be unrealistic does not render 
ineligible any critiquing of the status quo and sympathising with 
some of the arguments gesturing towards a different direction.
There is, of course, a potentially more devastating criticism, and 
it usually comes in the form of a question. That is: what would 
you do, then, if a child was under attack? Or how do would you 
deal with Hitler? Surely there is a limit to how far you can be lo-
ving and pacific? Where, then, should that line be drawn?11 
Tolstoy did consider this line of criticism. One response was to 
note that the choice is not necessarily a dichotomous one between 
violence and passivity. Other, more creative responses are possible 
 10 Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, Second ed. (Oxford: Peter Lang, 
2010); Mathias Thaler, “Peace as a Minor, Grounded Utopia: On 
Prefigurative and Testimonial Pacifism,” Perspectives on Politics (2019).
 11 Iain Atack, Nonviolence in Political Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2012), 161; Ward Churchill, Pacifism as Pathology: 
Reflections on the Role of Armed Struggle in North America (Edinburgh: 
AK Press, 2007), 47–51; Dustin Ells Howes, “The Failure of Pacifism 
and the Success of Nonviolence,” Perspectives on Politics 11/2 (2013), 
429; McKeogh, Tolstoy’s Pacifism, 116; Rancour-Laferriere, Tolstoy’s 
Quest for God, 119; Ronald Sampson, “Tolstoy on Power,” Journal of 
the Conflict Research Society 1/2 (1977), 68; Ernest J. Simmons, Tolstoy 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 1973), 174.
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too. After all, Tolstoy’s most famous follower was Gandhi (alt-
hough Tolstoy was not Gandhi’s only inspiration: the Bhagavad 
Gita, Buddhism, Jainism, Thoreau and Ruskin were important 
too), and Gandhi demonstrated that what might start as an 
 uncompromising Tolstoyan line on nonviolence could be trans-
lated into a political tactic to resist injustice.12 Whether Tolstoy 
preached absolute non-resistance, something closer to Gandhian 
nonviolent resistance, or indeed something more ambivalent, will 
be considered below. What is relevant here is that the first ele-
ment of an answer is to point out that there are options between 
passive capitulation and enraged retaliation – such as interpo-
sing one’s body, trying to engage verbally, calmly and rationally 
with the assailant, and indeed reacting by metaphorically turning 
the other cheek in an effort to expose the injustice and surprise the 
attacker into thinking again about the intended action. 
However, this will not suffice in every situation. Such creati-
ve replies may transform the situation if only in the longer run, 
but equally they might not. What then? Would the nonviolent 
Tolstoyan cowardly let the injustice unfold? Tolstoy tended to 
avoid a frontal answer to this question. When he did confront 
it, he sometimes stuck to his unflinching pacifism, and other ti-
mes wobbled and conceded that in the most extreme cases an 
exception may be needed.13 He perhaps knew that he himself 
could probably not commit to turning his cheek in the worst and 
most challenging situations, but was wary of the thin edge of 
the wedge. Once the justness of violence is conceded in extreme 
situations, opportunists quickly emerge to expand the range of 
scenarios, and before long an aggressive act is justified as measu-
red and appropriate when clearly, for Tolstoy, it is not. 
 12 Martin Green, Tolstoy and Gandhi, Men of Peace (New York, NY: Basic, 
1983); Martin Green, The Origins of Nonviolence: Tolstoy and Gandhi 
in the Historical Setting (London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1986); A. L. Herman, “Satyagraha: A New Indian Word for Some Old 
Ways of Western Thinking,” Philosophy East and West 19/2 (1969); 
Ramin Jahanbegloo, Gandhi: Aux Sources De La Non-Violence (Paris: 
Félin, 1998), part 3; Janko Lavrin, “Tolstoy and Gandhi,” Russian Review 
19/2 (1960); Tolstoy, “Gandhi Letters”; Tolstoy, “A Letter to a Hindu”.
 13 For a fuller exposition of this, see Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s Political 
Thought, 38–42.
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Moreover, for Tolstoy, it is also worth reflecting on what is en-
abled when conceding the argument about exceptional predators 
needing exceptional measures. Tolstoy writes: 
I have never, except in discussions, encountered that fantastic bri-
gand who before my eyes desired to kill or violate a child, but […] 
I perpetually did and do see not one but millions of brigands using 
violence towards children and women and men and old people and 
all the labourers, in the name of a recognized right to do violence 
to their fellows.14
In other words, according to Tolstoy, those child-attackers and 
Hitlers may exist and might need to be anticipated, but we also 
need to remember that the violence which, out of fear of relatively 
infrequent evildoers, we authorise the arms of the state to inflict, is 
carried out on an industrial scale, and much more regularly. This 
defence does not quite respond to the question directly, but it is 
worth remembering the dangers of cold, industrial, state-driven vi-
olence and the risks of it being misused when we readily legitimise 
the existence of such an armed administrative giant on the back of 
fears of exceptionally horrible people. Still, it is difficult to deny 
that Tolstoy’s answer is not entirely satisfactory, and perhaps his 
uncompromising rhetoric on nonviolence does need to be relaxed 
in genuinely extreme cases. 
In any case, much as Tolstoy generally takes an uncompromi-
sing line on his ideals, he does at times recognise that compromise 
is often likely in practice. This might seem paradoxical, but for 
him it is precisely because people will fall short in practice that the 
ideal must remain absolute. He writes: “It’s impossible to admit 
the slightest compromise over an idea. Compromise will inevita-
bly come in practice, and therefore it’s all the less possible to ad-
mit it in theory.”15 For Tolstoy, “The whole point is in the constant 
effort to approach the ideal” – however stringent.16 Something 
 14 Tolstoy, “Introduction to a Short Biography of William Lloyd 
Garrison,” 534. 
 15 Tolstoy, quoted in R. F. Christian, “Introduction,” in New Essays on 
Tolstoy, ed. Malcolm Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), 12.
 16 Tolstoy, quoted in M. J. de K. Holman, “The Purleigh Colony: Tolstoyan 
Togetherness in the Late 1890s,” in New Essays on Tolstoy, ed. Malcolm 
Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 218.
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between non-resistance and nonviolence should therefore 
always be the aim, even it cannot always be achieved in practice.
A separate difficulty with Tolstoy’s criticism of violence is that 
he provides no clear definition of what he means by ‘violence’. 
It seems quite clear from his writings that he is mostly referring 
to physical violence (as illustrated by the smiting of cheeks), or at 
least the compelling of someone to do as another decrees. But this 
could be seen as too narrow. What about psychological, structural 
or verbal violence, for instance? Indeed, is Tolstoy, in his passiona-
te denunciations, not arguably violent sometimes?17 Possibly. But 
Tolstoy’s primary concern is the physical violence that human be-
ings inflict on their fellows. His arguments can often be extended 
to other forms of violence, and with his anarchism Tolstoy himself 
does extend it to some forms of structural violence in particu-
lar, but his primary wish was to reduce the injuries and suffering 
 caused by tangible, physical violence.
Relevance today
As already noted, Tolstoy’s writings on nonviolence influenced 
Gandhi – who in turn inspired many of the nonviolent acti-
vists of the twentieth century. They also encouraged numerous 
 conscientious objectors to compulsory military conscription. 
Some commentators thus see Tolstoy as one of the significant (if 
often overlooked) ancestors of the pacifist movement, through 
which his thought therefore exerts an indirect influence today.18 
There are also people nowadays who, like Tolstoy, see Jesus 
as an interesting moral teacher – people who are not necessa-
rily comfortable with some of the doctrines of Christianity but 
who find in Jesus some worthy and thought-provoking ethical 
teachings.19 And even if the Christian community at large has not 
 17 Charlotte Alston, Tolstoy and His Disciples: The History of a Radical 
International Movement (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014), 161–162; 
McKeogh, Tolstoy’s Pacifism, 195; Maude, The Life of Tolstoy, 672–673.
 18 Atack, Nonviolence in Political Theory; Peter Brock, Pacifism in Europe 
to 1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Peter Brock, The 
Roots of War Resistance: Pacifism from the Early Church to Tolstoy 
(New York: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1981).
 19 Neil Carter, Five Times When Jesus Sounded Like a Humanist 
(Patheos), available from http://www.patheos.com/blogs/godlessindixie/ 
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quite led the pacifist revolution one could have expected from 
those who ostensibly took up their cross and followed Jesus, 
some Christian communities and individuals have nevertheless 
made  efforts in that direction. Then again, the Christian tradition 
is also responsible for originating Just War Theory – for Tolstoy, a 
 blatant betrayal of the teaching of Jesus. 
In any case, it remains important to unmask and denounce 
the violence that can be committed by today’s powers, especially 
when committed in our name. Democratic states have not always 
been honest and fair in administering their power over their own 
citizenry or indeed abroad, yet that violence is committed in the 
name of their citizens. Perhaps too few such citizens speak out aga-
inst some of the miscarriages of justice, abuses of power, violent 
repressions and other violent actions carried out in the name of 
order and stability. Tolstoy would rail against those, and expect 
Christians to do so too. This is all the more important given that 
the instruments of industrial violence are much more lethal to-
day: not just have nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons been 
invented and used since Tolstoy’s death, but the tentacles of sur-
veillance reach further than ever before. When human institutions 
can wield such power, it seems crucial than we reflect on the vio-
lence they can inflict and whether it is truly necessary. 
Furthermore, the view that ethical behaviour can be taught by 
legislation ultimately resting on coercion has not subsided. Yet do 
we really behave morally only because deviance from those mo-
rals will be punished, or do we behave morally because of the in-
trinsic validity of moral standards and because others have taught 
us their value by their example? More generally, a variety of stu-
dies in social psychology, criminology, pedagogy, and indeed poli-
tical science and thought have tended to reinforce the case against 
any rushed resort to violence in attempting to resolve  particular 
2016/10/09/five-times-when-jesus-sounded-like-a-humanist/ (accessed 
28 August 2018); Tom Krattenmaker, Confessions of a Secular Jesus 
Follower: Finding Answers in Jesus for Those Who Don’t Believe (New 
York: Convergent, 2016); Peter Turner, Zingcreed: A Christian-Atheist 
Polemic, available from https://zingcreed.wordpress.com/ (accessed 24 
August 2018 2018); Ken Schei, An Atheist for Jesus: A Personal Journey 
of Discovery, Second ed. (San Diego: Synthesis, 2008).
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 problems.20 Tolstoy, in a sense, expressed a concern that anticipa-
ted these waves of scholarship.
In short, Tolstoy’s pacifist thought invites us to reconsider our 
assumptions on how to approximate justice and morality. Whether 
individually or collectively, we readily assume that  coercion, retali-
ation and punishment are appropriate methods, yet these methods 
frequently fail to prevent further violence. Given the harm that 
our own violence can cause, we could arguably be more reflective 
and probing before resorting to violence.
II – Anarchism
There have been enough hints of this so far: Tolstoy was an anar-
chist. That is, he saw it as an inevitable extension of his faithful 
pacifism that the state and its allegedly legitimate monopoly over 
the use of violence had to be denounced and rejected.21
Tolstoy’s claims
The state, as Weber would famously observe years after Tolstoy’s 
death, can be defined as the monopoly over the (allegedly) legi-
timate use of violence over a particular territory.22 For Tolstoy, 
anarchism therefore follows logically from the teaching of Jesus: 
 20 Extensive references to these are given in Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s 
Political Thought, 52–54.
 21 On Tolstoy’s anarchism, see for instance: Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, 
“Leo Tolstoy on the State: A Detailed Picture of Tolstoy’s Denunciation 
of State Violence and Deception,” Anarchist Studies 16/1 (2008); 
Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s Political Thought, chap. 2; Paul 
Eltzbacher, “Tolstoi’s Teaching,” in Anarchism (Radford VA: Wilder, 
2011); Terry Hopton, “Tolstoy, God and Anarchism,” Anarchist Studies 
8 (2000); George Woodcock, “The Prophet,” in Anarchism: A History 
of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975). 
Tolstoy’s own writings particularly focused on anarchism include: 
David Stephens, ed., Government Is Violence: Essays on Anarchism and 
Pacifism (London: Phoenix, 1990); Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is 
within You”; Tolstoy, “An Appeal to Social Reformers”; Leo Tolstoy, 
“The Slavery of Our Times,” in Essays from Tula, trans. Free Age Press 
(London: Sheppard, 1948); Tolstoy, “On Anarchy”.
 22 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965).
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a consistent application of that teaching on violence cannot but 
threaten the state. In his own words: “Christianity in its true sense 
puts an end to the State. It was so understood from its very begin-
ning, and for that Christ was crucified.” 23 According to Tolstoy, 
Jesus’ teaching was always implicitly subversive of structures res-
ting on violence or the threat of it, which the authorities of his day 
understood and had to punish him publicly for. 
Tolstoy is suspicious of the state, including when nominally de-
mocratic. Democratic or not, the state uses physical violence and 
the threat of it, does not love its enemies, and judges its citizens – all 
of which Tolstoy sees as clear contraventions of Jesus’ teaching 
and as ultimately irrational and unjust. Indeed, majority rule, for 
Tolstoy, does not guarantee the attainment of justice any better 
than other systems: 
When among one hundred men, one rules over ninety-nine, it is 
unjust, it is a despotism; when ten rule over ninety, it is equally 
unjust, it is an oligarchy; but when fifty-one rule over forty-nine 
(and this is only theoretical, for in reality it is always ten or eleven 
of these fifty-one), it is entirely just, it is freedom! Could there be 
anything funnier, in its manifest absurdity, than such reasoning? 
And yet it is this very reasoning that serves as the basis for all refor-
mers of the political structure.24
Put differently: the tyranny of a majority is still tyranny. In majo-
rity rule, laws can still be imposed on an unwilling minority. 
For Tolstoy, however, “‘[l]aws are rules, made by people who 
govern by means of organised violence for non-compliance with 
which the non-complier is subjected to blows, to loss of liberty, 
or even to being murdered.’”25 Laws are enforced through vio-
lence or the threat of it. Yet for him, there is no way of justifying 
someone’s violence as more legitimate than another’s. In typically 
syllogistic fashion, he says:
One of two things: either people are rational beings or they are 
irrational beings. If they are irrational beings, then they are all irra-
tional, and then everything among them is decided by violence, and 
 23 Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is within You,” 259. 
 24 Tolstoy, “The Law of Love and the Law of Violence,” 165. 
 25 Tolstoy, “The Slavery of Our Times,” 112. 
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there is no reason why certain people should, and others should 
not, have a right to use violence. In that case, governmental vio-
lence has no justification. But if men are rational beings, then their 
relations should be based on reason, and not on the violence of 
those who happen to have seized power. In that case, again, govern-
mental violence has no justification.26
For Tolstoy, it is simply wrong to inflict violence on other human 
beings, because they are as capable as us of thinking rationally 
and being reasoned with. Moral behaviour cannot be taught by 
coercion – although what coercion might inadvertently teach is 
that coercion is a way of getting others to do as you wish. 
Moreover, Tolstoy argues that the state system is so arranged 
that it becomes easy to think that somebody else is responsible for 
state violence: 
At the bottom of the social ladder soldiers with rifles, revolvers, 
and swords, torture and murder men and by those means compel 
them to become soldiers. And these soldiers are fully convinced 
that the responsibility for their deed is taken from them by the 
officers who order those actions. At the top of the ladder the Tsars, 
presidents, and ministers, decree these tortures and murders and 
conscriptions. And they are fully convinced that since they are 
either placed in authority by God, or the society they rule over 
demands such decrees from them, they cannot be held responsible.
Between these extremes are the intermediate folk who superin-
tend the acts of violence and the murders and the conscriptions of 
the soldiers. And these, too, are fully convinced that they are re-
lieved of all responsibility, partly because orders received by them 
from their superiors, and partly because such orders are expected 
from them by those on the lower steps of the ladder.27
Because we are all mere cogs in a complex machine, we absolve 
ourselves from the less laudable ‘outputs’ of that machinery – if 
we even know about those at all. This is obviously dangerous in 
that the productive efforts of all the agents who constitute this 
structure can be harnessed towards goals which most of them 
 26 Tolstoy, “The Slavery of Our Times,” 119, Tolstoy’s emphasis. 
 27 Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is within You,” 351.
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would not pursue themselves, but which they let be pursued by 
the broader structure and those who control it.
Ultimately, Tolstoy joins other thinkers in reckoning that the 
real purpose of the state’s coercive apparatus is to protect the loot 
of the elite, both that stolen in wars of adventure abroad and 
that stolen from the fruits of labourers’ labour. Indeed for 
Tolstoy, the capitalist system amounts to wage slavery for the 
many. As he puts it:
If the slave-owner of our time has not slave John, whom he can send 
to the cess-pool to clear out his excrements, he has five shillings of 
which hundreds of Johns are in such need that the slave-owner 
of our times may choose anyone out of hundreds of Johns and be a 
benefactor to him by giving him the preference, and allowing him, 
rather than another, to climb down into the cess-pool.28
The system is arguably more perverse, because, to most Western 
audiences at least, the fact of enslavement is mostly hidden. Today’s 
slave Johns might be in China or Brazil, and today’s  slave-owners 
might be anonymous investments funds, but this merely hides bet-
ter from the average saver and producer the raw implications of 
their relationship. The employment contract might allegedly be 
signed between equal parties, but it is not equal, because those 
who own property can own slaves and those who do not, cannot. 
Again like other Marxists, socialists and anarchists, Tolstoy sees 
property distribution as the basis of an asymmetric and unjust 
system. For him, though, private property is not nefarious only 
because of the unequal economic relations it institutionalises, 
but also because it generates greed, covetousness and a conco-
mitant moral depravity – and this, among both the haves and the 
have-nots. 
In the end, Tolstoy argued, the state works like a protection racket:
Governments, justifying their existence on the ground that they en-
sure a certain kind of safety to their subjects, are like the Calabrian 
robber-chief who collected a regular tax from all who wished to 
travel in safety along the highways.29
 28 Tolstoy, “The Slavery of Our Times,” 95.
 29 Tolstoy, “The Slavery of Our Times,” 124–125. 
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Each state justifies the maintenance of its army as a necessary 
defence against ill-intentioned foreigners, but “that is what all go-
vernments say of one another,” so that in the end, “[t]he power of 
the State, far from saving us from attacks by our neighbours, is on 
the contrary itself the cause of the danger of such attacks.”30 
Tolstoy therefore despises the state because it is an institution 
which is violent, unjust and protects the interests of a narrow 
elite against those of the very masses that constitute it. Tolstoy’s 
pacifism, along with his analysis of the political economy and the 
mechanics of collective actions, leads him to his anarchism.
Yet the state is also only ‘what we make of it’: it is constituted 
by its agents. In democratic states in particular, the violence com-
mitted by the state is violence we commit against one another 
through it – the state commits it in our name. 
Tolstoy reckons we could do much better. It is evident from 
his corpus – not just the Christian anarchist parts – that he held 
much respect and admiration for the rural life of contemporary 
Russian peasants. For him, small communities organised around 
agricultural labour were far better politically and morally than 
modern industrial society.31 One senses traces of Rousseau – 
whom he deeply admired – in Tolstoy’s nostalgic eulogy for the 
smaller communities which have been increasingly swallowed 
by the onward march of industrial progress and political conso-
lidation. Either way, Tolstoy advocates modes of communal life 
independent from the state.
Criticisms
One criticism that can be made of Tolstoy’s anarchism, as for many 
of his views, is that it is too rigid in its black-and-white logic, 
too simplistic, too categorical. Tolstoy can indeed be a little dis-
ingenuous in his illustrations and comparisons, and perhaps 
he is wrong in rejecting every possible state just because it can 
 30 Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is within You,” 199. 
 31 This partly explains his attraction to dissenting Christian sects like the 
Doukhobors: Matthew S. Adams and Luke Kelly, “George Woodcock 
and the Doukhobors: Peasant Radicalism, Anarchism and the Canadian 
State,” Intellectual History Review 28/3 (2018). 
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 sometimes be violent. Then again, what he says about state 
 violence does seem to hold when the state is indeed violent, and 
every state – democratic or not – has shown itself capable of 
adopting such violence. Hence Tolstoy might be too quick to con-
demn the state, but his observations about state violence might still 
hold true when the state does adopt such violence – which might 
be more often than we like to remember. 
Nevertheless, some might say, the state today is not just police 
and prisons and armies – at its best it is also health care and edu-
cation and social and economic safety nets. Are these public goods 
not worth preserving? Tolstoy died before a lot of those emerged 
– would he not revise his rejection of the state now? Perhaps. Yet 
it is also worth remembering that ever since the rise of uninhibited 
‘neoliberal capitalism’ in the 1980s, that facet of the state is being 
actively eroded (and this, in those instances where it was quite de-
veloped in the first place), whereas its machinery of surveillance, 
repression and war is decisively spreading its tentacles. Not all 
that the state does is bad from a caring and loving perspective, 
yet its core business remains law-making along with its apparatus 
of coercion and violence. States that fail to perform that protec-
tive role are seen as failing in their core mission. Whatever else 
the state does, it can only start operating if it does monopolise the 
officially legitimate mechanisms of violence. 
Another line of criticism typically levied against anarchists 
consists in commenting that (representative) democracy, however 
imperfect, is still the best system we know. Churchill’s words are 
often quoted: “Democracy is the worst form of government, ex-
cept for all those other forms that have been tried from time to 
time”.32 Perhaps. Yet is this not a rather damning condemnation 
of human creativity and humanity’s collective potential? If repre-
sentative democracies plagued with voter disenfranchisement, 
 fuelled by partisan funding and whipped by the media into a cele-
brity-spectacle is the best we can really do, then so be it. Yet some 
think democracy can be more than such a façade, that it can be 
more direct and participative, more ambitious and more accoun-
 32 Winston Churchill, Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of 
Quotations (London: Ebury, 2008), 574.
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table. More deeply democratic forms of government like these 
have been experimented with in smaller-scale towns and move-
ments and various organisations. Could some such experiments 
not be improved and expanded? Is representative democracy as 
practiced in the West today really satisfactory enough to stop ai-
ming for better? Tolstoy would encourage us to think otherwise, 
to be more ambitious and aspiring. 
And yet, some have put it to Tolstoy, surely the state is needed 
to deal with criminals, with foreign aggression, and to regulate 
human interaction?33 Perhaps. But does this really prevent cri-
minality and aggression – does it really act as the deterrent it 
is proclaimed to be? Does it even come close to eradicating these 
problems in the long run? Human interactions do not necessarily 
require the threat of violence to follow certain agreed customs, 
and criminality and injustice are not that particularly successfully 
prevented by the state and its dedicated apparatus. Indeed various 
experiments in restorative justice have provided plenty of argu-
ments for more creative approaches to dealing with criminality 
and aggression than the model which projects some sort of alle-
gedly caring and wise, but strict and often authoritarian, parent. 
Relevance today
Today’s ‘state’ does, it is true, look very different to that of 
Tolstoy’s day. It is bigger, more far-reaching, and can administer 
violence even more lethally and clinically, and it has depersona-
lised and institutionalised the functions of government even fur-
ther. The agents of the state arguably have even less sight today 
of the eventual impact of the policies they contribute to as mere 
cogs of an extensive machine. In short: the state has evolved and 
looks very different today than in Tolstoy’s Russia, yet its coercive 
machinery is stronger than ever. 
Furthermore, the apparatus of oppression equivalent today to 
what Tolstoy criticises as the ‘state’ is broader and more  complicated 
 33 Tolstoy, “The Slavery of Our Times,” 112, 118; Tolstoy, “The Law of 
Love and the Law of Violence,” 210; Tolstoy, “Letter to Ernest Howard 
Crosby,” 188; Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is within You,” 197–199, 
263–267.
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than can be encapsulated by the notion of ‘state’. Just as the tar-
get of anarchist criticism has evolved from the nineteenth-century 
focus on the state to a broader network of globalised structures 
of patriarchy and oppression underpinned by the state but also 
including economic, cultural and other elements, so can Tolstoy’s 
anarchism be applied more broadly today to this broader variety 
of inter-related structures of oppression. Indeed Tolstoy’s anarchist 
critique of political violence and deception might be even more 
important in the twenty-first century given the globalised scale 
of the phenomena he wrote about and given the critical analyses of 
capitalism, gender and ethnicity (among others) which have been 
articulated since his death. Even if it is no longer as central a focus 
of anarchist ire as it was among the anarchists of Tolstoy’s days, 
the state underpins a variety of structures of oppression. 
These days, nonetheless, concrete state violence – including 
in democracies – comes in many varieties, including for instance 
police at demonstrations, visible walls such as borders or invi-
sible walls between classes, war, prisons, and the expanding cri-
minalisation of deviant behaviour. In all these examples, agents of 
the state can and not-so-infrequently do inflict physical violence 
on human beings, directly and indirectly. And yet today perhaps 
more than ever before, those agents of the state are led to disso-
ciate themselves from any responsibility in those acts: one person 
signs the form, another moves the outlaw, another decides how 
they shall be treated, and so on, such that the administration of 
state violence ultimately appears impersonal and anonymous, and 
its agents see responsibility resting elsewhere in the system. And 
yet in democratic states in particular, what the state does, it does 
in the name of its demos, meaning it is all the more important for 
that demos to be fully conscious of the full picture of state activity. 
Some anarchists have questioned Tolstoy’s inclusion in the 
anarchist tradition (for instance due to his ‘Christianity’ or to his 
absence from concrete contemporary anarchist struggles), but 
many consider him one of the many voices illustrating its sheer 
diversity.34 His denunciation of state violence and deception did 
 34 A fuller discussion of this, with extensive references, is provided in 
Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s Political Thought, 94–95. 
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also draw respect from anarchists such as Goldman, Guérin and 
Kropotkin. Tolstoy moreover constitutes one of the main voices 
within the Christian anarchist tradition. In the wider Christian 
community, he has helped establish the credibility of a specifically 
anarchist reading of Jesus’ teaching and example. Furthermore, 
Tolstoy also helped clear the path for a specifically pacifist avenue 
to anarchism, preparing the ground for a rapprochement between 
the two perspectives in the 1950s and 60s. In short, although Tolstoy 
presents anarchist arguments that can be found in other anarchists 
too, he nevertheless articulates an anarchism which cohabits with 
a justifiable reading of Christianity, which is specifically pacifist, 
and which concentrates in particular on denouncing both state vi-
olence and the various processes and excuses that help the human 
agents of that violence evade their moral responsibility for it. 
III – Anticlericalism
Tolstoy’s conclusions about the central meaning of Jesus’ teaching 
led him to reflect on why this understanding of it was not ad-
vocated more visibly by Jesus’ official followers, and this in turn 
led him to the conclusion that the church (or at least most ortho-
dox churches and certainly his contemporary Russian Orthodox 
Church) had belied and betrayed that teaching and its mission – a 
message he was eager for Christians in particular to hear.35
 35 For Tolstoy’s views on religion and the church, see for instance: 
Christoyannopoulos, “Tolstoy’s Anticlericalism”; Christoyannopoulos, 
Tolstoy’s Political Thought, chap. 3; E. B. Greenwood, “Tolstoy and 
Religion,” in New Essays on Tolstoy, ed. Malcolm Jones (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978); Gustafson, Leo Tolstoy: Resident 
and Stranger; G. M. Hamburg, “Tolstoy’s Spirituality,” in Anniversary 
Essays on Tolstoy, ed. Donna Tussing Orwin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Matual, Tolstoy’s Translation of the Gospels; 
Medzhibovskaya, Tolstoy and the Religious Culture of His Time. Tolstoy’s 
own writings articulating his anticlericalism include: Leo Tolstoy, “A 
Reply to the Synod’s Edict of Excommunication, and to Letters Received 
by Me Concerning It,” in On Life and Essays on Religion, trans. Aylmer 
Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); Lev N. Tolstóy, 
“Critique of Dogmatic Theology,” in The Complete Works of Count 
Tolstóy: My Confession; Critique of Dogmatic Theology, ed. Leo Wiener, 
trans. Leo Wiener (Boston: Dana Estes, 1904); Tolstoy, “The Restoration 
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Tolstoy’s claims
For Tolstoy, this betrayal of Jesus is typified by Emperor 
Constantine’s ‘conversion’ to Christianity, when instead of adap-
ting the empire to Christianity, the latter was adapted beyond 
recognition to suit the interests of the former. Ever since that 
conversion, the official church has cuddled up to state power, legi-
timising whatever regime happens to be protecting it. For Tolstoy, 
the mainstream church has thus become one of the major ob-
stacles to the dissemination of Jesus’ radical teaching. 
Tolstoy also slates the sanctimonious tone with which the chur-
ch preaches its corrupted interpretation. For instance, Tolstoy de-
nounces the alleged infallibility of the church and of the Bible. The 
latter, for him, is just a collection of writings from very different 
authors cobbled together and tinkered with time and time again. 
The former is just a collection of men as likely to be fallible as 
any other.
Tolstoy is particularly dismissive of the various ways through 
which church theologians reduce the importance of Jesus’ most 
important commandments. Tolstoy expects those who claim to 
follow Jesus to actually follow his teaching and example. Like 
other Christian radicals, he is therefore scathing of much of 
the official church for not doing so, indeed for even wilfully dis-
counting the uncomfortable parts of Jesus’ ethics and distrac-
ting its flock with fantastic dogmas and stupefying rituals. For 
Tolstoy, this amounts to a cowardly and despicable betrayal of the 
core teaching of the one whom Christians call God. Tolstoy’s 
strong language attests to the extent to which he feels the church 
has betrayed its original mission – to teach and exemplify the ra-
dical morality preached by Jesus.
Tolstoy further accuses the church of deploying a broad arsenal 
of mental trickery to distract the masses from Jesus’ revolutionary 
morality, including: the idea that miracles somehow provide proof 
of church creeds; the focus on external worship in which impossible 
propositions are repeated robotically (again as a distraction from 
the essence of Christianity); the deliberate mixing of truths with 
of Hell”; Tolstoy, “What Is Religion?”; Tolstoy, What I Believe; Tolstoy, 
“Reason and Religion.”
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falsehoods in order to drown the former in the latter; and the way 
in which all this combines to stifle reason and basically amounts 
to carefully planned hypnotism. All this, according to Tolstoy, is 
calculated precisely to dilute Jesus’ revolutionary morality.
For such views, predictably enough, Tolstoy was 
 excommunicated – though this excommunication came only in 
reaction to the publication of Tolstoy’s Resurrection in 1901. If 
anything, the result was to spur Tolstoy into publishing even more 
blunt criticisms of the Russian Orthodox Church. The church did 
try to re-admit Tolstoy into its congregation on his deathbed – 
in the hope that it could parade a victory if it could claim that 
Tolstoy confessed his errors and returned to a church that magna-
nimously forgave him at the last gasp. Tolstoy, of course, refused. 
Criticisms
One criticism of Tolstoy’s account of religion is that it is too cru-
dely rationalistic.36 His dismissal of the resurrection in particular 
means to some that he cannot be considered a ‘Christian’, because 
he denies a central tenet of that faith. Besides, the exaltation of ‘re-
ason’ typical of Enlightenment thought has come to be criticised 
more recently (e.g. by post-colonial and post-structuralist schools) 
for the questionable nature of reason’s ‘universality’ and because 
such universalism can lead to forms of neo-colonial imperialism.37 
Nevertheless, although ‘reason’ can indeed be criticised, the 
momentous achievements of science are based on it. Perhaps re-
ason has too often been used as an excuse to impose Eurocentric 
policies instead of respecting local traditions (and this should be 
 36 Georges Florovsky, “Three Masters: The Quest for Religion in Nineteenth-
Century Russian Literature,” Comparative Literature Studies 3/2 (1966); 
Greenwood, “Tolstoy and Religion”; Matual, Tolstoy’s Translation of 
the Gospels; G. W. Spence, “Tolstoy’s Dualism,” Russian Review 20/3 
(1961); James Townsend, “The Theology of Leo Tolstoy,” Journal of the 
Grace Evangelical Society 11/20 (1998).
 37 Benjamin Franks, “Postanarchism and Meta-Ethics,” Anarchist Studies 
16/2 (2008); Nathan Jun, “Deleuze, Values, and Normativity,” in Deleuze 
and Ethics, ed. Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2011); Achille Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, 
trans. Laurent Dubois (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).
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recognised and denounced), yet what other tool have we against 
superstitions, obscurantism, and other threatening ghosts whose 
harm haunts the annals of history? Is one of the central aims of 
education not to foster a critical and rational mind? Indeed how 
unpopular really is what Enlightenment thinkers called reason to-
day? Do many critical citizens not use ‘reason’ to measure claims 
thrown at them? The critique of ‘reason’ and ‘rationalism’ arti-
culated by post-structuralist scholarship in recent decades is rich 
and important, but even if it convincingly demonstrates that argu-
ments founded on reason are not ‘universally’ applicable, the re-
flections articulated by rationalist thinkers such as Tolstoy remain 
pertinent and applicable in at least some, perhaps many, historical 
contexts. Besides, perhaps Tolstoy went quite far in dismissing all 
of Christianity that he judged to be irrational, but he is not alo-
ne in this. Numerous agnostics and atheists will be sympathetic, 
as will indeed those Christians who are minded to filter some of 
the traditional package of Christianity in light of evolving science. 
Tolstoy’s rationalism might be fairly extreme, but rationalistic app-
roaches are still adopted by many nowadays. Tolstoy’s thought, 
therefore, can still find sympathetic ears in the twenty-first century. 
A separate criticism is that religion should not be reduced sol-
ely to morality: moral guidelines are important aspects of all reli-
gious traditions, but there is much more to religion, and Tolstoy 
is guilty of ignoring all those other aspects that make religions 
richer than a mere moral code can be.38 However, it remains the 
case that ethical concerns are quite central to them. Every reli-
gious tradition advocates certain types of behaviour and frowns 
upon others. There may well be much more to Christianity than 
the moral teaching of Jesus, but that teaching is part of it too. 
Tolstoy might be rightly accused of ignoring or dismissing many 
Christian dogmas, but then could many avowed Christians to-
day not equally be accused of ignoring or dismissing Jesus’ moral 
 38 Sergey Khudiev, The Trouble with Tolstoy (Pravmir), available from 
http://www.pravmir.com/the-trouble-with-tolstoy/ (accessed 18 February 
2016); Pål Kolstø, “The Demonized Double: The Image of Lev Tolstoi 
in Russian Orthodox Polemics,” Slavic Review 65/2 (2006); Matual, 
Tolstoy’s Translation of the Gospels; Townsend, “The Theology of Leo 
Tolstoy”.
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teaching? Tolstoy’s views on the facets of Christianity which he 
dismissed may not stir everyone’s interests, but what he does say 
about Jesus’ moral teaching might still be worth paying some at-
tention to, because it is both central to the Christian story and, 
 according to Tolstoy, actually rather rational and wise. Just becau-
se Tolstoy’s Christianity was rationalistic and moralising need not 
prevent those whose religiosity is more mysterious or numinous 
from engaging with Tolstoy on morality. 
Some have argued that not all institutional Christianity is that 
noxious, and that the Russian Orthodox Church in Tsarist Russia 
– clearly a central focus for Tolstoy’s ire – was a particularly pro-
nounced case of what he criticised.39 There have also been many 
examples of Christian groups across time and place (including in 
Tolstoy’s Russia) that were much closer to Jesus’ teaching that 
the mainline church: the Christian tradition is not monolithic, 
and the potential for different Christian interpretations has been 
taken up by numerous offshoots over the centuries. Tolstoy in-
deed recognises and praises these. Moreover, morality-focused 
interpretations of the gospel similar to Tolstoy’s have sprung up 
both before Tolstoy and since. Nevertheless, much Christianity 
does tend to come close to what Tolstoy criticises. Moreover, with 
time, many of even the more radical Christian sects which Tolstoy 
praises made compromises, became comfortable and gradually 
lost their radical aspirations. In other words, a process of insti-
tutionalisation does seem to systematically dampen the originally 
more  radical offshoots of Christianity. 
Relevance today
It may seem when watching from much of Western Europe  today 
that anticlericalism has become largely irrelevant – religion, it 
is said, has been losing influence as society has gradually secu-
larised. Yet, as recent scholarship on postsecularity has argued, 
 39 Gustafson, Leo Tolstoy: Resident and Stranger; Matual, Tolstoy’s 
Translation of the Gospels; Rancour-Laferriere, Tolstoy’s Quest for 
God; Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is within You”; John Howard 
Yoder, Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution, ed. Theodore J. 
Koontz and Andy Alexis-Baker (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2009).
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it seems premature to expect it to disappear in the way much 
Enlightenment thought had expected it to.40 
For a start, even in Western European countries – those often 
cited as the most secularised – state and church are rarely ful-
ly separated. In some European countries, the subsistence of the 
clergy is funded by the state; in others, Christian ‘heritage’ forms 
an integral part of national identity (church property might be 
maintained and preserved by state funds, for instance); in many, 
the symbols and iconography of one are present in the other, and 
so on. In short, religion still influences politics and vice versa, even 
in much of Western Europe.41 The collaboration between church 
and state which Tolstoy criticises so vehemently still persists. 
This is even truer outside Western Europe – not least in Tolstoy’s 
own country. The clergy remains powerful and influential in much 
of the Christian world (as indeed do religious figures in other reli-
gious traditions). In other words, despite a degree of secularisation 
both in Western Europe and beyond, much of what Tolstoy says 
about institutionalised Christianity is no less apposite today than 
it was in Tolstoy’s context. Indeed, church theologians continue to 
cite many of the arguments mocked by Tolstoy to downplay the 
radicality of Jesus’ morality or to otherwise justify Christian sub-
mission to the established political and economic regime. Tolstoy’s 
 40 For instance: Joseph A. Camilleri, “Postsecularist Discourse in an ‘Age 
of Transition’,” Review of International Studies 38/5 (2012); José 
Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994); Fred Dallmayr, “Post-Secularity and (Global) 
Politics: A Need for Radical Redefinition,” Review of International 
Studies 38/5 (2012); Luca Mavelli and Fabio Petito, eds., Towards a 
Postsecular International Politics: New Forms of Community, Identity, 
and Power (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Eduardo Mendieta 
and VanAntwerpen. Jonathan, eds., The Power of Religion in the Public 
Sphere (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Pippa Norris and 
Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
 41 See for instance: Peter L. Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the 
World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington: W. B. 
Eerdmans, 1999); Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan 
VanAntwerpen, eds., Rethinking Secularism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World; Jonathan 
Fox, A World Survey of Religion and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008).
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 voice therefore still speaks to those contexts where mutually- 
beneficial partnerships between churches and political institutions 
survive and thrive, and in so doing adds to the many other voi-
ces, including but not limited to atheists old and new, calling for a 
 firmer separation of religious institutions from political one. 
At the same time, a considerable number of (in particular, but 
not only) Westerners have become visibly disillusioned by ‘institu-
tional’ Christianity, especially since the Second World War. Whilst 
scholars still debate the extent of secularisation in the West, there 
is broad agreement that religiosity has evolved. Many have turned 
away from church attendance and been attracted by new, more 
personal, expressions of spirituality – and Tolstoy’s critique of 
the church may well resonate with the views of those who have 
 consciously moved away from the church, as well as with atheists 
and religious sceptics.42 That said, Tolstoy was not interested in 
spirituality but in morality.
Either way, it seems likely that Tolstoy would wish to reiterate 
his arguments to those who consider themselves Christians today. 
His writings (including his detailed exegeses) invite Christians to 
reconsider Jesus’ teaching anew, to question or bypass the exegesis 
traditionally preached from church pulpits and make up their own 
mind on whether Jesus did not quite clearly and deliberately call 
his followers to exemplify the morality he preached. Tolstoy might 
be an eccentric and anticlerical Christian thinker, but he contribu-
tes to Christian thought nonetheless. The main reason he was so 
hostile to the church was because he felt that it was diluting, dis-
missing and ignoring the very essence of Jesus’ teaching. There is 
every chance he would feel similarly today, though he would also 
praise and encourage those Christians who question the veracity 
of the comfortable church’s interpretation and who try to whole-
heartedly follow Jesus’ teaching and example. In short, Tolstoy’s 
 42 Jonathan Fox, An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory and 
Practice (Oxon: Routledge, 2013); Fox, A World Survey of Religion and 
the State; Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the World; Jeffrey Haynes, 
An Introduction to International Relations and Religion (Harrow: 
Pearson, 2007); Luca Mavelli and Fabio Petito, “The Postsecular in 
International Relations: An Overview,” Review of International Studies 
38/5 (2012).
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anticlericalism is not as dated or limited to its narrow context as 
might seem. It is addressed to Christians then, but also today and 
tomorrow, for them to become more Christ-like and more critical 
of the self-appointed official intermediaries of God on Earth.
IV – Activist methods
If the global arena is so violent and its institutions are failing to 
deliver justice, how, then, are we to respond? What does Tolstoy 
expect from Christians and pacifists in particular? In other words, 
what is to be done, and how?43 
Tolstoy’s claims
Tolstoy was very concerned with the growing popularity of 
violent methods among the revolutionaries of his day – not least 
in Russia. This was the era of the anarchist wave of terrorism, 
of mounting tit-for-tat revolutionary and counter-revolutionary 
violence. Tolstoy warned that violent methods would only lead 
to more violence, and that therefore revolutionaries must forego 
the use of violence lest they merely instigate a new, different but 
equally unjust dictatorship. For him:
Anarchists are right in everything; in the negation of the existing 
order, and in the assertion that, without Authority, there could not 
be worse violence that that of Authority under existing conditions. 
They are mistaken only in thinking that Anarchy can be instituted 
by a [violent] revolution.44
 43 For Tolstoy’s thoughts on what is to be done, see for instance: 
Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s Political Thought, chap. 5; Kennan, “A 
Visit to Count Tolstoi.” Tolstoy’s own writings specifically on this ques-
tion include: Tolstoy, “An Appeal to Social Reformers”; Lyof N. Tolstoï, 
What to Do?, trans. unknown (London: Walter Scott, n.d.); Leo Tolstoy, 
An Appeal to Russians: To the Government, the Revolutionists and the 
People, available from https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/An_Appeal_to_
Russians:_To_the_Government,_the_Revolutionists_and_the_People 
(accessed 24 September 2018); Tolstoy, “Bethink Yourselves!”
 44 Tolstoy, “On Anarchy,” 68. 
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Tolstoy can understand the appeal of violence, nurtured as it 
is by a deep frustration against the cunning and resilience of the 
system. Besides, violent revolutionaries only employ the methods 
they have been ‘taught’. But for Tolstoy, as explained above, vio-
lence was not the way to go. Surely, Tolstoy hopes, revolutionaries 
must be capable of devising “better means of improving the con-
ditions of humanity than by killing people whose destruction can 
be of no more use than the decapitation of that mythical mons-
ter on whose neck a new head appeared as soon as one was cut 
off?”45 Tolstoy would thus invite twenty-first century activists to 
think carefully about the tactics they adopt and about the risks of 
compromising with violence.
Injustice must be denounced, but for Tolstoy, the only truly re-
volutionary method is the one articulated by Jesus, and its “es-
sence […] lies in substituting an inward aim (to attain which no 
one else’s consent is necessary) in place of external aims (to attain 
which everyone’s consent is necessary).”46 According to Tolstoy, 
the only true revolution must be led by example. It must start 
within us, by a change of heart which leads to a refusal to be com-
plicit in, or consent to, violence and injustice. In turn, our example 
might inspire others to follow it and do the same. The structures 
of violence and injustice would be incapacitated by the infectious 
defections of the human cogs that constitute them. Tolstoy has 
faith in the contagious power of such inner transformation: 
Men in their present condition are like a swarm of bees hanging 
from a branch in a cluster. The position of the bees on that bran-
ch is temporary and must inevitably be changed. They must bestir 
themselves and find a new dwelling. Each of the bees knows this 
and wishes to change its position and that of others, but no one of 
them is willing to move till the rest do so. […] It would seem that 
there was no way out of this state for the bees, just as there seems 
no escape for worldly men who are entangled in the toils of the so-
cial conception of life. […] Yet as it is enough for one bee to spread 
her wings, rise up and fly away, and a second, a third, a tenth, and 
a hundredth, will do the same and the cluster that hung inertly be-
comes a freely flying swarm of bees; so let but one man understand 
 45 Tolstoy, “Thou Shalt Not Kill,” 197. 
 46 Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is within You,” 413. 
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life as Christianity teaches us to understand it, and begin to live ac-
cordingly, and a second, a third, and a hundredth will do the same, 
till the enchanted circle of social life from which there seemed to be 
no escape will be destroyed.47
Tolstoy thinks – or at least hopes – that the world can be trans-
formed by enough pioneers adopting Jesus’ method of refusing to 
be directly or indirectly complicit in any violence whatsoever. He 
hopes that enough people living and relating to each other diffe-
rently might inspire others to do the same. For Tolstoy, however, 
the way forward also involves what could be described as a kind 
of ascetic self-control.48 Tolstoy is critical of the material indul-
gences practiced by high society and envied by the rest: not only 
do they distract the mind and awaken intoxicating emotions, but 
their production relies on the ongoing exploitation of workers 
and limited resources. Gastronomic pleasures, alcohol, tobacco 
and the like should ideally therefore be tempered. The purest ide-
al is complete abstinence. Tolstoy also particularly frowns upon 
meat-eating given the cruel brutality of murdering animals to eat 
their flesh. 
Against this, Tolstoy preaches the virtues of manual work to 
earn one’s living. Cultivating the earth for one’s food not only 
undermines the economic processes that allow some to stay idle 
and ride on the exploitation of others, but is in itself a source of 
health, self-sufficiency and contentment. This is why Tolstoy was 
a long-term admirer of the life of agricultural communes. 
Tolstoy himself tried to transform the way he lived. He beca-
me a vegetarian, he laboured his fields, he donated most of his 
 royalties, and he recurrently got into heated arguments with 
his wife about what to do with his property. As a campaigner, he 
tirelessly wrote dozens of books, letters, articles and pamphlets 
reacting to ongoing events, appealing to powerful people and in-
stitutions, pleading his contemporaries to reject violence and to 
disassociate themselves from the state and church. For this, pre-
dictably, his writings were censored, and his followers persecuted 
 47 Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is within You,” 234–235. 
 48 Christoyannopoulos, Tolstoy’s Political Thought, chap. 4.
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– though the authorities dared not persecute him lest they turn 
him into a martyr.
Some have remarked that Tolstoy, far from adhering to the 
non-resistance advocated by Jesus in the verse about turning 
the other cheek, in fact advocated a form of nonviolent resistance. 
Tolstoy spoke out against the regime, encouraged conscripts to 
refuse their conscription, and advocated a form of resistance to the 
state by withdrawing from it. 
Yet it seems that Jesus did ‘resist’ in some sense too. He denoun-
ced religious authorities and overturned tables in the temple. In his 
actions, however, he remained nonviolent and forgiving (whether 
violence against humans was used in the temple cleansing episode 
is questionable)49, even as he was being crucified. It seems, there-
fore, that some degree of ‘resistance’, or certainly some reaction 
to injustice, is part of what Jesus preached – though the spectrum 
of options probably lies between the temple cleansing and turning 
the other cheek. 
What Tolstoy calls for is similar. His own writings display 
some ambivalence between non-resistance and nonviolent resi-
stance: depending on whom he is addressing and the context he 
is  reacting to, sometimes he seems to be calling for absolute non- 
resistance, sometimes for absolute nonviolence in clearly respon-
ding to, and in that sense ‘resisting’, evil. But even if what is called 
for is resistance, crucially, of course, Tolstoy insists on remaining 
nonviolent in that resistance. In fact, look closer at the text and 
even when Tolstoy speaks of ‘non-resistance’ he actually seems 
to have ‘not resisting with violence’ in mind. When Kennan asks 
Tolstoy whether resistance to oppression is justifiable, he replies: 
“That depends upon what you mean by resistance; if you mean 
persuasion, argument, protest, I answer yes; if you mean violence 
– no. I do not believe that violent resistance to evil is ever justi-
fiable under any circumstances.”50 Elsewhere, Tolstoy insists that 
it is essential to “fight [...] by means of thought, speech, actions, 
life”.51 Clearly then Tolstoy is not advocating total non-resistance, 
but resistance, action, defiance – just never of a violent kind. 
 49 Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, 102–106.
 50 Kennan, “A Visit to Count Tolstoi,” 256.
 51 Tolstoy, “On Anarchy,” 70.
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Criticisms
Whether those seeking revolutionary change should always res-
trict themselves to nonviolent methods has long been a source of 
debate among anarchists.52 One criticism is that nonviolent resi-
stance does not work, that it has only ever worked when violent 
campaigners had also been fighting for the same cause too – every 
Martin Luther King has its Malcolm X, as the (excessively binary 
and simplistic) saying goes.53 That may be true. And yet many a 
revolution hinged on the change of allegiance of key protectors of 
the regime – the army, the middle class, the commercial elite, and 
so on.54 In those pivotal moments when revolutionary demands 
are conceded, does the courageous refusal to adopt violence by 
many – despite the reactionary violence inflicted on them in their 
attempt to improve things – not play at least some role in convin-
cing those protectors of the status quo to withdraw their protec-
tion? Most pacifist campaigners had their violent counterparts, 
but the opposite is true too, and the refusal to adopt violence by 
many often played a significant part in helping convince regime 
protectors of the legitimacy of the argument for radical change, 
whereas revolutionary violence often hardened their resolve to 
preserve the regime.
 52 April Carter, “Anarchism and Violence,” in Anarchism, ed. J. Roland 
Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 
1978); Churchill, Pacifism as Pathology; Peter Gelderloos, The Failure of 
Nonviolence (London: Active Distribution, 2013); Uri Gordon, Anarchy 
Alive!: Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory (London: 
Pluto, 2008), chap. 4; Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings, 
“Anarchist Ambivalence: Politics and Violence in the Thought of Bakunin, 
Tolstoy and Kropotkin,” European Journal of Political Theory (2016); 
Vernon Richards, ed., Violence and Anarchism: A Polemic (London: 
Freedom, 1993); Chris Rossdale, Resisting Militarism: Direct Action and 
the Politics of Subversion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 
chap. 7.
 53 Churchill, Pacifism as Pathology, 55–57, 73–77.
 54 Atack, Nonviolence in Political Theory, 113–114, 123–124; Joseph 
Llewellyn, “Building Emancipatory Peace through Anarcho-Pacifism,” 
Critical Studies on Security 6/2 (2018), 46–50; Howes, “The Failure of 
Pacifism and the Success of Nonviolence,” 434–435; Sharon Erickson 
Nepstad, Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), chap. 7.
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Some argue that real and meaningful change cannot come only 
from mere changes of personal lifestyle, that it takes collective 
struggle and organising to get tangible improvements.55 Yet even 
if that is true, lifestyle changes and collective struggles are not 
mutually incompatible. Perhaps Tolstoyan methods on their own 
will not suffice, but that need not mean that engaging in broader 
methods of campaigning need require dissent from Tolstoy’s advi-
ce on personal lifestyle and a refusal to compromise with violence. 
Some worry that Tolstoy’s recommendations would lead to 
a collective suicide: if we all turn the other cheek in the face 
of evil, the worst people will take over, and civilisation will be 
sacrificed.56 This seems true if indeed the evildoers and their sup-
porters have no heart and would never repent, but of course, 
Tolstoy’s hope is that their heart might turn in the face of a 
form of denunciation which displays unexpected and determi-
ned nonviolence and forgiveness. How else and why else would 
Tolstoyan methods gain any new converts anyway? Widespread 
suicide is only a logical consequence of Tolstoyan behaviour if 
one projects ahead an increasing adoption of Tolstoyan methods 
(which would mean hearts can turn) yet also a refusal to coun-
tenance that such ethical behaviour can be contagious (which 
now suggests the opposite). Therefore, Tolstoy assumes that way 
before it would lead to collective suicide, the seemingly logically 
suicidal but primarily principled and courageous commitment of 
nonviolent exemplars would transform humanity. 
 55 Bob Black, Anarchy after Leftism (Columbia: Columbia Alternative 
Library, 1997); Murray Bookchin, Social Anarchism or Lifestyle 
Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm (Edinburgh: AK, 1995); Laurence 
Davis, “Individual and Community,” in The Palgrave Handbook of 
Anarchism, ed. Carl Levy and Matthew S. Adams (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2019); Laurence Davis, “Social Anarchism or Lifestyle 
Anarchism: An Unhelpful Dichotomy,” Anarchist Studies 18/1 (2010); 
Albert Meltzer, Anarchism: Arguments for and Against, available from 
https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/albert-meltzer-anarchism-argu-
ments-for-and-against (accessed 12 September 2018); Laura Portwood-
Stacer, Lifestyle Politics and Radical Activism (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2013).
 56 Churchill, Pacifism as Pathology, 47–51, 58, 86–87; Frazer and 
Hutchings, “Anarchist Ambivalence: Politics and Violence in the Thought 
of Bakunin, Tolstoy and Kropotkin,” 18.
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Some have also been critical of the austere and prohibitive 
self-denial of Tolstoyan asceticism.57 It seems the only gratifica-
tion Tolstoy tolerated was that of masochistically adhering to a 
particularly categorical morality. Some will prefer a less desolate 
way of life. But even if ascetic self-denial need not be imposed 
to such a rigorous degree, perhaps it is important to at least re-
main alert to the sometimes morally dubious production proces-
ses  behind what one consumes, and to the distracting potential of 
hedonistic escapism. 
Others could argue that, even were it to work, Tolstoy’s method 
to improve the human condition is too slow, that it would take too 
long and we do not have such time.58 This might be true, and the 
ecological crisis, to name but one, may indeed be a challenge that 
cannot wait to be addressed. At the same time, if a revised moral 
order is not one that is wanted and willed by all, if therefore coerci-
ve means are needed to enforce it, then more violence and injustice 
will ensue, rendering that moral order unstable again. For Tolstoy, 
transformations that are imposed are never stable or satisfactory.
Relevance today
The question of how to improve the world is no less important 
and debated today than in Tolstoy’s era. Whatever the promises 
of secular (or indeed religious) ideologies, suffering, injustice and 
violence persist. Freedom, equality, indeed even true democracy 
remain closer to utopian aspirations than reality. Many have opted 
for formal institutional channels to try to improve things, but the 
 57 Ronald D. LeBlanc, “Tolstoy’s Way of No Flesh: Abstinence, Vegetarianism, 
and Christian Physiology,” in Food in Russian History and Culture, ed. 
Musya Glants and Joyce Toomre (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1997), 84–91; Vernon Lee, “Tolstoy as Prophet. Notes on the 
Psychology of Asceticism,” The North American Review 182/593 (1906); 
Matual, Tolstoy’s Translation of the Gospels, 16–18; McKeogh, Tolstoy’s 
Pacifism, chap. 6–7; G. W. Spence, Tolstoy the Ascetic (Edinburgh: Oliver 
and Boyd, 1967).
 58 Leo Tolstoy, “Nobel’s Bequest: A Letter Addressed to a Swedish Editor,” 
in Writings on Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence, trans. Aylmer Maude 
(Philadelphia, PA: New Society, 1987), 237; Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of 
God Is within You,” 235.
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global political economy is becoming more unequal, while wea-
pons and their potential for mass destruction are spreading. Many 
good intentions seem to get diluted and lost in these institutional 
channels that are meant to help reach them. Many therefore face 
the uncomfortable realisation that our institutions are failing, and 
wonder how best to proceed. To those seekers of truth and justice, 
Tolstoy’s writings on the dangers of violent methods remain worth 
reflecting upon. Tolstoy invites us to think carefully about how to 
bring about justice, about tactics and in particular about the dang-
ers of compromising with ‘violence’.
More generally, many today still concede that violence is some-
times necessary – whether to implement reforms through the state 
or to resist injustice outside it. Good ends can, in the eyes of many, 
justify violent means. In other words, the very same justifications 
of violence which Tolstoy criticised remain widespread nowadays. 
Yet one interesting development in the past century is the  increasing 
popularity of nonviolent methods of activism and denunciations of 
violence. Gandhi, who was partly inspired by Tolstoy but who tran-
slated high Tolstoyan ethics into concrete and pragmatic tactics of 
nonviolent resistance, in turn inspired many after him. Since Tolstoy 
and Gandhi, nonviolent activism has been increasingly popular and 
increasingly successful – indeed interestingly more effective, some 
empirical work shows, than more violent methods.59 
In any case, (at least) three colossal challenges face humani-
ty: an ecological crisis, a deeply unstable and unsustainable glo-
bal economy, and the security challenges posed by the continu-
ing proliferation of weapons – both conventional and of mass 
destruction. These challenges are all potentially very dangerous, 
will not be contained within artificial human borders, and ar-
guably require more radical solutions than those likely to come 
from established institutions. This calls for action, for a collecti-
ve  human awakening. Many campaigners and movements share 
 59 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: 
The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013); Howes, “The Failure of Pacifism and the Success 
of Nonviolence.”; Llewellyn, “Building Emancipatory Peace through 
Anarcho-Pacifism”; Nepstad, Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, 
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those concerns, and to them Tolstoy would reiterate his warnings 
about consenting to or being complicit in violent means, whether 
bottom-up or top-down. 
However, Tolstoy would not only address radicals and refor-
mers. He would call on us all to awaken to the violence and suffe-
ring perpetrated within the global political economy, and crucially 
to our role in it by both legitimising it and staffing it. He would 
call us to choose carefully the role we play, however small, in this 
global context. Following Tolstoy, one could argue that there are 
at least four (overlapping) ways in which we all make choices: as 
producers, consumers, politically-active citizens and through 
everyday personal encounters.60 As producers, we spend decades 
of our professional lives working in a particular sector. Tolstoy 
would urge us to think carefully about what that profession 
is dedicated to – is it public service, is it science, it is the wea-
pons industry, fossil fuels, merely the interests of profit maximi-
sing? Similarly, we all consume, but do we consume ethical, local 
or organic products? Where and under what working conditions 
were these products produced? Did their production kill? Is our 
consumption too escapist or indulgent? And whose pockets do 
we fill? As citizens, we can vote, sign petitions, write letters and 
take part in campaigns – what choices do we make there?61 And 
as community members, we have conversations with one another, 
we respond to remarks made by family members, friends or ran-
dom encounters. How committed are we to truth and justice in 
such micro-political encounters? Tolstoy wants us to consider our 
role in the broader structures we constitute, to see the connections 
between our behaviour and the impact of it through these structu-
 60 Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, “Think the World’s in a Mess? Here Are 
Four Things You Can Do About It,” The Conversation, 16 November 
2016, available from https://theconversation.com/think-the-worlds- 
in-a-mess-here-are-four-things-you-can-do-about-it-68789 (accessed 15 
August 2017).
 61 Tolstoy of course did not believe in representative democracy, but he did 
petition politicians up to the Tsar, he corresponded with activists around 
the world, and helped organise campaigns such as famine relief and the 
emigration of persecuted Doukhobors.
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res, and where appropriate, to withdraw from these structures, to 
stop furthering evil and to exemplify alternatives instead.
Some will argue we cannot all make our own choices. The jobs 
on offer may not be many, for instance, and organic food comes 
at a price. Yet this is why Tolstoy’s remarks are addressed most 
pointedly towards the comfortable – those who have more free-
dom to make these choices. Those who are poor, less educated 
and oppressed have more limited choices in those four realms, 
but the richest are freer to choose. Indeed they often know, if not 
explicitly then at least deep down, that they are making choices 
which might hurt others. They might see those as deplorable or 
necessary, and they might note that the world is tough and will 
remain so whatever they chose at their individual level. In other 
words, and following Tolstoy, they might be deceiving themselves 
and desisting from their moral responsibilities. The higher up the 
pyramid of privileges, the harsher Tolstoy’s gaze will be. But some 
degree of choice, most of us do have, to some degree.
Conclusion
It might be argued that Tolstoy was neither a Christian (because 
his thought strips away too many of its defining characteristics) 
nor an anarchist (because he seems to follow ‘revealed’ biblical au-
thority). He is also too hard-line a pacifist for many pacifists, and 
his thoughts on activist methods remain controversial for those 
eager to improve the human condition. However, Tolstoy does 
arguably develop with remarkable logical consistency the radical 
pacifist implications of Jesus’ teaching with regards to collective 
violence. He is therefore ‘Christian’ in the sense that his thought 
takes its cue from Jesus’ morality, and he is an ‘anarchist’ in the 
sense that he rejected the state and the unjust economy which 
it patrols on that basis. It is, moreover, precisely because of his 
hard-line commitment to pacifism that he develops anarchist con-
clusions and favours activist methods that refuse any compromise 
with violence. 
Some might see Tolstoy as somewhat confusing in terms of his 
ultimate motive: sometimes he seems to preach nonviolence out of 
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fidelity to what is divinely commanded, regardless of the impact it 
may or may not end up having on society; yet sometimes he seems 
more clearly driven primarily by a desire to transform society. The 
confusion is partly the result of Tolstoy adapting his language and 
his arguments depending on who he is addressing: when addressing 
Christians, especially the clergy, he tends to insist that nonviolence 
is what God (through Jesus) clearly demands; but when addres-
sing secular interlocutors in secular and rational terms, his tactic is 
to defend nonviolence on similarly secular and rational grounds, 
and here the worthiness of nonviolence stems from its potenti-
al effect on society. Either way, it seems quite clear that Tolstoy 
was longing for social transformation. It also seems clear that 
he was aware it might not take hold, and in such a scenario he still 
seems to have favoured principled behaviour on the part of those 
who shared his views. In any case, the revolution he envisaged did 
rest on some pioneers’ fidelity to nonviolence, so it should come as no 
surprise that he insisted on such fidelity come what may, and in the 
hope that what might come would be a nonviolent pacification 
of society. In short, Tolstoy’s primary aim is social transforma-
tion, though even if it fails he still favours nonviolence, and to 
Christians he will repeat that it is what God commands. 
Tolstoy’s political writings are those of a critic – an iconoclastic 
prophet, as it were. He plays a role analogous to the Socratic gadfly 
about violence and about the suffering inflicted by structures which 
we constitute and legitimise. The world has changed  dramatically 
since 1910, and Tolstoy’s arguments are possibly too categorical, 
but much of his diagnosis remains painfully perceptive, even if his 
solutions are not necessarily more realistic today than in his time. 
Eccentric though his thoughts might be, they invite us to reconsider 
our role in the violence perpetrated upon others. 
It might also be worth recalling that in the years that followed 
Tolstoy’s death in 1910, both his native Russia and indeed the 
world witnessed conflagrations of violence on an industrial scale 
– precisely the horrors Tolstoy feared. The Russian Revolution 
and other dictatorships illustrated what a Left-wing revolutionary 
transformation of society from the top down could lead to, and 
two world wars illustrated the destruction which human beings 
justifying violent means to attain perceived laudable aims could 
Tolstoy’s Christian Anarcho-Pacifism: An Exposition 109
lead to. In the unstable balance of power that has followed the 
Cold War and 9/11, in a world facing an ecological catastrophe, 
the seemingly unstoppable proliferation of weapons of mass 
 destruction and increasingly widening economic inequalities, in a 
world where economic, security and ecological imbalances are so 
acute that system collapse is not implausible, the risks of violent 
conflagrations are arguably greater than in 1910. For that reason 
alone if for no other, Tolstoy’s Christian anarcho-pacifism remains 
worth paying attention to in order to reflect upon our choices and 
how they affect others today.
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Community, Communion, and 
Communism: Religion and Spirituality in 
Herbert Read’s Anarchism
Matthew S. Adams 
Loughborough University, UK
Herbert Read was not a religious anarchist, but nevertheless a sense 
of the spiritual played an important role in his thought. Through a 
comparison with the work of H.G. Wells, who Read treated as a 
representative of a particularly arid form of social theory, this chap-
ter reconstructs Read’s argument that spiritual unity was integral to 
any functioning society, and would therefore also be important 
to any successful anarchist community. The truth of the lesson was 
revealed for Read in the centrality of spiritual vibrancy to historical 
moments of particular artistic creativity. With cultural effervescence 
his measure of the successful realisation of meaningful freedom, he 
theorised a utopian anarchist community defined by both its econo-
mic communism and spiritual communion.
Even though he was no particular fan of H.G. Wells’ writing, 
Herbert Read admitted, perhaps mainly out of politeness, to en-
joying the “fantasia about dreams called The Happy Turning” 
that Wells was “circulating among a few friends” in the summer 
of 1943.1 However, Read informed Wells, while he agreed with 
the “underlying moral” of the story, he confessed that he  “jibbed 
 1 H.G. Wells to Herbert Read: 13th July 1943”, Herbert Read Papers, 
McPherson Library, University of Victoria. [Hereafter: HRP] HR/HGW-
7 Eud.04.
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at […] one aspect”, which was “its out of date anti- clericalism.”2 
Lest he be misinterpreted, this was not, Read added, out of 
any  attachment to “priests or churches”, but instead reflected 
the simple fact that organised religion exercised little power in 
mid-century Britain. In countries “like” Spain religion might play 
an influential role, but in Britain as “in most parts of the world 
[churches and priests] seem to me to be as harmless as the rats and 
crows which [...] inhabit their historic monuments.”3 
Read’s letter to Wells suggests that he unequivocally saw religion 
as an irrelevance in the modern world, yet his comments do not 
convey the underlying complexity of his position. While demonstra-
ting his hostility to the rituals, conventions, and hierarchies of the 
Church, more broadly Read actually held a generally ambiguous, 
and frequently magnanimous, view of religion and spirituality, se-
eing religion as an important, often vital, cohesive force throughout 
human history. But religious feeling was not something that he 
simply saw as an historically useful phenomenon. When pondering 
the shape of an anarchist future unencumbered by capitalism 
and the state, Read often noted the importance of shared spiritu-
al values in ensuring the survival of any experiment in anarchy. 
Anarchism was for Read a rational project – the soundest basis upon 
which to found a just and free society – but he was at the same time 
a critic of the kind of arid rationalism that he thought characterised 
social scientific thinking in the mid-twentieth century. Anarchism’s 
rational ideal must also be in tune with, and draw upon, the spiritual 
values beating in the heart of any viable community, he concluded. 
Read’s perspective on religion therefore offers an interesting via 
media in debates about the possible compatibility of religious and 
anarchist thought, from an intellectual who enjoyed a complex 
relationship with anarchism as a political tradition. Most famous 
in his lifetime as a propagandist for modernist art,4 Read always 
 2 Herbert Read to H.G. Wells: 27th August, 1943 in HRP: HR/HGW-
9 Eud.04. For Read’s comments on Wells, see: Herbert Read, The 
Contrary Experience: Autobiographies (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), 
pp. 88–89. 
 3 Read to Wells: 27th August, 1943.
 4 For the definitive biography of Read, see James King, The Last Modern: 
A Life of Herbert Read (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
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pointed to the ‘unity’ of his diverse interests – which included 
literary criticism, the philosophy of art, psychoanalysis, and art 
 education – with anarchism a key connecting thread. ‘There is no 
separation’, he wrote in 1954, ‘between what I have written on this 
subject [anarchism] and what I have written on social problems 
generally…on the social aspects of art…or on the social aspects of 
education. The same philosophy reappears in my literary criticism 
and in my poetry’.5 The intellectual restlessness that characterised 
his life, and his imperfect efforts to think about the consequences 
of his defence of the numinous, mysterious, and individual impul-
ses underpinning artistic creativity for the rational and collective-
ly-minded political ideology he subscribed to, mean that his ideas 
offer a useful route into thinking about anarchism’s relation to 
the spiritual. While this debate has often centred upon the legiti-
macy of deistic thinking in the context of a political tradition de-
fined by its rejection of authority, Read’s theorisation of necessary 
spirituality offers a different take on this conundrum.6 He was 
not a ‘Christian anarchist’ in the sense of the intellectual position 
outlined by Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, where an ‘explicitly 
“anarchist” conclusion’ is reached “based on [an] understanding 
of “Christianity””, even if he has been thought of in these terms.7 
Nicolas Walter, for example, admittedly no fan of Read whom he 
considered dilettantish and politically shallow, judged that he saw 
anarchism as an essentially “religious philosophy”.8 Walter over-
stated the case, but Read certainly did see connections between the 
religious impulse and communalist ethics that an anarchist com-
munity might usefully approximate. This sense of the importance 
 5 Herbert Read to Francis Berry: 10th April 1953, HRP, 61/20/9; Herbert 
Read, Anarchy and Order: Essays in Politics (London: Faber & Faber, 
1954), p. 9.
 6 For an overview see Alexandre Christoyannopoulos and Lara Apps, 
‘Anarchism and Religion’ in Carl Levy & Matthew S. Adams (eds.) 
The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2019), 
pp. 169–192 (especially pp. 170–176).
 7 Alexandre J.M.E. Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism: A Political 
Commentary on the Gospel (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), p. 269.
 8 Nicolas Walter, “Anarchism and Religion” in Damned Fools in Utopia, 
ed. David Goodway (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2009), pp. 279–285 
(p. 284).
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of spiritual unity also found expression in Read’s broader concern 
with the social status of the arts, and the idea, explored in his his-
torical studies, that those societies with the strongest communal 
ethic achieved the most vibrant art.9 
To consider Read in terms of the “spiritual” also highlights the 
ambiguity of that concept. If, in comparing the slippery category 
of “spirituality” with the equally ineffable “religion”, we charac-
terise the former as exemplified by a quest for an “authentic con-
nection with the inner depths of one’s unique life-in-relation”, and 
the latter as an impulse to “conformity to external authority”, we 
begin to see how an anarchist may conceivably approach the spi-
ritual as a component of social liberation.10 Inevitably, however, 
such neat distinctions fail to support the interpretative weight 
they must bear. After all, popular, but less precise uses of “spiritu-
al” often point to a blending of these perspectives:
‘Spirituality’ is often used in Christian circles to express devotion 
to God […] as when spirituality is thought of as ‘obedience to the 
will of God’ with the believer entering into an intense relationship 
(involving surrender) with the divine. Such spirituality is subjective 
 9 While there is a tendency to bifurcate his cultural and political ideas, 
Read was in fact mirroring ideas adumbrated by Kropotkin, who simi-
larly saw a defining relationship between great art and communal unity. 
In contrast to Kropotkin, Read’s articulation of this idea was a prominent 
feature of his thought, revealing a theme that has a deeper place in the 
history of anarchist political thought, but has often been implicit. On 
the division between Read’s aesthetics and politics, consider the work of 
David Goodway and Peter Marshall, who, while recognising that Read 
saw a fundamental connection, are sceptical. David Goodway, Anarchist 
Seeds Beneath the Snow: Left-Libertarian Thought and British Writers 
from William Morris to Colin Ward (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 2006), p. 181, 184; David Goodway, “Herbert Read, organicism, 
abstraction and an anarchist aesthetic” in Anarchist Studies, Vol. 19, 
No. 1 (2001), pp. 82–97; Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: 
A History of Anarchism (London: Fontana, 1993), p. 592. For this 
narrative in Kropotkin’s work, see: Peter Kropotkin, The Conquest 
of Bread (New York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1907), pp. 124–143. For a 
more detailed exploration, see: Matthew S. Adams, Kropotkin, Read, 
and the Intellectual History of British Anarchism: Between Reason and 
Romanticism (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015).
 10 Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead, The Spiritual Revolution: Why 
Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 4. 
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in the sense that it involves often intense experiences…but objecti-
ve in the sense that it is focused on something which […] remains 
external to and higher than the self.11 
We should not expect Read to bring clarity to the concept of 
 spirituality, but this chapter demonstrates that a sense of the spi-
ritual that cuts across these definitions plays an important role 
in his utopian politics. Purged of any sense of obedience to God, 
his utopianism does, nevertheless, place importance on a social 
unity informed by an intense, authentic, relationship between in-
dividuals, and, in his writing on art, a surrender to something 
beyond individual experience that highlights a sense of the nu-
minous running through his thought. Given that Read’s anar-
chism drew most directly on the work of Peter Kropotkin – a 
figure often encountered as an unforgivingly deterministic and 
 mechanically-minded thinker – this interest in the spiritual points to 
a distinctive thread in Read’s philosophy, and one that reflects a 
willingness to draw insights from otherwise distinct philosophical 
approaches, including the individualism of Max Stirner and Carl 
Jung’s psychoanalysis.12 
Having established his sympathetic interpretation of spirituality, 
and, in the second section of this chapter, traced its prominence 
in his thought in relation to his hope for a revivified culture, the 
final section considers Read’s position in the wider intellectual 
history of the period. Juxtaposing his defence of spirituality with 
Wells’ critique of religion reveals the generational gap between 
these thinkers, one that it is possible to map onto the complex 
cultural legacies of the First World War. His congeniality to 
spiritualism, and his predilection for romanticism, demonstrates 
the inappropriateness of overstating the case for seeing the war 
as a “slaughterhouse” for Edwardian verities.13 Rather than a 
brave new world, modernism, and post-war British culture more 
generally, often felt a renewed acquaintance with tradition.
 11 Ibid., p. 5.
 12 For more on Read’s approach to Stirner and Jung, see: Adams, Kropotkin, 
Read, and the Intellectual History of British Anarchism, pp. 175–179.
 13 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the 
Modern Age (New York, 1989), p. 258.
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I. “The needle between reason and romanticism”: 
utopianism, community, and the spiritual
Wells’ The Happy Turning: A Dream of Life, published in 1945 
and written in the heat of the Second World War, charts the au-
thor’s attempts to escape the “overstrain” occasioned by the pre-
sent “chaotic war”, in the comfort of sleep. “More and more”, 
he writes, “are my dreams what I believe the psychologists call 
compensatory; the imaginations I have suppressed revolt and 
take control.”14 An early reference to J.W. Dunne’s influential 
work An Experiment with Time (1927) points to the text’s affi-
nities with one of Wells’ more famous forays into genre-blending 
fiction, The Shape of Things to Come. Published in 1933 and pre-
senting itself as a “Short History of the World for about the next 
century”, in this text Wells occupies the role of editor and literary 
executor to the fictional historian Dr Philip Raven.15 Inheriting 
Raven’s notes upon his untimely death, Wells writes that he com-
piled the “dream book” from these scattered manuscripts, revea-
ling an imaginative attempt to record the history of the future. In 
his introduction, Wells recounts Raven’s belief in the argument 
put forward in An Experiment with Time that “we may anticipate 
the future” and that “in the dozing moment between wakefulness 
and oblivion” some intimation of future events is possible.16 For 
the real-life Dunne, this was a prelude to highlighting the role of 
human consciousness in ordering time, a hardwiring escaped in 
sleep, during which precognitive dreams reveal that all states of 
time are, in fact, simultaneous.17 
The dream state had long been a favoured method for utopian 
writers to imagine the contours of a possible future. Unencumbered 
by either the restrictions of an imagination-confining present, or 
the difficulty of inventing a feasible plot device that enables the 
present to be juxtaposed with the utopian future, the dream state 
 14 H.G. Wells, The Happy Turning: A Dream of Life (London: William 
Heinemann, 1945), p. 1, 7.
 15 H.G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come (London: Gollancz, [1933] 
2011), p. 4.
 16 Wells, The Shape of Things to Come, p. 7.
 17 J.W. Dunne, An Experiment with Time (London: A. & C. Black, 1929), 
pp. 29–38, 23–125.
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allows the utopian writer to move between reality and fancy at 
will, mining the unwritten future for lessons of immediate poli-
tical salience. Often, as in William Morris’ News from Nowhere 
(1890), these slumbering visions were imbued with an appro-
priately romantic imagery, in this example a product of Morris’ 
 indebtedness to the late-Victorian cult of the medieval that was an 
antidote to the smokestacks and riveted-iron of nineteenth-cen-
tury capitalism.18 Wells’ oscitant premonitions, as his use of 
Dunne’s pseudoscientific theories indicate, were rather different 
however, rooting themselves in the voguish language and concepts 
of contemporary sociology. Manifesting a “degree of institutional 
specificity” that stood in distinction to Morris’ playfulness, Wells 
also tended to present his utopian speculations – despite their of-
ten-fantastical settings – in terms of their eminent plausibility.19 
A common theme in these works, such as Anticipations (1901) 
and A Modern Utopia (1905), was the importance of enlightened 
minorities acting under the aegis of a powerful state replacing the 
anarchy of the present with a technologically sophisticated and 
orderly society, a vision echoed in The Shape of Things to Come.20 
Wells’ utopianism is an important context for comprehending 
both Read’s location in deeper traditions of British radicalism and 
utopian speculation, and his general antipathy towards Wells’ 
work, which, for obvious reasons, does not register in their brief 
correspondence. Key is this distinction between the romantic and 
scientific, and it is Read’s embrace of the romantic that informed 
his openness to a spiritual dimension in anarchist politics that 
would have been an anathema to a rationalist like Wells. Despite 
his position in the advanced guard of modernism, Read continu-
ed to insist upon his credentials as a son of the soil. “In spite of 
 18 Morris’ book did, after all, bear the subtitle “being some chapters from a 
Utopian Romance”. William Morris, News from Nowhere or an Epoch 
of Rest in News from Nowhere and Other Writings, ed. Clive Wilmer 
(London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 41–228 (p. 41). See also: Ruth Kinna, 
William Morris: The Art of Socialism (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 
2000), pp. 38–40.
 19 Ruth Levitas, Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of 
Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 65, 81.
 20 Wells, Shape of Things to Come, pp. 22–32.
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my intellectual pretensions”, he wrote in Poetry and Anarchism 
(1938), one of his earliest political pronouncements, 
I am by birth and tradition a peasant. I remain essentially a 
peasant. I despise this foul industrial epoch – not only the pluto-
cracy which it has raised to power, but also the industrial proleta-
riat which it has drained from the land and proliferated in hovels 
of indifferent brick.21
Politicised in part by reading the blended aesthetic and social 
critique of Morris and John Ruskin, and by the poverty and 
ugliness he discerned in pre-First World War Halifax, Read’s 
anarchism would reflect these influences.22 Believing that the di-
versity of artistic creativity was an “index” of social progress, 
and that modernist design, sensitive to the demands and requi-
rements of local communities, could moderate the brutality of 
industrial capitalism, Read looked askance at the technocratic 
impulse that characterized scientifically-minded utopians such 
as Wells.23 Striving to fuse the design-and-planning-led urge of 
modernism, with the localism and direct-democracy of the or-
ganic community, Read’s was a vision defined against Wells’ 
all- seeing “world state” in which progress was secured by the 
actions of a technocratic elite. 
These diverging perspectives came to the fore in Read’s and 
Wells’ brief correspondence. Despite his lack of sympathy for 
much of Wells’ political vision, Read was evidently amused by 
The Happy Turning. A phantasmagoric and playful text in com-
parison to Wells’ other utopian works, the cluster of stories that 
comprised it, including one where Wells meets Jesus, who laments 
the perversions of his teachings with the admonition “Never have 
disciples”, were no doubt a relief from the oppressive internatio-
 21 Herbert Read, Poetry and Anarchism (London: Freedom Press, [1938] 
1947), p. 8.
 22 For more on this, see: Matthew S. Adams, ‘To Hell with Culture: Fascism, 
Rhetoric, and the War for Democracy’, Anarchist Studies 23: 2 (2015), 
pp. 18–37.
 23 Herbert Read, ‘Preface’ to To Hell With Culture (London: Routledge, 
1963), pp. ix–xii (p. xii). For this see also: Adams, Kropotkin, Read, and 
the Intellectual History of British Anarchism.
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nal situation in 1943.24 But Read noted that he “enjoyed it as a 
story and I fully agreed with its underlying moral”, concluding 
with the subtly ambiguous statement that “I find your fantasy 
as stimulating as ever”.25 He did have reservations, however. He 
did not mind what Wells described as the gentle “blasphemy” 
of the text, but saw the more virulent denunciations of religion 
as anachronistic.26 Religion, Read argued, posed an insignificant 
obstacle to social regeneration, adding laconically that it “will 
automatically be cleaned up as we rebuild”.27 This was a mild 
rebuke, but it was underpinned by Read’s divergence from Wells’ 
more rigid brand of politics. Invoking Lord Acton, he made a plea 
for the value of both diversity and permissiveness in the face of 
dehumanising dogmatism: 
But generally – and this, if anything, is what might divide us – I am 
all for Tolerance rather than Tidiness. I don’t believe that good and 
evil determine human institutions: there is good and evil in every 
human institution, whether the College of Cardinals or the House 
of Commons, the Kremlin or the White House. Acton (whom I’ve 
been looking into lately – what a wise man) wrote: “Good and evil 
lie close together. Seek no artistic unity in character” – a good mot-
to for a novelist as well as for an historian.28
For all that Read confessed to a real affinity with Wells’ work, this 
motto pointed in a different direction. Rejecting the “tidiness” of 
completeness, this was an idea whose truth, Read felt, was more 
apparent in his own anarchist politics than in Wells’ utopianism. 
The just society, he reflected elsewhere, was the one that truly 
protected and nurtured meaningful individuality and rested com-
fortably in its imperfection and incompleteness. “The only idea 
of a society which is capable of guaranteeing the integrity of the 
person”, Read once argued, “is the negation of the idea of socie-
ty.” Rather than pointing to a kind of Stirnerian solipsism, for 
Read this reflected the fact that the “whole of what we mean by 
 24 Wells, The Happy Turning, p. 14.
 25 Read to Wells: 27.8.43
 26 Wells, The Happy Turning, p. 6. 
 27 Read to Wells: 27th August, 1943.
 28 Read to Wells: 27th August, 1943.
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civilization or culture has been built up by a dialectical process”, 
and, accordingly, “every advance towards community must be 
countered by an affirmation of individual freedom”.29 There was 
no place, in this vision, for either an all-powerful state or the idea 
that a utopian society was an end in itself, a resolution of huma-
nity’s troubled history. 
A month before they debated the importance of anticlericalism, 
Read offered Wells a more substantial overview of his politics. 
Seeking opinions on a series of letters that Wells had written for 
The Times pondering the Allies’ war-aims, Read proposed a number 
of amendments to what would eventually appear as the pamphlet 
The Rights of Man, or What are We Fighting For?30 In suggesting 
textual improvements, Read drew heavily on the conceptual re-
sources of his anarchist politics. “You have removed my particu-
lar bogey, the suggestion of a centralised world state with all the 
obsolete machinery of representative government”, but Read sug-
gested two further clauses, one addressing “consumer interests” in 
“some sort of guild organisation of industry”, and the other cal-
ling for the abolition of that “mental dinosaur”, money. Read also 
suggested adding a further substantive clause, the “right to mem-
bership of a community”. He defined this community, in typically 
anarchic terms, as the ideal crucible for individual growth:
A community is an association of like-minded people for mutual 
aid. Each person within a community has a right to select that pla-
ce within the community most appropriate to his abilities, and the 
duty to contribute his due quota to the common wealth. In return 
the community will guarantee him the supply of all the necessaries 
of a happy and productive life.31
 29 Herbert Read, A Coat of Many Colours: Occasional Essays (London: 
Routledge, 1947), 317, 312, 317.
 30 H.G. Wells, ‘Letters to the Editor: War Aims’ in The Times, 26th September 
1939, pp. 4; H.G. Wells, ‘Letters to the Editor: War Aims: The Rights of 
Man’ in The Times, 25th October 1939, pp. 6; H.G. Wells, The Rights of 
Man, or What are We Fighting For? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1940); 
H.G. Wells (ed.) The Rights of Man: an Essay in Collective Definition 
(Brighton: Poynings Press, 1943).
 31 Herbert Read to H.G. Wells: 28th July, 1943, HRA: HR.HGW-7 Enclo.02. 
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Here, the differences between Read’s and Wells’ politics come 
to the fore. Against the state, he poses the constructive and organi-
sational potential of the guilds, as well as offering a trenchant de-
fence of the community as the locus of individual growth. Beyond 
this, however, he firmly identifies with that Kropotkinian shibbo-
leth, the abolition of the wage system as the prerequisite of any 
libertarian society.32 
A particular understanding of society – of its existential impor-
tance; of its necessary independence from an “abstraction” like 
the state, but also of its potential to stymie individual  development 
– clearly ran through Read’s thought.33 While dismissive of the 
power of religion in his comments on The Happy Turning, Read’s 
image of community nevertheless drew heavily on ideas of spiri-
tual union. In the series of Nietzschean aphorisms that closed his 
pamphlet Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism (1949), he de-
veloped this concept of society, arguing, in terms that Wells would 
have struggled to recognise, that the commune was social unit best 
suited to preserving “the freedom of the person”.34 Revealingly 
drawing on the work of Martin Buber, he added that successful 
communal experiments, while rare, were those defined by a strong 
and unifying religious impulse. Where they failed, Read perceived 
the root of this collapse not in economic pressures, but principally 
as the result of a lack of durable bonds between the community’s 
members. “Religious communities like the Hutterites”, he obser-
ved, are the communities with the “longest record of success”, 
not “because of their superior skill in agriculture or their genius 
for planning, but simply because their members have been with 
one another, in real communion.”35 Quoting Henrik Infield’s book 
Co-Operative Communism at Work (1947), Read concluded that 
the overriding evidence was that in religious and non-religious 
 32 For a classic definition of this position, see: Peter Kropotkin, Act for 
Yourselves: Articles from Freedom, ed. Nicolas Walter & Heiner Becker 
(London: Freedom Press, 1998), pp. 103–113.
 33 Read, A Coat of Many Colours, 310.
 34 Herbert Read, Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism (London: 
Freedom Press, 1949), p. 27.
 35 Italics are Read’s own. Read, Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism, 
p. 28.
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communal experiments, success was determined by the existen-
ce of a “central emotional impulse, comparable to the religious 
motive...[that]...is important to the success of comprehensive 
co-operation”.36 
Spiritual union was therefore essential, Read thought, and 
turning to the issue of equality – a principle so often in the his-
tory of utopian thinking redolent of austerity and Spartanism – 
 invested it with a spiritual dimension too. Indeed, the  association 
of austerity with equality, he complained, was the result of a 
failure to appreciate the spiritual ethos of this distributive ethic, 
a point he made by drawing a distinction between the desire to 
“make all incomes equal” and “hold all things in common”.37 The 
former, he argued, was the intention of the “average democratic 
socialist”, going on to suggest that the “distinction between false 
communism and true communism” lay in this issue. Quoting the 
Acts of the Apostles, Read also suggested that this was a distinc-
tion familiar to “early Christian communities”:
The multitude of them that believed were of one heart [...] Neither 
was there any of them that lacked: for as many as were possessors 
of lands or houses sold them, and brought the prices of the things 
that were sold, and laid them down at the apostles’ feet: and distri-
bution was made unto every man according as he had need.38 
While Read cleaved to the anarchist-communist tradition in de-
manding a community of goods (“all is for all” in Kropotkin’s 
dictum), he challenged the rhetorical objection that this is based 
on a “superhuman” perception of human nature through an ap-
peal to the “spiritual”, a position in stark contrast to Kropotkin’s 
 36 Henrik Infield cited in Read, Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism, 
p. 28. A useful comparison here is with Herbert Read’s friend George 
Woodcock, whose interest in the dissenting Christian sect the Doukhobors 
remained a perennial interest. For more on this see George Woodcock 
and Ivan Avacumovic, The Doukhobors (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1968) and Matthew S. Adams & Luke Kelly, ‘George Woodcock 
and the Doukhobors: peasant radicalism, anarchism, and the Canadian 
state’, Intellectual History Review 28: 3 (2018), pp. 399–423.
 37 Italics are Read’s own. Read, Existentialism, Marxism and 
Anarchism, p. 34.
 38 Read, Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism, p. 34.
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rationalism.39 Communism of this kind was not unrealistic, Read 
continued, because it rested on a communion that made such orga-
nic, communal societies durable in the face of outside pressures. 
Invoking the Hutterites, he suggested that the “libertarian con-
ception of society as a brotherhood” that made this communism 
viable, had deep historical roots. “The first Hutterite colonies 
were founded in 1526”, he wrote, adding, in a broadside aimed 
at those incapable of thinking of social life in the absence of the 
nation-state, that “no other social system can boast such an unde-
viating record of stability and self-sufficiency.”40 The roots of this 
longevity lay in their perception of community, and Read retur-
ned to the idea of “communion” and “brotherhood” to describe 
an encompassing sense of community with a “necessary physical 
(sensational) basis”.41 
Viewed in the context of Read’s broader philosophy, this un-
derstanding of necessary spirituality comes into sharper focus, 
and shows why Read and Wells had such a difficult time com-
prehending each other in their correspondence. A central aspect 
of Read’s thought was a belief in the importance of appreciating 
the intuitive, irrational, and ethereal aspects of the phenomeno-
logical world, a belief that explains his attraction to the work 
of Nietzsche, Georges Sorel and Henri Bergson.42 Against the ra-
tionalism of Wells’ utopianism or the “piecemeal planning, prac-
tical politics” of contemporary technocrats, Read stressed the 
 39 Read, Existential, Marxism and Anarchism; Kropotkin, The Conquest of 
Bread, p. 26.
 40 Read, Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism, p. 34.
 41 Read, Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism, p. 34, 36.
 42 Read would recognise major faults in these theorists, especially in their 
politics, but all three were important formative influences. His approach 
to Nietzsche is an illustrative example. In his autobiography, Read details 
his exposure to Nietzsche’s ideas in “cataclysmic” terms, confessing that 
encountering Nietzsche at university was a conduit to “Schopenhauer, to 
Kant, Hegel, Hume, Pascal, Plato”, and describing Nietzsche’s words as 
a “prophetic fire” that destroyed his “Sunday-school piety and priggish 
morality”. By wartime, this infatuation had faded, with Read observing 
in 1915 that “Nietzsche’s appeal to me is largely poetical.” See Read, 
The Contrary Experience, p. 167, 187, 203–206, 277–27’ Read, The 
Contrary Experience, p. 165; Herbert Read, The Tenth Muse: Essays in 
Criticism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 176.
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 spiritually enlivening quality of an anarchism “guided by instinct 
rather than reason, [that is] passionate and spontaneous rather 
than cool and calculated.”43 Such “absurdism” had a religious pa-
rallel, he noted, in that as all religions are based on a sense “of 
the numinous [which is] absurd, not rooted in normal experience, 
closed to normal channels of perception, and resistant to normal 
modes of expression”.44 For a sociologically-minded utopian like 
Wells this was too unscientific, and for the practical planner in-
spired by modern sociology it was too fanciful: for both it offered 
little in addressing immediate social and economic problems. To 
Read’s mind, in contrast, the “ideal” had an important vitalising 
quality that was a corrective to the ‘despair [and] nihilism’ of tho-
se fixated on the immediately practicable and restored the impor-
tance of the human and creative to the mechanistic utopians – in 
his terms, the “poeticization of all practicalities”.45 
Losing sight of the irrational was, for Read, therefore, ope-
ning the door to a pernicious kind of technocratic politics. His 
comments on Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution (1907) offer 
another route into this issue. Reading Bergson’s classic text, he 
commented, served to temporarily ease the feeling occasioned by 
the loss of his childhood religion, which he observed had plunged 
him on a path of “bleak rationalism which was not consistent 
with my romantic temperament.” His fleeting Bergsonianism was 
an antidote to the “mechanistic interpretation of the universe” he 
was nurturing, that, while “keeping within the world of scienti-
fic fact”, eschewed a “finalist” interpretation of the universe and 
emphasised the spontaneity at the heart of natural processes.46 
All of this was a challenge to the scientific utopianism of Wells, 
and Read similarly condemned both historical materialism and 
its conceptual sibling “logical positivism”. Their insensitivity to 
“instinctive modes of thought, of super-rational intuitions, of the 
aesthetic nature of perception”, leaves its theorists “slaves to their 
formulae – hard, intolerant, and sadistic.”47 His vituperation may 
 43 Read, Anarchy and Order, 13, 17.
 44 Read, Anarchy and Order, 13.
 45 Read, Anarchy and Order, 20, 19, 23.
 46 Read, The Contrary Experience, p. 277, 278.
 47 Read, Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism, p. 29, 30.
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overstate the case, but its purpose was to stress the importan-
ce of the numinous against the “arid” instincts of modern philo-
sophy.48 A revitalised social world, one defined by communalism 
and economic communism must be sensitive to the emotional and 
intuitive, and recognise the importance of a unity drawing its 
strength from something other than instrumental logic. This, in 
Read’s view, was to appreciate the contradictions of experience, 
and to realise that “wisdom [...] is the needle which comes to rest 
between reason and romanticism”.49 A modern utopia must re-
cognise this to achieve meaningful emancipation, or the shape of 
things to come could only be a worsening of the noxious present. 
II. “In the beginning was the image”: art in history50 
Read’s notion of “communion” as a foundation of a vibrant socie-
ty also manifested itself in his aesthetic theory. Given his lifelong 
interest in the visual arts, and persistent anxiety over their social 
position, this was a fitting fusion. He often commented on this es-
sential unity in his philosophy, noting in the collection of his politi-
cal essays Anarchy & Order (1954) that there was “no categorical 
separation [...] between what I have written on...[anarchism]...and 
what I have written on social problems generally [...] or on the so-
cial aspects of art.”51 Despite the renewed interest in Read’s political 
ideas of late, and the acknowledgement that his anarchism perhaps 
ran deeper than has been thought, his aesthetic philosophy has not 
been suitably integrated with his politics.52 Looking at his histories 
 48 Read, Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism, p. 30.
 49 Read, Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism, p. 30.
 50 Herbert Read, Icon & Idea: The Function of Art in the Development of 
Human Consciousness (New York: Schocken, 1965), p. 88.
 51 Read, Anarchy and Order, p. 9.
 52 Amongst the work on Read, Goodway has done most to rescue Read’s 
political thought from oblivion. While he suggests that there is overlap 
between his politics and aesthetics, he is generally sceptical that his anar-
chism informed his aesthetic philosophy. See: Goodway, Anarchist Seeds 
Beneath the Snow; Goodway, ‘Herbert Read, organicism, abstraction and 
an anarchist aesthetic’ in Anarchist Studies. A number of other works have 
traced stronger connections between his aesthetics and politics, but these 
have tended to be relatively brief. See: Allan Antliff, ‘Open form and the 
anarchist imperative: Herbert Read and contemporary anarchist art’ in 
134 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
of aesthetics, and his vision of community as the crucible of great 
art, supports the view that Read’s politics were a continual source 
of inspiration for his wider cultural theory. Moreover, Read’s under-
standing of the sort of historical social structures that allowed past 
cultures to achieve artistic greatness displays an overlooked debt to 
late nineteenth-century socialism, particularly in the context of his 
more challenging works on aesthetic philosophy dating from the 
1950s. Like Read, Kropotkin believed that Renaissance art drew 
its strength from the power of a communal identity supposedly 
 pervasive in the city-states, and his image of the Greek sculptor chi-
seling to “express the spirit and heart of the city”, parallels Read’s 
approach to modern European cultural history.53 Read gathered 
these ideas from more sources than Kropotkin alone – after all, 
Kropotkin was working in a characteristically socialist furrow, one 
also ploughed by Henry Hyndman, William Morris and Thorold 
Rogers – but it was a reading of Kropotkin in particular that infor-
med Read’s work.54 
In one sense, Read’s art theory seems ahistorical. His oft-repeated 
assertion that the artistic urge was a perennial and inherent aspect 
of the human condition, does not necessarily lend itself to nuanced 
historical analysis. As he reflected in 1951: “There is no phase of 
art from the Palaeolithic cave-paintings to the latest developments 
of constructivism, that does not seem to me to be an illustration of 
the biological and teleological significance of the aesthetic activity 
Anarchist Studies, 16: 1 (2011), pp. 6–19; Allan Antliff, ‘David Goodway 
critiques Herbert Read’ in Anarchist Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2011), 
pp. 98–106; Carissa Honeywell, A British Anarchist Tradition: Herbert 
Read, Alex Comfort and Colin Ward (London: Continuum, 2011); Dana 
Ward, ‘Art and Anarchy: Herbert Read’s Aesthetic Politics’ in Re-Reading 
Read: New Views on Herbert, ed. Michael Paraskos, (London: Freedom 
Press, 2007), pp. 20–33. For works on anarchism in which Read is men-
tioned, but analysis of his thought is comparatively underdeveloped, see: 
April Carter, The Political Theory of Anarchism (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1971), pp. 91–3; Benjamin Franks, Rebel Alliances: The 
Means and Ends of Contemporary British Anarchisms (Edinburgh: AK 
Press, 2006), p. 52; Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, pp. 587–593; 
David Miller, Anarchism (London, J.M. Dent, 1984), pp. 141–151.
 53 Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread, p. 139.
 54 A. Dwight Culler, The Victorian Mirror of History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985), p. 155. 
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in man”.55 While deeming art the product of a constant aesthetic 
desire might entail a static interpretation of the history of art, Read 
was, in fact, at pains to show that art was, nevertheless, an area of 
constant innovation. “My whole reading of the history of art”, he 
added in the same work, “tells me that change is the condition of 
art remaining art”.56 In seeking to understand this change, Read 
was equally adamant that any overly “materialistic” explanation, 
shorthand for the Marxist art critics that were prominent in British 
art criticism in the 1930s and 1940s, was insufficient.57 Despite 
his claims for the universality of the aesthetic sensibility therefore, 
Read was fully committed to an historical interpretation of art that 
was sensitive to the impact of social and cultural change. In one 
the earliest expressions of this nascent aesthetic philosophy Art 
and Society (1936), a work that was reprinted in 1967 with a fresh 
preface from Read defending its central assertions, he called for 
an understanding of art that was attuned to the role of material 
factors but also cognisant of art’s relative autonomy:
Art […] is [...] influenced like all our activities by the material con-
ditions of existence, but as a mode of knowledge at once its own 
reality and its own end. It has necessary relations with politics, re-
ligion, and with all other modes of reacting to our human destiny. 
But as a mode of reaction it is distinct and contributes in its own 
right to that process of integrations which we call a civilization or 
a culture.58 
In cautiously trying to move the debate away from viewing art 
as an “efflux” of material conditions, Read was challenging the 
Marxist orthodoxy in art criticism, but also making the case for 
an historically-attuned idealistic theory of art.59 This reading of 
art history was at the fore of his 1954 work Icon & Idea, which 
 55 Herbert Read, ‘Preface [1951]’ to The Philosophy of Modern Art: 
Collected Essays (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), p. 13.
 56 Read, The Philosophy of Modern Art, p. 57
 57 Read, Icon & Idea, p. 21. For a riposte from Read to these critics, includ-
ing Alick West, see: Read, Coat of Many Colours, pp. 212–221.
 58 Herbert Read, Art and Society (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), p. 2.
 59 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, ed. C.J. Arthur 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1999), p. 47.
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argued that art was an existentially vital source of meaning, and 
had even contributed to humanity’s evolutionary survival:
Art [...] was never [...] an attempt to represent the totality of ap-
pearances; but rather it has been the piecemeal recognition and 
patient fixation of what is significant in human experience. The 
artistic activity might therefore be described as a crystallization, 
from the amorphous realm of feeling, of forms that are significant 
and symbolic.60
In a letter to the poet Stephen Spender, Read offered a pithier 
précis of Icon & Idea:
The whole argument of my Harvard Lectures [...] is that society 
owes everything to the artist – that the philosophy and science of 
any age is but a commentary on its art. And even its religion – 
 religion as a commentary on instinctive ritual, on magical objects 
and events. The poet is a legislator, not in the sense that he lays 
down laws, but because he creates the pattern of ideas and  ‘endows’ 
society with thought.61 
Art is at the fore of human development, and as well as under-
pinning our intellectual advances, offers an avenue into what lies 
beyond conscious thought – the realm of feeling, with its rich, 
suggestive, and vital symbolism.
The dualism that Read saw at the heart of artistic activity, at 
once eternal and individual but also shaped by context and emi-
nently social, points to a productive tension in his thought. But his 
understanding of communion as the foundation of a healthy so-
cial compact, and his abiding interest in the relationship between 
the artist and society, clearly highlights an important historical 
dimension to his complex aesthetic theory. Here, as much as in 
his comments on the unconscious and symbolic component 
behind artistic inspiration, we see the significance of the spiritual 
to the position he reached, an idea that comes to the fore in 
his discussion of the Renaissance. Artistically, Read was often 
rather ambivalent towards the achievements of the Renaissance, 
 60 Read, Icon & Idea, p. 18.
 61 Herbert Read to Stephen Spender: 22nd February, 1955, HRA, 49/28/ 
1-HR/SS-70 Enclo.012.
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but thought that its enduring cultural impact, acting parallel 
with the philosophical triumphs of the age, was a result of a ge-
neral emancipation from the “central imperial power [of] the 
Church”.62 In freeing itself from the requirement of “illustrating” 
religious “dogma” that cramped the creativity of medieval art, the 
Renaissance began with a loosening of these binds and a growing 
interest in “natural phenomena” and a “reaffirmation of classical 
humanism”.63 Mirroring Kropotkin’s view of the rise of the ci-
ty-states and the communal movement in twelfth-century Europe, 
Read argued that this cultural change emerged from a complex 
of economic and social factors. Following Kropotkin’s argument 
in Mutual Aid, he suggested that with the eclipse of the Church’s 
authority, social life was diversified and invigorated.64 “Here a re-
public challenged the authority of the Pope”, he wrote,
Elsewhere a king disposed the [...] monasteries [...] events which 
loom large in our history books. More significant, however, is the 
change in mood and temperament which affected people at large. 
The actual process consisted, I believe, of an infinite series of small 
deflections and counter-deflections caused first by one force and 
then [...] another, the heart taking, as a result, the zig-zag course of a 
vessel tacking against the wind. As the historical process developed, 
it revealed itself as a disintegration, better still, as differentiation.65 
The power of Renaissance humanism grew from this freedom, as, 
in Read’s view, the artist won the space to express “his sensibili-
ty”, rather than being required to glorify God, and in turn could 
reflect on the relationship between the individual and  society. 
“The artist declared himself, confessed his humanity”, Read wro-
te, “and celebrated the humanity of his fellow-men”.66 
Read was not arguing that turning the clock back was either 
possible or desirable. He chastised William Morris for his naive 
commitment to medievalism, and criticised his failure to  recognise 
 62 Read, Art and Society, p. 67. On his ambiguous relation to the 
Renaissance, consider: Read, A Coat of Many Colours, pp. 1–5.
 63 Read, Icon & Idea, p. 93.
 64 For Kropotkin’s narrative, see: P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of 
Evolution (London: Penguin, [1901] 1939), pp. 129–179.
 65 Read, Art and Society, p. 67
 66 Read, Art and Society, p. 67.
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the potential for machinery to produce aesthetically beautiful art-
efacts.67 Neither was Read blind to the iniquities of the patronage 
system that underpinned this period of artistic creativity. In Art 
and Society, for example, he noted that the Renaissance often of-
fered a “specious” freedom, one that might leave the artist “free 
to express himself, but only on condition that the “self” expressed 
was a marketable commodity”.68 Also, Read cautioned against se-
eing the Renaissance as a united phenomenon, noting the existence 
of a “Northern Renaissance” operating under the influence of the 
Reformation, and a “southern Renaissance” pursuing its own uni-
que path, with the latter offering a secularized, “positive process 
[...] in the direction of increasing self-assertion, self-affirmation, 
self-control”, and a subsequent reorientation of art.69 But Read’s 
interest in the social aspect of the Renaissance rested on a belief 
that it approximated the notion of communion he explored in his 
political writings, and despite his qualifications, he associated the 
Italian experience of the Renaissance as an epitome of this spiritu-
al communion. Echoing characteristically anarchist concerns over 
the size of decision-making units, he noted that the “integrated 
communities of the past - Athens, Etruria, the Christian commu-
nities of the Middle Ages, Venice in its republican glory – [...] were 
never large”, and their working democratic principles, even if they 
were “sometimes [...] careless of civil liberties”, allowed art to 
grow. More than this, Read concluded that the pervasive mutual 
aid ethic existing in these communities nurtured a spiritual unity 
with direct cultural consequences:
They were not conscious of the artist as a separate [...] kind of 
man. They were only conscious of a living community, its members 
 differentiated according to their individual skills, and all contribu-
ting to the common glory.70
 67 Read did note that Morris reached some accommodation with the ma-
chine later in life Read, Poetry and Anarchism, 9; Herbert Read, Art and 
Industry (London: Faber and Faber, 1934 [1944]), 39–47.
 68 Read, Art and Society, 65
 69 Read, Art and Society, p. 66.
 70 This aphorism can be found in the extended version of ‘Chains of 
Freedom’, published in Anarchy and Order. See: Read, Anarchy and 
Order, p. 222.
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From this imperfect communion, the imperfect art of the 
Renaissance grew.
Read was evidently not glorifying the role of Christianity in a 
conventional sense. While recognizing the realities of aristocratic 
patronage and the imprimatur of the Church as forces shaping 
Renaissance art, he also emphasised the idea that its grandeur 
grew from a social soil fertilised by the freedom and unity of the 
communal movement. The spiritual – however attenuated by 
competing forces – was nevertheless essential. Writing in a diffe-
rent context, Read noted that while the achievements of modern 
science had made the “supernatural” sanction of religion obso-
lete, that obviously did not mean that the “state of our scientific 
knowledge is final or absolute”. Rather than religious obscuran-
tism or Zamyatinian rationalism, the solution to social stability 
lay instead somewhere between these poles:
No one who has given the least thought to the morphology of so-
cieties will be disposed to deny that they always depend for their 
cohesion and survival upon some unifying idea, which unifying 
idea has generally been of a mystical or religious kind. Only the 
most inveterate rationalist would be hardy enough to believe that a 
society might exist on a purely rational basis […] I do not estimate 
the survival value of such a society very highly – it would probably 
die of a kind of communal accidie.71 
Read’s art histories give an indication of how he saw communion 
in action, and reveal how this spiritual ethos stemmed from his 
perception of mutual aid as a logic of group organisation. Although 
working in a seam of thought inaugurated by Kropotkin, and cou-
pling his ideas to Kropotkin’s, Read’s emphasis on the emotional 
aspect of mutual aid betrays a subtler conception of this principle. 
Kropotkin was not silent on the emotional quality of mutual aid, 
after all, both Ethics (1921) and shorter pieces such as the pamph-
let Anarchist Morality (1892) dwell on “large  natures overflowing 
with tenderness, with intelligence, with goodwill”, but his moti-
vating desire was to root this ethical language in the discourse of 
 71 Read, A Coat of Many Colours, 314, 315.
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nineteenth-century science.72 Anarchism was a moral denunciation 
of capitalism, but one apparently backed up by the weight of the 
latest scientific thinking. Read largely accepted this position, tel-
lingly observing that Kropotkin had adduced impressive “empiri-
cal evidence” to justify the theory of mutual aid, but deliberately 
eschewed the language of positivism, fearful that it would open the 
door to the emotionally withered politics of a utopian like Wells.73 
Indeed, in The Philosophy of Anarchism (1940), while lambasting 
Marxism for its premature rejection of religious feeling, Read con-
fessed that although he had “no religion to recommend and none 
to believe in [...] on the evidence of [...] history [...] a religion is a 
necessary element in any organic society.”74 And, he tied the idea of 
spiritual ecstasy to aesthetic pleasure, arguing that “poetry, in its 
intensest and most creative moments, penetrates to the same level 
of the unconscious as mysticism.” This sibling relationship led Read 
to ponder if the “origins of a new religion”, one congruent with 
anarchist principles, might be found “if not in mysticism, then in 
art.”75 Wherever it was to come from, a reassessment of the spiritual 
would define anarchist society, and the effervescent cultural creati-
vity and experimentation that would come with it.
III. Locating Read
Read’s sympathy towards spiritual expressions, and his belief that 
any future anarchist society must be united by some kind of spi-
ritual ethos, shows that he was engaged in a creative reading of 
the historical tradition of anarchism, notably Kropotkin’s work. 
His cultural politics was not a simple reapplication of Kropotkin’s 
ideas to meet the challenges of contemporary political life, but a 
significant revision of these political principles in a quest to ma-
intain the relevance of anarchism in a very different world. This 
revision bore the imprint of both Read’s particular interests (art 
 72 Peter Kropotkin, ‘Anarchist Morality’ in Fugitive Writings, ed. George 
Woodcock (Montreal: Black Rose Books, [1892] 1993), pp. 127–153.
 73 Read, A Coat of Many Colours, p .63
 74 Herbert Read, The Philosophy of Anarchism (London: Freedom Press, 
1940), p. 25.
 75 Read, Philosophy of Anarchism, p. 26
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and cultural creativity), but also a broader intellectual clima-
te in which coming to terms with the legacy of the First World 
War was, for obvious reasons, a key concern. Read, who had ser-
ved on the western front with distinction and found his initial 
notoriety as a war poet, was a characteristic representative of this 
tradition, and the Great War remained a perpetual frame of refe-
rence in his writing. Indeed, in the year before his death, Read tied 
his conversion to anarchism directly to his experience of war, ob-
serving that the “fidelity” of comradeship that emerged in the heat 
of battle, was a pellucid lesson to him in the instinctual nature of 
mutual aid.76 The war was also a time of intellectual growth for 
Read, who, his education interrupted by mobilisation, avidly di-
gested the pamphlet literature of nineteenth-century socialism and 
the latest modernist periodicals including A.R. Orage’s The New 
Age and Dora Marden’s The Egoist, both of which would later 
be vehicles for Read’s literary work. His idiosyncratic modernism 
developed in this context, his initial enthusiasm for the semantic 
discipline and clarity of Imagist poetry ultimately tempered by his 
enduring interest in the defining characteristics of romanticism: 
emotion, expression, and a fascination with nature.
Read’s politics emerged from this complex of ideas: obsessed 
with the importance of artistic self-expression and built upon an 
appeal to the spiritual, whilst at the same time accommodating 
itself to the rationalistic discourse of nineteenth-century anar-
chism. Inevitably this entailed tensions, but Read’s navigation of 
these competing values – his efforts to strike a balance between 
 “reason and romanticism” that informed a particular vision of 
modernist art – should also be recognised as the product of its ti-
me.77 With his championing of modernism in mind, a contribution 
 76 Herbert Read, The Cult of Sincerity (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), 
p. 41. For more on these themes, see: Matthew S. Adams, ‘Herbert Read and 
the Fluid Memory of the First World War’, Historical Research, 88: 240, 
pp. 333–354; Matthew S. Adams, ‘Mutualism in the Trenches: Anarchism, 
Militarism and the Lessons of the First World War’ in Adams & Ruth 
Kinna (eds.) Anarchism, 1914–18: Internationalism, Anti-Militarism, 
and War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), pp. 243–262.
 77 Tellingly, this was the title of Read’s first collection of essays. Herbert Read, 
Reason and Romanticism: Essays in Literary Criticism (London: Faber and 
Gwyer, 1926).
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that has only recently been rescued from historical oblivion,78 the 
First World War figures prominently in efforts to understand the 
growth of this cultural stance. One approach is to see the war, in 
undermining the verities of the Victorian and Edwardian age, as a 
crucial moment; its jarring and destabilising effects giving rise to 
new types of poetic diction and artistic imagery that reflected the 
scale of the trauma. What Graham Greene once referred to as 
the “Victorian look of confidence, of being at home in the world 
and knowing the way round”, was superseded by a post-war cy-
nicism, whose emergence one scholar boldly dated to the first day 
of the Somme, 1st July, 1916.79 Modernism was the artistic articu-
lation of this mentality, matched in the hedonistic behaviour of 
the “younger generation” in the 1920s, who met with scepticism 
“the moralistic idealism that had kept busy the slaughterhouse 
that was the Western Front”.80 
While the First World War may have been a catalyst for moder-
nism in the arts, it would be reductive to see this cultural growth 
purely in terms of the rupturing effects of war. Indeed, as Read was 
well aware, modernism had deeper roots, as he playfully obser-
ved when arguing that “modern art” was born in the immediate 
aftermath of the “Universal Exhibition of 1889”.81 Here, he wrote, 
the displays of “primitive art” intoxicated Gauguin and Van Gogh, 
forcing them to see a connection across the ages that unmasked 
the importance of social unrest and “insecurity” on the movement 
“away from representational realism [...] towards some degree of 
abstraction or symbolism”.82 Not only was modernism in the arts 
frequently informed by a renewed contact with tradition then, but 
in the aftermath of war people often looked back, rather than for-
 78 Michael Paraskos, ‘The Curse of King Bomba: Or How Marxism Stole 
Modernism’ in Paraskos (ed.) Rereading Read: New Views on Herbert 
Read (London: Freedom Press, 2007), pp. 44–57; Jerald Zaslove, ‘Herbert 
Read and Essential Modernism: Or the Loss of an Image of the World’ 
in David Goodway (ed.) Herbert Read Reassessed (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1998), pp. 287–308.
 79 Graham Greene, The End of the Affair (London, (1951) 2004), p. 14; 
Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (London, 1975), p. 29.
 80 Eksteins, Rites of Spring, p. 258.
 81 Read, The Tenth Muse, p. 304.
 82 Read, The Tenth Muse, p. 304, 309, 308.
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ward: in mourning, an idealised past was more of a balm than the 
queasy disruptions of challenging modernism.83 
Again, Read’s own work, in spite of his perceived position as the 
“last modern”, shows this process at work.84 In the article “The 
Greatest Work of Art in the World”, he recounts a visit Florence on 
the eve of war in July 1939. With the city pregnant with anticipa-
tion at the impending conflict, Read admitted that his “systematic 
tour of churches and museums, palaces and picture galleries” provi-
ded distraction but little satisfaction, until, returning to the Museo 
Archeologico, he encountered a “small object I had never seen be-
fore [...] unlabelled and unhonoured.”85 This bronze - “the head of 
a negro boy, probably a slave” - affected Read more deeply than the 
treasure troves of “High Renaissance” artefacts. As he wrote:
Whatever he was, and whenever he lived, this artist created 
 something without age or epoch, something so elementally simple 
and fresh that it had the power, in my sophisticated mind, to 
rouse the highest pleasure and to prompt – as an aftermath – the 
deepest questionings. 
Read over-dramatised this event, but his point was to emphasise 
the ability of the forgotten craftsman to create an object who-
se beauty could survive the ages, and sit happily alongside the 
canonical works of the Renaissance. This democratic vision infor-
med his aesthetic politics, but also demonstrates the retrospective 
aspect of modernism at work. Rather than emancipation from 
history, modernists like Read were involved in a creative discus-
sion with the past, and the artistic departures of modernism of-
ten gained their impetus from a contact with tradition instead 
of its renunciation. Read’s panegyric for the bronze in a dusty 
Florentine cabinet was an expression of this idea, and, aside from 
an invitation to think more openly about the criterion of beauty, 
shows that it is more useful to see modernism in a history of con-
tinuity, rather than rupture.
 83 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in 
European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995).
 84 King, The Last Modern.
 85 Read, A Coat of Many Colours, p. 1, 2.
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Placed in this intellectual context, Read’s position on anar-
chist spirituality becomes clearer. Although he continued to frame 
both his politics and aesthetics as a product of logic, and saw 
the essential truth of these theories increasingly revealed by mo-
dern science, he equally strove to strike a balance with a sense of 
the numinous. Concluding The Contrary Experience, following 
a protracted reflection on how the work of the naturalist D’Arcy 
Thompson and the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead echoed 
his belief that the laws of art were akin to the laws of nature, Read 
noted that this language of logic was always tempered in his mind 
by a fascination with the unknowable:
In this story of the growth of my mind, every advance has been 
due to the exercise of the faculty of reason; but that advance is not 
uniform, unimpeded. It abounds in deviations and contradictions: 
the opposed terms of a dialectical progression. The very bases of re-
ason, the perceptions of an unclouded intellect, are continually [...] 
contradicted by the creative fictions of the imagination, by a world 
of illusion no less real than the reality of our quick awareness.86
His temporising over the importance of reason versus intuition 
may make Read’s philosophical voice a difficult one to compre-
hend, but this search for a compromise bears the imprint of a 
thinker working in an age seeking to come to terms with an un-
precedented cataclysm. Just as the spiritual more generally was 
to undergo something of a renewal in the aftermath of war, so 
it is possible to read Read’s spirituality as a product of the rejec-
tion of an essentially Victorian rationalism that impelled Europe 
on the path to war.87 Faith in progress and the boons promised 
by science, and, importantly, the conquering of political life by 
adventurous social scientists keen to reshape society in accordan-
ce with their observations and measurements, left Read cold. He 
may have  criticised Wells for wasting too much energy ridiculing a 
Church that was already bankrupt, but underlying this was a be-
lief that the more positive aspects of spiritual communion had 
 86 Read, The Contrary Experience, p. 346, 353.
 87 Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, pp. 54–77; Jennifer 
Hazelgrove, ‘Spiritualism after the Great War’ in Twentieth Century 
British History, 10: 4 (1999), pp. 404–430.
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also been neglected by social thinkers too intent on unmasking 
the laws that governed society. Mutual aid, Read wrote, might be 
a demonstrable fact by turning to “biology and history”, but if 
anarchists lost the “mystique” of this theory they were following 
a road tramped by positivists and dialectical materialists decades 
earlier. Their faith in the powers of logic led to the “pretentious” 
belief that from the “incomplete record of past events” it was pos-
sible to deduce a “law of history”, which in turn led to the willing 
application of force to achieve these apparently predestined ends. 
To lose sight of the unknowable was a mistake.88
Conclusion
Read was not a religious thinker, and distrusted the claims of or-
ganised religion. His understanding of spirituality was, in this sen-
se, functional89, and its importance rested in its ability to  provide 
communities with strong social bonds, and thereby support a 
 vibrant artistic culture. This rested on a particular sense of the spi-
ritual. It was not defined by a “relationship with a Transcendent 
Being”, but it certainly did point to practices and habits “infor-
med by a certain spiritual tradition, which fosters a sense of mea-
ning, purpose, and mission in life”.90 It was the promise of a sense 
of unity and commitment to a common purpose that this revealed 
that attracted Read, and in railing against a culture that he incre-
asingly saw as moribund, he became interested in the integrative 
value of spirituality. His was thus not an unqualified acceptance 
of religion, and Read clung to an interpretation of organised reli-
gion that would have been familiar to atheistic nineteenth- century 
socialists. But in adding a sense of the spiritual to the theory of 
mutual aid, Read made a significant, and historically revealing, 
contribution to anarchist thought. While heavily indebted to 
Kropotkin, the scientistic air of nineteen-century anarchism did 
not appeal to Read’s artistic temperament. In the process of up-
holding Kropotkin’s key ideas – clear in his defence of mutual aid 
 88 Read, The Tenth Muse, p. 96.
 89 I am indebted to Alexandre Christoyannopoulos for this point.
 90 David R. Hodge, ‘Spirituality: Towards a Theoretical Framework’, Social 
Thought, 19: 4 (2000), pp. 1–20 (p. 2)
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as a scientifically sound theory – Read nevertheless tried to soften 
its potentially unforgiving rationalism with a dose of spirituality; 
a tonic that was also a reminder, in the post-war context, of the 
dangers of scientific hubris and tidy social thinking. 
It was perhaps with a hint of regret that Read confessed that 
he could never become a “believer” in a simple sense. “And so we 
come to the spiritual void that opens in my own path”, he wrote, 
shortly before his death in 1968:
I have read Berdyaev and many other Christian apologists, and 
have been moved especially by two of them, Kierkegaard and 
Simone Weil [...] The difficulty I experience with all such Christian 
apologists is that they rely, for their final argument, on the necessity 
of grace.91 
Yet, on the next page, Read willingly appropriated the langua-
ge of theology to insist on the pressing need for radical change. 
“The present and urgent necessity”, he argued, “is to admit the 
sickness of man’s soul and take practical measures to cure it.”92 
While Read clearly lacked any conventional religious faith, it is 
also apparent that his anarchism was invested with a deep sense 
of spirituality. Looking forward to an anarchist society in which 
rich aesthetic sensibility was universal, Read understood art as 
enabling an existential reflection on the nature of human life, and 
granting access to the deeper issues of human existence. In short, 
art would enthuse humanity, understood in the original meaning 
of the word enthous – “possessed by a god”. The conflict between 
the rational and intuitive was not something Read could solve, 
and neither did he intend to, rather these poles created a magnetic 
field that pulsed through his aesthetic politics. And Read was well 
aware of his equivocation. Examining whether a personal rela-
tionship with an idea of God in the manner of Martin Buber or 
Carl Jung was the solution, he confessed that he had left the per-
mutations of philosophical spirituality frustratingly unexplored, 
something, he added, that might mask his own lack of conviction. 
 91 Read, The Cult of Sincerity, p. 47.
 92 Read, The Cult of Sincerity, p. 48.
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“I seem to avoid the final issue”, he concluded, “perhaps [I] have 
done so all my life.”93
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Revolution as Redemption: 
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The contribution of Daniel Guérin (1904–1988) to the ‘rehabilita-
tion’ of anarchism in the 1960s is well known, as is his commitment 
to anticolonialism and gay liberation. Based on biographical rese-
arch on Guérin’s early years examining the reasons for his ‘conver-
sion’ to revolutionary politics (given his social origins in the Parisian 
grande bourgeoisie), this chapter asks to what extent we can say that 
his political commitments from 1930 onwards were motivated or 
underlain by religious or spiritual ideas, or represented some kind of 
political or secular religion. Using unpublished archival sources as 
well as Guérin’s autobiographical and fictional writings, I examine 
the various childhood influences on his ethical and spiritual ideas, 
especially his discovery as a teenager of Tolstoy and his close friend-
ship during the 1920s with the novelist François Mauriac, as eviden-
ced in their correspondence, which makes clear the spiritual crisis 
Guérin struggled through as he sought to reconcile his concern with 
sexual liberation, his evident fideistic tendencies, and the reactionary 
stance of the Catholic church. Moral outrage and guilt over his own 
privileges led him to seek redemption through a Gandhian ‘religion 
of service’, putting himself at the service of the Revolution (with 
a capital R) in order to help the oppressed and exploited achieve 
liberation. Love (‘fraternity’, ‘mana’) was central to his thinking 
and to his responses to others’ suffering; for him it was constituti-
ve of what it is to be human and therefore enabled self-realisation 
through ‘merging with the people’. This faith in Revolution is an 
aspect of what Gentile calls a ‘religion of humanity’, and of what 
Aron referred to as a ‘secular religion’ – a doctrine that promises 
ultimate salvation, but in this world. 
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In short, love is the great, the solemn, I would almost say the only 
purpose of humanity. 
– Pierre-Joseph Proudhon1
If I found myself entirely absorbed in the service of the communi-
ty, the reason behind it was my desire for self-realization.
– Mohandas Gandhi2
To what extent can we say that Daniel Guérin’s political commit-
ments were motivated or underlain by religious or spiritual ideas, 
or that they represented some kind of political or secular religion, 
however defined?3 The impetus for this questioning lies in  research 
conducted on the first three decades of Guérin’s life as part of a 
longer biographical study, research which has thrown light 
on a surprising side of the young militant’s ideas.4 Indeed Guérin 
(1904–1988) is doubtless best known to students of anarchism 
for his two best-selling 1965 books, Anarchism: From Theory to 
Practice, and the anthology No Gods, No Masters, as well as for 
his later promotion of a synthesis of anarchism and Marxism.5 
 1 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Système des contradictions économiques. 
Philosophie de la misère (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1850), pp. 363–64. All 
translations are the present author’s unless stated otherwise.
 2 Mohandas Gandhi, An Autobiography. The Story of my Experiments 
with Truth (London: Penguin, 2007), p. 155. First published 1927–29.
 3 These terms first came to be widely used in the 1930s – the period during 
which Guérin first became politically active – in analyses of Bolshevism, 
fascism and nazism, and saw aspects of some ideologies and political 
movements as replacing traditional religions. The concepts are still con-
tested. See Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion (Woodstock: Princeton 
University Press, 2006).
 4 Other aspects of this period in Guérin’s life have been examined in great-
er detail in David Berry, ‘Metamorphosis: The Making of Daniel Guérin, 
1904–1930’, Modern & Contemporary France vol. 22, no. 3 (August 
2014), 321–42; and Berry, ‘From son of the bourgeoisie to servant of 
the Revolution: The roots of Daniel Guérin’s revolutionary socialism’, 
Moving the Social – Journal of Social History and the History of Social 
Movements vol. 51 (2014), pp. 283–311.
 5 L’Anarchisme, de la doctrine à la pratique (Paris: Gallimard, 1st ed. 1965); 
translated by Mary Klopper as Anarchism: From Theory to Practice (New 
York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1970); Introduction by Noam 
Chomsky. Ni dieu ni maître, anthologie de l’anarchisme (Lausanne: La 
Cité-Lausanne, 1st ed. 1965); translated by Paul Sharkey as No Gods, 
No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1998), 
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(It is perhaps worth noting in passing that despite the strong 
 tradition of anticlericalism in French anarchism, and the French 
left  generally, Guérin did not include anything concerning reli-
gion in his anthology beyond a passing mention of ‘the theolo-
gical ramblings’ of primitive human societies in an extract from 
Bakunin’s God and the State.6) Marxists, especially Trotskyists, 
admire his Fascism and Big Business and his Class Struggles under 
the First Republic.7 Others will be more familiar with his cam-
paigns for the liberation of the French colonies from the 1930s 
onwards, or for homosexual emancipation in the 1960s and 
against militarism in the 70s and 80s. The purpose of this paper, 
however, is to focus on one particular aspect of what he descri-
bed as ‘the unorthodox paths by which a son of the bourgeoisie 
sought to merge with the people and ultimately to put himself at 
the service of the Revolution’8: what experiences and intellectual 
influences of a spiritual nature led him to reject bourgeois society 
in favour of other values—in the process undergoing a series of 
‘conversions’.9 Prolific though he was, Guérin never devoted any 
of his writings to religion or spirituality as such, and this will the-
2 vols. See also David Berry, ‘The Search for a Libertarian Communism: 
Daniel Guérin and the ‘synthesis’ of Marxism and Anarchism’, in 
Libertarian Socialism: Politics in Black and Red ed. by Alex Prichard, 
Ruth Kinna, Saku Pinta & David Berry (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2017), 
pp. 187–209. For a comprehensive primary and secondary bibliography, 
see the website of the Association des Amis de Daniel Guérin (http://
www.danielguerin.info). 
 6 Ni dieu ni maître (Paris: La Découverte/Syros, 1999 edition), p. 171.
 7 Fascisme et grand capital (Paris: Gallimard, 1st ed. 1936); translated by 
Frances and Mason Merrill as Fascism and Big Business (New York: 
Pioneer Press, 1st ed. 1939), introduced by Dwight Macdonald. La lutte 
de classes sous la Première République, 1793–1797 [Class Struggle under 
the First Republic] (Paris: Gallimard, 1946; revised edition 1968), 2 vols., 
has never been translated in full. 
 8 Daniel Guérin, Autobiographie. D’une dissidence sexuelle au socialisme 
(Paris: Belfond, 1972), p. 9. 
 9 On this notion of ‘conversions’ and the subsequent production of 
new life-narratives by the autobiographical subject, see Todd Weir, 
‘Between Colonial Violence and Socialist Worldview: The Conversions 
of Ernst Däumig’, German History 28: 2 (2010), 143–66. See also D. 
Bruce Hindmarsh, The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual 
Autobiography in Early Modern England (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
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refore be a biographical study based primarily on a close reading 
of his several autobiographical texts, his fictional works and his 
private correspondence, as well as other unpublished papers. In 
the  process, I hope to clarify the nature and roots of his later po-
litical positions and more specifically their ethical, philosophical 
or spiritual foundations. For as Orwell said of the examination of 
his own formative influences:
I give all this background information because I do not think one 
can assess a writer’s motives without knowing something of his 
early development. His subject matter will be determined by the 
age he lives in — at least this is true in tumultuous, revolutionary 
ages like our own — but before he ever begins to write he will have 
acquired an emotional attitude from which he will never comple-
tely escape.10
Family background
To a large extent, the story of Guérin’s adoption of the cause of 
the oppressed was to be coterminous with his growing determi-
nation to reject all ties with his own class, the grande bourgeoisie. 
Nevertheless, it becomes clear on reading Guérin’s autobiographies 
and from interviews that Guérin’s politics and more general  outlook 
on life owed much to the influence of his branch of the family: 
 humanist, liberal and cultured, both his parents had been ‘passiona-
tely pro-Dreyfus’ – in other words, republican, antinationalist and 
antiracist.11 Daniel’s father, Marcel Guérin, had in his youth served 
at Toynbee Hall in Whitechapel—the original university ‘settlement 
house’ of the so-called ‘settlement movement’, which welcomed gra-
duates who volunteered to teach and to do social work in poor ur-
ban areas. Marcel published a report on his visit in the newsletter of 
the Musée Social: Daniel’s personal papers contain a copy bearing 
the handwritten dedication: ‘To my dear son Daniel to give him a 
 10 George Orwell, ‘Why I Write’ (1946), in The Collected Essays, Journalism 
and Letters of George Orwell, vol. 1– An Age Like This 1945–1950 
(London: Penguin, 1970); also available at: http://orwell.ru/library/
essays/wiw/english/e_wiw.
 11 Guérin, Autobiographie, pp. 10 & 16.
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taste for social questions.’12 This exposure to the situation of the 
working class in London’s East End had prompted Marcel to read, 
amongst others, Marx, Proudhon and Kropotkin, and especially 
Tolstoy. The Tolstoyan influence was strong on the mother’s side of 
the family too: a ‘consummate polyglot’, Daniel’s great- grandmother 
had translated two of Tolstoy’s novels into French.13 
These Tolstoyan tendencies were evident at the time of the 
Great War, when the young Daniel’s feelings of incomprehensi-
on and revulsion at the killing and the suffering were shared by 
his ‘antimilitarist’ father: ‘the absurd slaughter disgusted him to 
the point of nausea.’14 Invited to participate in some propaganda 
work designed to boost national morale, Marcel Guérin refused 
outright, writing afterwards to a friend: ‘I confess I suffered an 
attack of anarchism. It’s my old Jacobin blood boiling from time 
to time.’15 But these pacifist leanings would resurface periodically, 
with news of further pointless mass slaughters provoking in him, 
in his own words, ‘upsurges of antimilitarism and of anarchism’.16 
Guérin’s mother and grandmother signed up with the Red 
Cross and served as nurses. Accompanying his mother, Daniel 
witnessed with his own eyes some of the horrific injuries of the 
soldiers – including the last moments of a German prisoner of 
war who became for him no longer an ‘Alboche’ (an older form 
of the pejorative term ‘Boche’), but ‘just a man, a man who was 
dying in the convulsions of tetanus’. Like many others, Daniel 
also ‘adopted’ a soldier with whom he corresponded and to whom 
he sent parcels, meeting him when he came home on leave. His 
 12 Bulletin mensuel du Musée Social 12, série B (30 August 1897). I am 
grateful to Anne Guérin for giving me access to this and other papers of 
her father’s. See also Janet R. Horne, A Social Laboratory for Modern 
France: The Musée Social and the Rise of the Welfare State (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2002). 
 13 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 15. On ‘Tolstoyism’ in France, see F.W.J. 
Hemmings, The Russian Novel in France, 1884–1914 (Oxford University 
Press, 1950).
 14 Guérin, Autobiographie, pp. 68 & 63.
 15 Quoted in Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 64.
 16 Quoted in Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 64.
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guilty feelings grew at leading ‘the life of a prince, far too pleasant, 
too easy, too protected, too spoiled’.17 
Towards the end of the Great War, the fourteen year old Daniel 
dedicated a poem to his father, ‘Pendant qu’ils se tuaient...’ [‘While 
they were killing each other...’], which evoked a feeling of pro-
found incomprehension in the face of the serene calm and beauty 
of the scenes of nature and of everyday life around him, ‘When 
all the universe resounds with suffering, When man, stupefied, 
loses hope.’18 Many years later, reading his father’s correspon-
dence from this period would make Daniel realize how much his 
own attitudes owed to ‘this simmering anarcho-pacifism’,19 and 
in the 1970s he would be a prominent figure in antimilitarist cam-
paigns. ‘At the age of 80’, he would write in an introduction to the 
memoirs of the anti-war syndicalist François Mayoux, ‘I can say 
that [...] the hatred of war, the struggle against war have been the 
visceral passion of my own life.’20
On the Church and reading Tolstoy
Guérin was raised in the Catholic Church, albeit not particular-
ly devoutly. In his autobiography he refers to his parents’ ‘vague 
Jansenism, an attitude which was more moral than religious’ 21, 
and many years later in an interview with the philosopher and 
journalist Christian Chabanis he would comment that his grand-
father had been an atheist, his father had been ‘completely 
 irreligious’, and although his mother had taken him to mass on 
Sundays it was largely ‘a society religion’.22 Be that as it may, in 
1915 Daniel took his first communion, and the following year he 
 17 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 62.
 18 Guérin, Le Livre de la dix-huitième année (Paris: Albin Michel, 1922), 
pp. 56–58.
 19 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 64.
 20 Marie & François Mayoux, Instituteurs pacifistes et syndicalistes. 
Mémoires de F. Mayoux (Chamalières: Editions Canope, 1992), p. 12.
 21 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 73. Jansenism emphasised humanity’s sinful-
ness and the necessity of divine grace.
 22 Interview in Christian Chabanis, Dieu existe-t-il? Non (Paris: Fayard, 
1973), pp. 222–3. A companion volume – Dieu existe? Oui – was pub-
lished in 1979.
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was sent to a Catholic school, the Ecole Bossuet, though whilst 
still taking classes at lycée (that is to say that the priests took their 
wards to lycée in the morning and brought them back in the after-
noon before delivering them to their families at seven in the eve-
ning after religious instruction).23 The repeated religious exercises, 
the sumptuous ceremonies, the candles and the incense induced 
in Guérin an ‘attack of mysticism’ and he experienced a taste, he 
claimed, of ‘what believers call the spiritual life’.24 The feeling and 
the certainty would not, however, last for long: ‘I was not really 
gifted for the supernatural.’25 Indeed, so negative was the impres-
sion made on him by the authoritarianism and the hypocrisy of 
the priests themselves at the Ecole Bossuet that the experience 
seems to have contributed to his loss of faith and the beginnings 
of his lifelong anticlericalism.
The real ‘crisis’, as the young Guérin experienced it, would 
 occur soon afterwards. Whilst turning him away from institutio-
nalised religion in some respects, the Ecole Bossuet had neverth-
eless instilled in him ‘something of a tendency towards belief’.26 In 
the interview with Chabanis about the existence of god he would 
talk about the ‘passionate dialogues’ he held with Jesus during 
his year at the school: ‘For me, Jesus was a human incarnation, a 
human being whom I adored and to whom I spoke.’ 27 But at the 
age of fourteen, Guérin definitively lost not only his belief in 
the Catholic Church but his faith in Christianity itself on reading 
his mother’s copy of Tolstoy’s diaries: 
At first, this book inspired no mistrust on my part, as it was the 
work of a Christian, of a believer in search of true Christianity, 
the work what’s more of a social apostle of whose teachings my 
father had, at one time in his life, been a follower. And yet this book 
spoke a language which I had never before heard. It cast doubt on 
the absolute truth of the myths and beliefs brought forth by hu-
man societies of the most diverse epochs and origins. [...] Tolstoy 
brought into question my entire upbringing. Evil arises, according 
 23 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 64.
 24 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 72.
 25 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 72.
 26 Chabanis, Dieu existe-t-il? Non, p. 221.
 27 Chabanis, Dieu existe-t-il? Non, p. 223.
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to him, from the fact that I attached too little importance to reason. 
It is the fruit of the false education which I had been given since 
my childhood. [...] The first thing I had to achieve was my religious 
emancipation. [...] I gave myself without reserve to Tolstoy.28
But having accepted Tolstoy’s critique of the Church and its 
teachings, Guérin found that his faith as a whole was undermi-
ned. His response was to throw himself into the study of theology, 
philosophy and even the physiology of the brain. His mother, in 
whom he confided regarding this spiritual crisis, promptly arrang-
ed for him to meet the eminent priest and historian of the Church’s 
teachings, Monseigneur Pierre Batiffol. He and Guérin had inter-
minable philosophical discussions, but these changed nothing – 
largely because, as Guérin writes, he came to the conclusion that 
‘this overly philosophical bishop had no more faith than I did’: 
‘His arguments were so Cartesian, so scientific, so materialist, that 
he actually confirmed me in the decision I had taken to abandon 
my religious faith.’29
Guérin continued nevertheless to read Tolstoy, and his novel 
Resurrection made a particular impression – ‘perhaps because of 
the passionate attack on an iniquitous society’, he comments in 
his autobiography. 30 One cannot help however but be struck by 
certain parallels with Guérin’s own life: Resurrection recounts the 
moral and spiritual crisis of a cosseted and self-centred young ari-
stocrat caused by his discovery of the suffering of the poor, and 
his subsequent determination to reject his own class and the 
artificiality of society in order to help the oppressed, no matter 
the cost to himself... 
The Pagan and the Catholic
In 1922, Guérin had managed to pluck up the courage to take a 
collection of his poems written since 1918, Le Livre de la Dix-
Huitième Année, to a publisher. Strongly influenced by Baudelaire 
amongst others, they bore witness to the depth of Guérin’s emo-
 28 Guérin, Autobiographie, pp. 80–1. 
 29 Guérin, Autobiographie, pp. 81–2; Chabanis, Dieu existe-t-il? Non, p. 222.
 30 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 94–5.
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tional life and the anguish caused by the conflict between the 
yearning for platonic love and that for  sensuality—‘the tyranny 
of the organs’ as Proudhon put it31. Guérin was delighted to 
receive encouraging letters from a number of prominent lite-
rary figures, including Maurice Barrès and François Mauriac. 
Barrès was a novelist, journalist and right-wing politician who 
had been one of the leading figures in the anti-Dreyfus camp. 
He held complex and contradictory views with regard to both 
politics and religious belief; his novels were extremely influential 
on younger generations of writers in the inter-war years, inclu-
ding Mauriac, and Guérin was also an admirer.32 Guérin first 
met Mauriac – who would be made a member of the Académie 
Française in 1933, but was already a successful novelist by 
this time – the following year, and the two got on immediately. 
Mauriac was particularly attracted to the rebellious spirit and 
demanding intelligence of this ‘young pagan’.33 In him, Mauriac 
recognised ‘at once his double and his opposite at the same age: 
a young, marginal and rebellious bourgeois, but one who was 
much more radical and emancipated in his way of living, of be-
ing and of thinking.’34 
At first, Mauriac took seriously his role as guardian or mentor, 
responding to Guérin’s assertion that he needed Mauriac: ‘It is 
true that I can fulfil for you what the adolescent Barrès wished 
for: ‘a friend who would be an older version of myself’’, he wrote. 
‘I know you to the extent that I know myself and I hear what 
you do not say.’35 Yet interestingly, in the same letter, Mauriac 
 31 Proudhon, Système des contradictions économiques, p. 363.
 32 See The New Oxford Companion to Literature in French, ed. by Peter 
France (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1995) and R. Gibson, ‘The First 
World War and the Literary Consciousness’, in French Literature and its 
Background, ed. by John Cruickshank (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1970), vol. 6, pp. 56–72.
 33 François Mauriac, letter to his wife, quoted in Jean-Luc Barré, François 
Mauriac: Biographie intime, vol.1: 1885–1940 (Paris: Fayard, 2009), 
p. 380.
 34 Barré, François Mauriac, p. 380.
 35 François Mauriac, letter to Daniel Guérin, 19 November 1924, in 
François Mauriac, Nouvelles lettres d’une vie (1906–70), ed. by Caroline 
Mauriac (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1989), p. 99; also quoted in Barré, 
François Mauriac, p. 381. 
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also contrasted his own adolescent rejection of all constraint with 
what he perceived to be Guérin’s nature, comparing him to the 
quasi-mystical, nationalist writer Ernest Psichari, who rejected 
what he saw as the decadence of Belle Epoque society and had 
converted to Catholicism in 1913:
And you, on the contrary, my dear child of the Left [...], you are 
also, without realising it, a little brother to Psichari, made to obey 
and to command, infused with the passionate desire to enter a re-
ligious order.36 
Guérin quickly became the only person to whom Mauriac felt 
able to confess his deepest and most troubling feelings, and the 
profound emotional and spiritual crisis through which Mauriac 
was going at the time led in a short time to a reversal of roles 
between the two men.37 The following year, Guérin started what 
was to be a long correspondence with Mauriac. He began it with 
a nostalgic letter about his loss of faith: ‘An unconsolable mys-
tic, that’s what I am, you know. And yet more distant from God 
than ever’; ‘Believers are happier than we are’.38 The believer 
Mauriac, in reply, attempted to console him and encourage faith 
and moral steadfastness. 
‘...But something is always lacking in our hearts...’, it is you who 
wrote this, my dear friend—and that is a humble reason to fall 
to our knees—a very humble reason, and yet one which remains 
for me, after so many years of doubt, anguish and desolation, the 
most effective. That hunger for a joy without shadow, that hunger 
for God survives within me despite all the disappointments, all the 
 36 Ibid; emphasis in the original. On Psichari, see France, The New Oxford 
Companion to Literature in French and Gibson, ‘The First World War 
and the Literary Consciousness’. 
 37 It would be thanks to information divulged by Guérin in an interview 
many years later, that it would first become widely known that Mauriac 
had enjoyed homosexual relationships. See ‘Entretien avec Daniel 
Guérin’, in Paris Gay 1925, ed. by Gilles Barbedette and Michel Carassou 
(Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 1981), pp. 43–55. 
 38 Undated letter to F. Mauriac [1924], Bibliothèque littéraire Jacques 
Doucet, Ms40251; Letter of 25 April 1924, in François Mauriac, 
Nouvelles lettres, pp. 92–93.
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errors, and, as I advance towards the end, it is in that hunger, that 
spiritual instinct, which I trust.39
But how, Guérin objected, can one practise a religion which claims 
to be in the service of the poor and yet which for centuries has 
been an instrument of oppression in the hands of the powerful? 
What is more, he argued, it is religion which sullies physical love, 
‘the healthiest and most natural act’, by imprinting upon it ‘the 
stigmata of Sin.’40 Mauriac’s response was to insist that ‘it is not 
religion which attaches something tragic to the flesh, this tragic 
aspect is there in reality, and one has to be blind not to see it’; and 
a part of Guérin seems to have shared this feeling that the ‘fren-
zy of the baser instincts’ undermined the ‘purity’ and ‘nobility’ 
of which humankind is capable.41 This conversation between the 
two would be repeated in one form or another for some time and 
would never be resolved. For Guérin, Mauriac ‘needed to believe, 
above all, in order to escape from temptation’; he himself, on the 
other hand, needed to overcome ‘the strange resistance which, 
since puberty, has prevented me, at every attempt, from taking 
the plunge.’ With hindsight, he concluded that he and Mauriac 
‘did not speak the same language, we have completely opposite 
problems to solve.’ 42 Thirty years later – shortly before coming 
out – Guérin would argue strongly that sexual liberation was but 
one aspect of the quest for human freedom in general: ‘If we wish 
to make free men, we must disalienate the Flesh, not repress it.’43 
So despite Guérin’s fideistic tendencies – what Le Bon saw as an 
instinctual ‘need to submit oneself to a divine, political or social 
faith’44 – he rejected the Catholic religion, at least, because of its 
hostility to sex and in particular to homosexuality.
 39 F. Mauriac, letter to D. Guérin of 25 April 1924, in Nouvelles lettres 
d’une vie.
 40 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 139.
 41 Letter of 2 March 1926, in François Mauriac, Nouvelles lettres, p. 106.
 42 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 139.
 43 Guérin, Shakespeare et Gide en correctionnelle? Essai (Paris: Editions du 
Scorpion, 1959), p. 10.
 44 Gustave Le Bon, Psychologie du socialisme (Paris, 1920), quoted in 
Gentile, Politics as Religion, p. 6.
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Towards the end of 1924, during his military service and after 
being tormented by his confused and confusing emotional and 
sexual needs for several years, Guérin finally found happiness 
in an affectionate (albeit sexually unconsummated) relationship 
with a sergeant from a different unit: ‘So, I was no longer a mons-
ter, a pariah. I was receiving my share of joy, like every living 
being. [...] In Strasbourg, I was beginning to live.’45 Nevertheless, 
he still struggled with feelings of guilt. A rather allusive letter to 
Mauriac provoked a fervent reply from the Catholic urging him 
to resist the temptations of the flesh created by his ‘appetite for 
tenderness’, so that he might ‘live’. Looking back, Guérin com-
ments: ‘Yes, I certainly wanted to live. But in order to live at last, 
I had first to stop resisting the call of my very nature, and cease 
listening to the paralysing interdict imposed by religion.’46
Point of departure: the divine need to love
In the autumn of 1925, two texts appeared which Guérin had writ-
ten during his military service. The first, entitled ‘Point de Départ’, 
was published in the literary magazine, the Revue Hebdomadaire, 
with an introduction by Mauriac (who had advised Guérin on 
a first draft). It is in some ways characteristic of the kind of ‘ge-
nerationalist’ writing – to use Wohl’s term47 – which appeared 
in this period, and the humanist’s malaise to which it gives voi-
ce chimes with that of other intellectuals who had lived through 
 45 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 154. 
 46 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 154.
 47 See Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1980); Gibson, ‘The First World War and the Literary 
Consciousness’; Mary Jean Green, ‘Visions of Death and Dissolution’, 
in A New History of French Literature, ed. by Denis Hollier (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 850–5. The notion of ‘genera-
tion’ is of course not unproblematic, as Nora comments in the first sen-
tence of a discussion of the history of the concept: ‘It is difficult to think 
of a notion that has become more commonplace yet at the same time 
more opaque than that of ‘generation’.’ ‘Generation’ in Pierre Nora (ed.), 
Realms of Memory. The Construction of the French Past (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 499–531.
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the Great War and its aftermath.48 The tone of bewilderment and 
disillusion is reminiscent of Paul Valéry’s 1919 essay, ‘La Crise 
de l’esprit’ [‘The Crisis of the Spirit’], which conjures the image 
of ‘an intellectual Hamlet meditating on the life and the death of 
the verities’49; or of André Malraux’s La Tentation de l’Occident 
[The Temptation of the West] (1926), which concludes: ‘There are 
no ideals to which we can sacrifice ourselves, for we know all 
their lies, we who do not know what is truth.’50 Underlining the 
extraordinary situation of his own generation (who unlike Wohl’s 
‘generation of 1914’ had been too young to experience the war di-
rectly, but grew up with its consequences), Guérin emphasises the 
significance of the rupture represented by the Great War.51 He also 
attacks not only the complacency of pre-war Europe’s belief in the 
solidity of its ‘old idols’ – its political institutions, its colonial con-
quests and its liberal economy – but also the responsibility of ear-
lier generations for the catastrophe of 1914. Writing in 1938, the 
Italian philosopher Adriano Tilgher would use the concept of the 
numinous to interpret the various secular religions which appea-
red after the Great War and ‘through which Western Civilization 
attempted to fill the vacuum left in the spirit by the decine of 
Christianity’.52 Guérin drew on the Indian writer and philosopher 
Rabindranath Tagore to question the value of the merely material 
advantages of modern capitalism: ‘But what of the mind, what of 
the need for love?’ With the decline of religious belief, he asks, 
‘what nourishment is left to us? In the depths of the eyes of each 
of our contemporaries, we can read utter dissatisfaction, thirst, 
 48 See Gibson, ‘The First World War and the Literary Consciousness’, 
pp. 56–72.
 49 Paul Valéry, ‘La Crise de l’esprit’, first published in Variété (Paris: Gallimard, 
1924), http://wikilivres.ca/wiki/La_Crise_de_l%E2%80%99esprit 
 50 Quoted in Gibson, ‘The First World War and the Literary Consciousness’, 
p. 66.
 51 On the generation of intellectuals born in 1905, see Jean-François 
Sirinelli, Génération intellectuelle: khagneux et normaliens dans l’entre-
deux-guerres (Paris: Fayard, 1988).
 52 Quoted in Gentile, Politics as Religion, p. 10. Gentile (p.1) defines secu-
lar religions as ‘ideologies and ideals that intended to replace traditional 
metaphysical religion with new humanist concepts that created a cult of 
humanity, history, nation and society.’
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emptiness.’53 And yet criticism of Guérin’s fatalism by Mauriac, 
and the advice not to simply curse life but to illuminate it and stri-
ve to change it had an effect: ‘This lesson, which at the age of 21 
I had been unable to draw by myself, did not fall on deaf ears.’54 
The Magic of Good Friday
The second text to appear in 1925 was Guérin’s first novel, 
L’Enchantement du Vendredi Saint [The Magic of Good Friday], 
whose main purpose he described as being to ‘come to terms, this 
time through the transparent veil of a fiction, with the dramas 
of tenderness and of unsatisfied desire which had poisoned my 
youth.’55 But there is an evident spiritual theme in the novel too. 
The story’s central character Armand is tormented by the conflict 
between reason, the passions and ‘the divine need to love’.56 At a 
moment of crisis in the story, he turns to the Jansenist philosopher 
Blaise Pascal, and reads:
What is it then that this desire and this inability proclaim to us, but 
that there was once in man a true happiness of which there now re-
main to him only the mark and empty trace, which he in vain tries 
to fill from all his surroundings, seeking from things absent the help 
he does not obtain in things present? But these are all inadequate, 
because the infinite abyss can only be filled by an infinite and im-
mutable object, that is to say, only by God Himself.57
‘Such words’, Armand notes, ‘are enough to turn a man’s life 
upside down.’ Soon after, he attends a performance of Wagner’s 
opera Parsifal, which, despite its Christian symbolism, has 
at its heart a number of Buddhist ideas (a result of Wagner’s 
reading of Schopenhauer): the ‘pain of untamed desire’, freedom 
through self-abnegation, and enlightenment through self-denying 
 53 Guérin, ‘Point de départ’, La Revue hebdomadaire, 43 (24 October 1925), 
457–68 (introduction by Mauriac pp. 457–58); extracts also quoted in 
Guérin, Autobiographie, pp. 156–9.
 54 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 160.
 55 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 160; L’Enchantement du Vendredi Saint 
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1925). 
 56 Guérin, L’Enchantement, p. 47.
 57 Blaise Pascal, Pensées (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958), no. 425.
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 compassion and service. The title of Guérin’s novel is a reference 
to the ‘Karfreitagszauber’, the ‘magic of Good Friday’ which, in 
the climactic scene in the final act of Parsifal, renews the world 
and redeems humankind, now freed from its burden of sin. Whilst 
still resistant to the Church’s theological dogmas (despite his best 
efforts to rediscover an orthodox faith), Armand had nevertheless 
found a kind of grace and a way forward.
Unknown lands: the road to Damascus
In 1927 Guérin would embark on a life-changing episode when 
he was offered the job of running the Syrian-Lebanese branch of 
the Agence Générale de Librairie, a subsidiary of Hachette, the 
family business. As Mauriac wrote to him on hearing the news, 
it would be exactly the kind of ‘break’ in Guérin’s life that he 
needed.58 For Guérin, tiring of a life in which ‘physical satiation’ 
– thanks to a string of sexual partners – had begun to take too 
large a place, this opportunity was to be a welcome ‘leap into 
the unknown’: 
This journey was going to take me much further than the Levant. 
Although I did not know it at the time, I was leaving behind me 
not just the bosom of my family, but other shores as well: bour-
geois society and Europe. I was setting a course for a succession 
of  unknown lands: the Orient, Islam, Asia, decolonisation and, 
beyond, socialism.59 
During his time in Beirut, the person who most profoundly affec-
ted Guérin was Louis Massignon, a professor at the Collège de 
France (the most prestigious academic institution in France) and 
an expert on Islam and sufism. Described by Guérin as a mystic, 
Massignon had come to his ‘fervent’ Roman Catholicism through 
his researches into Arab mystics, having written a thesis on sufism: 
Whilst, objectively, his project was decolonisation, as one would 
say nowadays, his subjective purpose was to build a bridge between 
 58 Letter of 9 September 1927, in Mauriac, Nouvelles lettres d’une vie, p. 116.
 59 Guérin, Autobiographie, pp. 178 & 183.
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Christianity and Islam. [...] In his ardent youth, in Morocco, he had 
become enamoured of the muslims.60 
Indeed, Guérin’s representation of his life in the Levant was of a 
contrast between these two different worlds between which he 
slipped ‘without transition’. He had one foot in Beirut, leading 
the usual, ‘worthless’ life of a privileged member of the French 
expatriate community; the other foot was in Damascus, ‘at the 
heart of Islam’, a life which included on one occasion, attendance 
at an all night ceremony of the sufi Aissawa sect, with its ecstatic 
rhythms and mystic whirling dervishes.61 Guérin became more and 
more attracted to Islam, reading the Koran with great diligen-
ce and listening enthralled to descriptions of Mecca and tales of 
the English Arabist and muslim convert St. John Philby, recoun-
ted by the French consul in Saudi Arabia. ‘Islam is more than a 
religion: it is half of the universe’, he wrote to his father. And in 
his autobiography he remarked: ‘I had a weakness for this reli-
gion without priests – just as, a little later, I would be attracted 
to Buddhism, a religion without gods.’62 Around the same time, 
according to a remark made by Mauriac in a letter to Guérin, 
the latter had also become interested in Jacques Maritain, the 
philosopher who was moved to convert to Catholicism because 
of his disenchantment with ‘scientism’ and who would publish 
Primauté du spirituel [The Superiority of the Spiritual] in 1927, 
before going on in later years to formulate a Christian humanism 
not dissimilar to Emmanuel Mounier’s ‘personalism’. 63
A visit from Guérin’s father was the occasion for a trip 
round Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. Guérin’s impressions of 
Jerusalem are interesting, initial disappointment being effaced 
by ‘the pure antinomic jewels of two arts and two beliefs: the 
 60 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 191; Guérin, Ci-gît le colonialisme (Paris: 
Mouton la Haye, 1973), p. 11.
 61 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 196.
 62 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 199. 
 63 Letter of 2 March 1926, in Mauriac, Nouvelles lettres d’une vie, p. 105. 
See Anthony Levi, ‘Jacques Maritain’ and François Nectoux, ‘Emmanuel 
Mounier’, in Encylopedia of Modern French Thought ed. by Christopher 
John Murray (New York & London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2004), 
pp. 458–60 & 490–1.
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Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Mosque of Omar. Which to 
prefer? Christianity? Islam?’64 These words would seem to sug-
gest more than issues of aesthetic and architectural taste. One is 
reminded of comments made by the novelist cum travel writer 
Pierre Loti at the end of his account of a journey to the ruined 
 temples of Angkor in Cambodia—a book we know Guérin read 
and enjoyed: 
So many places of intense adoration which I have come across on 
my path and which all correspond to a particular form of human 
anguish, so many pagodas, so many mosques, so many cathedrals, 
where the same prayer rises from the most diverse of souls!65 
Guérin spent the early summer of 1928 editing and to some extent 
researching and writing the Guide bleu for Syria (Blue Guides 
being the tourist guidebooks published by Hachette since the 
mid-nineteenth century). This was an onerous task, but an enligh-
tening and fulfilling one. It led him to study, amongst many other 
 sources on the region’s ancient history, art and religion, Frazer’s 
The Golden Bough – first published in 1890 and the first com-
parative study of religions and myths from an anthropological 
point of view – and Les Mystères païens et le Mystère chrétien 
[The Pagan Mysteries and the Christian Mystery] (1919) by Alfred 
Loisy – a Catholic theologian and a professor at the Collège de 
France who was a modernist (in Catholic terms) and was excom-
municated in 1908: ‘It was the history of religions which, in that 
period, most excited my irreligious curiosity.’ 66
A value to replace the flesh
Something else on which Guérin worked hard in Beirut was a 
second novel, La Vie selon la chair, which was finally published 
at the beginning of 1929.67 The title of the book – ‘Life according 
to the flesh’ – is a biblical reference: ‘For if ye live after the flesh, 
ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of 
 64 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 200.
 65 Pierre Loti, Un Pèlerin d’Angkor (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1912), pp. 228–9.
 66 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 202. 
 67 La Vie selon la chair (Paris: Albin Michel, 1929).
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the body, ye shall live’ (Romans 8:13, King James Version). In 
it, Guérin gave vent to what he called his ‘carnal tempests’.68 A 
psychological novel, it follows the intertwined emotional lives of 
four characters. A number of themes are developed through the 
novel: the emotional and sexual anxieties of puberty, seen espe-
cially through the homosexual Hubert’s growing awareness of 
his own ‘singularity’; feelings of exclusion from a happiness sha-
red by others; innocence lost and the guilt caused by the conflict 
between sensual desire and the young mens’ moral and religio-
us education; ‘nausea’ in the face of the ‘void’, the meaningless-
ness of existence, and the ways in which different characters try 
to disguise this reality (amoral indulgence in sensual pleasures, 
meaningless but socially approved routines...); the realisation 
that, despite our belief in free will, our lives are largely out of 
our control; and the impossibility of ever really understanding 
or communicating with others: ‘Humankind [...] seemed like a 
bizarre ensemble of incomplete beings, of ambiguous individuals 
incomprehensible to themselves.’69
The novel’s publication caused something of a brouhaha at 
home. This is not surprising, given the fairly grim picture the no-
vel paints of four lost souls struggling to find happiness in a deca-
dent, cynical, meaningless and sexually promiscuous society. It is 
also explicit for its time (although the treatment of homosexuality 
is relatively muted). Guérin’s family was horrified. Mauriac, in 
whose novels the bestiality of sex is a recurrent theme, wrote to 
his young confidant: ‘Life according to the flesh – life according 
to the spirit: one has to choose.’70 And yet in a sense the novel 
is in fact extremely moral. A recurrent theme is the characters’ 
constant attempts to find meaning and a new direction in life, the 
need to make choices about what course to follow, the need in 
fact for self-discipline: the end of the story inconclusively leaves the 
three main characters on the threshold of new departures, 
searching for ‘a value able to replace the flesh.’71
 68 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 210. 
 69 Guérin, La Vie selon la chair, p. 208.
 70 Letter quoted in Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 211.
 71 Guérin, La Vie selon la chair, p. 279.
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Guérin was deeply hurt by what seemed to him to be sava-
ge and unfair attacks on the novel, and the experience led him 
to want to break with his family and, he added, ‘with myself.’72 
Combined with his ever growing taste for exploring Africa and 
Asia, this rejection also helped alienate him from France. Indeed 
Guérin’s preferred reading in this period concerned the history 
of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as well as books on the Buddha 
– whose teachings fascinated him by virtue of their focus on ‘the 
extinction of identity in Nirvana, beatitude through deliverance 
from the passions’.73 He now proposed to devote a three month 
retreat in the Far East to studying the political, economic and so-
cial questions which he had not yet been able to examine in any 
depth. He left again for Marseille and, on 23 December 1929, 
without notifying his parents, set sail for the Far East aboard the 
cargo boat, Bangkok – which, ironically, was carrying munitions 
for the French expeditionary forces in the colonies in Indochina. 
On a slow boat to Indochina
The Bangkok was a freighter, not a passenger-ship, and he was 
given ‘a minuscule cabin, which was very uncomfortable, but for 
me heavenly’.74 Like a monk in his cell, he devoted himself to the 
 intense, solitary study of a small library of books on Marxism, 
syndicalism, anarchism, colonialism and pacifism, but also of 
Asian religions, reading and re-reading them, taking reams of no-
tes, and scribbling approving or critical comments on them:
Why on earth had I taken Marx’s Capital, Kautsky’s The Social 
Revolution and Socialist Programme, La révolution défigurée by 
Trotsky, Les Réflexions sur la violence by Georges Sorel, Gandhi’s 
autobiography, and books about Proudhon, Jaurès, Lenin, India 
and China, on American imperialism, on Soviet Russia, labourism 
and syndicalism? Today I struggle in vain to recollect the origin of 
such a sudden and multifarious curiosity.75
 72 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 212.
 73 Guérin, Autobiographie, pp. 213–14.
 74 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 217.
 75 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 218. Guérin’s reading notes are in the 
IISH, Amsterdam, Daniel Guérin Papers, Box 1, Folder 62. Subsequent 
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The effort exhausted him:
I was banging my head against a certain number of walls. My app-
roaches towards socialism were littered with stumbling blocks and 
dilemmas. Socialism from above (Leninism) or from below (revolu-
tionary syndicalism)? Marxist class struggle or Tolstoyan ‘love’ and 
Gandhist non-violence? For or against Stalin’s Russia? For or aga-
inst the Communist Party? For or against anarchism? The  tension 
nearly made my head explode.76
An examination of Guérin’s notes from this reading provides us 
with some insights into his political and ethical thinking at this 
point in his life, shortly before his experiences in Indochina would 
trigger a radical change in his life. The first thing to note is that 
Guérin’s retrospective description of this episode as representing 
his ‘apprenticeship in Marxism’ seems misleading, or at least too 
simple.77 I have analysed his political views at this point elsewhe-
re, but with regard to the focus of the present paper, a number of 
things are striking.78 
Comradeship and moral rectitude
Firstly, there is a strong and repeated emphasis both on personal 
moral rectitude and on an ethic of comradely solidarity between 
socialists of all shades of opinion. Ideological correctness is not 
sufficient: it is important to be ‘an upright man [un homme droit]’, 
and ‘at bottom, political history is explained much more by dif-
ferences of character than by differences of ideas.’79 One might 
detect here the influence of Mauriac, who in his introduction to 
Guérin’s ‘Point de départ’ had remarked on the dogmatism and 
sectarianism of French politics: 
 references to these notes will give just the sleeve number (in Roman nu-
merals) within this folder.
 76 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 221.
 77 Coversheet attached to file, IISH, Box 1, Folder 62; and Guérin, A la 
recherche d’un communisme libertaire (Paris: Spartacus, 1984), p. 9.
 78 See Berry, ‘Metamorphosis’.
 79 XVII: ‘La ligne droite du socialisme’. 
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The highest privilege of the novelist is that in these times of demo-
cracy, in which all of us live within the walls of a party, nobody re-
proaches him for his incursions between the lines and even as far as 
the enemy camp; there he learns that from one field to another, the 
motivations for human actions hardly vary. The novelist is exempt 
from the hate which the passion for the public good nowadays 
lights in the heart of the best of us [...].80
As a consequence, one of his main criticisms of the Russian bols-
heviks, despite his admiration for Lenin and Trotsky, was that 
they seemed to him to be so driven by malice and hatred: 
Beware of hatred, which defiles the soul. And if we fight what must 
be fought, let it be on the basis of Love, in the light of Love. [...] 
Too much hate. The cause is too beautiful, too irresistibly just, to be 
mixed up with so much hate.81 
The refusal of such dogmatism and sectarianism, and respect for 
the opinions of those with whom one disagrees, would certainly 
always be one of the characteristics of Guérin’s political practice.
The spiritual ideal 
Secondly, ‘idealism’, Guérin insisted, is an essential part of revo-
lutionary politics, and much of his reading notes concerned not 
just the importance to socialism of idealism and morality, but also 
religion or spirituality. Reading Gandhi immediately after Sorel 
prompted him to comment on the superiority of the former in 
that Gandhism always held up ‘a spiritual ideal at the end of its 
action’ (although he did concede that ‘‘direct action’ through non- 
violence has not shown itself to be entirely effective’).82 He also 
 80 La Revue hebodomadaire, 43 (24 October 1925), p. 458.
 81 XIV: Notes on Pierre Chasles, La Vie de Lénine (1929). Capitalisation in 
the original.
 82 III: Notes on Le message révolutionnaire de Gandhi. When Gandhi 
visited Paris in 1931, Guérin wrote a very sympathetic report for 
the  fortnightly syndicalist magazine La Révolution prolétarienne, and the 
following month published Gandhi’s answers to a questionnaire Guérin 
had submitted to him through Romain Rolland, who hosted Gandhi’s 
visit: ‘Gandhi à Paris’, December 1931; ‘Gandhi et la lutte de classes. 
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read Unto This Last (1862) by the English art critic and  social 
 reformer John Ruskin, a critique, based on a biblical parable, of 
the dominant economic ideas of the time, the reading of which in 
South Africa had prompted Gandhi to transform his way of life. 
Guérin also read Tolstoy’s letters to Gandhi, as well as his The 
Kingdom of God is Within You (1893) —a book which also had a 
powerful influence on Gandhi’s evolution towards non- violence.83 
Guérin directed some of his more impassioned  criticisms at 
Trotsky for what seemed to him to be the casual acceptance of 
violence: ‘Terrible. No, I refuse to believe that it will be in an im-
mense pool of blood that we should build the edifice of the new 
social order.’84 
Guérin accepted that Tolstoy could be somewhat fashionable 
with the bourgeoisie, as it was unthreatening and seemed (to some 
at least) to require little action in comparison with Marxism; ne-
verthless, ‘there is in Tolstoy and in Gandhi, his spiritual son,’ he 
insisted, ‘a precious light which can illumine Marxism and extend 
it in Love [le prolonger dans l’Amour].’85 Guérin’s notes also in-
clude the plan for a book entitled La Ligne Droite du Socialisme 
(literally The Straight Line of Socialism, although ‘droit’ also 
has ethical connotations), which includes a proposed chapter on 
‘Gandhism beyond Marxism’.86
Guérin continued to study Asian civilisations, reading amongst 
other works René Guénon’s Introduction to the Study of the 
Hindu Doctrines and Emile Hovelacque’s study of China. Of 
what he called ‘the Orient’, Guérin wrote: 
Un entretien avec Gandhi et Romain Rolland’, January 1932. Available 
online at http://gallica.bnf.fr/. 
 83 Leo Tolstoi, ‘The Kingdom Of God Is Within You.’ Christianity Not As A 
Mystic Religion But As A New Theory Of Life (New York, 1894; trans-
lation by Constance Garnett). First published in French as Le Salut est en 
vous (Paris: Perrin, 1893). See Gandhi, An Autobiography, p. 136.
 84 XV: Notes on Léon Trotsky, La Révolution défigurée (1929).
 85 XIII: Notes on Luc Durtain, L’Autre Europe: Moscou et sa foi (1928). See 
also Marie-France Latronche, L’influence de Gandhi en France de 1919 à 
nos jours (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999); and, for the argument in favour of 
seeing Gandhism as a form of non-violent anarchism, Manuel Cervera-
Marzal, ‘Gandhi: de l’antilibéralisme à l’anarchisme non-violent’, in 
Réfractions, 28 (May 2012), pp. 128–45. 
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Its spiritual civilisation can enrich us, bring us back to simplicity 
and to charity, which we have long forgotten. [...] All of humanity 
will one day drink from the same spiritual sources, in fraternity.87
The idea that a fulfilling human life cannot be achieved through 
an exclusive emphasis on merely material benefits or physical en-
joyment recurs in Guérin’s notes with some frequency, and was a 
belief expressed both with regard to some socialists’ understan-
ding of the ‘good life’ and to the developing consumer society un-
der twentieth-century capitalism – as in this outburst provoked by 
a book on the contemporary USA: ‘It is the final triumph of mat-
ter over spirit, the death of all inner life and of all spirituality. This 
is where we must listen to the lesson of the Orient, and reply to 
the businessman with Gandhi.’88 (Despite his antiracism, Guérin 
was not immune to the essentialising exoticism characteristic of 
many European writers.89) Although Guérin notes explicitly his 
agreement with the Marxist view of the social role of religion as 
the opium of the people (in the sense that it taught the proletariat 
to be patient and simply content themselves with asking for alms, 
in Guérin’s view), he was worried about Marxism’s seemingly ex-
clusive emphasis on the material advantages of socialism: 
This is the terrible danger, the only danger of Marxism – Constantly 
to announce a material paradise is not to raise man up, but to cast 
him down even lower. We must regard sufficient material well- 
being as nothing more than the simple and necessary precondition 
of intellectual and spiritual development.90 
Guérin was of course not alone on the left in finding Marxism spi-
ritually inadequate, and many of his comments echo the ideas of 
those such as Ernst Bloch for whom Marxism was ‘insufficiently 
utopian’.91 Nor is this a question which seems to have concerned 
 87 IX: Notes on Emile Hovelacque, La Chine (1920). 
 88 X: Notes on Octave Homberg, L’Impérialisme américain (1929). 
 89 See Kate Marsh, ‘Gandhi and le gandhisme: Writing Indian Decolonisation 
and the Appropriation of Gandhi 1919–48’, Modern & Contemporary 
France, 14: 1 (2006), 33–47.
 90 XX: Notes on É. Vandervelde, Jaurès (1929). Emphases in the original. 
 91 Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth, and 
Dissolution, vol. 3: The Breakdown (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 
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Guérin only in his 20s. In 1945, he wrote a congratulatory let-
ter to the Italian novelist Ignazio Silone after reading The Seed 
Beneath the Snow: 
I do not know how to find the words to describe to you the pro-
found impression the novel has made on me. [...] What struck me 
above all is that your book is on the borderline between Catholic 
spiritualism and Marxist materialism. I do not believe anybody else 
combines in himself these two conceptions of the world.92
Indeed Guérin thought so highly of the novel that in 1961 he 
adapted it for the stage.93 
The folder of Guérin’s reading notes also contains a cutting 
from the review Monde about Hendrik de Man, a social psycho-
logist at the University of Frankfurt – where he was a colleague 
of Karl Mannheim and Max Horkheimer – and a leading figure 
in the Belgian Workers’ Party.94 De Man had first come to promi-
nence just a few years before with the publication in 1926 of Zur 
Psychologie des Sozialismus [On the Psychology of Socialism], an 
‘intensive critique of the stultifying legacy of Second International 
determinism’.95 De Man’s ideas for a positive alternative to 
p. 423. I know of no evidence that Guérin knew of Bloch’s work  (although 
he did read German), but most of Bloch’s main ideas were already devel-
oped in the 1920s: Geist der Utopie [Spirit of Utopia], which argued that 
humans are utopian subjects, appeared in 1918, and Durch die Wüste 
[Through the Desert], which attacked the utilitarianism and nihilism of 
modern bourgeois civilisation, in 1923.
 92 Letter of 23 October 1945, BDIC F°Δ Rés.688/10/1. See Stanislao G. 
Pugliese, ‘Wrestling with Two Angels: Communism and Christianity in 
the Work of Ignazio Silone’, in New Directions in Italian and Italian-
American History, ed. by Ernest Ialongo and William M. Adams (New 
York: Calandra Italian American Institute CUNY, 2013), pp. 50–64; 
and Tom Moylan, ‘Anticipatory Fiction: Bread and Wine and Liberation 
Theology’, Modern Fiction Studies, 35: 1 (Spring 1989), 103–17.
 93 The adaptation was published as Le Grain sous la neige (Paris: Del Duca/
Editions mondiales, 1961).
 94 Monde was created by the writer, pacifist and communist Henri Barbusse 
in 1928. 
 95 Gerd-Rainer Horn, ‘From ‘Radical’ to ‘Realistic’: Hendrik de Man and 
the International Plan Conferences at Pontigny and Geneva, 1934–1937’, 
Contemporary European History, 10: 2 (July 2001), 239–65 (p. 243).
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 orthodox Marxism, with a view to reinvigorating the socialist 
movement, were developed subsequently. He notably argued for 
a redefinition of ‘interests’ and ‘needs’ in order to embrace religi-
ous and ethical ideas, and emphasised the disinterested, ethical 
impetus in socialism. His main criticism of Marxism was that it 
was overly deterministic, neglecting morality, psychology and the 
human will, and that it was too disdainful of the power of religion 
as a provider of a set of moral values. De Man published Au-delà 
du marxisme [Beyond Marxism] in 1927, and the following year 
was one of the founders of a new movement whose focus was the 
reconciliation of Western religious traditions with socialism.96 De 
Man asserted that there was ‘a common ethical substructure to all 
universalistic religious systems’ and that these ‘would be transla-
ted into secular realization only through the socialist program.’97 
He also argued that the socialist movement was suffused with 
‘eschatological yearning’.98
Thirdly, Guérin seems to have been drawn both to the total 
personal commitment implied by the bolshevik idea of the ‘profes-
sional revolutionary’ and to Tolstoy’s and Gandhi’s ideas on the 
priority to be attached to moral self-improvement. On reading a 
biography of Lenin, he noted: ‘A man who claims to be a socialist 
no longer has the right to devote a part of his intelligence to sterile 
intellectual exercises.’ 99 And in his notes on a study of Trotsky, 
having first invoked Gandhism, he commented: 
Before replacing the bourgeoisie, first show yourselves to be 
 superior to them [...] by virtue of your morality: abstain from drun-
kenness; accept the rigourous discipline of the trade union; push 
aside exclusively material appetites; love your neighbour – and you 
will be more worthy of power than the bourgeoisie.100 
 96 Peter Dodge, Beyond Marxism: The Faith and Works of Hendrik de Man 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 67.
 97 Dodge, Beyond Marxism, p. 108.
 98 Gentile, Politics as Religion, p. 7.
 99 XIV: Notes on Pierre Chasles, La Vie de Lénine (1929).
 100 XIII: Notes on Pierre Fervacque [pseud. of Rémy Roure], La Vie orgueil-
leuse de Trotski (Paris: Fasquelle, 1929).
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Bourgeois socialists, he wrote, can never understand working-class 
realities unless they are completely ‘expropriated’, cut off from 
their roots and forced to live as workers: ‘This rôle must be really 
lived’.101 There are perhaps certain parallels here between Guérin’s 
subsequent decision to do precisely that (of which more below) 
and the social-Catholic ‘worker-priests’ of the 1940s-50s, as 
well as the students of the puritanical maoist Union des Jeunesses 
Communistes (Marxistes-Léninistes) going to work in the facto-
ries in the 1960s.102
Metamorphosis
In his notes on Sorel, Guérin commented that ‘it is not through ide-
ology that I came to socialism, but through the body and through 
the heart’, and in his autobiographies and interviews, Guérin was 
keen to emphasize the visceral nature of his political commitment, 
derived from his direct personal knowledge of the bourgeoisie 
and of the colonial system, but also from his relationships with 
 working-class men:
Although founded on very wide reading, the metamorphosis 
which led me to socialism was not objective, on an intellectual le-
vel. Rather it was subjective, physical, stemming from the senses 
and the heart. [...] I had sought camaraderie. It was that which I 
hoped to find a hundredfold in socialism.103
He felt at that time as if the ‘metamorphosis’ he was undergoing was 
a kind of sublimation of his own sexuality in his new aim in life: 
I resolved to employ my particular form of eroticism, thus far un-
controlled, wasted and more or less asocial, and to subordinate it 
to the highest ends: the liberation of all, which would at the same 
time be my own liberation.104 
 101 XXII/a: Notes on Hyacinthe Dubreuil, La République industrielle (Paris: 
Bibliothèque d’éducation, n.d.).
 102 See Christophe Bourseiller, Les maoïstes. La folle histoire des gardes 
rouges français (Paris: Points, 2008), pp. 109–26.
 103 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 218.
 104 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 219.
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Back in Paris in April 1930, Guérin’s attempts at explanation did 
little to soothe his parents’ alarm at his decision, and faced with 
their incomprehension and disapproval, he cut his economic ties 
with his family. Having found work as a proof-reader, he moved 
out of the family home and found a room in the working-class 
quarter of Belleville.105 Both geographically and sociologically, 
this was a Paris which had not been part of his world until now, 
beyond going to work in La Chapelle in 1925. Guérin liked it 
there: ‘It was the happiest period of my life, getting to know this 
proletarian milieu.’106 The other inhabitants of the building, most-
ly young construction workers, were friendly and sociable and 
became a kind of substitute family. His small room was (to use 
Guérin’s words) like a monk’s cell in its bareness. As a police sur-
veillance report on him put it:
He occupies a modest and uncomfortable room. [...] The subject is 
described as a mystic. He strives to live modestly in accordance with 
the meagre resources he earns from his work as a manual wor-
ker and journalist. He nevertheless regularly visits his parents, 
22 Boulevard Saint-Michel, who naturally deplore the political 
 attitude of their son.107
As Guérin himself commented, ‘I looked for myself, I more or less 
found myself’, and an essential part of that was abandoning the 
class from which he sprang: 
 105 See Patrice Spadoni, ‘Daniel Guérin – 5 rue Lesage’, in Un Paris révolu-
tionnaire, ed. by Claire Auzias (Paris: L’esprit frappeur, 2001), pp. 366–8.
 106 Interview in television documentary, Daniel Guérin, dir. Jean-José 
Marsand, questionnaire and interview by Pierre André Boutang 
(Broadcast on FR3, 4 & 11 September 1989, série Archives du XXe Siècle; 
film made in 1985); interview material re-used in Laurent Muhleisen & 
Patrice Spadoni, Daniel Guérin, 1904–1988: Combats dans le siècle 
(Productions Imagora, n.d.).
 107 Archives Nationales, Centre des archives contemporaines (CAC), 
Versement coté 19940448, Fichier central de la Direction générale de la 
Sûreté nationale du Ministère de l’Intérieur, Box 450, file 38145; quoted 
in Antonio de Francesco, ‘Daniel Guérin et Georges Lefebvre, une ren-
contre improbable’, La Révolution française (Cahiers de l’Insitut d’his-
toire de la Révolution française), http://lrf.revues.org/162
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I irrevocably abandoned one familial clan [...] to join another, 
which was infinitely more vast since it embraced the wretched of 
the earth. It is more exalting than the first, for it counts within its 
ranks truth and justice, and more powerful, since it has number in 
its favour.108
This was undoubtedly a pivotal moment in Guérin’s life, and is 
strongly reminiscent of the moral crisis which led Tolstoy in the 
1870s to renounce all his earlier literary works, and of Gandhi’s 
decision to adopt what he called a ‘religion of service’, feeling that 
‘God could be realized only through service.’109 Guérin, vowing to 
devote his life to ‘the struggle for the abolition of the social and 
colonial scandal’, similarly renounced all the ‘superfluous’ pasti-
mes of his privileged youth, burning his unpublished fictional wri-
tings and consigning to silence his published poems and novels, 
ashamed of their very existence.110
Mana
Others’ commentaries on Guérin’s early years, as well as his own, 
have tended to be framed either in terms of the break with his 
own class and his quest for ‘the great family of fraternal cama-
raderie and shared struggle’, ‘the camaraderie of community’;111 
or in terms of the problems he experienced coming to terms with 
his sexuality;112 or in terms of his quest to ‘reunify’ his self, his 
identity, as both revolutionary and homosexual. It seems to me 
that another (complementary) perspective is possible. On such a 
reading, spirituality acquires a more important – perhaps even 
central – rôle in determining Guérin’s life decisions and, indeed, 
 108 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 229.
 109 Gandhi, An Autobiography, p. 155.
 110 Guérin, Autobiographie, p. 227. On Guérin’s social and political engage-
ments from 1930 onwards, see David Berry, ‘‘Un contradicteur perma-
nent’: The ideological and political itinerary of Daniel Guérin’, in After 
the Deluge: New Perspectives on the Intellectual and Cultural History 
of Postwar France, ed. by Julian Bourg (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2004), pp. 149–74.
 111 Guérin, Eux et Lui, pp. 7 & 8.
 112 Guérin, ‘Commentaires très libres sur les Mémoires d’un jeune homme 
excentrique’, Text of a talk given by Daniel Guérin on 17 February 1965. 
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his everyday conduct, and particularly at this crucial moment 
in his life. It is doubtless necessary to distinguish between religion 
and the admittedly rather ambiguous term spirituality. We have 
already seen that Guérin rejected the Church and Christian dog-
ma, and his history of the French Revolution is certainly sympat-
hetic towards the revolutionaries’ policy of ‘dechristianisation’.113 
In 1968, he insisted on the need to fight the ‘obscurantist fanati-
cism’ of the Catholic Church.114 And in the raw confessional text 
Eux et Lui (first published in 1959), he wrote (in the third person) 
of his lack of religious belief:
Neither god nor the devil cohabited within him, fighting over his 
soul. The absence of god did not represent, in him, an obsession 
with god, and hell was the least of his worries. A believer [...] would 
have perceived in him the ravages caused by the absence of god. But 
he ignored such self-interested suggestions and he managed perfect-
ly well without god. 
So clearly Guérin had moved beyond his youthful agonising over 
religion in the sense of belief in a supernatural deity and church 
doctrine, yet he went on: ‘For him the cosmos, with which he 
believed he communicated and which filled him with its mana, 
took the place of god.’115 How one should interpret this remark 
is unclear. ‘Mana’ is a concept drawn from the cultures of the 
Pacific islands (Polynesia, Melanesia, Micronesia) and has a num-
ber of meanings which depend on context, but tend to be associa-
ted with sacred or spiritual authority, power or energy.116 Perhaps 
Guérin is suggesting some kind of numinous experience of the sa-
cred which, in the words of the theologian Rudolf Otto, produced 
an irrational energy which... 
 113 Guérin, La lutte de classes sous la Pemière République, 1793–1797 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1946; revised edition 1968), 2 vols.
 114 ‘De la répression sexuelle à la Révolution’, from Le Point, Brussels, 
December 1968, in Guérin, Homosexualité et révolution (Paris: Le Vent 
du ch’min, 1983), p. 34.
 115 Guérin, Eux et lui (Lille: Gai Kitsch Camp, 2000), p. 16. 
 116 Tony Swain & Garry Trompf, The Religions of Oceania (London & New 
York: Routledge, 1995).
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engages man’s sentiments, drives him to ‘industrious fervour’ and 
fills him with a boundless dynamic tension both in terms of asceti-
cism and zealousness against the world and the flesh, and in terms 
of heroic behaviour by which the inner excitement erupts into the 
external world.117
Or perhaps, rather, it makes sense to see similarities with Bloch’s 
utopian spirit – Guérin certainly had strong chiliastic tendenci-
es, as seen, for instance, in Eux et Lui, when he cites Trotsky’s 
1940 Testament:
[W]hatever may be the circumstances of my death I shall die with 
unshaken faith in the communist future. This faith in man and in 
his future gives me even now such power of resistance as cannot be 
given by any religion.118
Or perhaps it means little more than an ‘emotional attitude’, 
to use Orwell’s words? In a later autobiography, he employed 
the concept of mana again when discussing the fact that many 
people seemed unable to reconcile Guérin the anticolonialist and 
revolutionary socialist with Guérin the campaigner for (homo)
sexual liberation: 
Personally, I believe that one and the same vital energy or, to use 
the Melanesian term, one and the same mana, has been the driving 
force in my political as well as my carnal life.119
Similarly, he once commented in an interview that ‘the driving for-
ce of my life has been love’120 – which brings us back to Gandhi. 
Reading of Guérin’s determination to start his life afresh in 1930, 
and recalling the way in which he earlier described his ‘discovery’ 
 117 Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in 
the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational (London & New 
York, 1917), quoted in Gentile, Politics as Religion, p. 10.
 118 Guérin, Eux et lui, p. 94. Translation from Leon Trotsky, ‘Testament’ 
(3 March 1940), http://www.marxist.com/testament-of-leon-trotsky.htm
 119 Guérin, Le feu du sang. Autobiographie politique et charnelle (Paris: 
Grasset & Fasquelle, 1977), p. 7. See David Berry, ‘‘Workers of the World, 
Embrace!’ Daniel Guérin, the Labour Movement and Hommosexuality’, 
Left History, 9: 2 (Spring/Summer 2004), 11–43.
 120 ‘Géographie passionnelle d’une époque. Entretien avec Daniel Guérin’, 
Débattre 10 (2000), 5–10. 
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of the working-class quarters of Paris as ‘restarting [his] life from 
zero’, one cannot help but be reminded of the closing lines of one 
of the many books he read on board the Bangkok, one which 
seems to have had a more profound impact than most, namely 
Gandhi’s autobiography: ‘I must reduce myself to zero. So long as 
a man does not of his own free will put himself among his fellow 
creatures, there is no salvation for him.’121
Conclusion
It seems clear that Guérin’s commitment to ending the ‘social 
and colonial scandal’ was motivated by moral outrage and by 
a profound sense of guilt at his own privileges as a member 
of the grande bourgeoisie and as a white man. He sought redemp-
tion through a Gandhian ‘religion of service’, putting himself 
at the service of the Revolution (with a capital R) in order to help the 
oppressed and exploited achieve liberation. Love (with a capital 
L) – ‘charity’, ‘the heart’, ‘fraternity’, ‘camaraderie’ - was central 
to his thinking and to his responses to others’ suffering; for him 
it was constitutive of what it is to be human and therefore enab-
led self-realisation through ‘merging with the people’ (Gandhi’s 
‘putting himself among his fellow creatures’). Although he 
doubtless exaggerates the extent to which his decision to devote 
his life to social revolution was ‘visceral’ (rather being prompted 
by a more rational decision based on his extensive studies), it was 
certainly rooted in his personal experiences and  relationships, 
and in his compassionate, empathetic responses to them – ‘in 
the heart’, to use his words. His deep dissatisfaction with the 
spiritual vacuousness both of capitalist society and of his own 
nihilistic indulgence in physical pleasures led him to seek ‘sure 
values’, meaning and ‘spiritual nourishment’ elsewhere. Guérin’s 
political commitment might thus be seen as an instance of the 
kind of religious experience described by Durkheim as produ-
cing ‘the transport of the individual beyond himself.’122 In such a 
view, society becomes the divinity.
 121 Gandhi, An Autobiography, p. 454. 
 122 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1930), quoted 
in Gentile, p. 8.
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Does it make sense to use the much debated concepts of ‘political 
religion’ or ‘secular religion’ with regard to Guérin? The more gene-
ral term ‘secular religion’ has been used of ideologies or ideals which 
replaced traditional, metaphysical religious beliefs with  humanist 
ideas such as humanity or society. The notion of  sacralisation – 
the creation by such beliefs of ‘an aura of sacredness around an 
entity belonging to this world’123 – may be useful in helping us 
understand Guérin’s commitment to the cause. De Man wrote 
of the idea of the Revolution which ‘so powerfully evokes emo-
tions that recall the eschatological visions of the Apocalypse, the 
end of the world, the Last Judgement, the Kingdom of God, etc.’124 
And Guérin’s use of a quotation from Trotsky’s ‘Testament’ sug-
gests that Guérin’s relationship to his revolutionary socialist po-
litics, the meaning and purpose with which it invested his life, his 
faith in the ultimate inevitability of the Revolution and the devo-
tion it aroused in him could indeed be seen as a form of ‘sacrali-
sation’ characteristic of a ‘political religion’. As religious historian 
Giovanni Filoramo put it: 
[T]he process of sacralization is triggered when individuals and 
groups of people confer an absolute value on objects and symbols 
in order to make sense of their individual or collective existence.125
Guérin, in common with many of his generation, did have a very 
nineteenth-century belief in the inevitability of the Revolution, a 
faith which can be seen as a form of ‘social transcendance’ of the 
kind identified by Salvador Giner.126
But the definition and usefulness of the concepts of secular or 
political religion are still debated, and a particular problem here 
is that ‘political religion’ tended for a long time to be used princi-
pally in analyses of fascism, nazism or bolshevism, and were thus 
assumed to involve repressive and demagogic techniques designed 
to bolster totalitarian systems – what Gentile calls the ‘crowd ma-
nipulation interpretation of religion’. Guérin would himself devo-
te a whole chapter of his 1936 classic Fascism and Big Business 
 123 Gentile, Politics as Religion, p. 1.
 124 Quoted in Gentile, p. 7.
 125 Quoted in Gentile, p. 14.
 126 Salvador Giner, quoted in Gentile, Politics as Religion, p. 14.
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to fascist ‘mysticism’ and insisted that fascism was a religion. 
But Guérin also gave attention to an analysis of the psycholo-
gical mechanisms at play in inter-war Europe which meant that 
so many people were receptive, thus enabling fascism to beco-
me a quasi-religious mass movement based on faith, belief and 
emotional fervour – in other words Guérin employed a ‘fideistic’ 
interpretation, as well as a ‘crowd manipulation’ interpretation. 
Clearly, the latter kind of use of the concepts of political or secular 
religion, with their connotations of demagogy, irrationalism and 
fanaticism – whether we are thinking of the inter-war years or 
the Cold War era – are inappropriate in Guérin’s case: he was too 
rational, too well informed, too committed to open and honest 
debate among comrades, too scornful of dogma and sectarianism. 
Indeed, as we have seen, he quite explicitly condemned the way in 
which Marx and Lenin had, in his eyes, been ‘sacralised’ (his term) 
and come to be regarded as infallible prophets.
And yet I think we can say that Guérin – as Mauriac percepti-
vely pointed out when he compared Guérin to Psichari, empha-
sising the former’s apparent need to ‘belong to a religious order’ 
– did have strong fideistic tendencies, if we understand by that 
‘the need to submit oneself to a divine, political or social faith’ in 
Le Bon’s words.127 Guérin was an adherent of what Gentile calls a 
‘religion of humanity’128, in the sense that his socialism provided 
a morality, a meaning and direction, and hope for a better world.
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Martin Buber’s Notion of Grace as a 
Defense of Religious Anarchism
Sarah Scott
Manhattan College, USA
“I asked Buber why God’s grace finds hardly any place in his 
work. He explained: ‘I write theology for men, not for God’”. 
— David Flusser1
I reconstruct Martin Buber’s conception of grace to show its impor-
tance for unifying his religious orientation and anarchist tendenci-
es. I first lay out an Augustinian account of grace and concomitant 
defense of hierarchy and submission. I then examine Buber’s anar-
chism and previous analyses of his notion of grace, which were 
incomplete insofar as they ignored his redefinition of what is given 
by grace and who gives these gifts. The primary gifts of grace he 
identifies are who we are (meant to be), moral norms and reality, 
each of which come to us not just from God, but also from rela-
tions with other creatures. Buber corrects the classic Augustinian 
notion of grace by replacing radical dependence on God with radi-
cal creaturely interdependence. Once hierarchy and submission to 
an inscrutable authority are no longer taken to be necessary for hu-
man flourishing, we are free to think along broadly anarchist lines.
The author wishes to thank the editors and reviewers for their helpful 
comments.
 1 David Flusser, ‘Afterword’, in Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith: A 
Study of the Interpenetration of Judaism and Christianity (New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 2003), pp. 175–229 (p. 198).
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Introduction
In order to show the compatibility between a religious orientation 
and anarchism I shall reconstruct Martin Buber’s (1878–1965) 
notion of grace [Gnade]. Well known for developing a distinc-
tion between I-Thou and I-It relations in his 1923 Ich und Du 
[I and Thou], this great Jewish thinker authored more than 700 
books and papers on subjects ranging from philosophy and po-
litical structures to education and religion, including commen-
taries on both Jewish and Christian theology and, with Franz 
Rosenzweig, a new German translation of the Bible.2 Buber was 
also quite  politically active. In his youth he advocated for cul-
tural Zionism and was close friends with the socialist anarchist 
Gustav Landauer. When the Nazis came into power Buber enga-
ged in “spiritual resistance” by organizing Jewish adult education 
programs, despite being banned from public speaking. Once in 
Palestine, Buber advocated for Jewish-Arab parity and a bi-natio-
nal state. Inter-religious dialogue was a special concern of his. In 
keeping with this proclivity, and building on Buber’s own stated 
differences with the positions of Christian traditions, this work 
will use Augustinian views on grace as a foil to elucidate Buber’s 
views on grace. Through this contrast I join those commentators 
who direct our attention to the ways Buber offers a genuine al-
ternative and who aim to correct the common, but misguided, 
tendency to subsume his stance under Christian frameworks.
I begin with an Augustinian account of grace and concomi-
tant defense of hierarchy and submission. This shows that so long 
as the notion of grace assumes an independent being deigning to 
bestow inscrutable gifts on radically dependent beings, the repli-
cation of this power structure between human beings seems ju-
stified by the “as above, so below” adage. I argue that Buber is 
able to propose very different power structures while retaining the 
“as above, so below” principle because he reconceives the nature 
 2 See Martin Buber: A Bibliography of His Writings 1898–1978, com-
piled by Margot Cohn and Rafael Buber (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press; 
München: K.G. Saur, 1980), which lists 1416 entries. See also the twen-
ty-two volume German critical text edition of Buber’s writings: Martin 
Buber Werkausgabe, eds. Paul Mendes-Flohr and Bernd Witte (Güterloh: 
Güterlohsloher Verlaghaus, 2001ff.).
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of grace. In order to illustrate the compatibility of his political 
and religious views I analyze his “anarchism”, which turns out 
to be not a simple advocacy of stateless or lawless societies, but 
a multifaceted position that has garnered numerous appellations. 
Joining the various accounts of commentators together produces 
the inelegant yet nuanced description of Buber’s position as “topi-
an-communitarian-socialist-federalist-anocracy”. I then examine 
previous analyses of his notion of grace, which were incomplete 
insofar as they ignored his redefinition of what is given by grace 
and who gives these gifts. The primary gifts of grace Buber iden-
tifies are who we are (meant to be), moral norms and reality, each 
of which come to us not just from God, but also from relations 
with other creatures. For Buber, grace may occur between per-
sons, and is not just bestowed by an inscrutable, higher being to a 
lower being. Buber thus corrects the classic Augustinian notion of 
grace by replacing radical dependence on God with radical crea-
turely interdependence. Once hierarchy and submission to an in-
scrutable authority are no longer taken to be necessary for human 
fulfillment, we are free to think along broadly anarchist lines.
As above, so below
In order to better understand the role that grace plays in uniting 
Buber’s religious and political philosophy, it helps to compare him 
to a familiar figure who can act as a foil. Buber identifies the views 
of the Augustinian tradition as directly opposed to his own: “the 
tendency from Augustine to the Reformation was to see faith as 
a gift of God. This … resulted in the retreating into obscurity of 
the Israelite mystery of man as an independent partner of God”.3 
As a familiar, albeit simplified, Augustinian story goes, although 
happiness and goodness are natural, we are incapable of attaining 
these states on our own.4 Each stage on the way to the fulfillment 
 3 Martin Buber, Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation Between Religion 
and Philosophy, trans. by Maurice Friedman (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
International Humanities Press, 1988), p. 107.
 4 E.g., Augustine, The Confessions, trans. by Maria Boulding (Hyde Park, 
NY: New City Press, 2001), VI.20, p. 110: “no one can be continent 
 except by your [God’s] gift”.
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of happiness and goodness is driven by divine grace: prevenient 
grace leads to faith, faith helped by grace creates a will to rightly 
ordered love, will helped by grace actualises rightly ordered love, 
rightly ordered love produces meritorious works, and meritorious 
works lead to further grace and eternal life. All faithful prayer 
for grace is conducted by those who have already received grace: 
“it is not in our power to live rightly, unless while we believe 
and pray we receive help from him who has given us the faith to 
believe that we must be helped by him”.5 While there may be sub-
sequent merit, there is no antecedent merit, for subsequent merit 
is ultimately the result of unmerited grace: “Everything, not only 
my salvation but even my choice to seek it, depends on whether 
God chooses that I will receive this gift of grace and persevere in 
to the end, and not only do I have no say over God’s choice but 
I am (by Augustine’s reckoning) in no position to know anything 
about it”.6
This model of grace supports a particular understanding of the 
proper ordering of relationships between humans. Having esta-
blished God as our inscrutable divine sovereign, the Hermetic “as 
above, so below; as below, so above” adage can be used to de-
fend the necessity of submission to human sovereigns. Augustine, 
for example, draws an analogy between the ordered obedience of 
body to mind, household to paterfamilias, citizens to sovereign, 
and humanity to God:
‘How is it that God rules man, the soul rules the body, the reason 
rules lust and the other perverted elements in the soul?’ By this 
analogy it is shown plainly enough that servitude is beneficial for 
some men, and that servitude to God, at least, is beneficial to all.7
 5 Augustine, Concerning the City of God, Against the Pagans, trans. by 
Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 2003), XIX.4, p. 852.
 6 Phillip Cary, Inner Grace: Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 101.
 7 Augustine, City of God XIX.21, p. 883. See City of God XIX.16, p. 876, 
for another application of the “as above, so below” principle: “Now a 
man’s house ought to be the beginning, or rather a small component of 
the city, and every beginning is directed to some end of its own kind, 
and every component part contributes to the completeness of the whole 
of which it forms a part. The implication of this is quite apparent, that 
domestic peace contributes to the peace of the city — that is, the ordered 
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This argument for the necessity of hierarchical relationships of 
governance between humans may be summarized as follows:
(1) God is our sovereign
(2) Human nature is radically dependent on God
(3) Without this dependency it is impossible for humans to 
attain virtue
(4) Servitude to God is beneficial to all
(5) As above, so below
(6) Therefore, dependence on / servitude to a human sovereign 
is beneficial for at least some humans.
Following the “as above, so below” adage, conceptions of pre-
venient grace and sovereignty go hand in hand; hierarchical or-
dering is a necessity given our flawed will and incapacity to attain 
virtue on our own. Those who resist the concomitant notions of 
prevenient grace and hierarchical ordering, and maintain greater 
human freedom and personal responsibility, such as the Pelagians, 
are deemed to have at best a naïve account of human nature and 
at worst to be dangerous heretics.8
Two main counter-arguments could be used to dismantle the 
classic Augustinian defense of the necessity for submission to a hie-
rarchical order and show the possibility of a religious anarchism. 
One tactic would be to question premise (5), that is, this applica-
tion of the “as above, so below” principle. Like all  arguments that 
rest on analogy, we might question if there are not relevant points 
of disanalogy to consider. Even if we do accept an analogical ar-
gument linking macrocosm to microcosm, the general statement 
that servitude to God is beneficial might not produce a sufficient 
defense of specific political systems, each of which might have 
harmony of those who live together in the house in the matter of giv-
ing and obeying orders, contributes to the ordered harmony concerning 
authority and obedience obtaining among the citizens”. Even slavery is 
justified using this analogy (City of God XIX.15, p. 875).
 8 For a more favorable account of the Pelagians than that of Augustine 
see Richard Fitch, ‘The Pelagian Mentality: Radical Political Thought in 
Fifth Century Christianity’, in Religious Anarchism: New Perspectives, 
ed. by Alexandre J. M. E. Christoyannopoulos (Newcastle upon Tyne, 
UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), pp. 2–29.
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institutionalized varying forms of dependence or servitude. The 
other tactic would be to question premises (1)–(4) and revise our 
conception of grace. If we replace the image of our relationship to 
God as one of subject to sovereign with an image of a relations-
hip between independent partners, which Buber calls the Israelite 
mystery, then we may be able to use this new imagery to rethink 
the nature of relations between humans.
If the second strategy is used the first is unnecessary. The “as 
above, so below” analogy can be kept intact if our understanding 
of our relationship to God alters simultaneously with our under-
standing of our relationship to one another. Buber provides an 
example of how to maintain the “as above, so below” analogy 
and use it to wed theology with political philosophy in support of 
religious anarchism. In I and Thou, he explains that to show “the 
close association of the relation to God with the relation to one’s 
fellow-men” is his “most essential concern”.9 He reemphasizes 
this point throughout his life, stating in 1964 that his one basic 
insight is that “the I-Thou relation to God and the I-Thou rela-
tion to one’s fellow man are at bottom related to each other”.10 It 
is a central refrain of I and Thou that “in the beginning is the re-
lation”.11 Beings are interdependent and  constituted by their rela-
tionships. In I-Thou relations we are in the mode of presence. We 
dynamically receive and respond to the other as a spontaneous 
totality, which, even when the exchange is non-verbal, Buber re-
fers to as dialogue. I-It, or monologic, relations are dominated 
by our capacity for holding onto the past and projecting into 
the future. Instead of embracing the totality and vital newness 
of the other, we interpret him through the lens of static catego-
ries. This allows us (we assume) to be able to predict his respon-
ses, and thus I-It relations lie behind every relationship of mere 
utility. While Buber recognizes the necessity of I-It modes, he cau-
tions us that contemporary humanity suffers from an excessive 
 9 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1996), p. 171.
 10 Martin Buber, ‘Interrogation of Martin Buber’, conducted by M.  S. 
Friedman, in Philosophic Interrogations, ed. by S.  and B. Rome (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964), p. 99.
 11 See, for example, Buber, I and Thou, p. 69.
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 development of the capacity for I-It relations and an impoveris-
hed capacity for I-Thou relations. For the purposes of this study, 
what Buber calls his one basic insight or central concern, namely 
that our capacity to enter into dialogue with other creatures pa-
rallels our capacity to enter into dialogue with God, is especially 
important. Buber argues for interdependence throughout all of 
the levels of being. The nature of the partners alters the speci-
fic dynamics of the dialogue — we give language to beings that 
are below the threshold of language, we enter into language and 
give and receive with each other, and we create language to ex-
press what we receive from the transcendent12 — but the dialogic 
orientation of the subject is the same regardless of the partner. 
Our capacity to enter into relationship with other creatures is 
not qualitatively different from the capacity to enter into a rela-
tionship with God, though the other we are in a relation with is 
qualitatively different. This embrace of the “as above, so below” 
adage and yet rejection of accounts of independence and depen-
dence in favor of an insistence on interdependence will provide 
the foundation for Buber’s religious anarchism.
Buber’s “anarchism”
With the basic problem of grace and the use of the “as above, so 
below” adage laid out, we are now in a position to first take a 
preliminary look at Buber’s political philosophy, in particular, his 
“anarchism”, and then take a preliminary look at his views on 
grace, in order to eventually unite these two strands of inquiry 
and develop a more complex view of each. Evidence for classifying 
Buber as a thinker with anarchist leanings comes from his close 
and sympathetic relationship with Landauer and writings such as 
Paths in Utopia (1945), which favorably discusses Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon, Peter Kropotkin and Landauer, while critiquing Karl 
Marx and Vladimir Lenin, and the collection of essays Pointing 
the Way, which includes “Society and the State” (1951) and 
 12 Buber, I and Thou, p. 57. When he revisits this tripartite categorization 
in his 1957 Afterward to I and Thou, Buber recasts it as marking dif-
ferent degrees of capacity for mutuality, not language. See Buber, I and 
Thou, p. 178.
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“The Validity and Limitation of the Political Principle” (1953).13 
However, few commentators have been satisfied affixing this label 
to a complex, unsystematic thinker. Part of the problem has to 
do with the term “anarchy”, the etymology of which suggests a 
complete absence of government. Alexander S. Kohanski prefers 
the term “anocracy” to describe Buber’s thought: “anocracy … 
means a ‘non-dominance’ (a-kratia) rather than a ‘non-governme-
nt’ (an-archia), not the abolition of the state but a curbing of its 
oppressive power”.14 The appellation “anocracy” is used by Buber 
to describe the “anarchy” of both Kropotkin and Proudhon, but 
as we shall see, it more accurately describes his own political phi-
losophy than the simple label “anarchy”.15
When Buber elaborates what we can call his own anocracy, he 
distinguishes between two principles: the political and the social. 
The state tends to be governed by the political principle, but the 
two principles are not tied to specific organizations as they refer 
to two different modes of relation. While the political and soci-
al principles generally correspond to I-It and I-Thou modes, the 
latter denote general modes of existence while the former deline-
ate modes of structural organization. Social relations are based 
on “common need or a common interest” and are the primary 
structures in which human beings are fulfilled. Political relations 
are secondary, and replace “association by subordination, fel-
 13 For an analysis of Buber as deeply influenced by Landauer’s anarchism, 
see Samuel Hayim Brody, Martin Buber’s Theopolitics (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2018), especially Chapter 1: ‘The True 
Front: Buber and Landauer on Anarchism and Revolution’. Brody goes 
on to argue that Buber’s thought is best understood as “Theopolitical 
Zionism”; Brody’s work was published after the completion of this 
paper and I was regrettably unable to incorporate his insightful analysis. 
For more on the influence of Landauer on the development of Buber’s 
philosophy of I-Thou relations see Paul Mendes-Flohr, From Mysticism 
to Dialogue: Martin Buber’s Transformation of German Social Thought 
(Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1989). For Landauer’s own 
work, see Gustav Landauer: Anarchist and Jew, eds, Paul Mendes-Flohr 
and Anya Mali (Berlin/Munich: Walter de Gruyter Verlag, 2014).
 14 Alexander S. Kohanski, ‘Martin Buber’s Restructuring of Society into a 
State of Anocracy’, Jewish Social Studies, 34: 1 (1972), 42–57 (p. 51).
 15 Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia, trans. by R. F. Hull (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1996), p. 43; emphasis in the original.
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lowship by domination”.16 While coercive and centralistic they 
are not in themselves bad or inhuman. Like the realm of I-It, they 
become dangerous when excessive and detached from what is es-
sential. As Steven Schwarzschild explains, for Buber “evil and the 
State are both nothings, privations, the absence of thouness and of 
community respectively. The State is really ‘absolute evil’, insofar 
as Buber can have such a thing. But evil = the State must be lived 
with minimally, and it must be maximally redirected”.17
Buber maintains that genuine society is not a mere aggrega-
te of individuals, but is made up of mutual relations of smaller 
societies, each of which are in turn made up of mutual relations 
between persons, and praises Jewish village communes, with their 
decentralised, minimal political principle, as contemporary ex-
amples of genuine society.18 Consequently, Bernard Susser labels 
Buber’s approach “anarcho-federalism”, while Amitai Etzioni de-
cides that Buber is best described simply as a “communitarian”.19 
In a renewed community, such as Buber fancied the Jewish village 
communes to be, there is a change in the apportionment of power 
as well as a change in the nature of power. Buber explains that 
the difference between administration and government lies in the 
measure of excess political power (“political surplus”), that is, 
 domination and coercion, possessed by the state.20 Ideally the po-
litical principle is incrementally minimized to what is indispensi-
ble, while decentralization and freedom are incrementally pushed 
to what is maximal, such that at some point government qualita-
tively transforms and becomes mere administration.21 However, 
 16 Martin Buber, ‘Society and the State’, in Pointing the Way: Collected 
Essays, ed. and trans. by Maurice Friedman (New York and Evanston, 
IL: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 161–76 (p. 161).
 17 Steven Schwarzschild, ‘A Critique of Martin Buber’s Political 
Philosophy: An Affectionate Reappraisal’, in The Pursuit of the Ideal: 
Jewish Writings of Steven Schwarzschild, ed. by Menachem Kellner 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), p. 194 note 90 (p. 347).
 18 Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 80 and p. 141.
 19 Bernard Susser, ‘The Anarcho-Federalism of Martin Buber’, Publius, 
9:4 (1979), 103–15; Amitai Etzioni, ‘Communitarian Elements in Select 
Works of Martin Buber’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 33: 2 (1999), 
151–69.
 20 Buber, ‘Society and the State’, p. 174.
 21 Buber, ‘Society and the State’, p. 175.
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the Jewish village model should not be blindly copied or enforced, 
for change must be “adapted and proportioned to whatever can 
be willed and done in the conditions given”.22 The minimum or 
maximum is constituted by an ever-shifting “line of demarcation” 
specific to each historical moment and place, or topos.23
Like the religious socialists Paul Tillich, Leonard Ragaz and 
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Buber maintained that socialism, which 
he defines as genuine community, could not be understand via eco-
nomic or political transformation but only by spiritual transfor-
mation.24 In “Three Theses of a Religious Socialism”, Buber argues 
that 1) socialism requires orientation to a common center, 2) the 
difference between authentic and inauthentic religious or socia-
list programs lies in the degree to which they serve relationship, 
whether of man to god or between men, and 3) religion and so-
cialism meet and are authenticated in concrete personal life, not 
in programs.25 Since we are dealing with modes of relating and 
not with institutions, true revolution cannot come about merely 
through the overthrow of the state; we “cannot solve social pro-
blems by political means”.26 Lasting, meaningful change to keep 
the political within its proper sphere occurs from the bottom up, 
through a revolution in the mode in which we relate to each other. 
This revolution begins with individuals and their direct sphere 
of influence, when “their own inner ‘statehood’ is broken open”.27 
Since the state promises to its populace protection from both 
internal and external threats, it “fosters a perspective which al-
lows differences of interest to appear as radical opposition” in 
 22 Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 56.
 23 On the notion of a “line of demarcation”, see Schwarzschild, ‘A Critique 
of Martin Buber’s Political Philosophy: An Affectionate Reappraisal’.
 24 Buber co-founded Die Kreatur, the first high profile interfaith jour-
nal, with Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. For Buber on Leonard Ragaz, see 
‘Religion and God’s Rule’, in A Believing Humanism: My Testament, 
1902–1965, trans. By Maurice Friedman (New York, Humanity Books: 
1999), pp. 109–12.
 25 Martin Buber, ‘Three Theses of a Religious Socialism’, in Pointing the 
Way: Collected Essays, ed. and trans. by Maurice Friedman (New York 
and Evanston, IL: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 112–14.
 26 Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 51.
 27 Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 48.
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order to justify its existence.28 This cultivated divisiveness and 
mistrust encourages an unhealthy individualism and pattern of 
relation, such that even outside of official state activities “men 
stand to one another in a ‘statual’ relationship” and seek to do-
minate and coerce one another.29 In contrast to the unhealthy 
individualism of the political, the social provides an authentic 
individuation of the whole person that enhances and is enhan-
ced by community through “functional autonomy, mutual recog-
nition and mutual responsibility”.30 As the means of attaining 
the utopia — the restructuring of relationships — is the end of 
utopia itself, the formation of direct relationships with others 
constitutes revolutionary action and “utopian” vision is a misno-
mer for what should be called “topical” change.31 Consequently, 
Kohanski decides, “I would call Buber’s socialism topian rather 
than utopian”.32 Uniting all of the various features identified in 
Buber’s political philosophy, we are left with the hybrid position: 
topian-communitarian-socialist-federalist-anocracy.
Previous analyses of Buber’s notion of grace
We meet further complexity examining previous interpretations of 
Buber’s notion of grace. Some confusion is due to the fact that reli-
gious writers have commonly used “grace” in two different ways. 
The first way is that utilised in our discussion of Augustine, 
where grace denotes an unmerited divine gift. However, because 
the notion of grace slipped into that of election, especially in the 
Augustinian Protestant tradition, we have a second usage of gra-
ce. Augustine argued that since original sin renders us incapable 
of obtaining virtue without grace, some of us must belong to the 
grace-receiving, virtuous “City of God” while others remain in 
 28 Martin Buber, ‘The Validity and Limitation of the Political Principle’, in 
Pointing the Way: Collected Essays, ed. and trans. by Maurice Friedman 
(New York and Evanston, IL: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 208–19 (p. 216).
 29 Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 46.
 30 Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 131.
 31 Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 81.
 32 Kohanski, p. 50; emphasis in the original.
200 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
the sinful “City of Man”.33 Drawing on passages such as I Tim. 
1.9 (The law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless 
and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners, for unholy and 
profane) and Gal. 5:18 (But if ye be led of the Spirit, ye are not un-
der the law), a radical Protestant argument is made that the elec-
ted are free from having to follow laws.34 We receive grace, under-
stood as an unmerited gift. This gift allows us to have an ethic of 
grace, understood as action guided by rightly ordered love rather 
than law, such as occurs when we transition from a continent to 
a virtuous character. Critics of Buber have occasionally identified 
the second use of grace in his work, pejoratively calling him an-
tinomian.35 This might be one way of reconciling religiosity with 
anarchism: no human sovereign or laws will be needed if we are 
living under an ethic of grace. However, the reading of Buber as 
antinomian is not quite accurate, for while Buber is dubious that 
morality is about following laws or that revelation can be lawgi-
ving, he nowhere endorses the notion that election frees us from 
the constraints of the law.36 When he refers to the idea of the elec-
 33 E.g., Augustine, City of God XXI.13, p. 989: “… there is no escape for 
anyone from this justly deserved punishment, except by merciful and 
undeserved grace; and mankind is divided between those in whom the 
power of merciful grace is demonstrated, and those in whom is shown 
the might of just retribution”. See also City of God XIV.28, p. 593; XV.2, 
p. 598; and XV.22, p. 637.
 34 Authorized King James Bible, Pure Cambridge Edition.
 35 The criticism of Buber as antinomian is documented and analysed in 
Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, 4th edn. (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 313–14. Sam Berrin Shonkoff 
counters this charge, writing, “I prefer the term metanomian to antino-
mian in the case of Buber because he was not committed necessarily to 
the breaking of religious laws but rather to the expansion of religious 
practice beyond laws”. See Sam Berrin Shonkoff, ‘Metanomianism and 
Religious Praxis in Martin Buber’s Hasidic Tales’, Religions 9: 12 (2018): 
399, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9120399, note 8.
 36 E.g., Buber argues for “the constitutive impermanence of moral valua-
tions” (‘Images of Good and Evil’, in Good and Evil: Two Interpretations, 
pt. 1: Right and Wrong, trans. by R.G. Smith, pt. 2: Images of Good and 
Evil, trans. by M. Bullock [Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997], 
pp. 63–143 [p. 117]); and writes “I do not believe that revelation is ever a 
formulation of Law” (‘Martin Buber to Franz Rosenzweig, Heppenheim, 
June 24, 1924’, in The Letters of Martin Buber: A Life of Dialogue, ed. 
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tion of Israel he describes it not as a static gift but as a calling 
that must be realized: “[election] does not indicate a feeling of 
superiority, but a sense of destiny. It does not spring from a com-
parison with others, but from the concentrated devotion to a task 
… if you turn election into a static object instead of obeying it as 
a command, you will forfeit it”.37
Buber’s ostensible ethic of grace raises the problem of what gift 
of grace supports this ethic. What is the source of an ethic of grace 
if not divine election? When Buber writes of I-Thou relationships 
he emphasises will as much as grace: contemplation can turn into 
a relation “if will and grace are joined”.38 And,
The You encounters me by grace — it cannot be found by se-
eking. But that I speak the basic word to it is a deed of my whole 
being, is my essential deed. … the relationship is election and elec-
ting, passive and active at once.39
This coincidence of will and grace has led to two criticisms. 
Commentators that have emphasised his mention of grace while 
ignoring his mention of will, such as Richard A. Cohen, complain 
Buber’s description of I-Thou relations renders social action and 
accountability impossible: “the embrace of encounter happens by 
chance, by ‘grace’ … Buber shows no way to get from encounter 
to community. Each is self-contained and accidental”.40 Walter 
Kaufmann erroneously suggests Buber split humanity into two 
worlds — those who live in I-Thou relations and those who do 
not — misleadingly implying a replication of Augustine’s City of 
by Nahum N. Glatzer and Paul Mendes-Flohr [New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1996], p. 314, emphasis in the original).
 37 Martin Buber, ‘Nationalism’, in A Land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber 
on Jews and Arabs, ed. by Paul Mendes-Flohr, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 47–57 (p. 56).
 38 Buber, I and Thou, p. 58.
 39 Buber, I and Thou, p. 62.
 40 Richard A. Cohen, ‘Buber and Levinas — and Heidegger’, in Lévinas and 
Buber: Dialogue and Difference, ed. by Peter Atterton, Matthew Calarco 
and Maurice Friedman (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 
2004), pp. 235–49 (p. 247).
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God and City of Man.41 Etzioni declares, “Buber is closer to the 
Protestant than to the Catholic interpretation of virtue: we can 
find out if we are the chosen ones but not become so by working 
to become virtuous”.42 Fritz Kaufmann goes so far as to call Buber 
“the Jewish ‘Protestant’”.43 These characterizations can be parti-
ally explained by the enthusiasm with which Protestant theolo-
gians embraced Buber and his I-Thou  philosophy. Unfortunately, 
in their enthusiasm to make him their own they distorted his 
thought. Karl Heim, for example, described the discovery of the 
difference between I-Thou and I-It relations as a “Copernican 
Revolution” akin to that of Immanuel Kant. However, Heim 
then read an Augustinian Protestant understanding of grace into 
Buber’s philosophy, and with it a notion of hierarchy that lead 
Heim to claim that one of the only ways one may have an I-Thou 
relationship is by submitting to the authority of one’s dialogic 
“partner”!44 Meanwhile, those who emphasise Buber’s mention 
of will while ignoring his mention of grace  complain that his 
theology offers “cheap grace, in the sense that God’s presen-
ce is supposedly easily available to the fully alert or attentive 
person”.45 Buber does write, “No prescription can lead us to 
the encounter, and none leads from it. Only the acceptance of the 
 41 Walter Kaufmann, ‘I and You: A Prologue’, in I and Thou, trans. 
by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 7–48 
(p. 17).
 42 Etzioni, p. 164.
 43 Fritz Kaufmann, ‘Martin Buber’s Philosophy of Religion’, in The 
Philosophy of Martin Buber: The Library of Living Philosophers, 12, 
ed. by Paul A. Schilpp and Maurice Friedman (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 
1967), pp. 151–70 (p. 210).
 44 Karl Heim’s usage of Buber is documented and analysed in Maurice 
Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, 4th edn. (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 192 and pp. 324–25.
 45 Michael Fishbane, ‘Justification Through Living: Martin Buber’s Third 
Alternative’, in Martin Buber: A Contemporary Perspective, ed. by Paul 
Mendes-Flohr (Syracuse, NY and Jerusalem: Syracuse University Press 
and The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 2002), pp. 120–32 
(p. 130). Note this is not Fishbane’s own view, which is explained below; 
he is summarizing an opposing view.
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presence [Gegenwart] is  required to come to it”.46 So is Buber an 
election-driven Augustinian Protestant or a will-driven Pelagian?
The answer is, of course, neither. In his insightful “Justification 
Through Living: Martin Buber’s Third Alternative”, Michael 
Fishbane shows what happens to our picture of Buber’s ethic of 
grace if we pay attention to his language use and range of literary 
activities, including translation. When Buber set out with Franz 
Rosenzweig to give a new German translation of the Bible they 
took up tzedakah and rendered it, along with other words with 
the stem tzedek, in such a way that suggests an alternative to 
both the Augustinian Protestant and Pelagian views of grace and 
will. Martin Luther had translated tzedakah as Gerechtigkeit [jus-
tice or righteousness], leading both rabbinic and Protestant inter-
preters to assume it denoted an earned merit or theological credit. 
Buber and Rosenzweig instead translated it as Bewährung [tested 
or proved true]. Bewährung is “the interiorization of a certain truth 
in the course of personal living … verification in life”.47 Fishbane 
shows how this Leitwort [keyword] pops up in Buber’s writing. 
Buber writes, for instance, that the pure relation  “cannot be pre-
served [bewahrt] but only put to the proof in action [bewährt]”.48 
This word choice points to a “third alternative”, in which an 
ethic of grace is linked neither to willful good works nor to grace 
given faith:
Over against any sense of a religious accounting or justification 
before God through (fixed) righteous deeds, on the one side, or 
through faith (in a specific ‘thing’) on the other, Buber’s use of 
Bewährung teaches the challenge of a living emunah in the course 
of life, such that one’s faithfulness to the address of God’s Presence 
is proved only through concrete acts in the world.49
Emunah refers to what Buber calls Jewish faith, which he descri-
bes as trust in the presence of a person, and which he contrasts 
to pistis, the Greek faith of Paul, which is faith in the truth of 
 46 Buber, I and Thou, p. 159.
 47 Fishbane, p. 124 ff.
 48 Buber, I and Thou, p. 163.
 49 Fishbane, p. 128.
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a  proposition.50 In this third alternative, the gift of God’s grace 
simply means that the lives of those that “prove true” are trans-
formed by their trust in the presence of God: “The tzaddik (den 
Bewährten) is transfigured by this emunah, and thus, so to speak, 
is protected by God’s grace”.51 
For our purposes, what is important about this third alternative 
is the way grace and will are intertwined through the notion of 
faith as an active trust. Dan Avnon describes this active trust as a 
state of “alert inactivity” and “active longing”.52 Yet even this 
alert inactivity, or trusting readiness to enter into relation, is no 
guarantee the relation will actually occur. One cannot say that 
Buber is “offering cheap grace” such that God’s presence comes to 
us through will alone. This would be magical thinking that would 
deny the reality of God as an independent other that cannot be 
conjured up but nevertheless enters into relation with us. In his 
analysis of Psalm 73 Buber explains that the opening line, “Surely 
God is good to Israel: to the pure in heart”, is not a commenta-
ry on prevenient grace or meritorious reward for those who are 
pure. Instead it is a description of what it is like to “prove true” 
through emunah:
[It] does not mean that God rewards him with his goodness. It 
means, rather, that God’s goodness is revealed to him who is pure 
in heart: he experiences this goodness. In so far as Israel is pure in 
heart, becomes pure in heart, it experiences God’s goodness.53
 50 Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith: A Study of the Interpenetration of 
Judaism and Christianity, trans. by Norman P. Goldhawk (New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 2003), passim.
 51 Fishbane, p. 131.
 52 Dan Avnon, Martin Buber: The Hidden Dialogue (Lanham, MA: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 61: “‘And I will wait 
for YHVH who hides his face from the house of Ya’akov, and I will in-
cline towards him’ [Isa. 8:17]. … the limmud [here a rare form of L/M/D 
meaning “disciple” or “a state of continuous study”] combines a state of 
anticipation, a form of alert inactivity (indicated by the phrase heekeetee 
l’YHVH, ‘I will wait for YHVH’) and an inner inclination, an active form 
of longing (designated by keeveetee loh, usually translated as ‘I will look 
for Him’)”.
 53 Martin Buber, ‘Right and Wrong’, in Good and Evil: Two Interpretations, 
pt. 1: Right and Wrong, trans. by R.G. Smith, pt. 2: Images of Good and 
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Throughout his analysis Buber emphasises activity: “The Presence 
acts as counsel: God counsels by making known that He is pre-
sent. … [Man] is not relieved of taking and directing his own 
steps”.54 Faith is not a cognitive state but a way of life, and God 
is not a proposition but a presence with whom one is in relation. 
This presence transforms us, but it does not remove our responsi-
bility for our part of the relationship.
A fresh start: what is given by grace?
With their attention to language and the range of Buber’s literary 
endeavors Fishbane and Avnon help resolve the question of how 
to relate Buber to Christian notions of will, election and righteous-
ness. However, we are left with the question of how to reconcile 
Buber’s religious views with his anarchist tendencies. To answer 
this we must take a fresh look at Buber’s notion of grace. We 
can take as our starting point a statement by Friedrich Nietzsche 
that Buber mentions twice in I and Thou: “You take, you do not 
ask who it is that gives”.55 In his first reference to this statement, 
Buber responds, “Man receives, and what he receives is not a ‘con-
tent’ but a presence, a presence as strength”.56 Buber elaborates 
that receiving this presence awakens us to the fact of reciprocity: 
a presence is given and we respond with our presence. With this 
reciprocity “nothing can henceforth be meaningless. The question 
about the meaning of life has vanished”.57 In his second reference 
Buber responds, “That may be so — one does not ask, but one 
gives thanks”.58 The obvious answer — so obvious that it does not 
have to be explicitly addressed — to the question “Who gives?” 
is that God gives. The less obvious answer to “What is  given?” 
Evil, trans. by M. Bullock (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 
pp. 3–60 (p. 34).
 54 Buber, ‘Right and Wrong’, p. 43.
 55 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Ecce Homo’, in On the Genealogy of Morals and 
Ecce Homo, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1989), pp. 201–335 (p. 300): “Man nimmt, man fragt 
nicht, wer da gibt”.
 56 Buber, I and Thou, p. 158.
 57 Buber, I and Thou, p. 158.
 58 Buber, I and Thou, p. 176.
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is that his presence is what is given. Yet it is precisely where 
an answer seems the most obvious that we ought to give the ques-
tion a second look. What exactly is it that we receive that gives 
such meaning to our life?
Buber describes three main things as gifts of grace or revelation: 
who we are (meant to be), moral norms and reality. While defer-
ring the metaphysical question of which comes first, essence or ex-
istence, Buber makes the phenomenological claim that we do not 
experience our own identity as something we freely make: “We are 
revealed to ourselves — and cannot express it otherwise than as 
something revealed”.59 Yet we are not ourselves as if we were elec-
ted so; we are still charged with the responsibility to actualise 
ourselves, and sometimes this responsibility is not fulfilled. On the 
one hand, the choices we make, and our relations to others, are no 
different from who we are. On the other hand, we are not simply 
our choices because we are also who we were called to be but are 
not yet, and perhaps never will be. We are also the ability to judge 
the difference between the two, which is to say, we have a cons-
cience. As Buber describes it, the conscience is not just a gauge of 
right and wrong, but is the faculty that “compares that which he is 
with that which he was called to become”.60 The conscience is the 
“ever-renewed self-confrontation of the person with the image of 
what he was destined to be and what he has relinquished”.61 Just 
as one does not freely invent the image our conscience shows us of 
our ideal or “true” self, we also do not freely invent moral norms, 
which even when absolute do not compel. Buber insists:
One can believe in and accept a meaning or value, one can set it 
as a guiding light over one’s life if one has discovered it, not if one 
has invented it. It can be for me an illuminating meaning, a direc-
tion-giving value only if it has been revealed to me in my meeting 
with Being, not if I have freely chosen it for myself from among 
 59 Martin Buber, Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation Between Religion 
and Philosophy, trans. by Maurice Friedman (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
International Humanities Press, 1988), p. 135.
 60 Buber, Eclipse of God, p. 87.
 61 Martin Buber, ‘People and Leader’, in Pointing the Way: Collected Essays, 
ed. and trans. by Maurice Friedman (New York and Evanston, IL: Harper 
& Row, 1963), pp. 148–60 (p. 153).
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the existing possibilities and perhaps have in addition decided with 
some fellow-creatures: This shall be valid from now on.62
Despite the language of revelation, we have an active relation to 
these norms, as we do to who we are. Each of us must actualise 
what is received. Similarly, we discover what is real, but neverth-
eless actively participate in its unfolding. In a striking account of 
our relationship to what is real, Buber describes reality as if it is 
an agent, our partner in life:
Although I myself have chosen it for myself, it guides me so that 
in proceeding I do not confound it with another and thus miss 
it; it stands by me. It must be one that has produced me and one 
that is ready, if I entrust myself to it, to bear me, to guard me, to 
educate me.63
This passage sums up our relationship to what we receive as gifts 
of grace. We receive and are produced, guided and educated by 
the image of who we are meant to be, moral norms and reality; 
we are also active participants who trust what we receive [emu-
nah] and choose to prove this in our actions [bewähren]; and the 
relationship between what is received and our response constitu-
tes the meaning of our life.
The specific gifts of grace we receive — our self, moral norms, 
reality, and the knowledge of all three — is not far from what our 
foil Augustine asserts. However, Augustine sees only a relation to 
God in all three revelations; all three come directly from God in 
the guise of the “inner teacher” and sociality plays no role in their 
acquisition.64 The “inner teacher”, also called inner truth or inner 
light, or more plainly, God or Christ, provides not only a  priori 
 62 Buber, Eclipse of God, p. 70. Buber is writing in opposition to Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s “Existentialism is a Humanism”.
 63 Martin Buber, ‘Education and World-View’, in Pointing the Way: 
Collected Essays, ed. and trans. by Maurice Friedman (New York and 
Evanston, IL: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 98–105 (p. 99).
 64 For an analysis of Augustine’s argument for semantic individualism, 
which may be opposed to a social theory of language acquisition, see 
Gareth B. Matthews, ‘Augustine on the Teacher Within’, in Augustine’s 
Confessions: Critical Essays, ed. by William E. Mann (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), pp. 31–43 (p. 34 ff).
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 truths, but all veridical judgments, including the rational inferen-
ces of defeasible arguments (e.g., from analogy). For instance, 
when describing how he learned to speak, Augustine relates, “I 
taught myself, using the mind you [God] gave me”.65 The capaci-
ties given to us by the inner truth come to us as acts of grace, and 
not at all from the educative forces of other persons:
A person thus made new considers your [God’s] truth and under-
stands it. He does not need some other human to explain it to him 
so that he may imitate his own kind; you explain it to him, so that 
he can discern for himself what is your will, what is good and ple-
asing to you and perfect. … He becomes a Spirit-filled person, fit 
to judge of any matters that call for judgment, though he himself is 
not subject to the judgment of his fellows.66
Human authorities only teach in two ways: 1) insofar as they 
point to realities that we would not normally have seen but, using 
the inner light, do understand upon indication and 2) as  privileged 
witnesses to truths that cannot yet be seen by us and hence have 
to be believed in before they can be understood (if they are ever 
understood). Regardless of the type of pointing practiced by our 
teachers, it is the inward truth that allows us to judge to what 
signs are pointing, and to judge the veracity of the inference.67
On the basis of this epistemology, Augustine maintains that 
others are not terribly helpful for recognizing the meaning of our 
life, and are typically harmful insofar as they direct our attention 
and love toward the wrong things. For example, Augustine att-
ributes his youthful theft of pears to an “exceedingly unfriend-
ly form of friendship,” where his “friends” merely served as an 
audience for his displays of freedom and power.68 When discus-
sing truer friends, Augustine still finds room for lamentation at 
his response to their death: “Woe to the madness which thinks to 
cherish human beings as though more than human!”.69 Augustine 
 65 Augustine, Confessions I.13, p. 21.
 66 Augustine, Confessions XIII.32, p. 294.
 67 Augustine, ‘The Teacher’, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. by 
J. H. S. Burleigh (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1953), 
pp. 69–101 (passim).
 68 Augustine, Confessions II.17, p. 42.
 69 Augustine, Confessions IV.12, p. 64.
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believes he should have loved God more than the transient and 
finite beings he called friends. The creature would seem to be a 
poor and misguided substitute for the creator. But in Buber there 
is no question of substitution or contest, though fleeting I-Thou 
creature-creature relations are contrasted to the eternal I-Thou 
relationship each creature has with God. With this reframing, 
we deepen creature-creature relationships in order to make them 
as eternal as possible, and cherish the preciousness of the other, 
“a creature, trivial and irreplaceable”, and our relationship with 
them all the more because of immanent and inescapable separa-
tion and death.70
Who gives grace?
This is not a minor difference between the two thinkers. Buber mo-
difies the classic Augustinian notion of grace by replacing radical 
dependence on God with radical creaturely interdependence. He 
hence would agree with the latter part of Augustine’s claim, “no 
one who sees can boast as though what he sees and the very power 
to see it were not from you [God] — for who has anything that he 
has not received?”, but would take issue with the first part.71 Much 
of what we receive comes to us not just from God but also through 
relations with other persons, and even non-human entities. Buber 
maintains, for instance, that both who we are and what is real only 
reveal themselves through relations with others:
It is in encounter that the creation reveals its formhood 
[Gestaltigkeit]; it does not pour itself into senses that are waiting 
but deigns to meet those that are reaching out. … No thing is a 
component of experience or reveals itself except through the reci-
procal force of confrontation.72
Reality only reveals itself to those who, in “alert inactivity” and 
“active longing”, reach out to it, while our individuation only 
occurs through relations with others. These need not always be 
 70 Martin Buber, ‘Dialogue’, in Between Man and Man, trans. by Ronald 
Gregor-Smith (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1–45 (p. 41).
 71 Augustine, Confessions VII.27, p. 84; referencing 1 Cor 4:7.
 72 Buber, I and Thou, p. 77.
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 intensive or explicitly confrontational relations, for often the mere 
presence of an other is enough for self-development. However, 
this does not imply a causal hierarchy, as if we do not exist until 
we passively receive the stimulus of the other calling us into being; 
it is a simultaneous acting and being acted on.73 Steven M. DeLue 
explains Buber’s notion of individuation:
as I relate to others and discover my possibilities, I work to fulfill 
them and as I do, I end up inevitably creating new relationships 
or new variants of existing relationships to others, each of which 
makes me aware of new possibilities for myself.74
In contrast to Augustine’s individualism and assumption of de-
pendence on God, Buber presents a thoroughly interactive and 
social epistemology. The self is likewise conceived in very diffe-
rent terms. Since we are interdependent with other creatures our 
 identity is not static and passively received but based on dynamic, 
ever changing relations. Even when reality or others resist our de-
sires, such that we are dealing with a more explicit confrontation 
with otherness, this resistance furthers our individuation and the 
revelation of who we are and what is real:
But this, too, that I cannot accomplish it the way I intended it, 
this resistance also reveals the mystery to me … this free human 
being encounters fate as the counter-image of his freedom. It is not 
his limit but his completion; freedom and fate embrace each other 
to form meaning; and given meaning, fate — with its eyes, hitherto 
severe, suddenly full of light — looks like grace itself.75
Reciprocity — even in the form of resistance — gives meaning, 
and as this meaning comes to us from the gift of the presence of 
the other that confronts us, even this resistance can be experien-
ced as grace.
Where is God in this picture of creaturely interdependence 
and reciprocal individuation? Human beings are independent 
partners with God that work to create relations and the indivi-
 73 Buber, I and Thou, p. 81.
 74 Steven M. DeLue, ‘Martin Buber and Immanuel Kant on Mutual Respect 
and the Liberal State’, Janus Head, 9 (2006), 117–33 (p. 119).
 75 Buber, I and Thou, p. 102.
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duation and reality that emerges out of relations. Indeed, Buber 
replaces the Christian notion of the consubstantiality of Father 
and Son with the notion of the consubstantiality of God and 
Man.76 Buber must walk the “narrow ridge” between, on the one 
hand, preserving God as uncircumscribable, and, on the other 
hand, relaying the human experience of theophany. He attempts 
to carefully capture the mysterious sense in which an all- powerful 
being “needs” us to enter into relationships, to individuate and be 
our selves, and to help draw out others, in passages such as, 
“How would man exist if God did not need him, and how would 
you exist? You need God in order to be, and God needs you 
— for that which is the meaning of your life”.77 Contrary to 
Augustine’s emphasis on dependence, Buber maintains that in the 
absence of consubstantuality no relationship with God is really 
possible: “Wishing to understand the pure relationship as depen-
dence means wishing to deactualise one partner of the relations-
hip and thus the relationship itself”.78 Indeed, when prevenient 
grace supplants partnership — with all that implies, such as mo-
ral responsiveness — there are far reaching social and political 
effects.79 Once we assume radical independence and dependence, 
the “psychical delusion of the spirit [Seelenwahn]” that we could 
exist on our own, as if we were that independent God and others 
were mere objects and not partners worthy of moral response, is 
created.80 Following the “as above, so below” adage, we will be 
moved to imitate this image of relationship and increase centrali-
zation, domination and coercion.
One might still object the capacity to have a community foun-
ded on “functional autonomy, mutual recognition and mutual re-
sponsibility” is still an act of divine grace, for God, as our eternal 
I-Thou partner, is the center of community, the center that all other 
 76 Buber, I and Thou, p. 133.
 77 Buber, I and Thou, p. 130. Buber uses Nicholas of Cusa’s term, “coinci-
dentia oppositorum”, to describe this mystery. For the relationship be-
tween the ideas of Buber and Nicholas of Cusa see Sarah Scott, ‘Knowing 
Otherness: Martin Buber’s Appropriation of Nicholas of Cusa’, 
International Philosophical Quarterly 55: 4 (2015), 399–416.
 78 Buber, I and Thou, p. 131.
 79 Buber, Eclipse of God, p. 107.
 80 Buber, I and Thou, p. 141.
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I-Thou relations depend on for their integrity. Recall that it was 
one of Buber’s theses in “Three Theses on Religious Socialism” 
that socialism requires orientation to a common center. Writing of 
Hasidic groups, which he admired as exemplary models of com-
munity, Buber states:
The Hasidic communal group, like all genuine community, consists 
of men who have a common, immediate, relation to a living cen-
ter, and just by this relationship have an immediate relation to one 
another. In the midst of the Hasidic community stands the zaddik, 
whose function it is to help the Hasidim, as persons and as a totality, 
to authenticate their relationship to God in the hallowing of life and 
just from this starting point to live as brothers with one another.81
We see Buber assert that community requires a common living 
center, which seems to cause the specific relationships among 
community members. We also see it is a human being — the zad-
dik [tsaddik, or den Bewährten] — that is placed at the center. 
However, this human being seems to not be a substantive center, 
for his function is to mediate and enable others to form relations-
hips — first with God, and then with each other. Putting this to-
gether into a causal chain we get 1) the creation of a zaddik, 2) the 
creation of relationships between the zaddik and other persons, 
3) the creation of a relationship between God and those persons, 
4) the creation of relationships between those persons that results 
in a community. But it is a mistake to seek recipes for community 
building. The hard truth is all four steps occur simultaneously. A 
leader is only a leader of a people if she is already in relation to 
them, and they are only a people to be in a relation with if they 
are already in relation with one another. 
Avnon argues that the founding of a Buberian community is not 
a metaphysical act of grace, for the “living center” is not God, but a 
living person: “[the community is] prepared by individuals, not by 
transcendent deities”.82 We might add, it is not a metaphysical act 
of grace unless the nature of grace is reconceived to include the 
unearned, always gratuitous gift of presence that creatures give 
to each other. These “builders of community” are the overlooked 
 81 Buber, ‘Interrogation of Martin Buber’, p. 68.
 82 Avnon, Martin Buber, p. 156.
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foundation for the “anarcho-federalist” and “topian” socialist 
theories identified by Susser and Kohanski.83 Yet now the objection 
may be made that highlighting the leader of a community seems 
contrary to Buber’s anarchist tendencies. How does this emphasis 
on the figure of the zaddik differ from Augustine’s argument that 
submission is due to the paterfamilias and the sovereign? No sub-
mission is due to the zaddik, and he may not be a leader in the po-
litical sense at all. 84 Rather, uniting Avnon’s exposition with that 
of Fishbane, the zaddik is one who has “proved true”: “These are 
not primarily political leaders but rather the great founders, those 
who established ways of life within which human beings can more 
fully know themselves, whose way leads to a radical reevaluation 
of the meaning and significance of relation”.85
So far we have seen that Buber maintains that the primary gifts 
of grace are who we are, moral norms and reality, and we have 
seen how who we are and reality are simultaneously received and 
generated through reciprocal relations of individuation. This ex-
planation of the zaddik helps elucidate how moral norms beco-
me received and generated. It has already been mentioned that 
Buber does not maintain that morality is about rule following. 
That would imply that morality is merely a matter of submission 
to a passively received law, which would run contrary to his in-
sistence each of us is responsible for the mutual creation of the 
three primary gifts of grace. Instead, moral norms come to us in 
the form of universally valid images of fulfilled human life. In the 
same way artistic genius is tempered by an education in universal-
ly valid — that is, tasteful — artworks, yet never falls into mere 
rule following, education depends on the internalization and imi-
tation, but not replicating or rule following, of universally valid 
images of humanity:
 83 Dan Avnon, ‘The “Living Center” of Martin Buber’s Political Theory’, 
Political Theory, 21: 1 (Feb., 1993), 55–77 (p. 60).
 84 On Buber’s notion of political power see the argument that Buber inverts 
Carl Schmitt’s political theology in Samuel Hayim Brody, ‘Is Theopolitics 
an Antipolitics? Martin Buber, Anarchism, and the Idea of the Political’, 
in Dialogue as a Trans-Disciplinary Concept, ed. by Paul Mendes-Flohr 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), 59–86.
 85 Avnon, ‘The “Living Center” of Martin Buber’s Political Theory’, p. 62.
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There exist, indeed, not merely universally-valid concepts, as phi-
losophy teaches, but also universally-valid images. The ages that 
possess real culture are ages where a universally-valid image of man 
stands above the heads of men. Looking upward to these images 
that are invisible and yet living in the imagination of all individuals 
constitutes the life of culture; the imitation of them out of the ma-
terial of the person is the educating, the forming of man.86
Buber offers Socrates, Goethe, Jesus and Buddha as examples of 
persons who ushered in new modes of individuating and relating, 
new universally valid images of humanity, “proven true”, that be-
came the moral center of a community.87 The zaddik is just such a 
person, that through “proving true”, serves as an exemplary model 
for community members. Here “proving true” means two things: 
the active trust mentioned earlier, and what has universal validi-
ty. Given Buber’s social epistemology the latter sense of proving 
true cannot simply mean what is know a priori, but what, like 
judgments of tasteful artwork or strong defeasible arguments, are 
learned and contextually specific but nevertheless generally valid.88
However, the objection could be raised that if universally valid 
images serve as the center of community, pluralistic communities 
would seem to be impossible. The great historical communities 
may have each united around a single image, but this need not 
lead us to assume that another route is not possible. Indeed, Buber 
maintains that while most times have had a “figure of general 
validity — the Christian, the gentleman, the citizen”, few cont-
emporary Western societies still have a universally valid image of 
humanity. Nevertheless, education and community creation can 
and does occur. What are educators doing if they are not mere-
ly transmitting a canon of universally valid images? In times in 
 86 Martin Buber, ‘China and Us’, in Pointing the Way: Collected Essays, ed. 
and trans. by Maurice Friedman (New York and Evanston, IL: Harper & 
Row, 1963), pp. 121–25 (p. 123).
 87 Buber, I and Thou, pp. 115–16 and pp. 138–41. Socrates, for example, is 
the “I of infinite conversation”.
 88 For the relationship between Buber’s moral philosophy and his use of aes-
thetics, especially the relation of Kantian reflective judgment to Buber’s 
moral epistemology, see Sarah Scott, ‘From Genius to Taste: Martin 
Buber’s Aestheticism’, Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 25:1 
(2017), 110–30.
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which there are no such figures of universal validity, or pluralistic 
figures, the only thing left to form is “the image of God … [the 
educator] is set in the ‘imitatio dei absconditi sed non ignoti’ [an 
imitation of the hidden but not unknown God]”.89 That the edu-
cator is to educate in imitation of God is less strange than it may 
sound. The educator is to not teach content so much as model a 
way of living and interacting through her deeds. This illustrates to 
students how we individuate ourselves by relating to other selves 
and our common human intellectual inheritance, preparing them 
to live in a shared reality. This is especially important insofar as 
the state “fosters a perspective which allows differences of interest 
to appear as radical opposition” and cultivates existential mistrust 
in its citizens, such that the citizen “believes that he has ideas, his 
opponent only ideologies”.90 The antidote this and the source of 
the social principle is education: “social education is the exact 
reverse of political propaganda”.91 This gives us a multi- layered 
understanding of the center of community. There may not be a 
single God’s Word, a single image for us to imitate. Sometimes 
the center is a great living spiritual leader, such as Jesus, but more 
commonly, “proven-true” educators hold the center, transmitting 
universally valid images though instruction in the canon, if one 
is present, and imitating God in the sense of modeling to stu-
dents how to turn to each other. The “proven-true” educator is 
not a substantive center — not a locus of political power — but 
a mediating center for the social principle. Consequently, the act 
of grace which founds, perpetuates and builds community, is no 
more nor less than our own educative forces, our ability to draw 
out the social principle in other persons.92 Education — which, 
even if transmitting a canon, always depends on living, exemplary 
 89 Martin Buber, ‘Education’, in Between Man and Man, trans. by Ronald 
Gregor-Smith (New York: Routledge, 2002) pp. 98–105 (p. 121).
 90 Buber, ‘The Validity and Limitation of the Political Principle’, p. 216; 
Martin Buber, ‘Hope for this Hour’, in Pointing the Way: Collected 
Essays, ed. and trans. by Maurice Friedman (New York and Evanston, 
IL: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 220–29 (p. 221).
 91 Buber, ‘Society and the State’, p. 176.
 92 Interestingly, all scenes of conversion and divine illumination in 
Augustine’s Confessions are either communal (e.g., with his mother) or 
follow social transmission (e.g., learning of the life of Antony). But this is 
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 educators — will either teach pupils the political principle is es-
sential and lead them to stand in “statual” relations to each other, 
or it will teach them the social principle is essential and will lead 
them to develop that community of “functional autonomy, mutu-
al recognition and mutual responsibility”.
Conclusion
In order to make sense of the various accounts of Buber’s anar-
chism as comprised of topian-communitarian-socialist- federalist-
anocracy we had to investigate his notion of grace. So long as 
the notion of grace assumed an independent being deigning to 
bestow inscrutable gifts on radically dependent beings, the repli-
cation of this power structure between human beings seemed ju-
stified by the “as above, so below” adage. To reconcile religious 
and anarchist tendencies either the “as above, so below” principle 
had to be thrown out, or grace had to be redefined. We saw that 
Buber redefines grace by assuming radical interdependence. God 
and humanity are consubstantial, as are creature and creature. 
By focusing on interdependence Buber bypasses the antinomy 
of whether we are passively elected to receive gifts or willfully 
earn them. We receive the presence of God and other creatures, 
and in our response to each other we mutually exchange the gifts 
of individuation, moral norms and reality. We “prove true” insofar 
as we trust in the presence of others and work to build  essential 
relations, that is, develop the social principle embodied in topi-
an-communitarian-socialist-federalist-anocracies. In this analysis of 
grace, educators serve as the primary vehicles for the development 
of the social principle, and thus replace sovereign power as the cen-
ter of genuine communities. Just as God gives the gift of presence, 
but does not elect or coerce, the centers of genuine communities 
give their educative presence to others, without taking on political 
power. Thus, to the extent that we can speak of election existing for 
Buber, it exists as a psycho-social problem, a problem of education.
With the notion of hierarchy and power removed from it, it may 
seem as if we are very far from any recognisable notion of grace. 
overshadowed by his insistence we only really learn from God, the “inner 
teacher”.
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Nevertheless, Buber repeatedly retains the term. Buber’s use of the 
term grace is still appropriate insofar as the presence we receive — 
whether that of God or another creature — is an excessive, unde-
served gift. Who can say that they have truly earned and not recei-
ved the gift of sharing a life with another being? Buber’s notion of 
grace leaves us asking, “What is it that we have taken from others, 
without realising its graciousness?” and “What of ourselves are we 
giving in our relations to others?” In a statement of thanks that 
Buber wrote on the occasion of his 85th birthday he explains that 
in Hebrew “the verbal form hodoth signifies first of all to avow 
faith in someone, after that to thank. … to avow faith in someone 
means: to confirm him in his existence”.93 In a similar statement, 
written on his 80th birthday, he muses on to whom he must thank:
Before all to what is above. Now, indeed, so strongly as could ne-
ver have been possible before, life is felt as an unearned gift … But 
after that it is necessary time and again to thank one’s fellow man, 
even when he has not done anything especially for one. For what, 
then? For the fact that when he met me, he had really met me, that 
he opened his eyes and did not confuse me with anyone else, that he 
opened his ears and reliably heard what I had to say to him, yes, that 
he opened what I really addressed, his well-closed heart.94
It must have seemed strange to Buber’s Christian readers that such 
a prolific author of philosophic and religious studies would avoid 
explicit analyses of grace. The absence of a definitive statement 
surely contributed to the erroneous interpretations, seen above, 
that he was evincing a “Catholic” or “Protestant” theology. As the 
epigraph of this paper notes, he was asked, “why God’s grace finds 
hardly any place in his work. He explained: ‘I write theology for 
men, not for God’”.95 Several years after responding in I and Thou 
 93 Martin Buber, ‘Expression of Thanks, 1963’, in A Believing Humanism: 
My Testament, 1902–1965, trans. by Maurice Friedman (New York, 
Humanity Books: 1999), p. 230.
 94 Martin Buber, ‘Expression of Thanks, 1958’, in A Believing Humanism: 
My Testament, 1902–1965, trans. by Maurice Friedman (New York, 
Humanity Books: 1999), p. 225.
 95 David Flusser, ‘Afterword’, in Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith: A Study 
of the Interpenetration of Judaism and Christianity (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 2003), pp. 175–229 (p. 198).
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to Nietzsche’s saying, “You take, you do not ask who it is that 
gives”, Buber mentions the saying again. Now he warns:
As we take, it is of the utmost importance to know that someone is 
giving. He who takes what is given him, and does not experience it as 
a gift, is not really receiving; and so the gift turns into theft. But when 
we do experience the giving, we find out that revelation exists.96
Buber showed that anarchist and religious orientations are mutu-
ally compatible, so long as we have the proper understanding of 
grace. The “as above, so below” analogy can be retained becau-
se we are co-workers with God and with each other. Buber may 
have written “theology for men, not for God”, because he realized 
that while his readers likely already knew that we should thank 
God for his presence, we can struggle with truly thanking one 
another for the presence that each offers to the other, that is, truly 
confirming and having faith in one another. Doing so might just 
be the first step toward a community of “functional autonomy, 
mutual recognition and mutual responsibility”.
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Contra Externalisation: Analogies 
between Anarchism and Mysticism
Stefan Rossbach
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In her classic work The Silent Cry, Dorothee Sölle referred to mys-
ticism as “the antiauthoritarian religion per se” (Sölle 2001: 36), 
suggesting an analogy between mysticism and anarchism. In this 
essay we explore this analogy by first discussing the mystical expe-
rience as a ‘stepping out’, as ekstasis, whereby the ‘I’ leaves itself as 
the being defined by the commotion of the world, achieving an 
at-one-ment with itself. The ‘stepping out’ of the mystic enables a 
mode of being marked by being ‘present in relation’, which con-
trasts sharply with the practices of ‘externalisation’ that outsource 
agency and surrender self-direction. Drawing on Plato’s critique of 
politics in the Republic, we identify ‘externalisation’ as the very 
essence of political life. Among modern philosophers, Rousseau is 
the foremost analyst of ‘externalisation’, and he provides the link to 
the radical reformers and anarchists who followed him. It is thus in 
the rejection of ‘externalisation’ that mysticism and anarchism con-
verge, and accordingly we suggest that they occupy analogous posi-
tions within their respective fields of political theory and theology. 
How these ideas work together is most clearly illustrated in the 
life and work of Gustav Landauer, whose encounter with Meister 
Eckhart’s sermons was formative for his mystic anarchism and the 
concomitant rejection of politics as encrusted ‘externalisation’. 
The parallel discussion of mysticism and anarchism shows that, 
even if articulated in secular or even atheist terms, and to the extent 
that it advocates the overcoming of externalising practices, anar-
chism has at its core a spiritual concern.
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Introduction and overview
In her 1997 book The Silent Cry, Dorothee Sölle (1929–2003) sug-
gested that there was a strong analogy between mysticism and re-
sistance. Mysticism heralds the possibility of a personal revelation 
outside the conventional canon of scripture and independently of 
clergical approval. The self-understanding of the mystics and their 
sense of purpose do not derive from the authority of a book, dog-
ma, ritual or priest. The unmediated nearness to God proclaimed 
by mystics is a provocation to the existing institutions and intel-
lectual authorities if their claim to power in society rests precisely 
on the idea of a privileged or indeed exclusive access to the divine. 
In the past, therefore, established institutions tended to look with 
suspicion at mystic visionaries and did not hesitate to collaborate 
with secular forces in order to oppress unorthodox teaching. 
Because mysticism bypasses institutional authority, Sölle calls 
it “the antiauthoritarian religion per se” (Sölle 2001: 36), thereby 
suggesting an analogy not just between mysticism and resistance, 
but between mysticism and anarchism – and it is this latter analogy 
that we aim to explore further in this essay. We argue that there 
is a sense in which the role played by anarchism within political 
theory is analogous to the role played by mysticism within theolo-
gy. In order to make this argument plausible, we begin in Section I. 
with a brief discussion of the mystical experience itself, which we 
understand as a ‘stepping out’, as ekstasis, which breaks through 
the commotion of the world and allows the mystic to experience 
a moment of ‘pure presence’. After describing some of the key 
features of this experience, focusing on the Christian variants, we 
proceed to investigate its relationship to community. Contrary to 
the common view that “mysticism negates community” (Buber, 
see below), we argue that the mystical experience is the beginning 
of a new kind of relationality, of a mode of being marked by being 
‘present in relation’. Drawing on Plato’s critique of ‘politics’ in the 
Republic, we argue in Section II. that this relationality contrasts 
sharply with the practices of ‘externalisation’ that define the very 
essence of political life. In Section III. we turn to anarchism and 
argue that ‘externalisation’ is indeed the primary target also of 
the anarchist critique. We support this argument with a discussion 
of the foremost modern theorist of ‘externalisation’, Jean-Jacques 
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Rousseau, who during the 19th century was widely considered the 
‘grandfather’ of contemporary radical reformers. While it is true 
that anarchists such as Godwin and Proudhon found much to 
disagree with in Rousseau, their thinking did converge on two core 
positions, namely that (i) moral self-direction was the defining 
feature of human existence and that (ii) externalisation was the 
fabric of modern, civilised society, which thereby jeopardised our 
very humanity. We conclude that it is in their orientation away 
from externalisation that anarchism and mysticism establish 
themselves as analogous in their respective fields. A brief discus-
sion of Gustav Landauer’s ‘mystic anarchism’ allows us to provide 
an illustration of how the analogy unfolds within the life-work 
of an anarchist thinker and activist. While Landauer represents a 
‘perfect storm’ within the cluster of ideas and concepts explored in 
this essay, it is important to underline that he is but an illustration 
– our argument is that the analogy between mysticism and anar-
chism holds at a deeper, theoretical level, so that it should be pos-
sible, in future research, to trace it in other anarchist thinkers as 
well. One of the interesting corollaries of this insight is that anar-
chism, regardless of whether it is presented in secular or even 
atheist terms, has at its core a spiritual concern.
I. Mysticism
Modern commentators are quick to emphasize that it is difficult 
to define ‘mysticism’ though all seem to agree that the term refers 
to a particular type of experience. In his classic definition, William 
James suggested that mystical experience was marked by “ineffabi-
lity”, “noetic quality” and “transience and passivity” (James 1985: 
379–382). William Ralph Inge finds in mysticism the  “attempt to 
realise, in thought or in feeling, the immanence of the temporal in 
the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal” (quoted in Ellwood 
1999: 16). Robert Ellwood defines the mystical experience as a re-
ligious experience that is “immediately or subsequently interpreted 
by the experiencer as a direct  unmediated encounter with ultimate 
divine reality.” This experience engenders a “deep sense of unity” 
and suggests that “during the experience the experiencer was living 
on a level of being other than the  ordinary” (Ellwood 1999: 39). 
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Jerome Gellman describes a mystical experience as an experience 
in which a person “has a nonsensory perception apparently of a 
reality (or state of affairs) of a sort that can neither be perceived by 
sense perception nor known by ordinary introspective self-aware-
ness” (Gellman 2001: 4). Sölle summarises that “a mystic is some-
one who has particular experiences that bring about altered states 
of consciousness deriving from the encounter with the other, the 
divine reality” (Sölle 2001: 16). 
In the accounts of mystical experiences, the encounter with the 
Divine is commonly represented as a ‘stepping out’, as ecstasy 
– ekstasis. Coming into contact with the other, divine reality en-
tails a stepping out of the limits of our common, everyday world. 
The mystic, however, is painfully aware that the ‘I’ of the person 
undergoing the experience is included and indeed determined by 
this world, so that stepping out of the world entails a stepping 
out of the ‘I’, a losing of oneself. The ‘I’ leaves the everyday world 
and, at the same time, “leaves itself as the being defined by that 
world” (Sölle 2001: 27). Thereby, ekstasis becomes an expression 
of the “uttermost freedom from what determines our lives” (Sölle 
2001: 27). 
According to Eric Robertson Dodds, Plotinus was the first to 
use the term ekstasis in the context of mystical experience (Dodds 
1965: 72; Hadot 1993: 32–33). In Plotinus’s symbolism, the soul 
transcends being and becomes one with the “completely other” 
on the last stage of the mystical ascent. In union with the One, the 
soul “becomes itself and what it was; life in this world of sense 
being a falling away, an exile, ‘a shedding of wings’” (VI, 9.9 as in 
Plotinus 1969: 622-623; cf. Gregory 1999: 127), where Plotinus 
took the ‘shedding of wings’ expression from Plato’s Phaedrus 
(248c). The soul experiences this movement, Plotinus explains, as 
a return to its origins, to the “land of its birth” where it is “nowhere 
deflected in its being”, having attained “to solitude in untroubled 
stillness”, “utterly at rest” (VI, 9.7, 9.9, 9.11 as in Potinus 1969: 
620–621, 622–623, 624–625; cf. Gregory 1999: 125, 128, 129). 
This is the “end of the journey” (VI, 9.11 as in Plotinus 1969: 625; 
cf. Gregory 1999: 130). Thus, as the soul finds itself in union with 
the One, it finds itself beyond being, completely outside itself – 
this is the moment Plotinus calls ekstasis. 
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In accordance with Plotinus’s account, mystics talk about their 
experience not just as one of ‘stepping out’, of ekstasis and freedom, 
but also as an experience of being at one with themselves. The step-
ping out of the ‘I’ is a form of self-giving, a cessation of the ego as it 
was defined by the world, leading to the simultaneous discovery of 
a deeper, more real self. The implication is that in our normal lives 
we are very rarely wholly present in what we experience. We usual-
ly act and think only with a part of ourselves; we continue to watch 
ourselves and “do not attain the self-forgetfulness of being one” 
(Sölle 2001: 25). The freedom of mystical ekstasis is the freedom 
of being one, which allows us to act in fullness of our being. The 
stepping out, paradoxically, is thus also a self-discovery or indeed 
a restoration of self, which is free from fear to the extent that it 
enjoys a ‘pure presence’ – “nowhere deflected in its being”, to quote 
Plotinus again. Retrospectively, after the stepping out experience, 
mystics tend to look back to their previous lives as a fake, oppressed, 
and unreal existence, which did not involve their true selves. 
Through the mystical ekstasis, the mystic is ‘made whole’. 
Inspired by Joseph Marechal’s Studies in the Psychology of 
the Mystics (1927), Bernard McGinn came to adopt the term 
‘presence’ as the central notion for “grasping the unifying note 
in the varieties of Christian mysticism”: “the mystical element 
in Christianity is that part of its belief and practices that con-
cerns the preparation for, the consciousness of, and the reaction 
to what can be described as the immediate or direct presence of 
God” (McGinn 1997: xvii). Christian believers, McGinn elabo-
rates, affirmed that God can become present in ordinary religious 
observances as e.g. in prayer, sacrament and other rituals, but 
not in any “direct or immediate fashion” (McGinn 1997: xviii). 
Mystical accounts, in contrast, attest to an immediate divine pre-
sence outside such observances. The presence referred to here, 
however, is always marked by duality and simultaneity, because 
while God is experienced as present, the one undergoing this ex-
perience will also be lifted to a new level of awareness, to a heigh-
tened and more intense consciousness involving the whole of his 
or her being. It is the simultaneity and coincidence of the two 
‘presences’ that allows the mystic to experience divine presence 
as an interior phenomenon.
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It is not a paradox, therefore, for Martin Buber to note that 
mystical ekstasis is an inward experience. Ekstasis is both a process 
and a moment of differentiation whereby the true self differentiates 
itself vis-à-vis the commotion of the world. The commotion, Buber 
explained, was “only the outside of an unknown Inward which is 
the most living thing of all”. The experience is beyond knowledge 
because “this Inward can withhold the experience of itself from 
knowledge, which is a daughter of the commotion, but not from 
the vibrant and self-liberating soul” (Buber 1996: 1): 
But there is an experience which grows in the soul out of the soul 
itself, without contact and without restraint, in naked oneness. It 
comes into being and completes itself beyond the commotion, free 
of the other, inaccessible to the other. It needs no nourishment, and 
no poison can touch it. The soul which stands in it stands in itself, 
has itself, experiences itself – boundlessly. It experiences itself as a 
unity, no longer because it has surrendered itself wholly to a thing 
of the world, gather itself wholly in a thing of the world, but be-
cause it has submerged itself entirely in itself, has plunged down to 
the very ground of itself, is kernel and husk, sun and eye, carouser 
and drink, at once. This most inward of all experiences is what the 
Greeks call ek-stasis, a stepping out. (Buber 1996: 2)
The mystical ecstasy is thus an experience of unity and oneness 
with oneself, which in turn realigns the self’s relationship with 
the world and with the divine. As a manifestation of the human- 
divine encounter, the experience is acknowledged in a vast range 
of spiritual symbolisms and practices, from world religions such 
as Christianity and Islam to more local practices such as trance 
possession of the loa in Haitian voodoo. In non-theistic religions, 
mystical ecstasy is often presented as an illumination; in theistic 
religions, the encounter is a union of the soul and God – the unio 
mystica. Especially in Christian contexts, the ‘stepping out’ of the 
unio mystica is a precondition of, and simultaneous with, the ‘en-
tering into God’, which is followed by being ‘filled with God’, 
enthusiasmos. The experience is differentiation and union at the 
same time, because, by entering into God and by being filled with 
God, “I am both more me and more than me” so that “the very 
contrast between union and differentiation is itself transcended, a 
condition in which the affirmation of the one is not bought at the 
price of the denial of the other.” (Turner 1995: 58).
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Mystics struggle to articulate their experience in language. As 
Buber explained, “[e]cstasy stands beyond common experience. 
It is unity, solitude, uniqueness: that which cannot be transferred. It 
is the abyss that cannot be fathomed: the unsayable.” (Buber 
1996: 6) Sölle, too, notes that “nearly all mystics give voice to 
the problem of the inadequacy of language” (Sölle 2001: 56). 
Accordingly they draw on negation, paradox and silence as they 
attempt to communicate the process of their own transforma-
tion. Language, which dissects by naming, appears to interrupt 
or disturb the vision of unity; it introduces dualisms, dichotomies, 
binary distinctions in order to enable the speaker to ‘intend’ reality. 
To the extent that they succeed in negating, de-stabilising and 
avoiding such dichotomies, mystics speak an “anarchistic language” 
(Sölle 2001: 63) which is unable to name and hence to evoke 
relationships of domination. 
That there is an intriguing and important relationship between 
mysticism and politics has not escaped the attention of commen-
tators and, indeed, mystics. Not unlike Sölle, who characterises 
mysticism as ‘anti-authoritarian’, Evelyn Underhill speaks of a 
“mystic freedom which conditions, instead of being conditioned 
by, its normal world […]” (Underhill 2002: 447). There is no 
‘structure’, and certainly no structure of domination, that could 
prevent or contain the ecstasy of mysticism. Accordingly, those 
who stress the “inherent politics in all mysticism” (Fox 1981: 
541) point to the potentially subversive nature of experiences and 
ways of life that transcend existing hierarchies, constraints and 
systems of oppression (Critchley 2009). 
Yet, while the appreciation of mysticism as a form of resistance 
and critique – even as a form of deconstruction (Derrida 1992a, 
1992b) – is surprisingly widespread, it is far less clear whether 
this form of critique can assume a political role not just by chal-
lenging existing power structures but also by informing alterna-
tive ways of life and the formation of alternative communities. 
Is the ekstasis of the mystic so radical that it implies a stepping out 
of community altogether? In an argument with Ernest Troeltsch 
at the First German Conference of Sociologists in October 1910, 
Martin Buber rejected the idea that mysticism was a “sociologi-
cal category” and insisted that mystical experience was a form of 
“religious solipsism”:
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It also seems to me that mysticism negates community – mysticism 
does not struggle with any organized community, nor does it set 
itself up as a countercommunity, as a sect would. Rather mysti-
cism negates community, precisely because for it there is only one 
real relation, the relation to God. The process noted by Professor 
Troeltsch, the coming together of the believers, […] does not at all 
occur in mysticism. The [mystic] remains thoroughly isolated in 
his belief, for nothing else matters to him than to be alone with his 
God. (Buber quoted in Mendes-Flohr 1996: xvii–xviii)
Buber would eventually replace the juxtaposition of ecstasy and 
worldly commotion with an elaboration of the “primary word” 
I-Thou (Buber 1958). At the time he understood this change of 
perspective as a ‘conversion’ away from the ‘exceptional’ experience 
of mystical otherness to the ‘need to be present’ in everyday life:
Since then I have given up the ‘religious’ which is nothing but the 
exception, extraction, exaltation, ecstasy; or it has given me up. I 
possess nothing but the everyday out of which I am never taken. 
(Buber 1967: 26)
However, calling this change in his outlook a ‘conversion’ is an 
exaggeration, especially as the conversion itself resulted from 
an experience, an encounter (Moore 1996: xxi). The Thou is met 
through grace; it cannot be found by seeking (Buber 1958: 24). 
When spoken, “the primary word I-Thou establishes the world of 
relation”, which subsequently I “body forth”, and “[i]n bodying 
forth I disclose. I lead the form across – into the world of It.” 
Buber translates grace into relation: “all real living is meeting” 
(Buber 1958: 18, 23, 25). Ecstasy may be extra-ordinary, but its 
impact radiates into everydayness. Ecstasy is not a step into iso-
lation but a shedding of the ties that bind us to the commotion of 
the world and hence a restoration of our ability to be open to, and 
hence to respond to, reality. The stepping out thereby becomes a 
new ‘immersing in’. 
The mystic is thus not a selfish visionary or an individual 
seeking to escape from the world, but someone who is again able 
to be open to reality and hence to be ‘present in relation’. This pro-
cess of restoration may entail a moment of individuation, but not 
in a sense that would hinder our ability to relate. On the contrary, 
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by turning inwards we become more able to attune ourselves to 
one another. Becoming more aware of ourselves, even where this 
involves pain, becomes a precondition for relating to others in a 
new, creative manner. We noted earlier how already in Plotinus’s 
account mystical ekstasis entailed a being-one with ourselves, 
a moment in which we act in the fullness of our being. In this 
moment of pure presence, bios and logos – what I do and what 
I say – are in harmony, and to the extent that I have achieved a 
‘unity of self’, the pronoun ‘you’ that others may use as they refer 
to me finally has a concrete and unique reference point. And to the 
extent that the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ eventually acquire meaning, 
the ‘we’ emerges as a reality. “Only humans who are capable of 
truly saying ‘you’ to one another can truly say ‘we’ together” 
(Buber quoted in Sölle: 165). In fact, Buber’s later philosophy of 
the I-Thou does not reflect a departure from his earlier interest 
in mystical ecstasy but rather its explication (cf. Mendes-Flohr 
1978; Schwartz 2006). The relation to the Thou does not deny the 
ecstatic union experienced by the soul but examines this union in 
relation to its consequences. 
II. Politics and externalisation
If ekstasis yields a surplus of freedom and thereby restores our 
ability to be ‘present in relation’, we need to ask how this ability 
could have been lost in the first place. The mystical vision is a 
revelation of possibilities which in a sense had been there pre-
viously, of opportunities which needed to be re-awoken. Ekstasis 
is thus the negation of a negation, the pushing aside of all that is 
preventing us from apprehending reality. 
How do we get lost in the commotion of the world? And what 
is the role of society and politics in this process? A lucid analysis 
of these questions is provided by Plato’s Republic, which in our 
reading implies a radical critique of politics. As our starting point 
we choose the passage at 404c–408b (Plato 1987), where Plato 
discusses the education of the philosophers who are to rule the 
city. At one point, Plato introduces an interesting image, which 
describes a common individual and social pathology. He portrays 
a man living a life of idleness who enjoys fatty foods – “the  luxury 
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of Syracusan and Sicilian cooking” and “Attic confectionary” – 
and too much alcohol, and who thereby fills his body “with  gases 
and fluids, like a stagnant pool”. As a result, his body will suf-
fer and display symptoms of sickness. At this point an expert, a 
doctor, will be consulted. The doctor will look at the case and 
charge a fee in return for a diagnosis that confirms that our pa-
tient is indeed sick. The medical profession will have labels and 
names for the illness thus diagnosed – Plato mentions “flatulence” 
and “catarrh” as examples. From now on, our patient needs to 
look after his illness. He may require medication in order to ma-
nage symptoms; he may require regular visits to the doctor, who 
will in turn continue to attest that our patient is in need of medical 
care. Life may become a “lingering death” as our patient devotes 
much attention and energy to his affliction. We can easily imagine 
an entire industry of people who are all too eager to look after 
the patient by cosseting his illness because their very livelihoods 
depend on the patient requiring attention and treatment. 
As Plato does not fail to note, however, there is an obvious and 
much less elaborate cure to the affliction: the patient must change 
his diet. He must change his habits, he must change his life, but 
this is exactly what he is not prepared to do. In frantic activity, he 
surrounds himself with theories, concepts, knowledge and people 
who will confirm to him that he is, indeed, ill. The point of the 
feverish activity is precisely to avoid a situation in which the patient 
would have to confront himself, his way of life. Elaborate systems 
of professions and services, often at the very heart of  society, are 
created and entire lives are lived in order to escape the simple in-
sight that we must change in order to live healthier, better lives. In 
the following reflections, we will refer to this pathology as ‘exter-
nalisation’. Through externalisation, we locate the causes of our 
ailments, our alienation, our suffering outside of ourselves, thus 
exposing ourselves to the commotion of the world. Externalisation 
does not just involve individuals as individuals; rather, externalisa-
tion is systemic in that it relies on the recognition provided by the 
surrounding society. Thus, the objectification entailed in externali-
sation is a social phenomenon, because for externalisation to work 
effectively, recognition is crucial. 
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In this image we gain a first inkling of society as a system of 
hideouts, where the members of society recognise and confirm each 
other’s externalising practices (Shillabeer 2007). As they run away 
from themselves, they run towards each other. They objectify each 
other and thereby sanction the lies they tell about themselves. 
According to Plato, politics is crucial in this system because exter-
nalisation is the essence of politics. Politics is the creation of entire 
structures, of professions, of policies, of entire worlds that help us 
to not confront ourselves. Politics is externalisation, and as such it 
entails an infinite deferral: before I ever change myself, I can keep 
myself busy by changing the city, the state, the world. This is the 
reason also why for Socrates and Plato, philosophy and politics 
finds themselves in a relationship of tension, because philosophy, 
not unlike mysticism, is about self-knowledge – as embodied by 
Socrates, philosophy is about revealing and dissolving the lies we 
tell each other about ourselves. 
Plato’s Republic elaborates on this point not just in isolated 
images as in the example given above. The understanding of po-
litics as externalisation is fundamental to the very structure of 
the dialogue. Initially, the Republic is a dialogue about justice, 
but then becomes, at a crucial point, a construction of a city “in 
words” and as a result the dialogue seems to deal with the po-
litical question of how to rule a city. However, in order to un-
derstand the purpose of the dialogue as a whole, it is important 
to understand why the characters in the dialogue felt it necessary to 
talk about cities in the first place. The transition occurs just af-
ter Socrates effectively won the argument against Thrasymachus, 
who had defended the position that “justice is simply what is 
in the interest of the stronger party”. Socrates argues against 
Thrasymachus that “injustice never pays better than justice”, 
and eventually prevails against his opponent, who accepts defeat: 
“This is your holiday treat […], so enjoy it, Socrates” (354a). At 
this point, Socrates explains that he thought “the argument was 
over”, and the book might have finished if indeed it was “only” 
about justice and the issues raised by Thrasymachus. Instead, the 
book continues because Glaucon is not satisfied with the ease 
with which Socrates defeated Thrasymachus and proceeds to 
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restate the case for  injustice, and he does so over several pages. 
Socrates is surprised that Glaucon, who had previously expressed 
his support for Socrates’s position, is able to produce such an 
eloquent and powerful defence of the argument that it “pays off” 
to be unjust. Socrates’s admiration for Glaucon’s flexibility is 
ironic: “You must indeed have something divine about you, if 
you can put the case for injustice so strongly, and yet still believe 
that justice is better than injustice.” (368a) 
The problem that Socrates now has to deal with is not just an 
intellectual problem. In fact, the rational part of the discussion 
had been concluded with Thrasymachus’s defeat. Glaucon’s re-
fusal, almost against his will, to accept the conclusions that had 
been reached, is the new driving force of the dialogue and the 
new problem that Socrates has to resolve. This is also the point at 
which Socrates, instead of addressing the condition of Glaucon’s 
soul directly and hence personally, takes a detour and begins to 
talk about a city because, he explains, the city is “bigger” and 
hence it will be easier to see what is going on. Because the soul, 
especially Glaucon’s soul, is too close to home, political themes 
are introduced as a deflection, allowing the discussion, which 
otherwise would have become very personal – and, for Glaucon, 
possibly uncomfortable – to continue. Glaucon and Adeimantus 
are perfectly happy to talk about how the city must change for 
justice to unfold; they would have been much less happy to talk 
about how they and their lives must change for justice to unfold 
in their souls. 
The ‘political’ themes in Plato’s dialogue are thus introduced 
as a deliberate externalisation in order to cater for the needs of 
Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’s souls. This ‘gesture’ is repeated at 
other key turning points in the dialogue. The first just city that 
Socrates outlines is what he calls the “healthy” city, in which ci-
tizens are content to live a simple life with few luxuries. Having 
completed the construction of the healthy city, Socrates proceeds 
to discuss the very nature of justice to be found in it, but this dis-
cussion comes to a sudden halt as Glaucon intervenes, accusing 
Socrates of having founded “a community of pigs” (372d). What 
Glaucon is implying here, unwillingly, is that he cannot see himself in 
the just city, without the luxuries he depends on. Put  differently, he 
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is not prepared to change so as to find his place in a city which he 
recognises as just. And so Socrates again proceeds to  ‘externalise’ 
the problem, away from Glaucon, by discussing not the healthy 
but the “feverish” society, which will have all the luxuries that 
Glaucon requires, making the question of justice all the more com-
plicated. The politics of the feverish society is thus an externalisa-
tion – a deferral, a deflection – of the fever in Glaucon’s soul. 
In the subsequent dialogue, Socrates needs to carefully re-intro-
duce philosophical themes so as to allow Glaucon and Adeimantus 
to contemplate what it might mean to gradually remove themsel-
ves from their feverish societies and thus to personally face the 
question of justice. Throughout the text, philosophy is presented 
as the antidote to an existence in a cave-like society, whose mem-
bers actively shun reality and kill those who draw attention to 
their condition. The escape from the cave is presented as an ascent 
and, more importantly, as a painful struggle as the soul must over-
come the temporary blindness caused by the excessive brightness 
of the sun outside the cave. As in St John of the Cross’s Dark 
Night of the Soul, the soul must endure a sudden deprivation – 
a loss of sight – which in truth is the result of an influx of light 
which eventually reveals the full potential of the soul’s  ability to 
see. Accordingly, Plato emphasizes that the escape is more than a 
mere acquisition of knowledge. The escape or the ‘turning around’ 
(periagoge) as Plato describes it, is in effect the turning away from 
an ‘old’ life and the embracing of a ‘new’ life. The cave society 
had its very own codes of honour and glory, which distinguished 
the more keen-eyed prisoners who were best able “to remember 
the order of sequence among the passing shadows and so be best 
able to divine their future appearance” (516c–d), but clearly the 
released prisoner would not be able to return to the mode of 
life represented by the cave dwellers and their hierarchies: “[…] 
he would far rather be ‘a serf in the house of some landless man’, 
or indeed anything else in the world, than hold the opinions and 
live the life that they do.” 
Thus, the turning around amounts to an ekstasis, a stepping 
out, whereby society’s practices and structures of externalisation 
lose their binding power. And in line with what we noted earlier 
– that the vision unfolds as a new ‘presence in relation’ – Socrates 
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explains that the released prisoner is to return to the cave and be 
of service to those who dwell there. In other words, he must show 
“some care and responsibility for others” (520b). Of course, it 
is Glaucon who initially misses the point and takes the prisoner’s 
vision as the foundation of a new code of honour, a new distinction, 
which would make him superior to the cave dwellers. It would be 
unfair, Glaucon protests, to ask the released prisoner to return 
to the cave because thereby he would be compelled to “live 
a poorer life than [he] might live”. Just as he was unwilling to 
live in a society of pigs, Glaucon refuses to mix with the cave people. 
But now Socrates is in a position to remind Glaucon that the city 
they had constructed in words provided for the education of the 
philosophers, thus implying an obligation on the part of the philo-
sophers to use their vision for the benefit of the whole community.
In Plato’s analysis, therefore, externalisation is what ties us to 
the commotion of the world and prevents us from experiencing 
unity, including the unity of self. Through externalisation, we 
‘outsource’ the responsibility we have for caring for our souls; 
we make ourselves dependent on a multitude of forces and in-
terests over which we have very little control as we begin to live 
through the eyes of others. The false identity we gradually esta-
blish in our attempts to avoid confronting ourselves is confirmed 
through the recognition it receives from others, and vice versa. 
The result is a tacit ‘contract’ whereby the members of society sus-
tain each other’s lies not just through silence or by ‘looking away’ 
but by positively endorsing and encouraging the various illusions 
people spin around themselves. It would be a mistake to consi-
der externalisation as a purely negative force because members of 
society will display a remarkable creativity in maintaining, sustain-
ing, extending and embellishing the stories they consider their 
own. Externalisation is an active force, which requires its agents 
to actively engage with other people in order to find reassurance 
that their cover has not yet been blown. Gaps in existing stories 
have to be managed and filled with new stories, and real decisions 
with real consequences are taken in order to keep our stories and 
identities alive. The manner in which people relate to each other 
through the bonds they create through externalisation is marked 
by mutual dependency and mutual suspicion. To the extent that 
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we ‘outsource’ ourselves, we remain ‘absent in relation’, as op-
posed to the interrelatedness that emerges from ekstasis, which 
 restores our ‘presence in relation’. The nakedness of ekstasis is 
thus directly opposed to the ‘emperor’s new clothes’ that people 
wear in the societies built around practices of externalisation. 
As the identities thus constructed inevitably remain fragile, 
extensive and costly efforts have to be invested into objectifying 
and ossifying them in structures and hierarchies. Therefore, even 
though members of society have to depend on each other for their 
stories to continue, their encounters and relations do not bring 
them closer together. On the contrary, the ultimate social effect 
of externalisation is differentiation and atomisation for the very 
purpose of the ‘contract’ is to allow members of society to be 
‘absent in relation’; ultimately, they remain aloof from the bonds 
of dependency that define their social identities. Externalisation 
thus generates both feverish social activity and atomisation. The 
‘contract’ offers “human beings the illusion of an identity, of dig-
nity, and of morality while making it easier for them to part with 
them.” (Havel 2010: 14) It also creates a culture of conformity, 
as everyone who dares to be different will attract the attention of 
those who rely on the predictability of the behaviour of others for 
maintaining their social status. Difference becomes problematic 
as it puts the existing narratives under pressure to adapt to a new, 
different situation, thus potentially exposing existing fissures and 
gaps. The dynamics of the situation will thus ensure that mimesis 
prevails whereby members confirm their complicity by copying 
each other. Mimesis ensures that externalisation becomes the very 
fabric of a particular kind of society, while politics is the means 
whereby these practices of externalisation struggle for permanen-
cy. In particular, the resulting objectification and rigidification 
must not be misunderstood as a political problem requiring a po-
litical solution. Politics, in Plato’s analysis, is part of the problem, 
not its solution. The solution, in contrast, is the experience of ek-
stasis: the restoration of openness, of ‘being present in relation’, 
and the new interrelatedness that unfolds from this presence. 
In that we introduced these concepts through Plato’s analysis 
of politics and society in the Republic, they remain theoretical 
notions without historical referent other than the Athenian  polis 
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that considered the teachings of Socrates, Plato’s teacher, to be 
so dangerous and subversive that he was sentenced to death. In 
Plato’s account, Socrates was not just an analyst of practices and 
structures of externalisation; he was also their victim, authen-
ticating his analysis with his death. It is far beyond the scope 
of this essay to now trace the historical evolution of practices of 
externalisation in order to explore how ‘politics’, since the 
‘Greek discovery of politics’ (Meier 1990), could evolve into 
the  hegemonic discourse and externalising practice that dominates 
modern societies today. However, it is worthwhile to look at the 
transition to modernity as a key moment in this evolution, and 
it is feasible to do so because it is precisely at that moment that 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau presents himself as the heir of Socrates’ 
and Plato’s ambitions (Orwin 1998). Within the context of the 
questions raised in this essay, Rousseau appears as modernity’s 
foremost theorist of externalisation as a social and individual 
pathology, and it is not accidental that he is also a key reference 
in the history of anarchism.
III. Contra externalisation: Rousseau and anarchism
Practices of externalisation generate societies in which mem-
bers imprison themselves in the ‘positions’ in social and political 
 hierarchies they create for themselves and others through mu-
tual recognition. They sustain each other in a “second reality” 
(Voegelin 1990: 49; Shillabeer 2007), where they can be ‘absent 
in relation’ and indefinitely defer the confrontation with self and 
reality. While much creativity can go into the creation of such 
second realities, their ultimate effect is constraining, and hence 
members of society may eventually recognise, with Rousseau, that 
“Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains” (Rousseau 
1973c: 181). Already in the First Discourse Rousseau offered an 
analysis of what it means to be ‘absent in relation’:
We no longer dare seem what we really are, but lie under a per-
petual restraint; in the meantime the herd of men, which we call 
society, all act under the same circumstances exactly alike, unless 
very particular and powerful motives prevent them. Thus we never 
know with whom we have to deal; and even to know our friends 
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we must wait for some critical and pressing occasion; that is, till it 
is too late; for it is on those very occasions that such knowledge is 
of use to us. (Rousseau 1973a: 6)
While the First Discourse lamented how “we build our happi-
ness on the opinion of others” (Rousseau 1973a: 29), the Second 
Discourse develops these themes and attempts to explore ‘inequa-
lity’ as a consequence of externalisation. Rousseau’s natural man, 
in contrast to Glaucon, would have been content in Plato’s “healthy 
city” because of the natural limits to his desires:
I see him [natural man] satisfying his hunger at the first oak, and 
slaking his thirst at the first brook: finding his bed at the foot of 
the tree which afforded him a repast; and, with that, all his wants 
supplied. (Rousseau 1973b: 52)
Natural men were strangers “to vanity, deference, esteem, and 
contempt” (Rousseau 1973b: 76) because they “quietly await the 
impulses of nature, yield to them involuntarily, with more plea-
sure than ardour, and, their wants once satisfied, lose the desire” 
(Rousseau 1973b: 78). Accordingly, natural man was “neither 
standing in need of his fellow-creatures nor having any desire to 
hurt them, and perhaps even not distinguishing them one from 
another” (Rousseau 1973b: 79). The natural equality resulting 
from man’s independence vanished as men “became accustomed 
[…] to making comparisons” (1973b: 89). As they live and work 
in greater proximity and contacts become more regular, they 
 become conscious of each other’s presence and thus “[e]ach one 
began to consider the rest, and to wish to be considered in turn; 
and thus a value came to be attached to public esteem. […] this 
was the first step towards inequality […]” (1973b: 90). Rousseau 
thus uses the term ‘inequality’ in its broadest sense as referring to 
a ‘distinction of rank’ primarily based on esteem. In Rousseau’s 
usage of the term, inequality refers to the “taking into account of 
differences” (1973b: 110–111), to an awareness of differences. 
While the political and economic inequalities that later theorists 
would focus on are inevitably the endpoint of this process of dif-
ferentiation, Rousseau’s ‘inequality’ has a much wider meaning. It 
refers to the process whereby men acquire a sense of self and oth-
ers by comparing themselves with each other. To the extent that 
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this process ossified into a system of ‘ranks’, with higher ranks 
reflecting more esteem than lower ranks, and to the extent that 
positions of rank were ultimately secured in relations of mutual 
recognition, it became 
[…] the interest of men to appear what they really were not. To 
be and to seem became two totally different things; and from this 
distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery, with all the 
numerous vices that go in their train. On the other hand, free and 
independent as men were before, they were now, in consequence 
of a multiplicity of new wants, brought into subjection, as it were, 
to all nature, and particularly to one another; and each became in 
some degree a slave even in becoming the master of other men: if 
rich, they stood in need of the services of others; if poor, of their 
assistance; and even a middle condition did not enable them to do 
without one another. (1973b: 95)
As a result, “man must now […] have been perpetually employed 
in getting others to interest themselves in his lot, and in making 
them, apparently at least, if not really, find their advantage in 
promoting his own.” This, in turn, rendered him “sly and artful 
in his behaviour to some, imperious and cruel to others […]” 
(1973b: 95–96). From this process of comparing and measuring 
each other, there developed in man a “universal desire for re-
putation, honours, and advancement, which inflames us all […]” 
(1973b: 112). The result is a feverish society, “an assembly of 
artificial men and factitious passions” (1973b: 115), in which 
this “desire of being talked about”, “this unremitting rage of dis-
tinguishing ourselves”, never gives us a moment’s respite (1973b: 
112). In this society, people are driven by “rivalry and competi-
tion on the one hand, and conflicting interests on the other, to-
gether with a secret desire on both of profiting at the expense of 
others” (1973b: 96):
Civilized man […] is always moving, sweating, toiling, and racking 
his brains to find still more laborious occupations: he goes on in 
drudgery to his last moment, and even seeks death to put himself 
in a position to live, or renounces life to acquire immortality. He 
pays his court to men in power, whom he hates, and to the wealthy, 
whom he despises; he stops at nothing to have the honour of ser-
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ving them; he is not ashamed to value himself on his own meanness 
and their protection; and, proud of his slavery, he speaks with dis-
dain of those, who have not the honour of sharing it. (1973b: 115)
Our desires thereby were no longer subjected to their natural li-
mits; on the contrary, as it was now our ambition to ‘outdo’ each 
other, our desires became limitless. Now “it appeared advanta-
geous to any one man to have enough provisions for two” and 
more (1973b: 92).
For Rousseau, politics is the means whereby this new situa-
tion acquires a degree of permanency. Society and law “bound 
new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich; which 
 irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law 
of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into 
 unalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious in-
dividuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery, and 
wretchedness” (1973b: 99). The people surrendered to the new 
system as they “judged it not inexpedient to sacrifice one part of 
their freedom to ensure the rest; as a wounded man has his arm 
cut off to save the rest of his body.” Thus, “all ran headlong to 
their chains, in hopes of securing their liberty […]” (1973b: 99). 
The strength of natural man was precisely that he never tried 
to outsource his power and ability because he had discovered 
“the advantage of having all our forces constantly at our dis-
posal, of being always prepared for every event, and of carrying 
one’s self, as it were, perpetually whole and entire about one.” 
(1973b: 54) In other words, natural man did not externalise 
and thus preserved what was for Rousseau the distinctly human 
characteristic of “free agency” (1973b: 60). In stark contrast, 
modern man lives in the opinions of others; indeed it is from 
their judgement that he derives “the consciousness of his own 
existence” (1973b: 116):
[…] always asking others what we are, and never daring to ask 
ourselves, in the midst of so much philosophy, humanity, and 
civilization, and of such sublime codes of morality, we have nothing 
to show for ourselves but a frivolous and deceitful appearance, 
honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure 
without happiness. (1973b: 116)
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And precisely because our exteriors are deceitful appearance, we 
must rely on mutual recognition in order to supply them with the 
appearance of reality. Therefore, the ferocity of our “rage for dis-
tinction” is directly proportional to the chasm that exists between 
who we succeed in pretending to be and who we truly are.
Rousseau’s analysis in the Second Discourse directly refers to 
the section in the Republic, referred to above, in which Socrates 
describes how we, with the help of the medical profession, 
cosset disease by giving an objective reality to ills of our own ma-
king (Rousseau 1973b: 56–57). However, Rousseau is of interest to 
this essay not only because of his eloquent presentation of exter-
nalisation as the underlying dynamics of civilizational decline – 
indeed of civilization as decline – but also because of his influence 
on radical reformist and revolutionary movements, particularly 
socialism and anarchism in their many variants. Throughout the 
19th Century it was common to refer to Rousseau as the “mas-
ter”, “father” or “grandfather” of the socialists and other radical 
reformers of the time, who in turn were identified as the “disciples”, 
“sons,” or “grandsons” of Rousseau (Noland 1967: 33). In 1851, 
Proudhon acknowledged that the “authority” of Rousseau had 
“ruled us for almost a century” (Noland 1967: 35; Crowder 
1991: 16). For a thinker like Proudhon, however, “authority” is 
an ambiguous notion and indeed while he could call Rousseau a 
“great innovator” and “the apostle of liberty and equality”, he 
could also occasionally express sentiments of revulsion and dis-
gust: “Never did a man unite to such a degree intellectual pride, 
aridity of soul, baseness of tastes, depravity of habits, ingratitude 
of heart […]” (quoted in Noland: 36–37). Godwin is generally 
more sympathetic towards Rousseau and acknowledged him as 
a major influence on the Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, 
admitting that he “frequently quoted Rousseau in the course of 
this work.” However, in the very same footnote, he found space 
to express his reservations: “Rousseau, notwithstanding his great 
genius, was full of weakness and prejudice” (Godwin 1993: 273).
The relation between the anarchists and Rousseau is complex as 
different anarchists adopt different positions towards Rousseau. 
In fact, there is often little consistency in the treatment Rousseau 
receives in the writings even of individual anarchists. Godwin and 
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Proudhon are very much aware of his writings, and they discuss 
them explicitly in their works in many places. Sometimes the en-
gagement with Rousseau amounts to positive influence, sometimes 
to negative reaction – with the former tending to predominate 
in Godwin, and the latter in Proudhon (Crowder: 17–18). 
Tolstoy idolised Rousseau in his youth and adopted similar views 
to his on education, compassion, and religion, even if he was cri-
tical of the notion of a ‘general will’ (Christoyannopoulos 2019). 
Kropotkin admired him for having been an eloquent defender of 
equality and human rights and for having thereby exerted a posi-
tive influence on the French Revolution (Crowder: 19). Bakunin 
too confirmed Rousseau’s influence on the Revolution but ultima-
tely judges this influence to be malign. Still, at another time in 
his life, he declared that “in his faith in the eventual triumph of 
mankind over priests and tyrants he is at one with the ‘immortal 
Rousseau’” (Crowder: 19). 
Paul McLaughlin suggested that, among all the philosophes, 
Rousseau “may have had the greatest influence on the development 
of anarchism” (McLaughlin 2007: 105). There are many reasons 
why the anarchists would have felt drawn to Rousseau, who was 
arguably the most radical thinker of his age. First, Rousseau’s 
notion of a realm of freedom as “a ‘natural’ order outside the 
artificiality of the state” (Crowder: 23) must have appealed to 
his anarchist readers. It is correct, of course, that this vision of 
state less freedom also posed a problem in that it seemed to suggest 
that it was the rise of society itself that disrupted and ultimately 
irretrievably destroyed the possibility of man living at peace with 
himself, virtuous and free, and without government. Godwin, for 
example, was critical of Rousseau’s suggestion that statelessness 
would not be possible under modern conditions. Still, he was too 
endeared by the vision itself and, instead of abandoning it, simply 
reversed Rousseau’s scheme of history. The happy, virtuous, free 
anarchy was not a memory of the past, but a prospect for the fu-
ture following the abolition of government and law. 
Second, the text that caused the greatest problems for 
Rousseau’s anarchist readers was The Social Contract, because 
here Rousseau seems to subscribe to what was arguably the most 
influential justification of the state at the time, the social contract 
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tradition. Even Godwin, who felt so close to the sentiments and 
analyses provided in the Second Discourse and in Emile, noted 
that in Rousseau’s political writings, “the unrivalled superiority of 
his genius  appears to desert him” (Godwin 1993: 273). Moreover, 
a superficial reading of Rousseau’s contract may give the impres-
sion that he, too, subscribed to the classic argument of the con-
tractarians that freedom is pre-social and must be constrained 
by government in order to allow men to coexist in society. 
This critique, put forward also by Proudhon and Bakunin, fails to 
appreciate the subtlety of Rousseau’s construction, which upon 
closer inspection can also be read as proposing precisely the kind 
of self-governing community that the anarchists were debating. 
After all, The Social Contract did not create a state separate from 
those it governed. In fact, the core principle of Rousseau’s vision 
is the inviolability of moral self-direction as the key feature of 
freedom. It is in The Social Contract that Rousseau describes mo-
ral self-direction as the very essence of “being a man” (Rousseau 
1973c: 186), and it is not impossible therefore that this work – 
 least loved by anarchists – is the very source of what is perhaps 
the most fundamental of their premises. Accordingly, at the very 
start of the Social Contract, Rousseau explained that the work 
was meant “to inquire if, in the civil order, there can be any sure 
and legitimate rule of administration, men being taken as they are 
and laws as they might be,” thus raising the key anarchist ques-
tion as to whether government as such – not what form, or how 
much – is legitimate (McLaughlin 2007: 106).
Third, anarchists would also accept the basic tenets of 
Rousseau’s analysis of modern society as a complex web of de-
pendencies in which both the subservient and the dominant had 
become alienated from their true moral nature. The introduction 
of governments makes this structure permanent, and the resulting 
moral decline is pervasive to such an extent that mere reform is 
insufficient for freedom and virtue to be attained. A total transfor-
mation of society is required. 
Rousseau had gone further than any other thinker in advocating 
two related positions: (i) freedom and agency, the defining features 
of human existence, are to be understood as moral self-direction 
(cf. Spaan 2011), and (ii) modern, civilized society is destructive of 
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moral self-direction because externalisation, which is the opposite 
of self-direction, is its very fabric. It is on these two fundamental 
positions that Rousseau’s and the anarchists’ outlooks converge. 
Thus, anarchists, too, can be read as theorists of externalisation. 
Godwin, for example, noted that “he that is not accustomed, ex-
clusively to act upon the dictates of his own understanding, must 
fall infinitely short of that energy and simplicity of which our na-
ture is capable.” (Godwin 1993: 306) Looking specifically at the 
politics of national assemblies, he observes how men inescapably 
end up losing the autonomy of their decision-making:
Every man looks forward to the effects which the opinions he 
avows will produce on his success. Every man connects himself with 
some sect or party. The activity of his thought is shackled at eve-
ry turn by the fear that his associates may disclaim him. (Godwin 
1993: 307)
Indeed, “men who act under the name of society, are deprived of 
that activity and energy which may belong to them in their indi-
vidual character. They have a multitude of followers to draw after 
them, whose humours they must consult, and to whose slowness 
of apprehension they must accommodate themselves.” (Godwin 
1993: 308) Thus, the politics of government, where the need to 
take binding decisions requires the imposition of a “fictitious 
unanimity,” ultimately leads men to abandon the principle of 
self-direction and to pursue their self-interests in competition with 
others by making their decisions and actions dependent on the 
strategic requirements of the situation. Thus, before laws can be 
introduced, “numerous amendments have [to be made] to suit the 
corrupt interest of imperious pretenders” (Godwin 1993: 307). 
The result is a derailment, a loss of openness, a collective and 
individual inability to detach ourselves from the commotion of 
the world – to use Buber’s term – and to look beyond our self- 
interests and the opinions of others. In other words, we become 
unable to ‘apperceive’:
The genuine and wholesome state of mind is, to be unloosed from 
shackles, and to expand every fibre of its frame according to the 
independent and individual impressions of truth upon that mind. 
How great would be the progress of intellectual improvement, if 
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men were unfettered by the prejudices of education, unseduced by 
the influence of a corrupt state of society, and accustomed to yield 
without fear to the guidance of truth, however unexplored might 
be the regions and unexpected the conclusions to which she con-
ducted us? (Godwin 1993: 306–307)
IV. Mysticism, anarchism and anti-politics
Mystical ekstasis pierces through the ‘cloud of unknowing’, the 
fog of externalisation, and thereby restores our openness to reali-
ty, our being ‘present in relation’. The analogy between mysticism 
and anarchism is based on their convergence on a critique of ex-
ternalisation, which is considered as the pathology – operating 
at an individual and social level – which undermines moral self- 
direction as the essence of our humanity. Thus, the modern state, 
as the ultimate manifestation of externalisation, de-humanises. 
The thinker who brings these notions of mysticism, anar-
chism and the critique of politics together most clearly is, of 
course, Gustav Landauer. The influence of Meister Eckhart, the 
German mystic (c.1260–c.1328), on Landauer is well documented 
(e.g. Hinz 2000; Sauerland 1999). During his imprisonment in 
1899/1900, Landauer spent considerable time translating some 
of Eckhart’s sermons; these translations were later published as 
a book (Landauer 1903). Joachim Willems suggested that since 
the encounter with Eckhart, mysticism assumed a systemic role 
in Landauer’s philosophical and political work, signifying a “de-
cisive turn” in his thought (Willems 2001: 12). How mysticism 
was absorbed in Landauer’s political thinking is evident as early 
as 1901 in his essay Anarchistische Gedanken über Anarchismus 
[Anarchic Thoughts on Anarchism] (Landauer 2010b), where he 
argues that the anarchic society can only be achieved through a 
mystic re-birth, an “inward colonization”: “Those whom I call 
true anarchists no longer deceive themselves; they have been able 
to remold themselves through the experience of a deep existential 
crisis; they can act in the way which their most secret nature de-
mands.” (Landauer 2010b: 87) The anarchists, he continues, “will 
not kill anyone except themselves – in the mystical sense, in order 
to be reborn after having descended into the depths of their souls.” 
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(88) It was not enough to reject conditions and  institutions: “we 
have to reject ourselves” in order “to become one with the world 
in a mystical union.” 
What these men will be able to bring to the world will be so ex-
traordinary that it will seem to have come from a world altogether 
unknown. Whoever brings the lost world in himself to life – to 
individual life – and whoever feels like a true part of the world 
and not as a stranger: he will be the one who arrives not knowing 
where from, and who leaves not knowing where to. To him 
the world will be what he is to himself. Men such as this will 
live with each other in solidarity – as men who belong together. 
This will be anarchy. (89)
Landauer’s path towards the anarchic community is via 
Absonderung, separation, a concept informed by Meister Eckhart’s 
Abgeschiedenheit. (Hoppen 2017, 2018) Eckhart’s concept refers 
to the detachment that prepares and effectuates the mystical eksta-
sis, the breaking through the commotion of the world. Landauer’s 
separation wants to capture the same movement, but highlights 
its importance in enabling individuals to live communally, away 
from the influences of authority, state and, indeed, politics: 
And the state exists to create order and the possibility to continue 
living amid all this spiritless nonsense, confusion, hardship and 
 degeneracy. The state, with its schools, churches, courts, prisons, 
workhouses, the state with its army and its police; the state with its 
soldiers, officials and prostitutes. Where there is no spirit and no inner 
compulsion, there is external force, regimentation, the state. Where 
spirit is, there is society. Where unspirit is, there is the state. The 
state is the surrogate for spirit.
The state, which is “nothing”, a “false illusion”, conceals this 
nothingness and, disguised as “nation”, becomes the “psychic 
equivalent to the intoxicating alcoholic spirits that have become 
the habitual poison of men living today”. (Landauer 1911) 
Since the late 1890s, Landauer described himself as an “anti-po-
litician”: “I was never politically, only anti-politically engaged” 
 (cited in Wolf 2010: 26). Anarchists, he wrote, “have no political 
beliefs – we have beliefs against politics” (Landauer 2010a: 79). 
Landauer’s anti-politics is commonly understood as a  rejection 
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of formal politics, but the concept goes much further – what 
is at stake in Landauer’s symbolism is a ‘stepping out’ of politics 
altogether. Like ekstasis, anti-politics is the negation of a nega-
tion – and this negation cannot be achieved from within politics. 
Political change only perpetuates and reinforces the hegemony of 
the discourse and practice of politics. As politics presents itself 
as the solution to the problems it creates, it further strengthens 
its grip on life and further normalises externalisation: “politics 
is inherently antonymous to community” (Hoppen 2018: 86). 
Anti-politics, in Landauer’s understanding, is therefore defined 
in opposition to politics only in name; its reality is sui generis, 
 referring to the evocation and unfolding of a community whose 
members are ‘present in relation’. The members of the true 
 community, Landauer explains, will not aspire to order the world 
 externally through politics, but they will find the world within 
themselves and become the world (Landauer 2010c: 100).
In the context of this essay, Landauer represents the oddity of 
an actually existing ‘ideal type’: his work, as an author and acti-
vist, exemplifies precisely the analogies between mysticism and 
anarchism explored previously, including the rejection of poli-
tics as encrusted externalisation. The historical singularity of this 
 example, however, should not distract from the more general 
point we wished to develop in this essay: the orientation away 
from externalisation is a key feature of anarchist thought and 
practice, and it is in this orientation that the analogy between 
anarchism and mysticism is rooted, giving them analogous roles 
in political theory and theology respectively. A community in 
which members are ‘present in relation’ is anarchic. Anarchy thus 
does not refer to lawlessness and chaos, but to a particular kind of 
relationality, which springs forth from the ‘stepping out’, ekstasis, 
of the commotion of the world. Moreover, even if articulated in 
secular or atheist terms, and to the extent that it advocates the 
overcoming of externalising practices, anarchism has at its core a 
spiritual concern.
If we develop the analogy between mysticism and anarchism 
further, however, we may have to acknowledge that there are dis-
tinct limits to our ability to create such anarchic communities by 
design. Mystics emphasise that the stepping out of  ekstasis cannot 
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be willed or forced. In particular, conventional politics is not a so-
lution to the problem; on the contrary, as we noted,  externalisation 
is the very essence of politics. It would be misleading and ultima-
tely self-defeating, therefore, to present anarchism as a political 
philosophy – just as it is impossible to establish mysticism as a 
religious institution. These reflections leave us with the profound 
question of how indeed we can ‘body forth’ communities in 
which we can be ‘present in relation’. Many anarchists, including 
Landauer, were and are aware of the problem. It was a “crucial 
fallacy,” he noted, to think “that one can – or must – bring anar-
chism to the world.” Those “who want ‘to bring freedom to the 
world’ […] are tyrants, not anarchists.” Indeed, “[a]narchy is not a 
matter of the future; it is a matter of the present. It is not a matter 
of making demands; it is a matter of how one lives.” (Landauer 
2010b: 87). These notions are not too far away from Occupy’s 
“We make the path by walking” (taken from Antonio Machado’s 
poem Caminante no hay camino, 1912), and not unlike Occupy, 
anarchists may need to ponder the meaning and possibility of an 
ekstasis from politics.
References
Bloch, E. (1972) Atheism in Christianity. New York: Herder & Herder.
Bornkamm, G. (1967), “μυστήριον”, in Gerhard Kittel (ed.), 
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol.IV. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, pp. 802–828.
Bouyer, L. (1981) “Mysticism: an essay on the history of the word,” in 
Richard Woods (ed.), Understanding Mysticism. London: Athlone 
Press, pp. 42–55.
Buber, M. (1958) I and Thou, 2nd ed., transl. by Ronald Gregor Smith. 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark.
Buber, M. (1967) “Autobiographical Fragments,” in Paul Arthur 
Schilpp and Maurice Friedman (eds) The Philosophy of Martin 
Buber. London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–39.
Buber, M. (1996) “Introduction: Ecstasy and Confession”, in Buber, 
Ecstatic Confessions: The Heart of Mysticism, ed. by Paul Mendes-
Flohr. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, pp. 1–11.
250 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
Christoyannopoulos, A. (2020). Tolstoy’s Political Thought: 
Christian Anarcho-Pacifist Iconoclasm Then and Now. Abingdon: 
Routledge.
Critchley, S. (2009) “Mystical Anarchism,” in Critical Horizons: 
A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory, Vo. 10, No. 2, 
pp. 272–306.
Crowder, C. (1991) Classical Anarchism: The Political Thought 
of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Derrida, J. (1992a) “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials”, transl. Ken 
Frieden, in H. Coward and T. Foshay (eds) Derrida and Negative 
Theology. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 73–142.
Derrida, J. (1992b), “Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices”, 
transl. John P. Leavey Jr., in H. Coward and T. Foshay (eds) Derrida 
and Negative Theology. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 283–323.
Dodds, E.R. (1965) Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: 
Some Aspects of Religious  Experience from Marcus Aurelius to 
Constantine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ellwood, R.S. (1999) Mysticism and Religion, 2nd ed. New York: 
Seven Bridges Press.
Fox, M. (1981) “Meister Eckhart and Karl Marx: The Mystic as 
Political Theologian,” in Richard Woods (ed.), Understanding 
Mysticism. London: Athlone Press, pp. 541–563.
Gellman, J. (2001) Mystical Experiences of God: A Philosophical 
Inquiry. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Godwin, W. (1993) An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and 
its influence on General Virtue and Happiness, Political and 
Philosophical Writings of William Godwin Vol. 3, ed. by Mark 
Philp. London: Pickering.
Gregory, J. (1999) The Neoplatonists: A Reader, 2nd ed. London: 
Routledge.
Hadot, P. (1998) Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press.
Contra Externalisation: Analogies between Anarchism and Mysticism 251
Havel, V. (2010) “The Power of the Powerless,” in Vaclav Havel et al. 
The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-
eastern Europe. New York: Routledge, pp. 10–59.
Hinz, T. (2000) Mystik und Anarchie: Meister Eckhart und seine 
Bedeutung im Denken Gustav Landauers. Berlin: Karin Kramer 
Verlag.
Hoppen, F. (2017) “A Reflection on Mystical Anarchism in the Works 
of Gustav Landauer and Eric Voegelin,” in A. Christoyannopoulos 
and M.S. Adams (eds) Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume 1. 
Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, pp. 198–237.
Hoppen, F. (2018) Putting politics in its place: Philosophies and 
Practices of Presence in the works of Gustav Landauer, Eric 
Voegelin, Simone Weil and Václav Havel. Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, University of Kent.
James, W. (1985) The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: 
Penguin.
Landauer, G. (1903) Meister Eckharts Mystische Schriften. In Unsere 
Sprache Übertragen Von Gustav Landauer. Berlin: Schnabel.
Landauer, G. (1911) “Call to Socialism”, available at the on-
line Anarchist Library, https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/
gustav-landauer-call-to-socialism.
Landauer, G. (2010a) “A Few Words on Anarchism”, in Gustav 
Landauer, Revolution and Other Writings: a Political Reader, transl. 
and ed. by Gabriel Kuhn. Oakland, CA: PM Press, pp. 79–83.
Landauer, G. (2010b) “Anarchic Thoughts on Anarchism,” in 
Gustav Landauer, Revolution and Other Writings: a Political 
Reader, transl. and ed. by Gabriel Kuhn. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 
pp. 84–91 
Landauer, G. (2010c) “Through Separation to Community,” in Gustav 
Landauer, Revolution and Other Writings: a Political Reader, transl. 
and ed. by Gabriel Kuhn. Oakland, CA: PM Press, pp. 94–108
Landauer, G. (2011) Skepsis und Mystik: Versuche im Anschluss an 
Mauthners Sprachkritik, ed. by Siegbert Wolf. Bodenburg: Verlag 
Edition AV.
252 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
Maréchal, J. (1927) Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics (transl. 
Algar Thorold). London: Burns Oates and Washbourne Ltd.
McGinn, B. (1989) “Love, Knowledge and Unio Mystica in the 
Western Christian Tradition,” in Moshe Idel and Bernard McGinn 
(eds) Mystical Union and Monotheistic Faith: An Ecumenical 
Dialogue. New York: Macmillan, pp. 59–86. 
McGinn, B. (1997) The Foundations of Mysticism: Origins to the 
Fifth Century. New York: Crossroads.
McLaughlin, P. (2007) Anarchism and Authority: a Philosophical 
Introduction to Classical Anarchism. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Meier, C. (1990) The Greek Discovery of Politics (transl. by David 
McClintock). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mendes-Flohr, P. (1978) Von der Mystik zum Dialog: Martin Bubers 
geistige Entwicklung bis hin zu “Ich und Du” (transl. Dafna A. 
Kries). Königstein/Ts.: Jüdischer Verlag.
Mendes-Flohr, P. (1996) “Editor’s Introduction,” in Martin Buber, 
Ecstatic Confessions: The Heart of Mysticism, ed. by Paul Mendes-
Flohr. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, xiii–xxx.
Moore, D.J. (1996) Martin Buber: Prophet of Religious Secularism. 
2nd ed. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press.
Noland, A. (1967) “Proudhon and Rousseau,” in Journal of the 
History of Ideas 28(1): 33–54.
Orwin, C. (1998) “Rousseau’s Socratism,” in The Journal of Politics 
60(1): 174–87.
Plato (1987) The Republic, transl. Desmond Lee. 2nd ed. New York: 
Penguin.
Plotinus (1969) The Enneads, 4th edn, trans. S. Mackenna. London: 
Faber & Faber.
Pseudo-Dionysius (1987a) The Divine Names, trans. Colm Luibheid, 
in Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist 
Press, pp. 47–131.
Pseudo-Dionysius (1987b) The Celestial Hierarchy, trans. Colm Luibheid, 
in Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 
pp. 143–259.
Contra Externalisation: Analogies between Anarchism and Mysticism 253
Rousseau, J.J. (1973a) A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts 
and Sciences, transl. G.D.H. Cole, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
The Social Contract and Discourses. London: Dent and Sons, 
pp. 1–30.
Rousseau, J.J. (1973b) A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, trans. 
G.D.H. Cole, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and 
Discourses. London: Dent and Sons, pp. 31–126.
Rousseau, J.J. (1973c) The Social Contract, trans. G.D.H. Cole, in 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses. 
London: Dent and Sons, pp. 179–309.
Sauerland, K. (1999) “Mystisches Denken zur Jahrhundertwende: 
der junge Lukács, Mauthner, Landauer, Buber, Wittgenstein und 
der junge Broch,” in Marijan Bobinac (ed.) Literatur im Wandel: 
Festschrift für Viktor Žmegac. pp. 175–190.
Schwartz, Y. (2006), “Martin Buber and Gustav Landauer: 
The Politicization of the Mystical”, in Michael Zank (ed.) 
Martin  Buber:  Neue  Perspektiven/New  Perspectives. Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, pp. 205–219.
Shillabeer, J. (2007) Self-Knowledge, Immunity and Conversion: Doderer, 
Musil and Voegelin on ‘Second Realities’ and the Soul’s Struggle 
for Truth. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Kent.
Smart, N. (1965) “Interpretation and Mystical Experience,” in 
Religious Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 75–87.
S0lle, D. (2001) The Silent Cry: Mysticism and Resistance. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
Spaan, C. (2011) Anarchism as a Form of Government. Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, University of Kent.
Turner, D. (1995) Eros and Allegory: Medieval Exegesis of the Song 
of Songs. Kalamazzo, MA: Cistercian Publications.
Underhill, E. (2002) Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and 
Development of Spiritual Consciousness. Mineola, NY: Dover.
Voegelin, E. (1990) “On Debate and Existence,” in Eric Voegelin, 
Published Essays 1966–1985, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin 
Volume 12, ed. by Ellis Sandoz. Baton Rouge, LO: Louisiana State 
University Press, pp. 36–51.
254 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
Willems, J. (2001) Religiöser Gehalt des Anarchismus und anarchis-
tischer Gehalt der Religion? Die jüdisch-christlich-atheistische 
Mystik Gustav Landauers zwischen Meister Eckhart and Martin 
Buber. Albeck bei Ulm: Verlag Ulmer Manuskripte.
Wolf, S. (2011), “Einleitung”, in Gustav Landauer, Skepsis und 
Mystik: Versuche im Anschluss an Mauthners Sprachkritik, ed. by 
Siegbert Wolf. Bodenburg: Verlag Edition AV.
From Benign Anarchy to Divine Anarchy:  
A Critical Review of “Spiritual Anarchism”
Anthony Fiscella
Independent Scholar, Sweden
Rather than assuming that such a thing as “spiritual anarchism” 
exists (a union of two highly contested terms), this chapter criti-
cally examines whom the label has applied to, whom it could 
refer to, and how we might conceive its story. Beginning with a 
critique of subtle but significant legacies of colonialism inherent 
within  contemporary terms such as “religion” and “politics” as 
well as “anarchism” and “spirituality,” this chapter moves from 
an overview of literature on “spiritual anarchism” (Sri Aurobindo, 
Peter Lamborn Wilson, etc.) to discussion of forgotten stories 
(Krishnamurti, Womanism, MOVE, etc.) and concludes with an 
eye toward future studies of “spiritual anarchist” praxis (Auroville, 
Alcoholics Anonymous, etc.).
I. Introduction
Despite more than a century of usage and an apparent  increase1 in 
people who espouse some sort of blend between presumably “spiri-
tual” and “anarchist” perspectives, the term “spiritual  anarchism” 
 1 In my search for discussions (rather than mere mentions) of “spiritual 
anarchism,” I found more examples in the last ten years than in the last 
100 years combined (see Charts 1–3). However, through a casual online 
Ngram search of phrase frequency in English literature, I noticed that 
the early 1930s seemed to have ten times as much frequency of the phrase 
as today (perhaps due in part to the founding of the Catholic Worker 
movement or Sri Aurobindo’s publications). 
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remains relatively obscure and understudied. Scholarship remains 
limited in at least three senses. First, while various writers have 
employed the term “spiritual anarchism” (often as if it had a 
self-evident meaning), no one seems to have ever attempted to chart 
the terrain—much less examine the term, its usage, or its possible 
usefulness. Second, those who mention “spiritual anarchism” typi-
cally emphasize texts, individual writers, and ideas rather than ac-
tivism, practitioners, and collective praxis. Third, many groups and 
figures who might seem directly related to the topic of “spiritual 
anarchism” do not appear to have received much (or any) atten-
tion. In particular, we find a general tendency to downplay or over-
look the roles of two cultures that have often overlapped with and 
provided inspiration for “spiritual anarchists”: stateless shamanic2 
societies and black liberation struggles. In this review, I aim to both 
provide a broad (albeit non-exhaustive) survey of usages of “spiri-
tual anarchism” as well as critically imagine alternatives that point 
our gaze in directions where—thus far—the term has not. 
In his monumental work, Demanding the Impossible (1992), 
Peter Marshall traced anarchism back thousands of years to 
Daoism and Buddhism.3  Along the way, he provided the first ge-
neric (as opposed to polemical) definition of “spiritual anarchism” 
(that I know of):
Spiritual anarchists see humans as primarily spiritual beings  capable 
of managing themselves without the curb of external government. 
Most of them reject man-made laws in favour of a prior obligation 
to natural law or the law of God; some go even further to insist 
 2 “Shaman,” originally a Siberian reference, remains a contested term (see, 
for example, Mayer 2008). I apply it here loosely rather than technically 
and simply point toward the type of decentralized and personal relation-
ships of healers, visionaries, entertainers, and mediators that help regu-
late the stories that organize social life in stateless societies. Indigenous 
cultures vary greatly from Lakota to Sami, from Tonga to Hi’aiti’ihi (of-
ten called Pirahā). Not all of them share a role that neatly corresponds 
to that of a shaman (however one defines it) and no single term could 
adequately describe all such cultures.
 3 Many discussions of “spiritual anarchism” mention Zen, Daoism, and/
or quote Lao Tzu. For arguments of Daoism as non-anarchist, see Feldt 
(2010); For research on Daoism and anarchism see Rapp (2012). For 
anarchism and Zen Buddhism, see Galván-Álvarez (2017). 
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that in a state of grace no law, whether human or divine, is applica-
ble. They generally assume that human impulses are fundamentally 
good and beneficent. Spiritual anarchism is not linked to any par-
ticular creed or sect, but its adherents all reject organized religion 
and the hierarchical church.4
Without dwelling on potential problems in the formulation 
(e.g., using an undefined “spiritual beings” to define “spiritual 
 anarchists,” ambiguity of “state of grace,” etc.), tautology (e.g., 
“capable of managing themselves without the curb of external 
government”—isn’t that plain anarchism?), or assumptions (e.g., 
“They generally assume…” yet “they” refers to whom?), we can 
see two key elements inherent in Marshall’s definition that may 
help us understand why people ever use the term at all. First, if 
“spiritual” implies here a “prior obligation to natural law or the 
law of God” then it may add a “positive” element to counter anar-
chism’s “negative” opposition-based implication (“an-arch” = 
against rule). In this sense, obligations—like devotion—may feel 
empowering because they fill social functions and provide a clear 
focus for action, routine, ritual, etc. Second, in rejecting “orga-
nized religion and the hierarchical church,” it seemingly fills the 
same function as the term “spirituality” (as in “spiritual but not 
religious”) yet, in combination with “anarchism” also provides 
a nuance to traditional anarchist anti-clerical critiques (implying 
that “spiritual” approaches need not fall into the same traps as 
“religious” approaches). Connecting these two elements, we see 
the possibility of voluntary obligation as well as broad ambiguity: 
as “creedless” this definition could include atheists and, via “natu-
ral law,” could include deep ecologists.5 
 4 Marshall 2008: 6. Marshall did not specify whom he included or 
 excluded while explaining “spiritual anarchism” as if it had one uncon-
tested definition.
 5 When Naomi Gross sought to identify the Swiss Brethren with “Spiritual 
Anarchism,” she cited the part of Marshall’s definition that bolstered her 
argument. The entire quote follows: “Spiritual Anarchists see humans 
as primarily spiritual beings capable of managing themselves without ... 
 external government.... [They] reject man-made law in favour of ... the 
law of God” (2013: 18).
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In American Gurus (2014), Arthur Versluis, without 
 mentioning Marshall, offered a more narrow but similarly 
“self-evident” definition: 
The term ‘spiritual anarchism’ …is a much more extreme form of 
what we saw more than a century earlier in Transcendentalism, 
itself an individualistic sport from Protestantism. Here, religious in-
dividualism is taken perhaps as far as one could take it. …Spiritual 
anarchism, as we will see in other instances as well, is fundamen-
tally different from political anarchism…Typically, spiritual anar-
chism emphasizes the moment, and a limited space and time within 
which liberty can be realized. In Zenarchy, Thornley extols the vir-
tues of ‘simply knowing that freedom is everywhere for those who 
dance through life, rather than crawl, walk, or run.’ For ‘what Zen 
has most to offer Anarchism is freedom here and now.’6
Here we see an emphasis on “freedom” and “liberty” without 
any reference to obligations. In contrast to Marshall, however, 
Versluis made it quite clear whom he thought of as the prototype 
for “spiritual anarchism”: Peter Lamborn Wilson aka Hakim Bey 
whom Versluis felt “brings together, more than any other figure, 
the many and varied aspects of spiritual anarchism, embodying 
them as no one else does.”7
Clearly, the proposed definitions of “spiritual anarchism” by 
Marshall and Versluis clashed yet I could find very little related 
debate. A few have rejected the term and/or that which it pur-
portedly represented. The controversial book on the European 
development and global spread of anarcho-syndicalism, Black 
Flame (2009), dismissed “spiritual anarchism” (e.g., Tolstoy) out-
right because it “[is] not part of the anarchist tradition …and ari-
ses from a misunderstanding of anarchism. …There is only one 
anarchist tradition, and it is rooted in the work of Bakunin and 
the Alliance.”8 Christian anarchist scholar André de Raaij (2009) 
vehemently rejected the term “spiritual anarchism” to describe 
people like Gustav Landauer or Jacques Ellul because it “reflects 
current fashions and quests” possibly making “these anarchists 
 6 Versluis 2014: 123, 128.
 7 Ibid: 146.
 8 Schmidt and van der Walt 2009: 71.
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being sold to the millions …because it tastes of the idiocies of 
consumer society.”9 
A few have argued about clashes between varieties of “spiritual 
anarchism.” In the early 1900s, Sri Aurobindo embraced the term 
but rejected what he saw as the “extreme” versions of  “spiritual 
anarchism” in Tolstoy and Gandhi.10 National anarchist acti-
vist Jay Cypher (2014) not only embraced the term “spiritual 
anarchism” but described two subcategories “Spiritually Based 
Anarchism” (in which people create a community based on “sha-
red spirituality and sustained by common bonds and experien-
ces”) and “Anarchism as Spiritual Practice” (in which members 
of a “tribe” do not necessarily share the same “spiritual beliefs” 
and where “creating an intentional community is a spiritual act in 
and of itself”). Commenting on this online video presentation, com-
menter “J. Harris” rejected the entire presentation on grounds that 
anything associated with “National Anarchism” did not qualify as 
“spiritual anarchism” because it descended from Julius Evola 
and “spiritual racism/fascism” and “real spiritual anarchism” re-
jects “hierarchy and tradition.”11
These squabbles may seem petty but, in regard to any term 
that gradually comes into use, they matter. They show the pa-
rameters of a term’s embryotic development. As Alexandre 
Christoyannopoulos and Matthew Adams (2018) wrote in the 
previous volume: “How one defines key terms does, after all, de-
termine what one analyses (and what not), and generally reveals 
one’s assumptions and preferences (implicit or explicit) about 
 9 Raaij 2009.
 10 Varma 1990: 300.
 11 Emphasis added. See comments to Cypher (2014). National anarchists 
combine nationalism and anarchism and typically meet strong opposi-
tion from antifascists as did Cypher’s National Anarchist Tribal Alliance-
New York (NATA-NY). Despite Cypher’s denial of racism, the broader 
National Anarchist Movement (NAM) apparently expelled NATA after a 
dispute about, among other things, whom one should stigmatize: Jews or 
Muslims. See Troy Southgate, “Important Message,” National Anarchist 
Movement homepage, 26 September 2016, http://www.national-anar-
chist.net/2016/09/important-message.html; For an anti-racist analysis of 
national anarchists, see Sunshine (2008).
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what is being discussed.”12 As scholars do not agree on how to 
define key terms such as “spirituality,” “religion,” “anarchism,” 
“state,” “justice,” or “violence,” the conjoining of “spiritual” and 
“anarchism” into “spiritual anarchism” both amplifies its ambi-
guity and the difficulty in uncovering implicit assumptions.13
With such a wide range of potential meaning, I shall restrict 
this discussion exclusively to “spiritual anarchism” as a term and, 
thereafter, critiques and ideas related to that. I shall ignore extensive 
material on “religious anarchism,”14 “mystical anarchism,”15 and even 
work that essentially discusses much of the same material that 
“spiritual anarchism” has referred to (i.e. work on the following 
topics and overlaps with many of the themes, concerns, and figu-
res that one finds associated with “spiritual anarchism”: stateless 
societies,16 syncretistic struggle,17 Swedenborgian syndicalists,18 
 12 Christoyannopoulos and Adams 2018: 1.
 13 I place quote marks around words such as “spiritual,” “religion,” and 
“spiritual anarchism” to remind readers that these terms remain ideolog-
ical, contested, and tentative categories. 
 14 In contrast to Marshall’s definition of “spiritual anarchism”, “religious 
anarchism” tends to refer to those who identify with an age-old organized 
(typically Abrahamic) tradition and/or who adhere to a particular creed 
such as Christian anarchists (Christoyannopoulos 2011; Foster 1997), 
Muslim anarchists (Crone 2000; Karamustafa 2006; Jean-Veneuse 2009; 
Kazmi 2014), Jewish anarchists (Shapira 2013; Magid 2017), or anar-
chist discussion of “religion” (Kennedy 2005; CrimethInc. 2013).
 15 This includes a variety of “mystical anarchisms,” including millenarians 
of the Middle Ages (Cohn 1970), certain Russian Symbolists (Rosenthal 
1977), a later Russian group in the 1920s also calling themselves “mys-
tical anarchists” (Nalimov 2001), or various recent works that have 
propagated the term such as Critchley (2009) and Ladha (2015). For a 
“social anarchist” critique of “Mystical and Irrationalist Anarchism,” see 
Bookchin (1995).
 16 See Barclay (1982) and MacDonald (2012).
 17 See McNicholl (2018).
 18 A seemingly improbable category, Ivan Aguéli (1869–1917) advocated 
Sufism, Swedenborgianism, and syndicalism and Helen Keller (1880–
1968), a member of the International Workers of the World (IWW), also 
identified with Swedenborg’s “spiritual” teachings (Gauffin 1941; Keller 
1998). For the record, Catholic priest Thomas Hagerty (also Haggerty) 
wrote the original preamble for the Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW) and theorized about its union structure (See “‘Father’ Thomas 
J Haggerty.” IWW homepage. 26 October 2011. https://www.iww.org/
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prophetic resistance,19 decolonizing,20 psychology and anarchism,21 
liberation psychology,22 anarchy and the sacred,23 anarcho- 
perennialism,24 biographies of people sometimes labeled “spiritual 
anarchist,”25 anarchist theology,26 anarchist conflict-resolution,27 
pagan anarchism,28 anarchistic “New Religious Movements,”29 
anarchism and Satanism,30 anarchist abolitionists,31 sub-scenes of 
punk such as taqwacore32 or straight edge,33 drop-out and psyche-
delic culture,34 utopian/anarchist/mystical communes,35 anarchist/
mystical social order,36 or any number of antinomian groups such 
as Thee Temple ov Psychick Youth (TOPY),37 Movement of the Free 
history/biography/FatherHaggerty and  “Father Thomas J. Haggerty’s 
Wheel.” IWW homepage. https://www.iww.org/about/official/wheel ).
 19 See McKanan (2011).
 20 See Forbes (2008).
 21 See Fox (2011), Heckert (2013), and Lees and Cleminson (2015).
 22 See Martín-Baró (1994) and Moane (2003).
 23 See Watson (1998) and Kursions (2005).
 24 Closely associated in modern times with Ivan Aguéli, René Guénon, 
Ananda Coomaraswamy, Julius Evola and others, perennialist philoso-
phy centers on belief in common eternal and esoteric truths underlying 
all world traditions. For anarcho-perennialism see Cudenec (2013). 
 25 For Angelic Troublemakers, a biographical study of Henry David 
Thoreau, Dorothy Day, and Bayard Rustin, see Wiley (2014). For a biog-
raphy of J. Krishnamurti, see Jayakar (1986); for early Sufi Rábi‘a al-Ad-
awiyya al-Qaysiyya of Basra (c. 713–801), see Upton (1988).
 26 See Mazura (2017) and Knowles (2002).
 27 See Auerbach (1983).
 28 See Starhawk (1998) and Thompson (2016). 
 29 E.g., the Earth People in Trinidad (Littlewood 2006).
 30 For Satanism and anarchism, see Faxneld (2012).
 31 See Perry (1995).
 32 See Fiscella (2012) and McDowell (2017).
 33 See Stewart (2017).
 34 See Goffman and Joy (2004).
 35 In particular, one prominent anarcho-vegetarian commune in the Swiss 
Alps named Monte Verità hosted visitors such as Rudolf Steiner and 
J. Krishnamurti (Green 1986) and Tenko Nishida founded the long-
standing service-oriented anarcho-commune Ittoen (also Itto-en) in 
1904 (Nishida 1983); For a broad study of anarchist and mystical com-
munes, see Veysey (1973).
 36 See Amster (2003) for overview on social control in anarchist  communities, 
including the Rainbow Family of Living Light and indigenous societies.
 37 See Keenan (2003).
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Spirit,38 or the Bāuls).39 Finally, in order to avoid attributing the 
term to people who do not use it, I also excluded discussions that 
combine anarchism with Daoism, Zen, and “spirituality” but do 
not use the terms “spiritual anarchism/spiritual anarchist”40 
While this may sound like an extremely narrow terrain remaining, 
we might better picture that which “spiritual anarchism” has refer-
red to by contrasting individualist and communal- collectivist vari-
ants. Taking one small step beyond the most individualist variants 
of “spiritual anarchism” which tend to emphasize autonomy, per-
sonal issues (drug use, sexuality, asceticism, etc.), magick,41 and/
or mind expansion, we might find someone like punk vocalist 
GG Allin (1956–1993) who said (shortly before dying of a heroin 
overdose): “I believe that everybody’s the ruler of their own temp-
le. If you don’t believe that you’re Jesus Christ or God or Satan, 
you’re selling yourself short. You can’t put any person before 
number one. Number one is you.”42 As per Versluis (“religious 
individualism [taken] as far as one could take it”), this resona-
tes both with the slogan, “Nothing is true—Everything is permit-
ted” popularized William Burroughs as well as Peter Lamborn 
Wilson/Bey’s conception of anarcho-monarchism and the “Imam-
of-one’s-own-being.”43 Burroughs notably shot and killed his 
wife, Joan Vollmer, presumably by accident, and Wilson/Bey used 
his idea of  “self- rule” to both imply a “personal ethics which 
reaches unimaginably higher than any moral code” and advoca-
 38 See Vaneigem (1998).
 39 See Bhattacharya (1999).
 40 See Clark (1984), Moore (1988), and Murray (1992). Morris character-
ized Lao Tzu not as a mystic but as an anarchist writing, “he was indeed 
the first writer to express the libertarian socialist ideal” (1996: 51).
 41 Aleister Crowley (1875–1947) coined the spelling “magick” which char-
acterized an interpretation based on Nietzschean type of will in contrast 
to “superstitious” connotations. Chaos magicians and TOPY later adopt-
ed this spelling. 
 42 Gangloff 1993: 17. Not far from this, one might find the philosophical 
nihilism of “spiritual terrorist,” U. G. Krishnamurti (see, for example, “U. 
G. Krishnamurti” https://people.well.com/user/jct/ ).
 43 Wilson 1993a: 65, 74; Following on the heels of Nietzsche’s declara-
tion “God is dead,” Crowley wrote, “Each one of us is the One God” 
(Crowley 1975: 4). For a Crowley-Discordian-Bey “genealogy,” see 
Greer (2013). 
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te adult sexual activity with pre-pubertal children.44 As Michael 
Muhammad Knight put it, Wilson crafted “a child molester’s libe-
ration theology” and published it “for an audience of potential of-
fenders.” Helms (2004) surmised that Wilson/Bey’s most famous 
work Temporary Autonomous Zones aka TAZ (1985) essentially 
provided a cover for Wilson/Bey’s “paedophile apologies.”45 TAZ 
also helped inspire various movements including Burning Man.46 
Therein lies one end of the individualist interpretation of “spiri-
tual anarchism.”
At the other end of the spectrum we see a collectivist approach 
that tends to emphasize responsibility, connections, community, 
mediating, healing, solidarity, service, and a sense of oneness with 
all existence. One step beyond the edge of what people have la-
beled “spiritual anarchism,” we may find something like “natu-
ral anarchism” as advocated by pattrice jones (2009): “It’s a false 
kind of freedom that depends on the separation of the individual 
from the community and its enveloping ecosystem. …Liberation 
does not mean freedom from all constraint. Liberation means 
freedom from unjust or unnatural restraints. …Thus the ultimate 
aim of natural anarchism is the restoration of the relationships 
severed by the state.”47 Without mentioning “spirituality,” jones 
implied natural, justifiable restraints and echoed Marshall’s asso-
ciation of “spiritual anarchists” with “obligation to natural law” 
by declaring: “liberation is connection” looking to animals and 
nature for inspiration.48 On the inner edge of what people have 
labeled “spiritual anarchist,” we find a pagan anarchist, author, 
and activist such as Starhawk whose vision sounds quite similar 
to that of jones:
 44 Wilson 1993a: 70.
 45 Helms (2004: 3). Versluis discussed Wilson/Bey’s “proclivity” for “love 
of boys” but added that it “is worth recognizing that cultural norms do 
differ” on this matter (2014: 144).
 46 Harvey 2013.
 47 jones 2009: 245–246; Or, as Forbes put it, if a person loses their hand, 
they still live but if they lose the sun, the plants, or the air, they die: 
“What is my real body? We are not autonomous, self-sufficient beings 
as European mythology teaches ...We are rooted just like the trees” 
(2001: 291).
 48 jones 2009: 245.
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The mysteries are what is wild in us, what cannot be quantified 
or contained. But the mysteries are also what is most common to 
us all: blood, breath, heartbeat, the sprouting of seed, the waxing 
and waning of the moon, the turning of the earth around the sun, 
birth, growth, death, and renewal. To Witches, the cosmos is the 
living body of the Goddess, in whose being we all partake, who 
encompasses us and is immanent within us. …But power-from-
within is also akin to something deeper. It arises from our sense of 
connection, our bonding with other human beings, and with the 
environment. …To connect, to build bonds of caring and commu-
nity, to create structures of support that can nurture us and renew 
our strength, are powerful acts of resistance.49
Starhawk co-founded the pagan Reclaiming Collective as well 
as women-led anti-militarism network Code Pink, and has led 
workshops in nonviolent resistance and Earth Activist perma-
culture courses.50 As we see, both individualist and community- 
oriented wings of “spiritual anarchism” tend to identify “self” with 
the “Divine” yet they seem to mean different things by that asser-
tion (or at least translate them into very different implications and 
applications). Thus, while people have used the term “spiritual 
anarchism” to refer to everything in between Allin/Wilson/Bey and 
jones/Starhawk (as well as beyond that linear spectrum), no one 
has thus far studied it. 
This chapter aims to address and discuss gaps in relevant 
 scholarship as well as provide resources and ideas for new 
 conversations. I do not, however, provide a comprehensive or 
 rigorous study here. Instead, I offer these stories and findings as 
“conversation starters.” To these ends, I purposefully choose bread-
th over focus veering more toward encyclopedic than theoretical. 
Deviating from conventional structure, I provide cursory over-
views (the resources) interwoven throughout this chapter with cri-
 49 Starhawk 1988: 6, 7 10, 84.
 50 Not without her own challenges, Starhawk faced critique from MaxZine 
Weinstein (2003) who complained about adulation of the “anarcho-god-
dess” Starhawk at pagan events and her complicity in that. While believ-
ing in “greater forces,” Weinstein felt that “spirituality” easily turns into 
“religion” and “seduces radical anarchists and creates an environment of 
repackaged religion under the guise of some supposedly liberating spirit-
uality” (2003: 32).
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tical reviews (ideas) in dialogue with—not just about—those who 
advocate some form of “spiritual anarchism.” I organize the chap-
ter in the following sequence: introduction to the topic (Section 1: 
Introduction); discussion of conceptual framework and language 
(Section 2: Concepts and Language); overview of relevant termi-
nology and development (Section 3: Terms and Background); 
general overview of the literature (Section 4: Material); closer 
look at selected material with consideration of racial whiteness 
(Section 5: Critical View: A Race for Anarchy?); presentation of 
overlooked figures (Section 6: Spirited Away: Forgotten Legacies), 
and finally a turn toward stories of practice/organization rather 
than ideas and writing (Section 7: Beyond Words: A Critical View 
of “Spiritual Anarchist” Praxis). We currently have no field of—or 
broad conversations—about “spiritual anarchism” but, if we did, 
what might they look like? 
II. Concepts and language
Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) insisted that asymmetric power 
relations ultimately corrupted both sides of a relationship.51 The 
very fact that I can write (in English no less) and publish texts 
marks my own asymmetrical position of power—while resisting 
power—in a world where a billion people cannot read and a tiny 
fraction participate in “expert”-based academia. I value diversity 
and inclusion yet while varieties of English continue to expand, 
hundreds of indigenous languages continue to die out or face ext-
inction. In English, we have to work extra hard to see fundamen-
tal relationships and interdependence that come more naturally in 
Native tongues because we have words such as “religion,” “philo-
sophy,” “politics,” “science,” and so on that divide the world, divi-
de, knowledge, and divide people—unequally—from one another 
and the environment upon which we all depend. To help con-
ceptualize underlying complexities, connections, and paradoxes 
I add a significant caveat to all apparent binaries here: rather 
than either/or, read both/and (while leaving space for neither/
nor); rather than opposition, read complementarity; rather than 
 51 See Wollstonecraft (1792).
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a neat “study” that “proves” a “thesis,” read sets of subjective 
observations and perspectives aimed to challenge assumptions, in-
crease inclusion, and add to existing conversations about radical 
 personal and social transformation. This caveat of admitted “mes-
siness,” informed my (imperfect) choice to integrate some Native 
voices from (in the following order Oglala Lakota, Yankton band/
Standing Rock, Hopi, Yaqui, Klamanth, and Sisseton Wahpeton 
Oyate) throughout this chapter rather than attempt to select a 
single one in the section on “Forgotten Legacies.”52 Native voices 
collectively share worldviews that fundamentally challenge the 
conceptual and practical underpinnings and ideologies of English 
and academic discourse which unconsciously affect all who par-
take. As Maia Ramnath wrote in Decolonizing Anarchism: “The 
fact is that every dimension of modernity as we know it was built 
on colonial history.”53 Reconfiguring one term would entail re-
configuring the broader constellation of ideas in which it found 
itself embedded. As Timothy Fitzgerald (2007) has argued, the ca-
tegories of “religion” and “religions”, not only form a basis for 
“the ideology of religious studies,” they also play a foundational 
role in constituting modernity and colonial consciousness: “We 
are not studying what exists in the world, but by reproducing 
religion and religions we are tacitly reproducing the whole rhe-
torical configuration.”54 In this regard, “anti-religion” anarchists 
and religious studies scholars alike confirm colonial ideology by 
using these terms as if they apply universally. Cedric Robinson 
(1940–2016) went so far as to argue that European anarchists 
did not actually envision a new society but merely engaged in 
“rearranging the ideas of that bourgeois society.”55 H. L. T. Quan 
wrote that, “despite its claim of heresy, anarchism in the West re-
mains faithful and obedient to the ontologies and life-worlds that 
gave birth to it.”56 Similarly, Russell Means (1939–2012), of the 
American Indian Movement (AIM), accused capitalist industry, 
 52 To a lesser extent I interspersed mentions of Unitarian Universalists 
with whom I affiliate. 
 53 Ramnath 2011: 29.
 54 Fitzgerald 2007: 26. 
 55 Robinson 1980: 215.
 56 Quan 2013: 125.
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as well as “the so-called theories of Marxism and anarchism,” of 
“despiritualizing the universe.”57 
Most Native languages did not see a need to conceive of a “reli-
gion” or “spirituality” in order to describe their lives. Interestingly, 
the Chinese word “Dao” translates the “Way” and we hear 
this term among Native Americans. As told by Vine Deloria, Jr. 
(1933–2005):
Someone was telling me last night that when the Navajo went to 
the Parliament of World Religions in Cape Town last year, one 
of their elders said, “We don’t have a religion, but we do have a 
‘way.’” That’s why you didn’t have religious conflict between tribes. 
You might have fought over everything else—women, horses, or 
 buffalo—but not over religion. Each person, each group, had to do 
what their tradition told them to do.58 
While obeying “tradition” may sound overly restrictive, one gets 
an idea of such “restrictions” from the Hopi as told by Kendrick 
Fritz: “the Spider Grandmother did give two rules. To all men, not 
just Hopis. If you look at them, they cover everything. She said, 
‘Don’t go around hurting each other,’ and she said, ‘Try to under-
stand things.’…You learn to respect everything because you are 
everything”59 Rather than focusing on belief, emphasis has resided 
on pragmatism. Lee Irwin wrote, Native American spirituality “is 
not so much about things or actions or quantifiable beliefs, but 
about the consequences of human decisions, the quality of life, the 
way things work, how life is valued and enhanced.”60 With such 
justifiable restraints (recalling jones), Native people did not need 
“freedom of religion” because they generally did not suppress 
beliefs.61 As Rebecca Tsosie wrote:
…most traditional Native societies did not separate their systems 
of thought into separate domains of “religion,” “philosophy,” 
and “science,” although their epistemologies contain all of those 
 functions. To the contrary, many Native societies operate within a 
 57 Means 1991: 72–73; Also see Barsh (1988).
 58 Smith 2007: 12.
 59 Heat-Moon 1999: 187.
 60 Irwin 1996: 310–311.
 61 Also see Lindquist (2014: 87).
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holistic understanding of the rules and responsibilities that govern 
the relations between people and all components of the natural 
world, whether human or non-human.62
By imagining disciplinary categories (which Native people never 
had) and building institutions of research on those categories 
(imposed upon Natives through colonial occupation) European 
“Enlightenment” traditions embedded unconscious ideological 
commitment into the very fiber of supposedly “neutral” acade-
mic language and terminology. Ironically, technical sciences have 
advanced to the degree that English fails to describe the “reali-
ty” that quantum physics reveals. Physicist David Bohm (1980), 
a friend of J. Krishnamurti’s, sought to modify English (a form he 
called “rheomode”) in order to make it more similar to verb- based 
Native American languages that he saw as better suited to descri-
be quantum mechanics (forces that move rather than “are”).63 
These perspectives may help explain some of this chapter’s 
idiosyncrasies: (1) As with “religion,” I do not assume here that 
words such as “freedom” or “history” can have non-ideological 
senses,64 (2) I try to speak here of stories and translate “religious 
belief” or “ideology” as life-organizing stories and “religion” or 
“politics” as life-organizing practices, and (3) Except when quo-
ting others, I have avoided use of the verb “to be” (which “al-
lows us to play God using the omniscient ‘Deity mode’ of speech,” 
oversimplifies messy questions of “identity,” and ascribes transient 
reality a static character).65 With this conceptual foundation and 
 62 Tsosie 2012: 1138.
 63 On a related note, see Blackfoot Physics by Peat (2002).
 64 The English word “history” refers to a common language term for “past 
events,” personal life story, as a Eurocentric academic discipline, and as a 
linear-oriented system of bureaucratic records and documentation using 
the mythical birth year of Jesus as the center of chronology. For critical 
views of “history,” see Christian (2005) and Fuglestad (2005). The English 
word “Freedom,” refers to a dominant social value with mythic implica-
tions (people kill and die for it) yet remains ambiguous, contradictory 
(always tied to an “unfreedom”), and unnecessary (traditional  stateless 
societies had neither enslavement nor prisons yet no word for “freedom”). 
For a decolonizing of “freedom,” see Fiscella (2015: 130–276).
 65 Kellogg and Bourland 1991: 42; Bourland refers to English without 
forms of “to be” as E-Prime. 
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appreciation for some limitations and impact of English language 
bias, we proceed now to terminology. 
III. Terms and background
This section shall address some fundamental terms related to “spi-
ritual anarchism” beginning with its constituent components and 
ease toward an overview of early and current uses of the term. 
“Anarchism” has elicited a variety of interpretations. This in-
cludes reluctant anarchists who oppose government for prag-
matic reasons but do not necessarily oppose all government as 
a matter of principle66 and also includes reluctant statists who 
may regard the state as wrong in principle but do not necessari-
ly oppose government expansion in practical terms.67 Finally, it 
has also included people who simply organize with other people 
non-hierarchically.68
The term “spiritual” has a similarly wide range. Jeremy Carrette 
and Richard King (2005) traced it from the Latin spiritus (breath 
of life) to the individualization of the term which ostensibly  began 
with Ignatius Loyola (founder of the Jesuits) in the 1500s and, in 
particular, Madame Guyon in the 1600s. In the late 1800s and 
early 1900s, writers, speakers, and activists such as Swami 
 66 See, for example, Patricia Crone’s (2000) discussion of “reluctant anar-
chists” such as the Najdiyya and certain Mutazilite ascetics within early 
Islam. Though they preferred to have a righteous caliphate, circumstanc-
es led them to advocate anarchism.
 67 See, for example, Kate Soper’s interview with Noam Chomsky who has 
both advocated anarchism and supported expansion of the federal state 
or Kropotkin and other anarchists’s “reluctant statism” when they sup-
ported war against Germany in 1916 and received critique from Errico 
Malatesta who lambasted them as “pro-government anarchists” (Soper 
1998; Malatesta 1977: 248).
 68 Similarly, Barclay distinguished between anarchy (“the condition in which 
a society is stateless,” i.e., traditional indigenous societies) and anarchism 
(“the socio-political theory developed largely in nineteenth-century 
Europe which reject all forms of domination”) (2002: 105). Broad under-
standings of anarchism include Mohammed Bamyeh’s view of anarchy as 
the “de facto practice of everyday life” and David Graeber’s suggestion 
of “endless examples of viable anarchism… from a klezmer band to the 
international postal service” (Bamyeh 2010: 61; Graeber 2004: 40).
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Vivekananda, D. T. Suzuki, and Helena Blavatsky (co-founder of 
the Theosophical Society in 1875) popularized Anglophone inte-
rest in Eastern mysticism and the practice of “spiritualism” (com-
munication with the dead) similarly spread during this period. 
Descendants of enslaved Africans (like Natives) had European 
conceptions of “spiritual” diversity forced upon them:
Thrust into the bowels of New World terrorism, her inferior sta-
tus caused her at times to abort her old life-affirming notions of 
self and spirituality, and to adopt debilitating ones. She was now 
subjugated to the European’s wants, desires, and ways of life. His 
puritan mindset, proslavery rhetoric, anti-African ideology, biblical 
text, and colonial laws served to deaden her precolonial sense of 
selfhood and seal her subjugation.69
With Muslims, Christians, and Animists forced to live together 
through enslavement, “spirituality” for African Americans morp-
hed into an interfaith practice “that collectively sustained and em-
powered them in times of crisis. …It reconnected them to God, 
the spirit world, land, nature, and each other.”70
During the 1800s, “spiritual” developed a noun form as African 
Americans “learned the Christian language of their oppressor(s), 
reinterpreted and subverted that language, and creatively commu-
nicated that subversion in song.”71 This could entail blending ar-
chetypes from previous traditions with new ones. By “envisioning 
God and Christ as tricksters and usurpers,” African Americans 
made “a way out of no way” and “used their religious and spiritu-
al convictions to subvert White, racist, and patriarchal hegemony; 
…agitate for social justice; and maintain a sense of community.”72 
For many people, “spirituality” relates to anything from choir to 
cooking, from gardening to resistance. 
By the 1970s, the term “spiritual” could appear without any 
association of a “spirit world” such as in the second Humanist 
Manifesto of 1973 which stated: “The cultivation of moral devo-
tion and creative imagination is an expression of genuine ‘spiri-
 69 Harrison 2009: 54.
 70 Ibid: 208–209.
 71 Ibid: 200.
 72 Mattis and Jagers 2001: 523.
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tual’ experience and aspiration.”73 The term “spirituality” today 
often connotes what “spiritual anarchism” implied 100 years ago 
except, of course, framed in positive terms: “The goal is not to 
defer to higher authority, but to have the courage to become one’s 
own authority.”74 This appears relevant because, in the United 
States alone, an increasing number of people (already 17 million 
by 2012) identify as “spiritual but not religious” (a term popula-
rized by AA and Twelve-Step programs).75 
The first instances that I could find of any variant of “spiritual 
anarchism” appeared in newspaper articles in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s. These mentions of “spiritual anarchism” implied or 
denoted things as varied as atheism,76 pacifism,77 Theosophy,78 ab-
sence of moral direction,79 lawless libertinism,80 rejection of bib-
lical authority,81 and the dismal state of London cultural life in 
the 1920s.82 It often bore a negative connotation as in Mysticism 
(1911) where Evelyn Underhill insisted that the “view which re-
gards the mystic as a spiritual anarchist receives little support 
from history; which shows us, again and again, the great mystics 
 73 Gina Allen et al. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973. https://americanhuman-
ist.org/what-is-humanism/manifesto2/ 
 74 Heelas and Woodhead 2005: 4.
 75 Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, “‘Nones’ on the 
Rise,” 9 October 2012. http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-
the-rise/ Accessed 27 October 2014.
 76 A letter to the editor reads: “atheism is anarchism, in the spiritual realm” 
in the Blue-Grass Blade, Springer 1908: 15. 
 77 Krishnamurti 1944: 1.
 78 A “Dr. Coues” stated that members of the Theosophical Society “are 
to the spiritual world …what the Chicago anarchists are to the politi-
cal world… They are the spiritual anarchists …If they were numerous 
enough they would create disorder and confusion, and play sad pranks 
in society” (Evening Star 1889: 11).
 79 According to the British Medical Bulletin, “Without this loving despo-
tism of the parents, the child turns towards spiritual anarchism, becom-
ing a law unto himself, and missing the two primary ‘goods’ of human 
life—control of self and consideration of others” (1947: 249).
 80 Weltin 1956: 382.
 81 A “Reverend Omer” stated: “In the divine government, if every citizen 
were allowed to erect his own standard of duty, we would soon run into 
a state of spiritual anarchy” (St. Louis Republic 1902: 10).
 82 Banks 1930: 38.
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as  faithful sons of the great religions.”83 The first instance that I 
have found of a public advocate for some form of “spiritual anar-
chism” appeared in the semi-autobiographical novel El Árbol de la 
Ciencia (1911) by Pío Baroja (1872–1956) where the main charac-
ter “was inclined to a spiritual anarchism, based on kindness and 
piety, with no practical solution.”84 The earliest instance I found of 
“spiritual anarchist” to describe someone positively appeared in 
1914 where Voltairine de Cleyre (1866–1912) posthumously used 
the term to describe Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882).85 
Around the same period, Sri Aurobindo Ghose (also Ghosh, 
1872–1950) created perhaps the first explicit and specific articu-
lation of “spiritual anarchism” as an ideology.86 Aurobindo wro-
te “the perfectly spiritualised society will be one in which, as is 
dreamed by the spiritual anarchist, all men will be deeply free, 
and it will be so because the preliminary condition will have been 
 satisfied.”87 Using “Nature” as a guideline, Aurobindo felt that 
humanity ascended through “spiritual” stages corresponding to 
individualism/democracy, then socialism, and finally anarchism.88 
He saw both revolutionary and state force as necessary until the final 
stage when reason would rule. Probably with Tolstoy and Gandhi 
in mind, he critiqued “impossible self-abnegation” and “asceticism” 
which impoverished life and ignored the “many real and valuable 
gains” of “civilization.”89 Yet, as Vishwanath Varma (1976) obser-
ved, Aurobindo did not emphasize “spiritual anarchism” but rather 
saw it as a byproduct of a “spiritualized society.”90
 83 Underhill 2002: 95–96.
 84 1911: 55 (translation my own); Baroja had described himself as “a lib-
eral radical, an individualist and an anarchist” and an enemy of first 
“Church” and then “State” in that order (Baroja 1920: 219). 
 85 She wrote, “None who are familiar with the thought of Emerson can fail 
to recognize that it is spiritual Anarchism” (de Cleyre 1972: 145).
 86 Aurobindo published his ideas related to this as early as 1915–1918 in 
a series of articles later printed as books in The Ideal of Human Unity 
(1919) and The Human Cycle (1949).
 87 Aurobindo 1997: 259.
 88 Ibid: 193.
 89 Ibid: 219.
 90 Varma 1976: 300–304.
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W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963) figures as an early promoter of 
some form of “spiritual anarchism” through his use of similar 
terms as early as the 1920s. Like Aurobindo, he saw concentra-
ted power as a necessary stage before ultimately attaining “divine 
Anarchy” and this bothered him.91 Yet, the anarchic goal, however 
distant, remained important and intimate: “Anarchy of the Spirit 
alone is the true Freedom.”92 Yet in contrast to those who saw 
inner change as a precursor to social change, Du Bois saw the re-
verse and maintained that “individual equality and the free soul is 
impossible” without first establishing an essentially socialist socie-
ty that guarantees “equality of opportunity.”93 In David Haekwon 
Kim’s (2004) summary of Du Bois’s position: “there can be no 
spiritual freedom or anarchy without political freedom or anar-
chy.”94 Despite seeming to differ from Aurobindo in his emphas-
is on external change as a prerequisite for internal change, their 
views seem similar. Du Bois, however, did not develop the theme, 
nor did he have—as Aurobindo did—a woman like Mirra Alfassa 
(founder of Auroville) who would put those ideas into practice.
Within anarchist contexts, “spiritual anarchism” and “anar-
chist spirituality” seem to have necessarily implied a rejection 
of the state. Yet whatever type of “spiritual anarchist,” they all 
seem to reject the authority of church and state in determining 
beliefs or behavior. Beyond that, they often espouse some sort of 
sanctification of “self” (defined individually or collectively), a ge-
neral reverence for nature, conceptions of existential oneness, ex-
ternal social change as intertwined with internal personal change, 
and an emphasis on immediate experience and/or behavior and 
a critique of language limitations. In other words, contemporary 
use of “spiritual anarchism” does, however ambiguously, seem to 
refer to a certain terrain of ideas and practices wherein people 
typically view change as both “internal” and “external” and/or 
identify the self with the divine. If, then, “spiritual anarchism” 
serves as a useful term in some sense we can examine how some 
 91 Du Bois [1928] 1995: 283.
 92 Du Bois cited in Kim (2004: 69).
 93 Kim 2004: 67–69.
 94 Ibid: 68. For a development of Du Bois’ thought, especially in regard to 
his limitations on gender, see Griffin (2000).
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have used it, how they have not used it, and imagine how we 
could use it. 
IV. Material
This section shall provide a broad overview of various instances 
in which the term has appeared in order to capture a bird’s eye 
view of how people have treated the term. The first list includes all 
people whom I found designated “spiritual anarchist” by someone 
other than themselves. The second list includes every piece I could 
find that specifically addressed the topic of “spiritual anarchism” 
in one way or another. After presenting material in this section, we 
have a better grasp of what people have already said in order to 
make preliminary assessments about patterns (if any) and also to 
discuss what patterns did not appear. 
Concerning people whom observers have described as “spiri-
tual anarchist,” I found the following:95 Lao Tzu,96 Leo Tolstoy,97 
Henry David Thoreau,98 William Godwin,99 William Blake,100 
William Lloyd Garrison,101 Robert Anton Wilson (RAW),102 Peter 
Lamborn Wilson (PLW),103 William Burroughs,104 Ralph Waldo 
Emerson,105 Walt Whitman,106 Toshihiko Izutsu,107 Max Stirner,108 
 95 List compiled primarily through Internet and database searches.
 96 Fox 2001: 19–20.
 97 Cannon 2014.
 98 Canby 1929: 789.
 99 Ibid.
 100 Wilson 2002. Marshall wrote that Blake (1757–1827) saw humans as in-
terdependent with nature and “went on to reject all moral rules and man-
made laws” (Marshall 1944: 22). Marshall described him as “visionary 
anarchist” yet clearly sees Blake as both “spiritual” and “anarchist” (con-
firmed via correspondence with author 16 February 2019). 
 101 Boitani 1979: 218.
 102 Versluis 2014: 136.
 103 Ibid: 140.
 104 Ibid: 104.
 105 Žižka-Marušiaková 2012.
 106 Mitchell 2015; Sarracino 1974: 15.
 107 Ueno 2016.
 108 Henderson 1918: 4.
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Friedrich Nietzsche,109 Henrik Ibsen,110 Alan Clements,111 Remy 
de Gourmont,112 Pío Baroja,113 Abiezer Coppe,114 Jacob Frank,115 
Henry Corbin,116 Henry Miller,117 Henry Wright,118 Henry “Harry” 
Hay,119 Ivan Illich,120 Robert Ingersoll,121 Gustav Landauer,122 
Charlie Chaplin,123 Martin Buber,124 Mattias Gardell,125 
Gary Snyder,126 John Scotus Eriugena,127 Oliver Cromwell,128 
Shakespeare,129 Aleksandr “A. A.” Meier,130 Nikolai Berdyaev,131 
Rudolf Steiner,132 Jiddu Krishnamurti,133 Keshub Chandra Sen,134 
 109 Goodway 2011: 157; Iliopoulos 2014: 12.
 110 Ibid.
 111 Pignataro 2003: 20.
 112 Ibid.
 113 Gleaves 1971.
 114 Levy 1995: 141.
 115 Peter Lamborn Wilson described the neo-Sabbatean Jacob Frank in 
Poland as “spiritual anarchist” in Akers et al (2012).
 116 Ben Chasny cited in Riley (2017).
 117 Sarracino 1974.
 118 Whyte 2012: 83.
 119 Hay co-founded Radical Faeries. Wilson 2002.
 120 Ibid.
 121 Voorsanger 1913: 249.
 122 Newman 2010: 11. Landauer’s name often appears in these contexts. For 
more on his life and work, see Hoppen (2017), Landauer (2010), and 
Maurer (1971).
 123 Zein 2016: 6–7.
 124 Magid 2017: 58.
 125 Höjer 2007.
 126 Mazura 2017: 34; Ueno (2016: 153) claimed that Snyder had used the 
term “spiritual anarchism” in his essay “Buddhist Anarchism” (1961). 
I cannot however find evidence of that in any version that I have seen. 
For more on Snyder’s approach to anarchism and spirituality, see Taylor 
(2005).
 127 Eagleton 2010: 25.
 128 Harrison 1908: 149.
 129 Beadle 2015: 47.
 130 Iliopoulos 2014: 73.
 131 Ibid.
 132 Barnes 2005: 17; Also see Preparata (2006).
 133 Gopal 1995: 96.
 134 Rambachan 1994: 27.
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Swami Nirmalananda,135 Sri Aurobindo,136 Osho,137 Mohandas 
Gandhi,138 and, three of the few women associated with the term, 
Starhawk (Miriam Simos),139 author Anaïs Nin,140 and the British 
suffragette Dora Marsden.141 On a few occasions, authors have 
described “Hindus”142 or “shamans”143 in general as “spiritual 
anarchists.” Others have attributed the label to movements such as 
early Christians,144 Anabaptists in general,145 Tantra,146 Swiss 
Brethren in particular,147 New Age circles,148 certain Russian 
Symbolists,149 American Discordians,150 and Dadaism.151 
The following charts organize all of the essays, articles, books, 
lectures,152 and blogs that I could find that have explicitly dis-
cussed “spiritual anarchism” or “anarcho-spirituality.” In order 
to retain a semblance of focus, I have restricted this list to those 
 135 Martin 1999.
 136 Chakraborty 1997.
 137 Marshall 2010: 530, 746 citing Stewart Edwards, “Spiritual Anarchism,” 
Bulletin of Anarchist Research 21 July 1990: 26. (I have not yet acquired 
the original source that Marshall cited).
 138 Badrinath 2016: 42; Also, see Stallings-Ward comparing Gandhi and 
Durruti (2011).
 139 Amster 2012: 4.
 140 Fitch 1993: 200.
 141 Clarke 1996: 50.
 142 “The Hindu has been a spiritual anarchist, his faith being intensely per-
sonal and individualistic” (Mohammada 2007: 79); Also, see Khalfaoui 
2009: 85. Sri Aurobindo referred to India’s Golden Age as one of “spiri-
tual anarchism” (Ghosh 2011: 45).
 143 Lindquist 2004: 87.
 144 Jenson and Wilhite 2010: 81.
 145 Walker 2013: 57.
 146 Dowman 1985: 3. 
 147 Gross 2013.
 148 Cuda 2017: 82–83; Citing Bamyeh’s definition of anarchism, Cuda wrote: 
“New spirituality groups can be categorized as forms of anarchism” that 
“are organized outside of traditional religion, ‘voluntarily through various 
institutions, groups and informal networks, which form a theater of non-
state oriented methods of collaboration [and] mutual aid’” (2017: 93).
 149 Hellman 2018: 20. Also see Rosenthal (1977).
 150 Greer 2013: 183.
 151 Fernée 2014: 28.
 152 I have included recorded public lectures but not online videos/podcasts 
sans audience. I made one exception with Herve from Los Angeles who 
identified as homeless. 
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that included a variant of “spiritual anarchism” (alt. “anarchist 
spirituality,” “anarcho-spirituality,” etc.) in the heading of their 
presentation or at least use the phrase repeatedly in their talk or 
text. The more that a presenter performed research, spoke des-
criptively, tried to present more than one perspective, and provi-
ded the listener/reader with sources (footnotes, bibliography, etc.), 
the more likely I would categorize their work as formal (Chart 1). 
The less they did, the more likely I would categorize it as pole-
mical (Chart 3). As a spectrum, I placed those with a blended 
 approach in the middle (Chart 2).
In the first list (above the three charts) of 46 individuals labeled 
“spiritual anarchist,” we see skewed ethnic representation through 
an abundance of white male writers (including four Henrys and six 
Williams/William’s sons aka Wilsons), eight Asian names appeared 
(six of those from India), and no indigenous peoples, Central or 




































































































































 153 Less than a page of his deals explicitly with the term “spiritual anar-
chism” yet Marshall views many of the topics covered throughout the 
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South Americans, Middle Easterners, Africans, or anyone from the 
African diaspora.159 We see a skewed gender representation with 
three of the 46 as white women (no women of color). Similarly, 
in regard to movements, several movements labeled “spiritual 
anarchist” seemed white-dominant (Dadaism, Anabaptism, and 
Symbolism), two originated in India, and only in one instance, 
shamanism, did the term apply to an indigenous tradition.
Although most of the names have acquired renown through 
their writing rather than activism, in my subjective and open-to-
question view, one might see at least half of the forty-six as enga-
ging in activism or organizing work of some kind, yet only fifteen 
of thirty-five white males seem inclined in this direction, all six of 
the Indian males, and two of the three white females engaged in 
extensive activism.160 Also, note that many of the people labeled 
“spiritual anarchists” did not reject the state on principle (Nin, 
Cromwell, Aurobindo, Ingersoll, etc.) indicating that the term has 
sometimes implied broad definitions of “anarchism.”
In the second list (Charts 1–3), of 30 presentations, we find 
no ethnographic or qualitative studies of “spiritual anarchist” 
practice. Yet two (1.8 and 2.6) seemed to clearly focus on 
group practice more than individual writers and their ideas: 
Gross (2.6) looked at Swiss Brethren practices while Anisin’s stu-
dy on nonviolent activism concluded: “No spiritually committed 
 anarchists have been observed to engage in violent dissent or … 
advocating violent actions.”161 In my highly subjective assessment, 
 159 To clarify, I see race as a social construction (superstition) that powerfully 
influences social life and I drew these assessments based on popular racial 
norms to expose the racial dynamics that tend to grant greater attention 
to people seen as “white men.”
 160 While tentative and subjective, I categorized the following as engaged 
in notable activism or organizational work, founding organizations, 
campaign work, civil disobedience, etc: Garrison, RAW, PLW, Coppe, 
Frank, Wright, Hay, Illich, Ingersoll, Landauer, Chaplin, Buber, Gardell, 
Cromwell, Steiner, Sen, Nirmalananda, Aurobindo, Osho, Krishnamurti, 
Gandhi, Starhawk, and Marsden.
 161 Anisin 2019: 391; Ambiguities, however, remain. Discussions of 
Aurobindo (1.1 and 2.2) may focus on ideas but Aurobindo’s aim toward 
practice ultimately manifested in the creation of Auroville. Weinstein’s 
(2.4) one-page piece focused personal experiences of group practice, 
PLW/Bey (2.1, 2.3, and 2.4) and, building on his work, Cypher (2.7), 
From Benign Anarchy to Divine Anarchy 285
eight of them seemed to lean in a communal/collectivist direction 
and/or emphasize some form of activism, social practice, and/or 
organization,162 twelve seemed to lean toward individualism and/
or emphasized writers, ideas, theory, and/or cognitive transforma-
tion,163 and thirteen seemed to fit neither category comfortably.164
Here, too, we can see an overrepresentation of whites as authors/
presenters, three from Asia (two from India), and none from any 
Native or African background or perspective. We also see a form 
of segregation in that mostly Indian writers addressed Aurobindo 
and the other group of largely (or wholly) white writers gene-
rally ignored him and his work.165 No presentation in Chart 1 
gave any attention to either Krishnamurti, Native Americans, or 
African/African diaspora-based groups as “spiritual anarchists.” 
In the next charts, two quoted Krishnamurti (3.5 and 3.8).166 
Shamanism and Native Americans also garner some (not extensi-
ve) attention in Charts 2 and 3, in least eight instances167 and we 
found a slight increase of attention to Africans/African diaspora 
with discussion of Moorish Science Temple (2.3 and 2.7)168 and 
discussed a wide variety of group practices in cursory sketches making 
them more difficult to categorize here in regard to practice.
 162 See 1.8, 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 3.9, and 3.11.
 163 See 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 3.1, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8.
 164 See 1.1, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.11, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.11.
 165 Marshall gave Aurobindo a paragraph (1992: 529). Versluis mentioned 
Aurobindo twice in his book but not in relation to “spiritual anarchism” 
and likewise for Tolboll. I have seen only one anarchist studies scholar, 
Brian Morris, give any notable attention to Aurobindo (1996: 108–111).
 166 Inspired by Krishnamurti’s assertion that “Truth is a pathless land” and 
his conception of “aloneness,” Tolboll devoted an entire section of his 
book to Krishnamurti (2014: 19–26); Wretch quoted Krishnamurti as 
stating “it is no measure of health to be well adjusted to a profoundly sick 
society” (n.d.: 71).
 167 2.1, 2.10, 2.3, 2.7, 2.8, 3.3, 3.8, and 3.10.
 168 The Moorish Science Temple (MST) appears repeatedly in Wilson/Bey’s 
work. In the early 1900s Noble Drew Ali (1886–1929) re-named/re-
claimed African Americans as “Moors” and re-interpreted Jesus to mean 
“justice.” He founded the Moorish Science Temple which spread its 
teachings through a new scripture: The Circle Seven Koran (no relation to 
the Quran) in the years immediately prior to the founding of the Nation 
of Islam by W. D. Fard. In 1986 Wilson revived a defunct white beat-
nik “branch” of Moorish Science named the Moorish Orthodox Church 
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brief mentions of “Bwiti people of Africa” and their use of the 
plant Iboga plant (2.8).169 
Only Cypher (2.7) discussed Fiver Percenters170 and Rastafaris, 
noting that the former broke down “ISLAM” as “I Self Lord And 
Master,” and “ALLAH” as “Arm Leg Leg Arm Head” (references to 
the self as God).171 In regard to Rastas, Cypher acknowledged them 
as a decentralized group fighting an oppressive state (Babylon) 
with degrees of self-sufficiency and they engage in “reclaiming and 
redefining language based on their spiritual views.”172 
Finally, Waldo Noesta (2.11) quoted black liberation scholar 
Angela Davis’s revision of the Serenity Prayer: “I am no longer 
accepting the things I cannot change. I’m changing the things I 
cannot accept.”173
As with the first list, most—but not all—of the presentations 
advocated a rejection of the state as well as church authority. 
(see Knight 2012: 20–23; 87–92). The MST shared commonalities with 
the Ahmadiyya, Rosicrucians, Theosophical currents, Freemasons such 
as the Ancient Egyptian Arabic Order Nobles Mystic Shrine (Black 
Shriners), and, in name at least, the Moorish Zionist Temple founded 
in 1899. For more on MST, see Curtis (2009), Nance (2002). For black 
Freemasonry (a major influence on the MST and later the Nation of 
Islam) see Sesay (2013).
 169 Broze and Vibes (2015: 48) referred (in passing) to the Bwiti tradition in 
Gabon in regard to the psychotropic Iboga plant. So did Wretch who also 
mentioned the Somali xeer system of conflict resolution (n.d.: 425, 85).
 170 Also known as the Nation of Gods and Earths (NGE).
 171 Promoting an egalitarian and antiauthoritarian interpretation of Islam 
via Nation of Islam (NOI) teachings, Five Percenters similarly reject the 
idea of a “mystery God” in the sky. They re-named Harlem “Mecca” and 
Brooklyn “Medina,” they avoid pork, and yet, unlike the NOI, they ada-
mantly reject the label of “Muslims”—in favor of “Gods” (Knight 2007). 
Five Percenters have developed a complex interpretational system called 
the Supreme Alphabet and Supreme Mathematics, which they use to 
build on tradition with new interpretations, essentially co- creating doc-
trine in participatory democratic gatherings reminiscent of the Vırasaivas 
of twelfth century India where men and women would share poetry to-
gether in meeting halls and co-create group doctrine (Schouten 1991: 4).
 172 Cypher 2014. Indeed, the Rasta term “I-and-I” means both “we” and 
“God.” As Edmonds noted, for Rastas the “locus of authority is in each 
individual” (2003: 71). 
 173 Noesta 2019.
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If exclusively white and Asian people have used the term “spi-
ritual anarchist,” that may help explain why we have never heard 
the term “anarchist spiritual” to refer to African American spiri-
tuals. Frederick Douglass said he would “bow to no priests either 
of faith or of unfaith,”174 yet I have yet to see anyone declare him 
a “spiritual anarchist.” This, in light of a range from Shakespeare 
to Anaïs Nin and from Cromwell to Ingersoll, begs the question 
as to who does not qualify. Dynamics of whiteness and structu-
ral racism seem to play a role in perception of the term but they 
do not fully explain “spiritual anarchism’s” apparent boundaries: 
I could not find anyone having ever described two well-known 
white men, Noam Chomsky and William James, as “spiritual 
anarchist.” With the former a prominent anarchist who has ad-
vocated “spiritual transformation”175 and the latter a forerunner 
of contemporary “spirituality” who advocated anarchism,176 one 
might think they would qualify. While exploring such questions 
lies beyond the scope of this chapter, we can take at least take a 
closer look at how some racial dynamics seem to have related to 
“spiritual anarchism.”
V. Critical view: a race for anarchy?
Tensions between people of color and white anarchists have long 
persisted in various forms.177 “Spiritual anarchists” have proven 
no exception. Adopting ideas from Indigenous peoples, African 
Americans, or “heretical” Islam—even “respectfully”—does not 
come without complications. Looking back we can see a long-term 
pattern of stolen words and distorted tales. Innocent Onyewuenyi 
argued that, “what we call Greek or Western Philosophy is copied 
from indigenous African philosophy of the ‘Mystery System.’ All 
 174 Aptheker 2001: 77.
 175 Chomsky supported Rosa Luxemburg’s call for “spiritual transforma-
tion” (Chomsky 2013: 46).
 176 William James wrote in 1900: “I am becoming more and more an indi-
vidualist and anarchist and believer in small systems of things exclusive-
ly” (Coon 1996: 81).
 177 E.g., Lagalisse (2011) and Hahn (2014: 124).
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the values of the mystery system were adopted by the Greeks and 
Ionians who came to Egypt to study.”178
As white Freemasons took inspiration from Islamic and 
Middle Eastern cultures, the Founding Fathers drew from Native 
Americans as they imagined and conceived new forms of go-
vernance. Two primary examples shall illustrate some tensions 
in contexts of “spiritual anarchism”: the literary blackface and 
orientalism of Wilson/Bey and Burroughs. Let’s start by looking 
at two quotes:
[D]ue to self-detrimental mental programs that have been installed 
in you by your parents, family, society, school, religion, consensus 
reality, etc. you have been limited and disabled. 
— Hakim Bey, Secret of Secrets, 2011.
What mysticism really tries to surmount is false consciousness, il-
lusion, Consensus Reality, & all the failures of self that accompany 
these ills. 
— Hakim Bey, T.A.Z. 1985/2003.
The two quotes seem to reference a single author and both mention 
“consensus reality” yet appearances deceive. How? Quite simp-
ly: two different people currently write under the name “Hakim 
Bey.” The first Hakim Bey, author of Secret of Secrets,179 appears 
African American, self-identifies as a Moor, and has membership 
in the Moorish Science Temple. The second Hakim Bey (PLW) 
appears European American, self-identifies as an anarchist, and, 
after working for the government of the Shah of Iran, returned to 
his native New York and revived the Moorish Orthodox Church 
(a somewhat Discordian-like white beatnik network of Noble 
Drew Ali enthusiasts). As Knight stated, “people often speak 
of the ‘black Hakim Bey’ and the ‘white Hakim Bey’ as though 
they’re oppositional twins in some cosmic dualism.”180 By writing 
T.A.Z. under that pseudonym, Wilson gave readers the image of a 
black man precisely because the name evokes the Moorish Science 
Temple (where members typically adopt the last name “Bey” or 
 178 Cited in King 1999: 29.
 179 Written under the name Moorpheus H. B. (2011).
 180 Knight 2012: 70.
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“El”). By borrowing the color and assumed authenticity of blacks, 
this male white gained street credibility and performed a symbolic 
coup by firing the imagination of readers who might otherwise 
have found an identical text by “Peter Lamborn Wilson” less in-
spirational. Furthermore, the words, “Hakim” (“wise”) and “Bey” 
(“prince”), have very different implications in relation to race in 
the United States. When a black man takes a name of prestige, he 
acts to re-capture a sense of dignity, humanity, and prestige that 
whites had stolen from him and his ancestors. Whites (especially 
from the upper middle-class) who call themselves “wise princes” 
build upon a racial foundation of prestige and skin privilege crea-
ted through theft, exploitation, and colonialism.
In another example, William Burroughs and Brion Gysin po-
pularized the phrase “Nothing is true––everything is permitted” 
(hereafter NITEIP) which has appeared in mainstream cultural 
contexts such as the TV series True Blood and the computer game 
Assassin’s Creed. It seems to offer universal license for any ac-
tivity. Burroughs attributed the phrase to the last words of the 
famous head of the Assassins, Hasan-i Sabbah, and, through his 
fictional writing, Burroughs built up his own mythology around 
Sabbah. In Wilson’s words: “‘Nothing is true; everything is per-
mitted.’ This was the teaching of Hasan-i Sabbah, the first Grand 
Master of Alamut, called the Old Man of the Mountain.”181 
Miles (2000), Gieger (2005), and later Knight (2012) false-
ly described NITEIP as the result of a “cut-up experiment” by 
Burroughs.182 Supposedly Gysin and Burroughs had rearrang-
ed or simply taken the words from a chapter heading in Betty 
Bouthoul’s (1936) book on the Assassins and haphazardly con-
nected it to Hasan-i Sabbah’s dying words. The story fails on 
several counts. First, Bouthoul used the exact phrase “Nothing is 
true; everything is permitted” (“Rien n’est vrai, tout est permis”) 
both as chapter title and in the text claiming that Hasan-i Sabbah 
spoke it as his dying words.183 Burroughs and Gysin simply took 
the phrase and story directly from Bouthoul without any creati-
 181 Wilson 1988: 56. 
 182 “Cut-up” = the cutting up text and rearranging the words. See Geiger 
(2005: 145–148) and Knight (2012: 18).
 183 Bouthoul 1936: 196.
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ve input. Nietzsche had also used the phrase (“Nichts ist wahr, 
Alles ist erlaubt”) decades earlier yet both he and Bouthoul 
seem to have taken the phrase from an 1818 book in Bouthoul’s 
bibliography by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall who used varia-
tions of the phrase to describe the philosophy of the Assassins 
but he neither attributed the phrase directly to Hasan-i Sabbah, 
did not use quote marks, nor cite any source for the phrase.184 
It seems that von Hammer-Purgstall interpreted the Ismailis; 
Nietzsche popularized this interpretation; Bouthoul embellished 
it and placed the phrase in Hasan-i Sabbah’s dying mouth; Gysin 
and Burroughs popularized the phrase in the U.S. (and mysti-
fied their own behavior with smoky clouds of Eastern exoticism). 
This mystique served not only to justify raw individualism but 
also disguise their own relationships to colonialism and racism.185 
The disguise worked so well that biographer Miles could list “all 
of the hideous personages” of Burroughs, including “Hassan-
i-Sabbah” and “an old Southern nigger-killin’ sheriff” without 
mentioning any racial implications.186
By taking the reader through the gradual steps of this narra-
tive construction I hope it clarifies how passive acceptance of 
“white people’s words” combined with orientalist manipula-
tions both objectifies and distorts colonized cultures and—in 
Wollstonecraft’s terms—corrupts both sides of the asymmetrical 
relationship. From Quakers’ problematic and paternalistic re-
lationship with Native Americans187 to complex ways in which 
Freemasons both created interfaith community centers based to 
some degree on mutual aid and also primarily served white pe-
ople (including Unitarians and Universalists such as Thomas Starr 
King, Thaddeus Mason Harris, and Hosea Ballou as well as anar-
chists such as Mikhail Bakunin and occultist Aleister Crowley), 
 184 Thanks to Jeff B. Taylor at Vanderbilt University who conducted this 
research and supplied details through correspondence: “Origins,” https://
my.vanderbilt.edu/jefftaylor/publications/origins/
 185 For more on Orientalism and how white Occidentals have a long tradi-
tion of shaping and distorting images of the East, see Said (1979) and 
King (1999).
 186 Miles 2000: 184–185.
 187 Milner 1982.
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race has affected social justice struggles.188 While the Unitarian 
Universalist Association (UUA) organizes according to a congrega-
tional polity akin to Bakunin’s federalism and act as pioneers of 
social justice, they too have struggled with racism in their mem-
bership and institutions.189 Even an anarchist such as John Collier 
helped entrench colonialism when he helped shape the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs for the U.S. government.190 More recently, the 
anarchic and largely white Rainbow Family of Light, also called 
Rainbow Nation, came into conflict when they planned to gather 
8,000–20,000 people in Black Hills, South Dakota in 2015 and 
a Lakota group, United Urban Warriors Society, viewing the land 
as sacred, ardently opposed the plan. Two Lakota activists com-
plained that “the Rainbow Family has no leaders, and no one 
is really accountable.”191 Michael Muhammad Knight came into 
conflict with Five Percenters when he accused Lord Jamar of ho-
mophobia. Knight ended his identification as a Five Percenter 
and framed his departure as a result of sexism and homophobia 
among Five Percenters (both of which he knew of when he joi-
ned). He accompanied his farewell essay with a pink and lavender 
version of the Five Percenter’s logo, the Universal Flag, to which 
a QueenAishah Intelligence responded “looks like you an agent[.] 
your determined idea was never to learn because if it was you 
would do just that and stay in your lane[,] not turn around and 
slander the Nation take the flag and disrespect the people that 
made it.”192 Tensions appear even in close relationships. Across 
 188 For prominent Unitarians and Universalists as Freemasons, see Sala 
(2000). For Bakunin as Freemason, see Lagalisse (2018: 297). Crowley 
additionally admitted working as an agent for the British state (Spence 
2000: 361).
 189 For Bakunin’s outline for anarchist federation, see Dolgoff (2002). For 
racism and the UUA, see Morrison-Reed (2011). For UUs and anarchism, 
see Dewey (2004). For an anarchist UU approach to challenging racism, 
see Crass (2001). 
 190 Hauptman 1983.
 191 Briquelet 2015. Ultimately, both sides seemed divided on the question 
and less than 1,500 “Rainbow warriors” showed up with minimal 
confrontations.
 192 See Knight 2013 plus comments.
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chasms such as racial divides, we can at least begin with acknow-
ledging the violence of silence.
VI. Spirited away: forgotten legacies
With much focus on individual white writers, focus on people of co-
lor and activist groups has fallen by the wayside. While impossible 
to address all such cases, this section briefly covers J. Krishnamurti, 
Earth First!, Womanism, MOVE, and indigenous peoples. 
Discussions of “spiritual anarchism” in general have largely ig-
nored J. Krishnamurti’s tremendous, long-term, and widespread 
influence. Aside from his literature, videos, and recordings, 
Krishnamurti’s legacy continues on in the schools that he founded. 
Furthermore, many anarchists and activists over the years have 
taken his message to heart. In 2005, the journal Green Anarchy 
published an anonymously written text on Krishnamurti’s phi-
losophy (alongside references to Daoism, William Blake, and 
Dadaism). For the author, one of Krishnamurti’s most important 
contributions entailed his emphasis on challenging authorities 
in our “internal environment,” the presuppositions that uncons-
ciously direct us. After all, “if ‘spirituality’ is synonymous with 
self-awareness, then those that don’t seek it are all mad as hatters. 
… all robots, and sleepwalkers.” The author concluded with quo-
tes from Krishnamurti such as:
Friends, why don’t you worship a cloud? Why don’t you pray to the 
man who is labouring in the fields, or take delight in shadows cast 
on tranquil waters? While you are worshipping in an enclosed shri-
ne, Life dances in the street and escapes you. If you do not test your 
strength by throwing away your crutches, how can you know your 
integrity, your vitality? …and enjoy that which creates all things.193
The author did not mention (and perhaps did not know) that other 
anarchists have discussed Krishnamurti’s work. Krishnamurti influ-
enced a wide range of people from writers such as Aldous Huxley, 
Henry Miller, Marshall Rosenberg, Alan Watts, and Timothy 
Fitzgerald to activists such as the Black Panthers, martial arts le-
 193 Krishnamurti quoted by Green Anarchy (2005: 13).
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gend Bruce Lee, Osho, and the founders of the anarchist commune 
Beeville in New Zealand.194 At one point in time, an anonymous 
editor surreptitiously cut and pasted his words into an apocryphal 
text supposedly documenting a debate between W. D. Fard (foun-
der of the Nation of Islam) and Albert Einstein in 1933.195
As early as 1931 the feminist Maria Lacerda de Moura wro-
te in Estúdios that Krishnamurti had influenced her.196 In 1935, 
Krishnamurti critiqued war, nationalism, and “religion” through 
seven lectures in São Paolo and Rio de Janeiro and Brazilian anar-
chist press covered his talks positively.197 According to Mendiola, 
in 1936, a Spanish vegetarian named Celestino García avoided 
“politics” and studied Krishnamurti. He and a friend  attempted 
to evade participation in the Spanish Civil War yet ultimate-
ly consented to serve in the Bakunin battalion without bearing 
arms.198 In 1960 the newspaper of the syndicalist AIT/CNT in 
exile, Solidaridad Obrera published an article by J. Tato Lorenzo, 
co-founder of the Hermanidad Universal Anarquista, where he 
discussed Krishnamurti’s teaching on ending exploitation and ba-
lancing reason and emotion through experimentation: “Find your 
own path and rise forth. …Belief is the wealth of the ignorant.”199
 194 Black Panther David Hilliard stated, “we lived by some of the Eastern 
philosophies of Krishnamurti. Vegetarianism was a big thing in our BPP. 
Our school was vegetarian [and] children were on a vegetarian diet.” 
“The Satya Interview with David Hilliard,” 2004. http://satyamag.com/
apr04/hilliard.html). Bruce Lee created a new martial arts style, Jeet Kune 
Do, based on Krishnamurti’s teaching (O’Regan 2005). Osho’s commune 
Rajneeshpuram named a lake after Krishnamurti (Carter 1990: 10). For 
his influence on Rosenberg, see Rosenberg (2003: 28). Inspired in part by 
Krishnamurti, members of the Beeville commune (1933–1973) in New 
Zealand lived a vegetarian and pacifist lifestyle, engaged in direct action 
(such as the refusal to pay “war taxes”), regularly served time in jail for 
refusing military service, and once even broke a fellow member out of 
prison (Sargisson and Sargent 2004: 33–35).
 195 Aside from Krishnamurti (1970: 129), the text also lifted liberally from 
Sikh and Christian Scientist sources. For a more detailed discussion, see 
Fiscella (2015: 361–363).
 196 Queluz 2018.
 197 Ibid.
 198 Mendiola 2015: 12. (Thanks Santiago Gorostiza!)
 199 Lorenzo 1960: 1. Translation from Spanish my own. Supposedly anar-
chists associated with the individualist anarchist journal Iniciales also 
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In his 1973 work on communes, Laurence Veysey wrote: 
“Emma Goldman thought it was worth devoting half a page of 
Mother Earth to a scornful account of Krishnamurti’s first arrival 
in America as the announced Theosophical avatar.”200 However, 
Goldman’s text appeared in 1913. Krishnamurti (barely 18 at the 
time) did not arrive in the U.S. until 1922. Nor did the article 
mention Krishnamurti’s name or seem to know anything about 
him. It stated: “It is fortunate that this time the Savior of the 
world is to be a real Yankee. Were he—God forbid—a foreigner, 
he would in all probability fall into the hands of the Immigration 
Bureau and be deported, so that the millions of Americans would 
be robbed of salvation and be doomed to eternal hell-fire.”201 
Later, Road to Freedom, a follow-up journal to Mother Earth, 
quoted Krishnamurti positively in 1930.202 In 1952 Henry Miller 
 described Krishnamurti thusly:
His career, unique in the history of spiritual leaders, reminds one 
of the famous Gilgamesh epic. Hailed in his youth as the coming 
Savior, Krishnamurti renounced the rôle that was prepared for him, 
spurned all disciples, rejected all mentors and preceptors. He in-
itiated no new faith or dogma, questioned everything, cultivated 
doubt (especially in moments of exaltation), and, by dint of heroic 
struggle and perseverance, freed himself of illusion and enchant-
ment, or pride, vanity, and every subtle form of domination over 
others. …“You seek truth,” he says again, “as it if were the opposite 
of what you are.” 
“Man is his own liberator!” Is this not the ultimate teaching? …
He has often been referred to as “the World Teacher.” If any man 
living merits the title, he does. But to me the important thing about 
Krishnamurti is that he imposes himself upon us not as a teacher, 
nor even as a Master, but as a man.203
studied Krishnamurti’s work yet I do not have documentation to verify 
this. 
 200 Veysey 1973: 45–46. Based on Veysey, Lagalisse repeated this informa-
tion (2018: 307).
 201 Mother Earth 1913: 196. Thank you to Candace Falk at the Goldman 
Papers for digging up this source!
 202 Veysey 1973: 49.
 203 Ibid: 153, 159.
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Miller’s depiction neatly captured a contradiction behind the al-
lure and drama of Krishnamurti’s seemingly egalitarian message: 
it depended upon the elite status that he rejected. In demolishing 
that glamorous pedestal he settled for a more modest one but he 
never lived an adult life without a pedestal.
For others who have spoken a similar message, attention has 
not come so easily. Especially when they have translated those ide-
as into action. We find, for example, very similar starting points of 
Oneness with nature in womanism, Earth First!, and The MOVE 
Organization who turned these basic premises into a pragmatic 
call to defend animals and Mother Earth from assault by humans. 
Alice Walker, inspired by Zen (among other things), wrote:
Womanism is a social change perspective rooted in Black women’s 
and other women of color’s everyday experiences and everyday 
methods of problem solving in everyday spaces extended to the 
problem of ending all forms of oppression for all people, restoring 
the balance between people and the environment/nature, and re-
conciling human life with the spiritual dimension.204
A womanist: “Loves the Spirit …Loves struggle. …Loves herself. 
Regardless.”205 Walker, who has expressed support for MOVE, 
wrote: “Certainly I don’t believe there is a God beyond nature. 
The world is God.”206 Not only does womanism embrace diver-
se DIY “spiritualities,” it involves an inclusive and broad-based 
“struggle against oppression based on race, gender, and class.”207 
Although given a name recently, one can trace the intersectional 
essence of womanism much farther back. For example, Frances 
Ellen Watkins Harper (1825–1911), an orphan who grew up to 
write and speak as one of the country’s foremost authors and abo-
litionists. Historian LaRese Hubbard described Harper as “one of 
the most important figures in African American intellectual his-
tory” and a “womanist sani-baat, a Wolof word and Senegalese 
 204 Phillips 2006: xx. At least one scholar, Jessica Sadr, has noticed that 
“natural anarchism and ecowomanism share conceptual and practical 
similarities for addressing ecological degradation and remedying uneven 
relationships between humans and non-human life” (2013: 18).
 205 Walker 1983: xii.
 206 Ibid: 265. 
 207 Vanessa Sheared cited in Razak (2013: 221).
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concept of ‘voice throwing’ [meaning] a disruptive and self-affir-
ming insertion of women’s voice in spaces and discourses which 
would exclude or silence them.”208 Harper called for “[e]arnest, 
self-sacrificing souls” who would make their mark and not allow 
“blood stained government” to buy their loyalty.209 When living in 
Philadelphia, she attended both the white First Unitarian Church 
and the black African Methodist Episcopal Church where she tau-
ght Sunday school class. In response to racism in the suffragette 
movement, she teamed up with Harriet Tubman210 and others to 
found the National Association of Colored Women (NACW) in 
1896 (reaching 100,000 members by 1924).211 With the slogan 
“Lifting as we Climb,” the NACW “built schools, ran orphana-
ges, founded homes for the aged, set up kindergarten programs, 
and formed agencies in New York and Philadelphia to help female 
migrants from the South find jobs and affordable housing.”212 
According to Nash, Dave Foreman, white co-founder of the 
generally anarchist eco-activist group Earth First!, “liked to say 
that ‘I’m operating as part of the wilderness defending myself,’ 
and that monkeywrenching was ‘self-defense on the part of the 
Earth.’”213 Another environmental activist described “spirituality” 
as knowing “what the trees are saying. …It has [convinced me 
we are not] separate from each other, and from the rocks, and 
everything else.”214 With these perspectives various Earth First! 
and animal liberation activists have committed acts of sabotage 
to prevent companies from “developing” land and killing or in-
carcerating animals. Bron Taylor described tactics of Earth First! 
and animal liberation activists as including tree spiking, sinking 
whaling ships, hunt sabotage, and arson attacks against trucks, 
research laboratories, ski lodges, or meat factories. Often however 
 208 Hubbard 2012: 68, 74.
 209 Sehulster 2010: 1138.
 210 For more on Tubman, whom Monica J. Evans called “that most prom-
inent of outlaw women,” see May (2014); Evans cited in jones (2009: 
239).
 211 Now called the National Association of Colored Women’s Clubs 
(NACWC). 
 212 Rubiner 1996.
 213 Nash 1989: 196.
 214 Taylor 2010: 97.
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“self-defense on the part of the Earth” has entailed less confron-
tational methods. In December 1997, a vegan activist named Julia 
“Butterfly” Hill climbed a giant redwood (dubbed “Luna” by 
Earth First! activists) in order to save the tree from logging. She 
spent two years living atop the tree, enduring winter storms and 
frostbite, yet “drawing strength from the tree” and only coming 
down “after negotiating an agreement with the logging compa-
ny that left Luna standing as well as a two-hundred foot buffer 
of surrounding trees.”215 She said she could feel the tree crying 
when the company had cut down trees in the vicinity. Graham 
Innes buried himself in a road up to his neck in order to hinder a 
company from cutting down trees. He described how, during this 
period, he felt an “awareness of a hitherto unknown  connection—
Earth bonding [when the Earth’s] pulse became mine, and the ves-
sel, my body, became the vehicle for her expression.”216 In 2012 
the Earth First! Journal published three pages by and about The 
MOVE Organization.217 Here we could read, for example, Phil 
Africa writing from prison: 
I just wanted to show some appreciation for the work yall do. It 
does us all good to see people out there with the courage to stand up 
for what’s Right against this rotten system. …People need to realize 
that when they take a stand for what’s Right it is for Themselves 
they are fighting for. People must realize that there is Nothing more 
important than LIFE/NATURE. …To quote JOHN AFRICA: “THE 
EARTH IS FOOD, WITHOUT EARTH THE SEED IS DEAD, 
WITHOUTH THE SEED THE EARTH IS DEAD, WITHOUT 
FOOD ALL LIFE IS DEAD FOR IT AIN’T THE CABBAGE THAT 
IS THE FOOD, IT IS THE LIFE IN THE CABBAGE THAT KEEP 
YOU ALIVE. EARTH IS LIFE, THE CABBAGE IS EARTH, WHEN 
YOU EAT THE CABBAGE YOU ARE EATIN’ THE SOIL JUST 
A[S] SURELY AS YOU ARE DRINKIN’ YOUR BREATH WITH 
EVERY SWALLOW OF WATER WHEN THIRSTY” …end quote 
LONG LIVE JOHN AFRICA!218 
 215 Taylor 2010: 94.
 216 Ibid: 95.
 217 For a comparison of MOVE’s significance in legal studies and their rela-
tive exclusion from religious studies, see Fiscella (2016). 
 218 Africa 2012: 12. Particular spellings and emphasis in original.
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John Africa founded the MOVE Organization in Philadelphia in 
the early 1970s. Based on the principle of the absolute unity of 
life, members lived communally and strove to end all violence 
 (including pollution, racism, prisons, and war). Rejecting trash 
collection, they put their food scraps on their yard and attracted 
large numbers of roaches and rats. Defending these “vermin” aga-
inst pesticide probably made MOVE the first activist group to de-
fend the rights of insects.219 After a period of weekly study sessions 
of the teaching of John Africa, MOVE began protesting zoos, pet 
stores, and the local Board of Education. Confrontations with po-
lice left a MOVE infant dead in 1976, a police officer dead in 
1978, nine MOVE members serving 30–100 year sentences, and a 
1985 bombing of their home by police which killed eleven people 
(including five children) and left 250 people homeless.220 Survivor 
of the bombing Ramona Africa has long served as spokesperson 
for MOVE’s continuing activities. Now, MOVE members have 
raised a generation of urban home-schooled sober youth who ex-
press deep concern for animals and nature. 
How differently would we think of MOVE and John Africa, a 
black man, if people would come to believe (correctly or falsely) 
that his parents who arrived in Philadelphia from Georgia in the 
early 1800s had Cherokee background? Would these principles 
of oneness with life, rejection of technology, and harmony with 
nature somehow seem more …natural?
Not only do the values of Krishnamurti, Earth First!, 
womanism, and MOVE resonate with one another, they resonate 
too with indigenous peoples who seem to, by and large, match or 
surpass criteria to which the terms “spiritual” and “anarchist” of-
ten seem to apply. Native societies resolved conflicts and crime 
 219 Jain ascetics, of course, have avoided killing insects for hundreds of years 
yet have not, as far as I know, actively defended insects’ rights. MOVE 
and Jains struck a prophetic chord: scientists now assess that corporate 
pollution, pesticides, and habitat devastation threaten a third of insect 
species and the entire eco-system of Earth along with them. See technical 
meta-study at Sánchez-Bayo and Wyckhuys (2019) and popular science 
overview in The Guardian by Carrington (2019).
 220 Boyette and Boyette 1989; Two MOVE members, Merle Africa and Phil 
Africa, have died in prison. The rest of the “MOVE 9” served 40–42 years 
in prison before exiting on parole 2018–2020.
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without formal law or incarceration,221 provided integrated and 
inclusive forms of psychotherapy,222 and they typically organized 
without state, police, homelessness, standing armies, great wealth 
disparities, and largely in sustainable relationship with sacred en-
vironment.223 Furthermore, many Native peoples have had more 
than two genders and/or allowed transition between them.224 As 
seen recently in Standing Rock and other places, many Native 
Americans/First Nations people continue to challenge corporate 
and settler state power.225
Clearly, more than ample material has existed in excluded 
contexts for people to have potentially characterized them as 
 “spiritual anarchist.” 
VII. Beyond words: a critical view of  
“spiritual anarchist” praxis
This section imagines what studies of “spiritual anarchism” might 
look like if they examined actual groups and practices. I selected 
two institutions, Auroville and Twelve-Step programs/Alcoholics 
Anonymous because (a) I had a degree of familiarity with them 
as well as access to research on them, (b) they both constitute 
early pioneers in “spiritual anarchist” contexts; and (c) they both 
captured my personal interest as groups that created new life- 
organizing stories and practices designed to heal relationships to 
self and society. Although I only provide a sketch rather than an 
actual study, this may hopefully inspire closer examination of the-
se groups and many others.
Mirra Alfassa (1878–1973), a disciple of Sri Aurobindo, foun-
ded perhaps the largest “spiritual anarchist” commune in the 
world: Auroville, a “cluster of ecovillages” in southern India with 
more than 1,500 residents stewarding 3,000 acres of land.226 
Alfassa founded Auroville on February 28, 1968 in southern 
 221 E.g., Okulski (2017).
 222 E.g., Lindquist (2014). 
 223 E.g., Barclay (1982). 
 224 E.g., Gilden (2006).
 225 E.g., Gilio-Whitaker (2019).
 226 Mueller 1990: 111.
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India. Asked by an interviewer about the type of organization 
that she hoped to see in Auroville, the Mother answered: “a di-
vine anarchy.”227 Today, members run Auroville as a network of 
eco-villages consisting of more than 2,000 residents. Their websi-
te states that “there are no leaders as such; each person is respon-
sible for the collective becoming of Auroville” and also “The bulk 
of Auroville’s administration is carried out by autonomous and 
non-hierarchic working groups.”228
Yet, Auroville, as studied by Joukhi (2006) and Namakkal 
(2012), also exemplifies a group of well-intentioned colonists. 
The members of Auroville initially viewed their Tamil neighbors 
with great respect. Yet Aurovilians’ respect for the locals also ass-
umed that the Tamil would understand the magnificent project of 
Auroville as superior to their own existing lifestyle and Tamil tra-
ditions. Due to cultural differences and economic disparities, the 
initial vision of absorbing the local populace into Auroville gave 
way to a sense of resignation. Instead of joining Aurovilians as 
equals, the local Tamil worked as servants and provided cheap la-
bor for the Aurovilians who, by and large, did not come from the 
local region (many came from Europe, the U.S. or northern India) 
and they did not speak Tamil. 
The creation of Auroville, a Western utopia, in India, a site of 
Western colonial expansion, reproduced colonial institutions, 
specifically those of race, class, and nation, thus maintaining con-
tinuity between the colonial and the postcolonial periods that the 
architects and visionaries behind Auroville had explicitly hoped 
to avoid.229
In Jukka Jouhki’s words: “It seemed as if the Aurovillian ideal of 
‘unity in diversity’ meant unity in Western diversity.”230 This “anti-
colonial colonialism” (as Namakkal termed it) stemmed from the 
structural institutions of the global economy and the classes and 
peoples that it privileged even if the members of Auroville aimed 
to abolish that system. As far as I can tell, Aurovilians still struggle 
 227 Anonymous 1977: 28.
 228 See www.auroville.org
 229 Namakkal 2012: 62.
 230 Jouhki 2006: 186.
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with the issue even while they have made progress. In addition to 
outreach programs, they have begun teaching Tamil to children in 
Auroville schools.231 Despite setbacks and difficulties, they have 
persevered. From their humble beginnings, for example, in a lar-
gely barren terrain, they planted approximately 2 million trees in 
their first 30 years alone.232 
Today with “inhabitants from about 40 different nations” 
Auroville consists of “nearly 100 communities of varying si-
zes” and “has nearly two dozen schools, a number of research 
institutes, cultural centers, a seed bank, forests and sanctuaries, 
appropriate technology and renewable energy centers, and many 
commercial units.”233 Among the features that have contributed to 
Auroville’s success, one resident stated ten “essential ingredients” 
including “commitment to being willing servitors of the divine (in 
a philosophical rather than religious sense),” a “sense of humor 
that usually manifests in bizarre forms of self-criticism,” and “a 
refusal to believe in impossibilities.”234
Bill Wilson aka Bill W. (1895–1971) and Robert Smith aka 
Dr. Bob (1879–1950) founded Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) in 
Akron, Ohio in 1935 and in 1939 published the “Twelve Step pro-
gram” which millions of people have used to address various types 
of addictions.235 AA/Twelve Step programs have meetings organized 
across the world but reject all forms of coercive organization. They 
lack both membership lists and leaders (rejections made  explicit 
 231 For more on Auroville, see Minor (1999), van den Akker and Lipp 
(2004), and Vengopal and Kumari (2010).
 232 Mueller 1990: 111.
 233 Ibid: 112.
 234 Ibid: 113. Watson (1998: 172–174) also noted Native use of humor in 
overcoming dualism.
 235 The twelve steps include: admit powerlessness in relation to addiction; 
believe a “higher power” could help; decide to turn one’s life and will 
over to that higher power; perform moral self-inventory; openly admit 
wrongdoing; feel ready for “God/higher power” to remove the defects; 
make such a request; make a list of people wronged and feel prepared 
to make amends; make amends; continue self-inventory and admit when 
wrong; use prayer and meditation to ask for direction and strength to 
follow through; having completed the previous steps, spread the message. 
See Kurtz (1979) and AAWS (1957).
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in Tradition Nine that guides AA groups).236 Participants identify 
themselves only by their first name (hence, the “anonymous” aspect 
of AA). Bill W. described AA as a “benign anarchy.”237 At its core, 
it functions as a form of decentralized mutual aid for people in 
need. Mark Andersen, co-founder of the straight edge punk activist 
collective Positive Force, described Twelve Step programs such as 
AA as “a powerful model …with their use of personal inventories, 
amends-making, and service.” Andersen continued: 
In our hierarchical, profit-driven health care system, where doctors 
can almost assume the role of God, such groups represent a radical 
alternative. Rotating leaders, no fees involved, the “sick” helping 
one another, with only the loosest of structures—what more pro-
found refutation of our present system could there be? Even the 
word “God” is left for each person to define for themselves, or to 
even reject outright, should another word like ‘greater power’ seem 
preferable. In their way, these meetings, autonomous except in mat-
ters affecting other Twelve Step groups, seem strikingly like anar-
chy in action. They begin with an admission of powerlessness over 
some aspect of life, but only in order to harness a deeper, broader 
power. The aim of the process is a small but very real liberation, one 
that can help clear the way for larger transformation.238
 236 Tradition Nine of the Twelve Traditions states: “‘A.A., as such, ought 
never be organized; but we may create service boards or committees 
directly responsible to those they serve.’ …Neither its General Service 
Conference, its Foundation Board, nor the humblest group committee 
can issue a single directive to an A.A. member and make it stick, let 
alone mete out any punishment. …It is clear now that we ought never 
to name boards to govern us, but it is equally clear that we shall always 
need to authorize workers to serve us. …If nobody does the group’s 
chores, if the area’s telephone rings unanswered, if we do not reply to 
our mail, then A.A. as we know it would stop. …Tradition Nine …
discloses a society without organization, animated only by the spirit 
of service—a true fellowship.” Thanks to Elena Metcalf for pointing 
this out to me years ago. For AA and spirituality see Kelly and Greene 
(2014) and Westermeyer (2014).
 237 AAWS 1957: 225; Butler (2010) even wrote a book bearing this title. 
Butler credited AA’s decentralized and non-partisan approach with its 
massive success in establishing itself throughout Ireland.
 238 Andersen 2004: 124.
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In another sense, its pragmatic inclinations and lack of critique of 
the state and state violence as such, has (unsurprisingly perhaps) 
led to collaborations with the state. Hence, although ostensibly 
a purely voluntary enterprise, the state can force prisoners into 
attending an AA program.239 Nonetheless, Twelve Step programs 
have led to discernable changes in many people’s lives. Al Smith 
(1919–2014), a Native American who had grown up without con-
tact with the Klamath tradition of his parents eventually succum-
bed to alcoholism but recovered through AA. Therein he began to 
rekindle his ancestral ties and a relationship with, in his words, “a 
God that I didn’t even understand.”240 When employers fired his 
work colleague for using peyote, he stood up for him and atten-
ded a Native American Church ceremony involving peyote. His 
legal defense of peyote use went all the way to the Supreme Court. 
Though the case lost, it led to a popular uproar that culminated 
in a 1993 congressional act to rectify it, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).
Whereas the “benign anarchy” of Twelve-Step programs/AA 
does not threaten the status quo per se, it can create important 
spaces for mutual aid, DIY education, self-organization, and hea-
ling within nation-state contexts. Whereas the “divine anarchy” 
of Auroville does not necessarily threaten the status quo either, 
the acquisition of land, creation of egalitarian organization via 
(semi-)permanent communal living can enable mini-versions of 
new egalitarian societies. Figure 1 illustrates that each of them 
have their corollaries in other contexts and may potentially com-
bine in an infinite number of constellations.
In Twelve-Step’s “benign anarchy,” we find an egalitarian 
approach that empowers its members to cooperate horizon-
tally toward healing themselves and personal relationships. In 
Auroville’s “divine anarchy,” the group tends toward both healing 
and building a new society alongside personal development. Both 
revealed promise for social transformation as well as, recalling 
Wollstonecraft’s observation about asymmetric power relations, 
complicity with existing power structures. Both examples seem to 
 239 Peele, Bufe and Brodsky (2000).
 240 Epps 2001: 19.
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suggest that whether a “benign anarchy” or a “divine anarchy,” 
all attempts to heal, repair, build, and sustain egalitarian commu-
nities today do so in relation to the complexities of power dispa-
rities, inequalities, and violence of governments, class, and race. 
VIII. Conclusions? 
In this chapter, I have addressed a notable gap in research by 
scanning uses of “spiritual anarchism” and, in particular, noted 
Marshall’s broad definition of “spiritual anarchism” that left spa-
ce for (unspecified) collective-oriented groups and obligations to 
“natural law” or “God’s Law” in contrast with a definition by 
Versluis which associated the term very specifically with the in-
dividualistic “freedom”-focused white Beatnik writers and Peter 
Lamborn Wilson/Hakim Bey. Second, I discussed racial dyna-
mics concerning the latter group. Third, I addressed voices lar-
gely excluded from “spiritual anarchist” discourse (including 
Krishnamurti, Earth First!, womanism, MOVE, and indigenous 
peoples) to provide potential counter-prototypes. Finally, with the 
examples of Auroville and Twelve-Step programs/AA, I offered a 







Benign anarchy Twelve-step programs;  





Divine anarchy Egalitarian eco-villages; 





Combination Bakunin’s federative  
system; Unitarian Universalist 
Association; Eco-village 
network; global trade unions; 
international DIY networks
Figure 1. Benign Anarchy and Divine Anarchy.
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Initially, “spiritual anarchism” caught my attention because it 
seemed to often point in directions that interested me (i.e., social 
and eco-justice work, radically revising dominant language and 
life-organizing stories, challenging patterns of violence inwardly 
and outwardly, building community, etc.). I don’t know that we 
need a single term for all of that. But, if some people use “spiri-
tual anarchism” to refer to those (and many other) things, it may 
warrant studying what people do with it and if the term continues 
to provide a function for thinkers, activists, and organizers as a 
means of harmonizing personal and social struggles then it may 
also warrant decolonizing.241
In a discussion about the need to include Indigenous perspec-
tives in interspecies thinking, Kim TallBear (2011) mentioned her 
skepticism toward the idea of beginnings. She argued that, along 
with the word “origin,” we “should dump that word ‘genesis’ 
from our scientific vocabulary” because such terms obscure the 
actual dynamics of “different pieces” forming to “make a new 
kind of whole.” Life, as we know it, offers no “discrete begin-
ning,” so unless “we are talking about the Big Bang, we probably 
should not use these terms.”242
One could perhaps say something similar about the idea of en-
dings. This several thousand-word journey ends where it began: with 
an awareness of the limitations of words. Which terms should we 
use when we speak and when we study? This chapter ends with 
a respect for the unknown and a willingness to listen. What hap-
pens if we look closer at the ways people relate to terms like “spi-
rituality” and “anarchism” and what do these relations say about 
larger societal challenges? What impact does the exclusion of wo-
men and people of color from discourse have on the emphasis of 
individualism and “freedom” versus connection to community and 
“justice”? This chapter ends with an attempt to shift focus from li-
fe-organizing stories toward life-organizing practices in that terrain 
 241 Or, if people choose a new term altogether, why not choose a verb (like 
daoing?—but less awkward—in reference to the Dao) or, in a nod to 
Russell Means’ opposition to colonial despiritualizing of the universe, 
respiritualizing?
 242 TallBear 2011.
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where questions morph into experiments. Perhaps, in scratching the 
surface, this chapter may spark conversations. 
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Galván-Álvarez, Enrique. “Why Anarchists Like Zen? A Libertarian 
Reading of Shinran (1173–1263).” In Christoyannopoulos, A. and 
Adams, M. S. (eds.) Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume 1, 
78–123. Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2017.
Gangloff, Mike. “GG Speaks: GG Allin, May 13, 1993.” Richmond 
City Paper. 6 June (1993): 17.
Gauffin, Axel. Ivan Aguéli: Människan—Mystikern—Målaren. 2 vol. 
Stockholm, 1940–1941. 
Geiger, John. Nothing is True Everything is Permitted: The Life of 
Brion Gysin. New York: Disinformation, 2005.
Ghosh, Aurobindo. “The Renaissance in India (1918).” In Indian 
Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence. Edited 
by Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, 37–66. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Gilden, Andrew.  “Preserving the Seeds of Gender Fluidity: Tribal 
Courts and the Berdache Tradition.” Michigan Journal of Gender 
and Law 13, no. 2 (2006): 237–272.
Gilio-Whitaker, Dina. As Long as Grass Grows: The Indigenous 
Fight for Environmental Justice, from Colonization to Standing 
Rock. Boston: Beacon Press, 2019.
Gleaves, Edwin S. “Hemingway and Baroja: Studies in Spiritual 
Anarchism.” Revista de Estudios Hispánicos 5, no. 3 (1971): 
363–375.
Goffman, Ken and Dan Joy. Counterculture Through the Ages: From 
Abraham to Acid House. New York: Random House, 2004. 
From Benign Anarchy to Divine Anarchy 313
Goodway, David. Anarchist Seeds beneath the Snow: Left Libertarian 
Thought and British Writers from William Morris to Colin Ward. 
Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2011.
Gopal, Madan. “Krishnamurti and Spirituality: A Comment on 
Wren-Lewis’s View.” Journal of Humanistic Psychology 35, no. 1 
(1995): 89–96.
Graeber, David. Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology. Prickly 
Paradigm Press, Chicago, 2004.
Green Anarchy. “There Is No Authority But Yourself: Reclaiming J. 
Krishnamurti for Anarchy.” Green Anarchy 20 (2005): 10–13.
Green, Martin. Mountain of Truth: The Counterculture Begins, 
Ascona, 1900–1920. Hanover, NH: University Press of New 
England, 1986.
Greer, Joseph Christian. “Occult Origins: Hakim Bey’s Ontological 
Post-Anarchism.” Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies 2, 
(2013): 166–187.
Griffin, Farah Jasmine. “Black Feminists and Du Bois: Respectability, 
Protection, and Beyond.” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 568, no. 1 (2000): 28–40.
Gross, Naomi. “A Historical Comparison of Anabaptism to 
Anarchism: To What Extent do the Swiss Brethren Embody the 
Ideals of Spiritual Anarchism?” Newsletter of the Mennonite 
Historical Society of Alberta 16, no. 3 (2013):  18–23. 
Hahn, Miriam. Playing Hippies and Indians: Acts of Cultural 
Colonization in the Theatre of the American Counterculture. Ph.D. 
Dissertation. Bowling Green State University, 2014.
Harrison, Frederic. Realities and Ideals. London: Macmillan 
Company, 1908.
Harrison, Renee K. Enslaved Women and the Art of Resistance in 
Antebellum America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Hauptman, Laurence M. “The American Indian Federation and the 
Indian New Deal: A Reinterpretation.” Pacific Historical Review 
52, no. 4 (1983): 378–402.
Harvey, Larry.  “How The West Was Won: Anarchy Vs. Civic 
Responsibility.” The Burning Man Journal.  12 November 
314 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
2013.  Available at:  https://journal.burningman.org/2013/11/ 
philosophical-center/tenprinciples/how-the-west-was-won- 
anarchy-vs-civic-responsibility/
Heat-Moon, William Least. Blue Highways: A Journey into America. 
Boston: Back Bay, 1999.
Heckert, Jamie. “An Other State of Mind is Possible: Anarchism and 
Psychology.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 7, no. 8 
(2013): 513–525.
Heelas, Paul and Linda Woodhead. The Spiritual Revolution: 
Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005.
Hellman, Ben. Poets of Hope and Despair: The Russian Symbolists in 
War and Revolution, 1914–1918. Leiden: Brill, 2018. 
Helms, Robert. “Leaving Out the Ugly Part—On Hakim Bey.” The 
Anarchist Library, 2004. Available at: https://theanarchistlibrary.org/
library/robert-p-helms-leaving-out-the-ugly-part-on-hakim-bey
Henderson, Archibald. European Dramatists. Stewart & Kidd 
Company, 1918.
Herve. “Spiritual Anarchism.” MEtheSIDEWALKandGOD. 21 July 2015. 
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOQyXT2BEbE 
Höjer, Henrik. “Möt Mattias Gardell—Hedningen Som Försvarar Politisk 
Islam.” Forskning & Framsteg 2, 2007. https://fof.se/tidning/2007/2/
artikel/mot-mattias-gardell-hedningen-som-forsvarar-politisk-islam 
Hoppen, Franziska. “A Reflection on Mystical Anarchism in the Works 
of Gustav Landauer and Eric Voegelin.” In: Christoyannopolous, 
A. and Adams, M. (eds.) Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume 
1, 198–237. Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2017.
Hubbard, LaRese. “Frances Ellen Watkins Harper: A Proto-Africana 
Womanist.” Western Journal of Black Studies 36, no. 1 (2012): 68–75.
Iliopoulos, Christos. Nietzsche & Anarchism: An Elective Affinity, and 
a Nietzschean reading of the December 08 Revolt in Athens.  Ph.D. 
Dissertation. Loughborough University, 2014.
Jayakar, Pupul. J. Krishnamurti: A Biography. London: Arkana/
Penguin Books, 1986. 
From Benign Anarchy to Divine Anarchy 315
Jean-Veneuse, Mohamed. Anarca-Islam. Anarchist Library, 2009. 
Available at: https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/mohamed-jean- 
veneuse-anarca-islam
Jenson, Matt and David E. Wilhite. The Church: A Guide for the 
Perplexed. London and New York: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2010.
jones, pattrice. “Free as a Bird: Natural Anarchism in Action.” In 
Contemporary Anarchist Studies. Edited by Randall Amster, 
Abraham DeLeon, Luis A. Fernandez, Anthony J. Nocella II, and 
Deric Shannon, 236–246. London and New York: Routledge, 2009.
Jouhki, Jukka. Imagining the Other: Orientalism and Occidentalism 
in Tamil-European Relations in South India. Jyväskylä: University 
of Jyväskylä, 2006.
Karamustafa, Ahmet T. God’s Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the 
Islamic Middle Period 1200–1550. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006.
Kazmi, Zaheer. “Automatic Islam: Divine Anarchy and the Machines 
of God.” Modern Intellectual History 12, no. 1 (2015): 33–64.
Keenan, David. England’s Hidden Reverse: A Secret History of the 
Esoteric Underground. London: SAF publishing, 2003.
Kellogg III, E. W. and D. David Bourland, Jr. “Working with E-Prime: 
Some Practical Notes.” In To Be or Not: An E-Prime Anthology. Edited 
by D. David Bourland, Jr. & Paul Dennithorne Johnston, 37–58. 
San Francisco: International Society for General Semantics, 1991.
Kelly, John F. and M. Claire Greene. “Toward an Enhanced 
Understanding of the Psychological Mechanisms by which 
Spirituality Aids Recovery in Alcoholics Anonymous.” Alcoholism 
Treatment Quarterly 32, no. 2–3 (2014): 299–318.
Kennedy, Karen. Deeply Felt: Reflections on Religion & Violence with-
in the Anarchist Turn. Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2015.
Khalfaoui, Mouez. “Indian Architecture: Social and Political 
Challenges.” Language, Communication, Information 4, (2009): 
81–94.
Kim, David Haekwon. “Modern Order and the Promise of Anarchy: 
From the ‘Writhing Age’ of Souls to World Reconstruction.” 
Hamline Review 28, (2004): 22–71.
316 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
King, Richard. Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India, 
and the ‘Mystic East’. New York and London: Routledge, 1999.
Knight, Michael Muhammad. The Five Percenters: Islam, Hip Hop, 
and the Gods of New York. Oxford: Oneworld, 2007.
Knight, Michael Muhammad. William S. Burroughs Vs. the Quran. 
Berkeley: Soft Skull Press, 2012.
Knight, Michael Muhammad. “Lifting Up My Skirt.” VICE Magazine 
12 February 2013. http://www.vice.com/read/lifting-up-my-skirt 
Knowles, Rob. “‘Human Light’: The Mystical Religion of Mikhail 
Bakunin.” The European Legacy 7, no. 1 (2002): 7–24. 
Krishnamurti, Jiddu. Think on These Things. New York: Harper & 
Row, 1970.
Krishnamurti, Y.G. The Betrayal of Freedom. Bombay: The Popular 
Book Depot, 1944.
Kropotkin, Peter. Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution. London: 
Freedom Press, [1902] 1987.
Kursions, Mia X. “Meditation on Mediation: Direct Experience as 
Spirituality.” Green Anarchy 20, 2005. http://theanarchistlibrary.
org/library/mia-x-kursions-meditation-on-mediation-direct-expe-
rience-as-spirituality.pdf 
Kurtz, Ernest. Not-God: A History of Alcoholics Anonymous. Center 
City, MN: Hazelden, 1979.
Ladha, Alnoor. “Mystical Anarchism: A Journey to the Borderlands 
of Freedom.” Kosmos 15, no. 1 (2015): 24–29.
Lagalisse, Erica Michelle. “‘Marginalizing Magdalena’: Intersections 
of Gender and the Secular in Anarchoindigenist Solidarity 
Activism.” Signs 36, no. 3 (2011): 653–678.
Lagalisse, Erica. “Occult Features of Anarchism.” In: 
Christoyannopoulos, A. and Adams, M. S. (eds.) Essays in 
Anarchism and Religion: Volume II, 278–332. Stockholm: 
Stockholm University Press, 2018.
Landauer, Gustav. Revolution and Other Writings. Edited and trans-
lated by Gabriel Kuhn. Oakland: PM Press, 2010.
From Benign Anarchy to Divine Anarchy 317
Levy, Leonard W. Blasphemy: Verbal Offense Against the Sacred, 
from Moses to Salman Rushdie. Chapel Hill and London: UNC 
Press, 1995.
Lindquist, Galina. “Meanings and Identities.” In Shamanism: Critical 
Concepts in Sociology. Edited by Andrei A. Znamenski, 86–113. 
London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, [1997] 2004.
Littlewood, Roland. Pathology and Identity: The Work of Mother 
Earth in Trinidad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Lorenzo, J. Tato. “Gotas de Miel y Ajenjo.” Solidaridad Obrera 16, 
no. 785, 7 (1960): 1.
Magid, Shaul. “Defining Christianity and Judaism from the 
Perspective of Religious Anarchy: Martin Buber on Jesus and 
the Ba‘al Shem Tov.” Journal of Jewish Thought & Philosophy 25 
(2017): 36–58.
Malatesta, Errico. “Pro-Government Anarchists.” Freedom 1916. 
Republished in Malatesta: His Life and Ideas. Edited by Vernon 
Richards, 248–251. London: Freedom Press, 1977.
Martinito, Mr. “What is Spiritual Anarchism?” Spiritual Anarchism: 
Thoughts on grassroots spirituality and other abominable heresies. 
15 January 2008 Available at: http://spiritualanarchism.blog-
spot.com/2008/01/what-is-spiritual-anarchism.html
Marshall, Peter. Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism. 
Oakland, CA: PM Press, [1992] 2010.
Martín-Baró, I. Writings for a Liberation Psychology. Essays, 
1985–1989 (Edited by A. Aron, and S. Corne). Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994.
Mattis, Jacqueline S. and Robert J. Jagers. “A Relational Framework for the 
Study of Religiosity and Spirituality in the Lives of African Americans.” 
Journal of Community Psychology 29, no. 5 (2001): 519–539.
Maurer, Charles B. Call to Revolution: The Mystical Anarchism of 
Gustav Landauer. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1971.
May, Vivian M. “Under-Theorized and Under-Taught: Re-examining 
Harriet Tubman’s Place in Women’s Studies.” Meridians 12, no. 2 
(2014): 28–49.
318 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume III
Mayer, Gerhard A. “The Figure of the Shaman as a Modern Myth: 
Some Reflections on the Attractiveness of Shamanism in Modern 
Societies.” The Pomegranate 10, no. 1 (2008): 70–103.
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Anarchism and religion have historically had an uneasy relationship. 
Indeed, representatives of both sides have regularly insisted on the 
fundamental incompatibility of anarchist and religious ideas and practices. 
Yet, ever since the emergence of anarchism as an intellectual and political 
movement, a considerable number of religious anarchists have insisted 
that their religious tradition necessarily implies an anarchist political 
stance. 
Reflecting both a rise of interest in anarchist ideas and activism on the 
one hand, and the revival of religious ideas and movements in the political 
sphere on the other, this multi-volume collection examines congruities 
and contestations between the two from a diverse range of academic 
perspectives.
The third volume of Essays in Anarchism & Religion includes five essays 
focusing on particular individuals (Abraham Heyn, Leo Tolstoy, Herbert 
Read, Daniel Guérin and Martin Buber), one essay on the affinities 
between mysticism and anarchism, and one surveying the vast territory 
of ‘spiritual anarchism’. 
In a world where political ideas increasingly matter once more, and religion 
is an increasingly visible aspect of global political life, these essays offer 
scholarly analysis of overlooked activists, ideas and movements, and as 
such reveal the possibility of a powerful critique of contemporary global 
society.
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International 
Relations at Loughbourough University
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